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Introduction: Ubiquity Has a History
Jacob W. Lewis and Kyle Parry
Among the most widespread orthodoxies about photography con-
cerns the intensity of its reach.1 The notion is both simple and 
all-encompassing. With the rise of smartphones and social media, the 
feedback loop of taking and sharing photographs has reached an omni-
present fever pitch. With more photographs produced every two min-
utes than were produced in the entire 19th century—although this com-
parison is likely outdated—the institution of photography has begun to 
pervade every dimension of social and political life.2 Whereas cameras 
and photos once enjoyed only partial distribution, now they enjoy a total 
distribution. In sum, or so this line of thinking goes, photography has 
become ubiquitous. It is everywhere, and it always will be.
In 2016, having arrived by different paths, we found ourselves living 
and working in a city suffused with and indeed haunted by histories of 
photographic distribution: Rochester, New York. Situated on the ances-
tral and unceded territory of the O-non-dowa-gah, the adopted home 
of the most photographed American in the 19th century, Frederick 
Douglass (Stauffer et al., 2015), Rochester underwent a massive, 
photography-driven transformation in the early 20th century. (fig. 0.1) 
Once the largest flour-producing city in the United States, by 1901 it 
had become the largest image-producing one, as the Eastman Kodak 
company had managed to turn the otherwise time-consuming practice 
of composing and developing analog photographs into a full-fledged 
industrial operation, first with the Kodak No. 1 camera, launched in 
1888, then with the Brownie camera, which debuted in 1900 and sold 
for the price of one U.S. dollar. Both the icons and the engines of their 
operation, the company’s user-friendly cameras arrived at consumers’ 
doors preloaded with roll film. When its operator had taken the allot-
ted “snapshots”—in Kodak No. 1’s case, one hundred exposures—the 
camera would be mailed back to Rochester along with the necessary 
payment, on the promise of being returned with both processed images 
and a newly loaded roll of film.
As Kodak users’ home archives filled with these snapshots, Eastman 
Kodak’s riches grew, and so, too, did the varieties of local educational 
and cultural institutions supported by George Eastman’s phil anthropy. 
At its height, Kodak employed over sixty thousand people in the 
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Rochester metropolitan area while also claiming over 80 percent of 
the United States’ and half the world’s market in photographic film 
(Viki, 2017). By 2012, however, having infamously failed to adapt to the 
rise of digital imaging, the company was forced to declare bankruptcy, 
leaving thousands of workers without jobs and the City of Rochester 
with only a critically weakened shell of its most essential and longest 
standing economic driver. Once the lifeblood of the “imaging capital of 
the world,” Kodak has since faced such desperate straits as to seek to 
become a corporate welfare beneficiary indebted to President Trump, 
whose promotion of a $765 million plan for the corporation to pivot to 
pharmaceuticals in the wake of COVID-19 preceded a sudden halting of 
the arrangement in August 2020 due to “serious concerns” over recent 
executive stock deals (Robinson-Jacobs, 2020; Klebnikov, 2020).
Both outside observers and indirect beneficiaries of Kodak’s and 
Rochester’s past successes (we were both working at the University 
of Rochester, a major recipient of Eastman’s philanthropy), we began 
to pursue the idea of a symposium that would make a theme of accu-
mulation and abundance from photography’s beginnings through to 
the digital present. The more we read and conversed, however, the 
Figure 0.1
Souvenir photograph 
of guests, including 
Frederick Douglass, at 
President Harrison’s 
visit to Kodak Park, 
Memorial Day, 1892, 
Frederick Douglass pa-
pers, A.D74, Rare Books, 
Special Collections, 
and Preservation, River 
Campus Libraries, 
University of Rochester. 
Courtesy of Rare Books, 
Special Collections, 
and Preservation, River 
Campus Libraries, 
University of Rochester.
See also Plate 1.
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more our curiosities turned to the apogee of these themes: the notion 
that photography has become ubiquitous. For Jacob, as a historian of 
photography, it was especially striking how old this idea was, as nu-
merous critics, historians, and theorists have, since the earliest days of 
the medium, identified the photographic image with a pervasive con-
quest of the world—from Charles Baudelaire and Paul Valéry to Susan 
Sontag and Christopher Pinney. For Kyle, as a media theorist, apart 
from the clearly consequential explosion of photography in the digi-
tal era, what stood out most was the universalizing nature of the claim, 
with little to no frameworks for digital photographic surfeit in circu-
lation, and instead numerous unqualified assertions of photography’s 
presence everywhere.
It was between these two initial observations that our inquiries 
into the history and theory of photographic ubiquity first took flight. 
Along one track, we would investigate whether and how one could 
trace a history of ubiquity purposely and emphatically decoupled from 
the digital-centrism that has come to mark discourses of pervasive-
ness. Along a second track, we would invite others to join and augment 
(and hopefully also trouble) that investigation through a symposium 
in Rochester comprised of papers addressing the insistent reality and 
enduring question of photography’s multitudes. In 2018, thanks to 
support from the Humanities Center at the University of Rochester 
as well as the Arts Research Institute at the University of California, 
Santa Cruz, we were able to host ten participants from the United 
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as well as our keynote speak-
er, Ariella Aïsha Azoulay.
This anthology represents the convergence of these two investigative 
tracks. At its heart is a twofold argument. First, far from being a unique 
property of the digital era, photographic ubiquity is a historical con-
struct that reaches back to the earliest days of the medium and is there-
fore open to theoretical revision or even outright rejection. Second, al-
though most instantiations of the ubiquity thesis have tended to suffer 
from manifest shortcomings, including a false universalism and a flat 
overwriting of geographical and cultural difference, it remains essen-
tial to research and critique both mythologies and actual circumstances 
of photographic hyperabundance and hyperdistribution. At stake isn’t 
just a much-needed addition to the history and theory of photography 
but also a sweeping revision of the terms through which questions of 
photographic presence and absence are conceived in the first place. This 
book asks what it means when artists and scholars consciously do not 
take for granted the event of photography’s spread, and instead histori-
cize these many events for their evident complexity, forgoing an iden-
tification of points on a timeline that too often reduce photography’s 
spread to the terms of an abiding faith in technological progress.
10 Ubiquity: Photography’s Multitudes
From Simultaneous Invention to Conquest of Ubiquity
In late 1839, the caricaturist Théodore Maurisset responded to the re-
lease of details about Louis Daguerre’s new invention, the daguerreo-
type, with a satirical image of the all-consuming reach of this novel in-
strument and its visual products, titled Daguerreotypomania. (fig. 0.2) In 
the lithograph, innervated crowds and queues assemble under banners 
pledging either irrational obsession (Daguerreotypomanes) or religious 
fealty (Daguerreotypolâtres) to the lauded inventor and his materials. 
In the foreground cluster various consumers hauling cameras, sitting 
for grueling portrait sessions, and gawking at oversized plates. In the 
center right, gallows for rent are provided for engravers whose profes-
sion is soon to be eclipsed by the advent of photographic illustration. 
Toward the horizon is a train whose interlinked cars are but giant cam-
eras, placing photography together with that other modern marvel, the 
steam locomotive. With these details and so many more, Maurisset’s 
image conveys not the culture surrounding a fad at one point in time but 
the expected impact of Daguerre’s novel process. In short, rather than 






Lithograph, 26 × 35.7 cm, 
J. Paul Getty Museum.
See also Plate 2.
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furthermore delivered via a still novel medium (lithography) whose 
process conveyed reproductive fidelity (like photography) and was in-
formed by the “larger picture of growth and proliferation” that emerged 
in 19th-century France (Farwell, 1977).
Maurisset’s lithograph, according to Jan von Brevern, “makes clear 
that photography was not only a result of progress but one of its en-
gines,” showing that “the new kind of image photography produced was 
expected to have consequences in all social domains, be they artistic, 
economic, or epistemic.” (Brevern, 2015: 72) While Daguerre’s image 
was new, the ideas surrounding the chemistry and optics seemed al-
ready, historically, present everywhere. Responding to early notices of 
the “discovery,” dozens of experimentalists and inventors across the 
world staked their own claims of priority to the invention, among them 
Hippolyte Bayard and William Henry Fox Talbot. In Brazil, artist and 
cartographer Antoine Hércules Florence even designated his own cog-
nate process under the name photographie in 1832, before the term was 
even applied to the inventions of Daguerre and Talbot. Responding to 
the news of Daguerre’s success across the Atlantic, Florence wrote to 
local newspapers to share his belief in simultaneous invention, and that 
a single idea can be shared at once, among many (Marien, 2015: 9).
While the invention phase indicated its own immanence, photo-
graphy’s discourse of universality generally belongs to academician and 
statesman François Arago, who successfully secured Daguerre’s inven-
tion as a gift of the French state to the world. For Arago, the daguerreo-
type plate’s unmatched power of visual exactitude confirmed Arago’s 
ideas about the benefits of popularizing scientific knowledge, as well 
as the political necessity of expanded suffrage and representation for 
French citizens, as Theresa Levitt argues (Levitt, 2003). What made 
such scientific and political idealism possible was the simplicity of 
the operation: “There is not one of the different branch operations of 
the Daguerreotype that every body cannot perform, even without any 
knowledge of drawing or of chemistry, and even with as much success 
as Mr. Daguerre himself.” (Arago, 2017: 236) Arago’s faith in photo-
graphy’s utility and ease, however, belied the fact that the technical 
practice required an arsenal of costly materials, institutional access, 
as well as a certain operational knowledge that lay beyond Daguerre’s 
published instructions. Nevertheless, reports in the robust print media 
landscape of the 19th century spread details of the process throughout 
the world. This networked world led far-flung amateurs such as Robert 
Cornelius in Philadelphia and William O’Shaughnessy in Calcutta to ex-
periment with the process and expand its applications, the former pair-
ing it with self-portraiture and the latter with telegraphy (Andreasson, 
2014; Pinney, 2008: 104).
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Just as Maurisset identified, commentators saw photography as part 
of a series of modern wonders, together with the electric telegraph and 
the steam locomotive, as technologies that shattered humanity’s grasp 
of space and time and their presumed limits. In his 1872 study L’Homme, 
Catholic writer and critic Ernest Hello described how modern techno-
logies large and small offered a glimpse of universals that were hitherto 
the province of philosophy and theology:
The chemical match […] certifies distinctly the universal presence 
of fire; photography certifies the universal presence of radiation. In a 
certain way, the electric telegraph delivering speech and steam power 
transporting man makes up for the desire for ubiquity to which man 
and his speech attest. (Hello, 1903: 197)3
In others’ estimations, photography was set to reveal not only the 
ubiquity of visible and invisible energies but also an untapped infinitude 
of photographic applications for use by art and science. As Emily Doucet 
argues, the inchoate photographic discourse of early technical manuals 
and treatises often addressed the future of photography in terms of ex-
pansive frames of time and with a decidedly utopian rhetoric (Doucet, 
2018).4 Such idealism and faith in progress, however, also accompanied 
the increasing suspicion about photography’s pervasiveness in the world 
of commerce. This is most notoriously explored in the art criticism of 
Charles Baudelaire, who in 1859, identified the love of photography with 
messianic materialism and blamed “the invasion of photography and the 
great industrial madness,” if left unchecked, for the fated degeneration 
of art and of the faculty of imagination (Baudelaire, 1980: 89).
Pairing both utopian and critical modes in response to photography’s 
increasing transformation of society and culture, photo-scientist Léon 
Vidal noted in 1886 that in the near future one will be able to practice 
photography “as one speaks prose.” (Frizot, 1998: 237) In fact, Vidal’s 
offhand prediction seemed to describe what was already in progress 
in Rochester. There, in 1888, entrepreneur George Eastman debuted 
the simplified Kodak camera, as well as its more innovative adjunct of 
in-house film processing for consumers. The vertical integration of 
Eastman Kodak’s operations translated into advertisements for the 
company under the banner of “you press the button, we do the rest.” 
Here, Arago’s description of photography’s effortlessness found its ul-
timate expression in the age of capital. Kodak enabled a demo cratization 
of the idea of photography, but by recasting it as a “black box” techno-
logy whose operators—shutterbugs, snapshooters, kodakers, and the 
like—understood the camera box’s input and output but not the phys-
ical and chemical operations occurring within it, not to mention the 
labor that produced it and the environmental effects that result from 
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it (Flusser, 2000: 16; Brunet, 2019). Kodak cameras, as well as the in-
expensive Brownie developed for sale in 1900, helped bring about what 
Kris Belden-Adams names “the first revolution in photographic ubiq-
uity,” the events of which “freed the camera from being the tool of a few 
hobbyists and made photography ubiquitous, and even perhaps wasteful 
and indulgent.” It is no surprise that online commentators and cultur-
al scolds have resurrected the same critical reaction against the omni-
present selfie in the 21st century (Belden-Adams, 2018: 92).
In the late 19th century, Kodak was but one innovation among many 
in the field. Photography’s input, output, and circulation expanded 
with the refinement and industrialization of such technical practices 
as photomechanical printing, stable dry gelatin film, instantaneous ex-
posures, cinematography, and color processing. By its drastic mutation 
into the hybrid worlds of mass media and modernism, photography be-
came an object of profound aesthetic, historical, and theoretical interest 
for the first time since its introduction, particularly during the interwar 
years in Europe.
Photography as a ubiquitous cultural force takes center stage in a few 
essays by Paul Valéry, whose views on technological media in the midst of 
its mass acculturation set a theoretical standard for subsequent discus-
sions of modern visual culture, including the work of Walter Benjamin.5 
In Valéry’s 1928 essay “The Conquest of Ubiquity”—to which this an-
thology’s theme and title owe a significant debt—Valéry outlined the 
inevitable future of reproducible media and its apparatuses for a sense of 
its modern omnipresence: “Just as water, gas, and electricity are brought 
into our houses from far off to satisfy our needs in response to a minimal 
effort, so we shall be supplied with visual or auditory images.” (Valéry, 
1964) While Valéry’s text promotes a sense of wonder about the ability 
to experience art and sensorial reality everywhere at once in the manner 
of public utilities, he also frames these relations in violent terms, from 
the imperial “conquest” of the essay’s title to analogies like the follow-
ing: “Just as we are accustomed, if not enslaved, to the various forms 
of energy that pour into our homes, we shall find it perfectly natural to 
receive the ultrarapid variations or oscillations that our sense organs 
gather in and integrate to form all we know.” (Valéry, 1964) For Valéry, 
ubiquitous photography, as well as the cognates of cinema and recorded 
sound, were always to be experienced via the electrified, networked, and 
thus tethered apparatuses of modern space-time. His descriptions of the 
future of media barely differ from the dystopian aspects that pervade 
the worlds conjured in classic science fiction, not to mention the land-
scape of screens and speakers, as well as the inverse of cameras and 
microphones that conquer our attentions (and record our movements) 
in the present day.
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While it was Vidal who identified the future of photographic practice 
in a manner of speaking prose, it was Valéry who articulated the impact 
that photography had on speech and the written word. In a lecture deliv-
ered to commemorate photography’s centenary at the French Academy, 
he notes that the medium’s development “has resulted in a kind of pro-
gressive eviction of the word by the image.” (Valéry, 1980: 192–193) 
While Valéry welcomed this move as cleansing literature of poor prose, 
it was in the historical imaginary, however, that he argues for the lasting 
power of photography’s reach: “The mere notion of photography, when 
we introduce it into meditation on the genesis of historical knowledge 
and its true value, suggests this simple question: Could such and such a 
fact, as it is narrated, have been photographed?” (Valéry, 1980: 195)
Here, photographic ubiquity is once again figured as pure potential-
ity—the “mere notion”—rather than a quantifiable actuality. Strangely, 
after Valéry nominated the era of technological reproduction in music 
and images as a “conquest of ubiquity,” it is still nevertheless the virtual 
expansiveness of photography that defines both its past and its future. 
Ubiquity is an active imaginary, an abstraction, and not necessarily a 
threshold surpassed by quantity or spatial distribution. It is akin to what 
Siegfried Kracauer theorized as the “warehousing of nature” wrought 
by the “sheer accumulation” of miscellaneous studio portraits, snap-
shots, photo magazines, archival documents, and aerial views produced 
by photographic means (Kracauer, 1995: 59, 62). What both writers 
identify with the medium of their own moment is an understanding of 
photography’s dramatic impact on historical consciousness, a claim that 
is unrecognizable without a belief in photography’s total saturation in 
and through the world.
From Image-World to Everyware
The move to describe not just photography but nearly anything “in terms 
of multiplicity, excess, omnipresence, totality and networking” has long 
been a matter of people speaking to their experiences and impressions of 
the visible world or, in an explicitly theological vein, to their overriding 
beliefs about the invisible one (Azoulay, 2014: 64).6 As much is evident 
in the English-language history of the term ubiquity, which is derived 
from the Latin ubīque, meaning “anywhere, everywhere, wherever.”7 
What this history reveals is a longstanding dynamic of real or imagined 
phenomena to which a notion of being present everywhere seems like 
the necessary answer for certain communities at certain times.
In the earliest days, in an echo of the religious origins of the term 
“data,” there is a theological (and, at the time, controversial) supposi-
tion among so-called “Ubiquitarians” that Christ manifests not only 
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in the Eucharist but in all places.8 Soon after the emergence of these 
Ubiquitarians, various writers, as if newly enabled to name something 
that had long been observed but not precisely named, refer to given 
people as “ubiquitarian.” Like the Royalist commander Prince Rupert, 
for whom Sir Thomas Fairfax’s army remains prepared lest “that ubiq-
uitarian steale on them unawares” during the First English Civil War in 
1644, some people manage to convey an impression of being everywhere 
at once (Exact and Certaine Newes From the Siege at Yorke, 1644: n.p). 
Subsequent variants on the ubiquity notion build on this more worldly 
use, not just around the presence of individuals but around a whole suite 
of modern phenomena. While those concerned with buying and sell-
ing speak of certain valued substances like saltpeter as “ubiquitarian” 
(Cressy, 2013: 15), those concerned with the arts invoke its “ubiquitory 
citizenship” as they defend the presence of foreign artists in England 
(Select Committee on Fine Arts, 1841: 585). Those faced with the fecun-
dity of ants in a colonial context (in this case, Jamaica) describe them as 
“ubiquitaries” that “make Bridges of one another” to pass over “Hollows 
of Water” set around cupboards (Sloane, 1707: 223). Ubiquity even takes 
on a legal meaning, referring to the fact of “being, in the eyes of the law 
or for legal purposes, present in all places or not limited to one place.” 
According to an 1841 Supreme Court decision, for instance, “The United 
States, in their sovereign capacity, have no particular place of domicile 
but possess, in contemplation of law, an ubiquity throughout the Union.” 
(Curtis, 1855: 3) In other words, the law, too, maintains an awareness of 
the possibility of being everywhere, and the ability to name and codify 
that possibility is of use to none other than the sovereign state, a new 
kind of omnipresence that hovers between the holy and the secular, the 
abstract and the concrete.
As a collector of quotations in the vein of Walter Benjamin, and as 
someone equally concerned with the interplay of war, media, and capi-
talism, Susan Sontag might well have found these historical iterations of 
ubiquity quite suggestive. Indeed, for Sontag, what was an unexpected 
four-year period of writing about photography (culminating in the still 
influential 1977 book On Photography) began with an interest to address, 
as she puts it, “some of the problems, aesthetic and moral, posed by the 
omnipresence of photographed images.” (Sontag, 1977: front matter)9 
Not one to shy from provocative and encompassing prose, Sontag crafts 
several characterizations of that omnipresence, doing so in a manner 
that could be mistaken for a response to the digital era. In one sense, the 
ubiquity of photography that had established itself by the 1970s was a 
matter of heightened accumulation; thanks to, among other things, the 
rise of instant photography and telecommunication, there are “a great 
many more images around, claiming our attention. This inventory start-
ed in 1839 and since then just about everything has been photographed, 
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or so it seems.” (3) In another sense, the recent pervasiveness of photo-
graphy is a matter of the dramatically increased speed and extent of 
participation in the institution enabled by cheaper, easier, and faster 
cameras. “That age when taking photographs required a cumbersome 
and expensive contraption—the toy of the clever, the wealthy, and the 
obsessed—seems remote indeed from the era of sleek pocket cameras 
that invite anyone to take pictures,” Sontag muses (7). “Like guns and 
cars,” she goes on to say, “cameras are fantasy-machines whose use is 
addictive.” (14) Photography “has become almost as widely practiced an 
amusement as sex and dancing.” (8)
If there are hints of resignation or even bemusement in these 
character izations of analog ubiquity, it is only a temporary suspen-
sion of the essays’ radically suspicious approach to the profligate me-
dium. For Sontag, in what comprises a significant departure from the 
white, male voices that had dominated theories of photography to this 
point, both the ubiquity of the photographic record and that record’s 
“passivity”—the insidious ease and promiscuity and self-effacement of 
taking and sharing photographs—amount to photography’s “message,” 
which is nothing less than its fundamental “aggression.” (7) Several dec-
ades before the horrifically banalized digital photographs of torture and 
sexual violence at Abu Ghraib that would come to occupy her attention 
in Regarding the Pain of Others, well before daily disaster selfies and viral 
deepfakes, Sontag finds in the profound pervasiveness of film-loaded 
cameras, printed photographs, and billowing image archives an entire 
“photographic enterprise” distinguished by “voraciousness,” aggran-
dizement, and “willy-nilly” “antiquing” of what is real, persistently 
shifting between “degraded and glamorous realities,” and perpetually 
beset by “confusions about truth and beauty.”10 In Sontag’s aphoristic 
polemic, photographic ubiquity has managed to not only rend the real 
world in which the writer lives; it has also parasitically fostered a sec-
ond, virtual one: an “image-world created by cameras” (178) that “bids 
to outlast us all” (109) and whose overall function is to sustain rampant 
consumerism, pervasive inequality, and the mere illusion of freedom. 
Although she is not alone in her attention to photographic ubiquity in 
this period—Roland Barthes’s work influenced hers, and figures like 
Vilém Flusser and Jean Baudrillard would soon add their own visions 
of omnipresent media—by means of these concepts, Sontag manages 
to both naturalize and, as it were, de-neutralize ubiquity’s existence and 
importance. To speak or work on photography is, after reading Sontag, 
to become increasingly subject to a perverse and pervasive force that ex-
ceeds any individual, community, or institutional capacities for control.
As the travails of criticism and scholarship persist, so do those of 
commerce and engineering. In 1975, Steven Sasson made a presenta-
tion to higher-ups at Kodak of what he called, in an unintentional send 
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up of the company’s prideful misreading of the future of the medium, 
“filmless photography.” (Deutsch, 2008) The toaster-sized contraption 
he presented would become the first in a long line of attempts within 
and beyond the United States to woo businesses and consumers with 
“self-contained,” and therefore portable, digital cameras. By the mid-
1990s, just as the allures of cyberspace and instant messaging were be-
ginning to take hold, it was possible but by no means common to forgo 
film in favor of digital formats, and this condition would more or less 
hold until the early 2000s, when DSLR and cheaper point-and-shoot 
cameras began to eclipse their slower rivals. But it was the abandonment 
of self-containment that ultimately set the digital image world alight.
In the first phase, starting with the Sharp J-SH04 (0.1 megapixels) in 
2000 and the GSM-linked Nokia 7650 (0.3 megapixels) in 2002, cheap 
CCD- and CMOS-based cameras made their way into the mobile phones 
many people carried with them almost perpetually. By roughly 2006, 
nearly all mobile phones sported a cheap camera. Marked by a “more 
ubiquitous and lightweight presence” than their self-contained fore-
bears, these early camera phones tended to enable “a kind of archive 
of a personal trajectory or viewpoint on the world, a collection of frag-
ments of everyday life.” (Okabe and Ito, 2006: 99) Although, as Chris 
Chesher writes, they did not manage to “displace the full technical or 
cultural functions of the film or digital camera,” these image-ready 
phones nevertheless fostered a cross-national impression of intrusive 
omnipresence, such that “stories of regulatory reactions,” including 
around fears of secret photographing of women in Saudi Arabia, “began 
appearing around the world.” (Chesher, 2012: 105) Witnessing the ad-
vent of the phone-enabled “moblog” as well as Nokia’s ultimately short 
lived, family-oriented “Lifeblog” (Gye, 2007: 283), at least one writer 
proclaimed the existence of a “Nokia moment” over and against the 
famous Kodak one (Palmer, 2005).
In 2007, Apple melded music and messaging by way of an iPhone 
that also boasted a 2.0 megapixel camera and associated app complete 
with shutter animation and sound effect. (fig. 0.3) Able to, as Chris 
Chesher puts it, “connect directly to the internet, and not to a tele-
communications company’s ‘walled garden,’” and soon including “apps 
that used the camera in ways other than taking standard snaps,” this 
new device further released the camera from the long-prevailing mod-
el of discrete and specialized production (Chesher, 2012: 106). By 2011, 
thanks in part to resolution and usability upgrades, the iPhone had be-
come the most popular camera on the image-sharing platform Flickr. As 
smartphone technologies improved, and as new habits formed and new 
addictions took root, more and more people could perform “real-time 
digital transformations, translations and transmissions on mobile am-
ateur images.” (107) Over the subsequent decade, with access to the 
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internet radically expanding, and with billions of smartphones entering 
purses and pockets (and, it should be noted, the global waste stream), 
a myriad of platforms further amplified this dramatic and widespread 
increase in vernacular communicative capacity. Starting in 2010, for in-
stance, Instagram lured users into its galaxy of visual-verbal reference 
through nostalgic filters and easy captioning and commenting. (The app 
reached one billion users as of 2019 and, as of 2020, clocks more likes 
in two days than there are people on the planet.)11 In 2011, Snapchat 
invited users to share ephemeral images well beyond the beautiful or 
the impressive. (As of 2020, users created over three billion snaps per 
day.)12 And, as a final example, over the 2010s and into the early 2020s, 
the Chinese company Meitu introduced rapid photo-editing apps to its 
hundreds of millions of users, thus further accelerating an already per-
petual planetary exercise of simultaneously algorithmic and user-driven 
image processing.
As phone-based photography proliferated, so did theories of ubiquity, 
so much so that, by the 2010s, assertions of the newfound omnipresence 
of photography had become a critical and journalistic commonplace. 
Within the necessarily partial history of the idea of photographic ubiq-
uity that we have been tracing, this is the period of both amnesia and 
effluence—amnesia because of the gradual erasure of nearly two cen-
turies of thinking through photography’s multitudes, effluence because 
those multitudes had become so immanent and impactful as to warrant 
one critical project after another.
Figure 0.3
From Steven P. Jobs 
et al., “Touch Screen 
Device, Method, and 
Graphical User Interface 
for Customizing Display 
of Category Icons.” Patent 
filed September 5, 2007.
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One strain of these projects echoes Arago and Valéry in its casting of 
ubiquity in terms of progress, habituation, and conquest. Typically, the 
overriding concern is a major shift ushered in by the hyperabundance of 
cameras and photographs in conjunction with the hyperconnectedness 
of photographing publics. “Now that cameras are ubiquitous, photo-
graphs of ordinary people are everywhere, too,” reads a subheadline 
in The Atlantic (Eveleth, 2015). “Ubiquitous digital cameras,” writes 
a contributor to BBC News Magazine, “turn events that in themselves 
would be a small story into a worldwide phenomenon.” (de Castella, 
2012) “Photography has become so ubiquitous and rapidly reproducible,” 
proclaims a critic for Seattle Weekly, “that part of the magic of the im-
age has been lost.” (Flock, 2014) Alongside these journalistic accounts, 
other writers within this family speak in more theoretically complex 
terms of transformations wrought by the pervasiveness of cameras and 
images. For George Emeka Agbo, for instance, the ubiquitous “editing, 
circulation and interaction around the photograph in internet spaces” 
has “the tendency to transform the image into a strong political state-
ment.” Speaking of Nigerian political elites in particular, Agbo writes 
that “their appearances in photographs—and, of course, the circulation 
and conversations around those images—give a sense that they are un-
der surveillance by the networked public.” While not necessarily always 
visible or even effective, the “political critique that grows out of this 
visual culture is so strong that it creates tension among the elites who are 
denounced as they strive either to exonerate themselves or to forestall 
further attacks.” (Agbo, 2019: 299)
A second strain of ubiquity-infused projects follows Sontag in 
reaching after more detailed and integrative accounts of disruptions 
and accelerations across art, society, politics, and visual culture. At 
the same time, unlike Sontag’s approach, what is centrally at stake is a 
tension between the authenticity and inauthenticity of experience, sub-
jectivity, and social interaction in the wake of the digitization of photo-
graphy.13 Fred Ritchin, for instance, invokes a longstanding perception 
of inauthenticity in describing the “multitudes of photographers now 
intensely staring not at the surrounding world […] but at their cam-
era backs or cell phones searching for an image on the small screens, 
or summoning the past as an archival image on these same screens.” 
Amid this “ubiquity of a billion cell phone cameras,” he writes, the 
image has gained “primacy over the existence it is supposed to depict,” 
thus “banish[ing] actual experience” and replacing it with “an unreality 
in which we hope to find a transcendent immortality, a higher, less fi-
nite, reality.” (Ritchin, 2009: 21) In the eyes of Nathan Jurgenson, lines 
of thinking such as Ritchin’s amount to a “popular fairy tale” in which 
the arrival of the “Internet, online social networking, and constant pic-
ture taking” replaces “real conversation and identity” with the “allure 
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of the virtual—the simulated second life that uproots and dis embodies 
the authentic self,” and thus leaves only “digital posturing, empty inter-
action, and addictive connection.” (Jurgenson, 2019: 61–62) In the 
language of Jurgenson’s more optimistic corrective, in a context in 
which “digital connection” is indeed “fundamentally ubiquitous” (62), 
“the social photo”—whether it is highly filtered, rapidly produced, or 
otherwise—“is not just a reflection of yourself and your world but, at 
the same time, equally the creation of your self and your world. It is a 
primary way we now learn to recognize ourselves as selves, our reality 
as reality.” (40)
Yet a third strain of inquiry into digital photographic ubiquity departs 
from this second one in its unqualified emphasis on domination over 
democratization. Speaking in broad terms, there is a split here in the 
source of that dominance, from political entities exercising sovereignty 
and violence to the distributed logics of capitalism. At least at one point 
in her work (see the interview in this volume for a discussion of her more 
recent work), Azoulay represents the former side of the equation. On 
the one hand, she writes, “[t]he increased number of cameras together 
with their increased potential presence all over enables the camera to 
operate, as it were, even when it is not physically present, by virtue of the 
doubt that exists with respect to its overt or covert presence, its capac-
ities for inscription and surveillance.” (Azoulay, 2015: 19) On the other 
hand, “[e]fforts made by various agents, usually state establishments, to 
control the content and accessibility of photographs, seek to obtain sov-
ereignty over the event of photography and over the interpretive frame-
work of its consequences. Yet the very conditions of photography as an 
encounter undermine the feasibility of such sovereignty.” (231)
Such willingness to speak of the resistant potentials in photography 
(in however qualified of terms) seems effectively anathema to Jonathan 
Crary, for whom the contemporary world is constituted by “omnipres-
ent conditions of social isolation, economic injustice, and compulsory 
self-interestedness.” (Crary, 2013: 108) In the polemical sprint that is 
24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep, Crary makes sense of those 
omnipresent conditions by way of something relatively rare in the his-
tory of ubiquity discourses, which is to interweave accounts of not just 
one but multiple, overlapping forms of technical and medial ubiquity. 
At one level, in a familiar sense, technical devices like smartphones and 
televisions are ubiquitous, thus yielding “[i]ncalculable streams of imag-
es omnipresent 24/7.” (48–49) At another level, though, there are both 
pervasive “electronic industries of temporal objects” (53) and the con-
stant “opportunity for electronic transactions of all kinds.” (75) Finally, 
at still another level (and in an echo of Michel Foucault’s work), there 
is an “omnipresent field of operations and expectations to which one is 
exposed and in which individual optical activity is made the object of 
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observation and management.” (33) For Crary, one can hardly hope to 
resist this field of operations through yet more media, as both “[v]isual 
and auditory ‘content’ is most often ephemeral, interchangeable ma-
terial that, in addition to its commodity status, circulates to habituate 
and validate one’s immersion in the exigencies of twenty-first century 
capitalism.” (52) In fact, or so Crary argues, it is sleep that is ultimately 
“a figure for a subjectivity on which power can operate with the least 
political resistance” and “a condition that finally cannot be instrumen-
talized or controlled externally—that evades or frustrates the demands 
of global consumer society.” (24)14
Hardly distant from Azoulay and Crary, but closer to the work of 
Flusser and Baudrillard, one final strain de-emphasizes the agency of 
individuals and institutions in favor of the distributed dominance of 
machines, programs, and algorithms. In both their individual and their 
collaborative projects, for instance, Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinksa 
take mediation as an “all-encompassing and indivisible” given, not just 
in human, cultural, and technical worlds but also across biological 
worlds (Kember and Zylinska, 2012: xv). In terms of ubiquitous photo-
graphy, Zylinska asserts that photographs “function less as individual 
objects or as media content to be looked at and more as data flows to 
be dipped or cut into occasionally.” One of the key implications of this 
new “photographic condition” is a persistent nonhuman dimension 
across the world of photography. (Zylinska, 2017: 74) This nonhuman 
dimension is evident in the ways mechanical and algorithmic agents 
shape photographic production. It is also evident in the manifold photo-
graphic practices, such as industrial and environmental monitoring, for 
which there is no human audience. While Kember parallels Zylinska in 
emphasizing these nonhuman operations, her own account of photo-
graphic ubiquity centers on the overt and largely commercial ambitions 
of ubiquitous computing or “ubicomp.”15 According to Kember’s explic-
itly feminist approach, it is time to “think of ubiquitous photography as 
more than everywhere” and instead, using Adam Greenfield’s term for 
computing integrated into all components of everyday life, to “rethink 
it in relation to the claims of ‘everyware.’” (Kember, 2013: 67) Central in 
Kember’s mind is the ongoing attempt to infuse human environments 
with so-called “ambient intelligence” and the role played by photograph-
ic systems thereby. Such systems, including face recognition techno-
logy, are increasingly used in the observation, analysis, and even mani-
pulation of individual moods and actions. (fig. 0.4) Effectively “making 
mug shots of us all” (70), photography aids and abets an all-encompass-
ing “reordering and instrumentalization of life in relation to technology 
and capital.” (Kember, 2012: 334) What Allan Sekula once dubbed the 
“general, all-inclusive archive”—one that contains “both the traces of 
the visible bodies of heroes, leaders, moral exemplars, celebrities, and 
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those of the poor, the diseased, the insane, the criminal, the nonwhite, 
the female, and all other embodiments of the unworthy”—can seem 
tame by comparison (Sekula, 1986: 10).
For Shoshana Zuboff, such critical warnings are far from hyperbole: 
in the new era of “surveillance capitalism,” ubiquity has become a literal 
and explicit goal, and “the planning, investment, and invention necessary” 
to bring a “vision of ubiquity into reality are well underway.” (Zuboff, 
2019: 201) The ubiquity Zuboff speaks to far exceeds the fact of billow-
ing digital archives of images in the cloud, or the supposed devolution in 
individual capacities to pay attention or remember because of constant 
visual stimuli. What is at issue is much larger and much more insidious, 
an ever-expanding “Big Other” that vacuums up information on human 
behaviors and vulnerabilities by means of the data so-called “smart” de-
vices harvest and that, in turn, finds ways to act on that information to 
“coax, tune, and herd behavior toward profitable outcomes.” (8) “Among 
high-tech leaders, within the specialist literature, and among expert pro-
fessionals,” Zuboff writes, “there appears to be universal agreement on 
the idea that everything will be connected, knowable, and actionable in 
the near future: ubiquity and its consequences in total information are 
an article of faith.” (222) What this means is not just photographic ubiq-
uity but surveillance ubiquity, computational ubiquity, search ubiquity, 
market ubiquity, and still other “ubiquities” naturalized, neutralized, 
and monetized. From data-gathering children’s dolls to time-targeted 
notifications and ads, there are constant and persistent “habituation ex-
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a “gradually accruing, smart, and muscular apparatus” over which no 
individual, government, or corporation can pretend to have full know-
ledge or control (201). The endgame isn’t just ubiquity; it is “the compre-
hensive visibility, coordination, confluence, control, and harmonization 
of social processes in the pursuit of scale, scope, and action.” (399) The 
vexing question is what can be done to defend freedom and democracy 
when this “new frontier of power” is both everywhere and nowhere at 
the same time. Maurisset’s hallucinatory conflation of photography and 
industry is as relevant as ever.
The Chapters
The notion of photographic ubiquity is as pervasive as it is under-
theorized.16 Like this introduction, the chapters in this anthology 
respond to this paradox, sometimes in quite direct ways, other times 
through indirect, elegant, yet nevertheless essential means. What su-
tures them together are their invaluable endeavors to pin either the event, 
consciousness, or discourse to certain perceptions of photography’s 
ubiquity and, in turn, to further describe and analyze the limits of such 
perceptions as part of photography’s history. Thus, the chapters in this 
anthology attend in various ways to the question of when photography 
came to be “everywhere,” with other historical priorities, whether they 
be technological, situational, or intellectual.
In the first chapter, “Early Photography’s Presence,” Jacob W. Lewis 
engages both photography’s origins and its discursive formation to 
convey how public conception of photography was never consigned to 
its actual available examples. Instead, commentators chose to convey a 
virtual, if vague, future condition of possibility for Daguerre’s process 
as well as its alternatives. Framing photography in the abstract was vital 
to its spread, but this abstraction also carried aspects of other modern 
signs of everywhereness, from utopian dreams and delusions to demo-
cratic acts and experiences. These signs tested the philosophical ideals 
of Saint-Simonianism, a 19th-century movement that promoted liberal 
and early socialist ideals, yet nevertheless helped engineer a powerful 
colonial and technocratic state in the French imperial context. While not 
yet a coherent medium—“photography, properly speaking”—the new 
technology’s presence in these early decades is framed by a rhetoric of 
excess, an aspect that the caricaturist Théodore Maurisset realized in 
several illustrations.
Expanding the study of photography and its relations to power 
into the context of the 1893 Columbian World’s Fair, Annie Rudd ex-
plores how the organizers’ prohibitions and exertions of control over 
amateur photography rebounded with new amateurs envisioning 
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their photographing of public space as individual acts of extraction 
and privilege. In her chapter “Photographic Privilege at the World’s 
Columbian Exposition,” Rudd details how mobile cameras equipped 
with instantaneous exposures enabled an event like the fair to have 
countless recorders and interpreters, whose resulting images told their 
own personal stories of visual conquest. Yet such techniques and nar-
ratives also opened the possibility of critique toward these demonstra-
tions of an inalienable right to photograph that predominantly white, 
middle-class consumers practiced with corporate products such as the 
Kodak camera. Thus, Rudd shows that the familiar narrative of photo-
graphy’s democratization obstructs a more insidious truth: consumer 
photography necessarily extends photographic privilege into an impe-
rial mode of being-in-the-world.
While a tacit right to extract views motivated early kodakers, Maura 
Coughlin explores how the Géniaux brothers, a pair of early documen-
tary photographers active during Kodak’s rise, figured the labor of ex-
traction that was part of everyday life in their home region of Brittany. 
In “Material Ecologies in the Géniaux Brothers’ Picture Archive of 
Brittany, ca. 1900,” Coughlin adopts an ecocritical approach to deline-
ate the taut connections between the shifting economic fortunes of the 
region and the visual culture of tourism that partly fueled the Géniaux 
brothers’ work. Their photographs, while contributing to the nostalgic 
view of a premodern Brittany for metropolitan audiences, record not 
only the working class but also aspects of the rise and fall of industry, 
agriculture, and trade relative to the “cheap nature” of the region. In a 
set of interrelated examples, Coughlin analyzes how photography pro-
duces an ambivalent image of the encultured landscapes of the region’s 
salt marshes, slate quarries, and hemp fields. Brittany, in their photo-
graphs of labor and material, becomes a site where rural culture is at 
once salvaged (in the crystalized photographic image) and destroyed 
(by modernization and economization). Furthermore, the photographs 
exhibit how the land’s myriad resources already serve as emblems of 
transformation and destruction even in Belle Époque France—a marker 
of loss rendered ubiquitous in the age of capital and the climatological 
disasters that follow.
Following a related ecocritical view, Niharika Dinkar argues for the 
need to critique the anthropocentric definition of the medium to explore 
more expansive ways that light writing occurs beyond the human realm, 
as she details in her chapter “‘Our Best Machines are Made of Sunlight’: 
Photography and Technologies of Light.” What if the photograph, as a 
recorded image of light that we deem ubiquitous in society or culture, 
makes up only a sliver of effects from a vast array of sensitive techno-
logies that record not only visible sunlight but also chemical fire, electric 
filament, and invisible radiation? And what if, as Dinkar pushes us to 
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ask, such materials and their illuminative effects cannot be sensed apart 
from their economic and geopolitical imbrications in history? Such is 
the case for her examples, from early photographic flash powder to the 
irradiant flash of atomic light inaugurated by nuclear warfare, whose 
own technology of light doubles as one of extinction and total destruc-
tion. As Dinkar proposes, light is continually weaponized by powers 
past and present; one cannot afford to believe the mythic exceptionalism 
of “honest sunshine” that governs photography’s history.
Just as Dinkar’s treatment of light expands our sense of the photo-
graphic condition of life, Joseph Moore interrogates similarly non-
human aspects and actors to flesh out what else comprises this condition. 
In “Managing Time: Nonhuman Animal Labor in Photographic Images,” 
Moore offers a statement detailing the creative process behind his body 
of artwork Oversight/Rendered and its relation to a history of animal 
life and photography. Moore connects the 19th-century photographer 
Étienne-Jules Marey, whose camera enabled a record of an animal’s bod-
ily movement in discrete phases using new instantaneous techniques, 
to the 20th-century Kodak corporation, whose manufacture of gelatin 
silver film necessitated the use of massive quantities of animal bodies 
and byproducts to increase Kodak’s expanding consumer base. This eco-
critical history of photography’s labor links with today’s “photographer-
less” internet protocol cameras and CCTV footage, from which the artist 
captures, automates, collects, selects, and finally prints in analog fash-
ion the images of the animals that afford an essential labor toward the 
photographic condition, in life as well as in death.
An essential aim of the present book is to question the surface divi-
sion between analog “mass” media and digital “ubiquity,” the one quan-
tifiably extended and the other immaterially present. Mette Sandbye 
addresses the trouble with such a notion directly in her chapter, “In 
1973: Family Photography as Material, Affective History.” Part of her 
inquiry is to examine how the digital turn has revised our understand-
ing of the place of the family snapshot and photo album as texts em-
bedded with data on social norms and cultural shifts. To redirect at-
tention from the photograph as a memory object to the act of “doing” 
photography as part of everyday lived experience, Sandbye identifies 
the third wave of photographic ubiquity in terms of the multitudes 
of family snapshots produced by the 1970s. Her control group is ver-
nacular photography produced in Denmark in the year 1973. What a 
synchronic study of typical photographs engenders is a description of 
codes, of affect and self-presentation, that can be named and organized 
into ad hoc binaries of gender, dress, pose, activity, environment, asso-
ciated objects, and so on. Whether identified across a comprehensive 
archive or read within a single dynamic image (both of which have their 
rarity, as Sandbye indicates), these codes and their eventual breakdown 
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in the act of analysis allow for a criticality otherwise lost in the context 
of the case-specific “particular” of the family photo album, or in the 
aggregate “universal” of today’s social media platforms.
Shifting from Sandbye’s concentration on Denmark in 1973 to Iran 
in 2009, Mohammadreza Mirzaei describes the synchronous and 
disparate views of the city of Tehran that became popular at a time of 
unrest. As outlined in his chapter “Where Is My Photo? A Study of 
the Representation of Tehran in the Work of Contemporary Iranian 
Photographers,” the same moment that dramatic protests against elec-
tion results spilled into city streets, there emerged a new direction in 
contemporary Iranian photography. In times of civil unrest, art styles 
and movements can enable a politics that is otherwise censored in online 
and public spaces to translate into aesthetic spaces instead, as Mirzaei 
suggests. In the empty urban spaces that featured so evocatively in the 
work of photographer Mehran Mohajer, whose work was on display 
during the protests, other artists adopted a similar strategy of “not 
seeing” as a deliberate political-aesthetic maneuver. In contrast to the 
citizen photography that circulated first among ordinary Iranians and 
then throughout international news media, photographers of Tehran’s 
gallery scene demonstrate how the oblique, obstructed, evacuated, and 
depopulated city scene—in conjunction with titles and statements on 
depression and fear—became another kind of ubiquity: a commodity 
on the national art market.
The next two chapters address what it means to bring affect and pol-
itics into relation with the dramatic cultural saturation of technologies 
of recording and playback that are camera phones, social photo, and 
streaming video. In “Evidence of Feeling: Race, Police Violence, and 
the Limits of Documentation,” Catherine Zuromskis describes the 
complexities of photographed police violence perpetrated against Black 
people in the United States, and how such shared events are compli-
cated by the dispersion and flow of such images and videos through a 
variety of contexts: legal evidence, vernacular and social photography, 
social justice activism, and contemporary art. The affective mode that 
governs vernacular photography and streaming video undermines po-
litical agency for the makers and viewers of such content, particularly 
in a nation characterized by both digital prowess and racist violence. 
These conditions press Zuromskis to explore other kinds of responses, 
including recent critical aesthetic approaches that center photography’s 
difficult relationship to futurity, taking us further away from the easy 
resolutions of liberalism that define much of documentary photography, 
whose classic proponents tended to approach visibility of—and expo-
sure to—social injustice as an end in itself.
In “On Photographic Ubiquity in the Age of Online Self-Imaging,” 
Derek Conrad Murray explores how the selfie and desire in online 
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culture engender new subjectivities that distort and even challenge 
strains of cultural critique. Like Zuromskis, Murray situates the ideo-
logical backdrop for the selfie and its critical reception with that of wan-
ing liberalism in the United States, here in the context of how the ubiq-
uity of “culture” in academic discourse and beyond has offered a poor 
substitute for politics. What, then, is the culture of the selfie, and where 
do we situate the sitter’s psychology of desire in the making and sharing 
of self-representations? Within the ambivalent genre of the “influencer” 
selfie as practiced by women of historically marginalized groups, one is 
able to read a new romance, not only between the self and image but also 
between the self-image and the society that renders such self-fashioning 
into an all-consuming project. Even so, representational acts like the 
selfie are all the more impressive in their ability to instantiate selfhood, 
if also to give in to the flows of capital and spectacle.
With a work by the Turkish media artist and director Refik Anadol 
as her departure point, Kate Palmer Albers’ chapter “Parafiction and 
the New Latent Image” redoubles Murray’s emphasis on fashioning 
the self, but places it instead at the lively and uncertain intersection of 
computation and photography. The Anadol work, titled WDCH Dreams, 
finds its basis in forty-five terabytes of digitized visual and auditory 
media from the archives of Frank Gehry’s famous Walt Disney Concert 
Hall in Los Angeles. Over ten nights in 2018, forty-two projectors cast 
a three-part, twelve-minute sequence onto the building, starting with 
“Memory”—the digitized materials read by Anadol’s bespoke neural 
network—moving to “Consciousness”—the materials reconfigured 
into visualized data—and concluding with “Dream”—the neural net-
work’s mostly inscrutable and often uncanny productions of new images 
based on its interpretation of those data. For Albers, WDCH Dreams both 
raises crucial questions about “fictive archival engagements”—such as 
those explored by the artist Zoe Leonard and filmmaker Cathy Dunye—
while also refusing to engage the uses and abuses of archives in history. 
At stake here is a more agential but also necessarily machinic means 
through which media-saturated publics can confront the critical and 
perceptual challenges of increasingly abundant visual data.
Likewise concerned with data and media abundance, Kyle Parry re-
sponds to the intuitive persuasiveness and deceptive universality of 
the widespread belief that photography has become ubiquitous in the 
digital era. An exercise in critical reconceptualization, Parry’s chap-
ter, “Dispersal and Denial: Photographic Ubiquity and the Microbial 
Analogy,” follows Gilles Deleuze in finding conceptual resources in an 
“inexact” scientific concept, in this case Lourens Baas-Becking’s micro-
bial biogeographical aphorism that “everything,” as in the totality of 
microbial life, “is everywhere, but the environment selects.” On the 
one hand, analogous to the remarkable dispersal capacity of microbes, 
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there is the extreme and seemingly unlimited spread and perpetuation 
of all manner of photographic forms. On the other, there are inevitable 
limits, whether political, social, technical, or material, to which photo-
graphic forms endure where, when, to what degree, and for whom. 
Acknowledging the inexact nature of this (and indeed any other) mi-
crobial analogy, Parry nevertheless suggests that attention to both the 
radical dispersal and inevitable denial of photographic forms means 
maintaining the best of the ubiquity concept while also evading its ten-
dency toward universalization, naturalization, and erasure.
Attentive to the many imperfect conceptions of photography’s spread, 
Michelle Henning’s chapter, “That Liking Feeling: Mood, Emotion, and 
Social Media Photography,” offers a way to subdue anxieties of digital 
omnipresence through a “thick description” of the everyday substance 
of social photo interaction. In the relations between hand and apparatus, 
or eye and screen, the practices involved in using social media harness 
the habitus of speech, gesture, affect, and anachronism, all of which tend 
to flow in and out of both digital landscapes and corporeal experience 
from moment to moment. For Henning, it is the singularity of the user/
consumer/photographer’s engagement with social media that compli-
cates the litany of concerns surrounding digital ubiquity, routinely cast 
as either a “flood” of images or an information “overload.” What binds 
the individual social photo user to digital culture are the larger complex 
modes of algorithmic metrics and data captures that pose at least one 
significant danger: the construction of a new physiognomy or behavioral 
pseudoscience, poised to take the social subject of the smartphone age 
and reduce them to a set of classifiable affective responses and definable 
cultural practices.
The book closes with an interview with Azoulay. Photography as a 
citizenry, the event of photography, potential history, imperial rights, 
worldly sovereignty—the conversation is a transit through many of the 
most vital and provocative concepts in Azoulay’s evolving political on-
tology of photography. It is also a ranging exploration of questions of 
distribution and omnipresence as they pertain to photography, imperi-
alism, capitalism, and modernity. For Azoulay, who refuses the smooth 
transitions of normative history, it is essential to maintain attention 
not just to the pervasiveness of this or that photographic device, but to 
the ubiquity of destruction in which photography emerged and upon 
which its most dominant logics of taking, opening, and extracting have 
been premised. How, Azoulay asks, can we “reconfigure the ontology 
of photography in a way that allows us to continue both to engage with 
it in order not to forget this mass destruction, and to transform it into 
the compass of repair?”
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Notes
1. One source of inspiration for this collection is Before 
and After Photography: Histories and Contexts, edited 
by Jordan Bear and Kate Palmer Albers. Here, we echo 
that book’s opening sentence as we call attention to a 
key “orthodoxy” in the study of photography, namely, 
ubiquity. The orthodoxy Bear and Albers cite is “a 
shared conviction that a single, authoritative account 
of the medium is both impossible and undesirable” 
(Albers and Bear, 2017: 1).
2. This often-quoted estimate originates from a post 
by Jonathan Good to the 1000 Memories blog 
(Good, 2011).
3. Author’s translation.
4. The editors are truly grateful for Emily’s contribution 
to our 2018 symposium at the University of Rochester, 
the material for which resulted in a publication (Dou-
cet, 2018).
5. Another significant cultural theorist indebted to Valéry 
is Walter Benjamin, whose essays on photography 
and film mostly posit their relation to traditional art 
and mass viewership, and not specifically as a sign of 
ubiquity (Benjamin, 2008).
6. Azoulay observes that “the pre-digital era saw frequent 
descriptions of cameras and photographs in terms of 
multiplicity, excess, omnipresence, totality and net-
working.” She suggests that these visions of pre-digital 
ubiquity “must have suited their writers’ world of 
experience” (Azoulay, 2014: 64).
7. This history of the term ubiquity is largely derived 
from the Oxford English Dictionary.
8. See entry on “Ubiquitarianism” in the New Catholic 
Encyclopedia.
9. Sontag’s book ends with an anthology of fragments 
from the history of photography. It is labelled as an 
“homage to W.B.”
10. The different references are as follows: enterprise, 3; 
voraciousness, 146; aggrandizement, 115; willy-nilly, 
antiquing, 79–80; degraded, 58; confusions, 112.
11. Salman Aslam, “Instagram by the Numbers: Stats, 
Demographics & Fun Facts,” Omnicore, https://www.
omnicoreagency.com/instagram-statistics (accessed 
July 15, 2020).
12. Janko Rottgers, “Snapchat Loses 3 Million Daily 
Users, but Beats Expectations in Q2 Earnings,” 
Variety, August 7, 2018, https://variety.com/2018/
digital/news/snap-posts-q2-revenue-beat-but-daily-us-
ers-down-for-first-time-1202898312.
13. Another example of this strain of ubiquity writing is 
the work of Martin Hand. For Hand, although there 
have been “previous perceptions” of cameras being 
everywhere, the now more profoundly “ubiquitous 
presence of the camera changes what can be, and is, 
seen, recorded, discussed and remembered, making the 
visualization of public and private life bound up with 
relations of power, expertise and authority” (Hand, 
2012: 9).
14. In 2017, the CEO of the streaming platform Netflix, 
Reed Hastings, admitted to his company’s ongoing 
battle with sleep: “You know, think about it, when you 
watch a show from Netflix and you get addicted to it, 
you stay up late at night. You really—we’re competing 
with sleep, on the margin.” The curators of the Netflix 
Twitter account saw in Hastings’s admission a market-
ing opportunity, tweeting “Sleep is my greatest enemy” 
(Cox, 2017).
15. Mark Weiser coined the term “ubiquitous computing,” 
suggesting that the “most profound technologies are 
those that disappear,” weaving themselves “into the 
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tives on ubiquitous computing, see a book that served 
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Throughout: Art and Culture Emerging with Ubiquitous 
Computing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).
16. We derive this formulation from Jurgenson, who 
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underconceptualized as it is ubiquitous” (Jurgenson, 
2019: 11).
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1. Early Photography’s Presence
Jacob W. Lewis
The history of photography has long aimed to chart the discursive for-
mation of its central object of study as an analytic unity, as medium or 
technology, framed as larger than the sum of its actual objects and pro-
cedures at a given moment in time. But since the 1970s, photography as 
such has been dutifully critiqued as an institutionally functional object 
of larger forces (Tagg, 1993). This includes corporations and small in-
dustry, the art market and art museum, and the state and its archive. The 
critical turn toward the study of “photographies” nevertheless occluded 
a more open analysis of photography’s abstract unity. This unity, I argue, 
can be thought of not in terms of its identity but in terms of its presence.
An illuminating example of how photography as such came to be 
conceived immediately upon its introduction to the world is Théodore 
Maurisset’s Daguerreotypomania! from 1839. (see fig. 0.2) A crucial bit 
of historical ephemera surrounding photography’s origins, this satirical 
lithograph gave form to a variety of collective psychoses behind the rush 
to define Daguerre’s new invention and its profligate cultural spread 
as a consequence of an ideological faith in progress, utopian idealism, 
and economic exploitation. Yet Maurisset’s social panorama describes 
an imaginary rather than an actuality. In late 1839, most of the artist’s 
audience, and plausibly even the artist himself, had yet to even see an 
object made by Daguerre’s process. In this case, what remains is to in-
terrogate the object of the disparate manias to which Maurisset’s image 
points us, with his ambivalent register of both hopeful prognostication 
and outright critical refusal. All signs point to the delusion that photo-
graphy was always already everywhere, amid other idealized demotic 
powers and more material expanses in the age of industry and capital. 
Early audiences understood photographic practice in relation to social 
traditions that came before, including professional organization, social 
emulation, and economic competition across 19th-century ideologies 
behind free-market capitalism and social utopianism. These early con-
ceptions of practice and the discourses that shaped them needed photo-
graphy to be a deferred object of thought. In short, photography’s iden-
tity belonged to the future, but its contemporaneity was felt in quite 
specific, public terms.
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To analyze further photography’s identity as deferred to the future, 
this essay traces the importance of the virtual—the realm of the in choate, 
the effective, the almost-as-described, the extant in potentia—to photo-
graphy’s early presence as an intelligible technology. Those academic 
scientists, amateur practitioners, hack journalists, and snobbish critics 
who helped define photography did so by expressing what the camera 
could potentially do that was neither measurable nor, in some cases, 
achievable in the moment. It is in early accounts and early images that 
the medium first expressed itself as, so to say, a virtual reality. One 
didn’t need to handle a camera or be recorded by it to know the mania 
of Daguerreotypomania! was at least a cumulative affect, and, at most, 
a shared psychosis. The collective delusion of photography’s omni-
presence anticipates and, historically, continues to infuse contemporary 
notions of ubiquity in the digital domain. But that takes us too far from 
photography’s start.
Arago’s Utpianism
Photography’s beginnings continue to clarify how the medium and its 
widespread applications have been historicized and intellectualized, so it 
follows that a return (again) to its contested origins is in order (Batchen, 
1999; Sheehan and Zervigon, 2015; Siegel, 2017)—not with the inven-
tor of photography, per se, but with the inventor of its discourse. That 
is, François Arago, the astronomer, scientist, statesman, and ardent 
Republican at a time of political repression under the July Monarchy 
regime. As a prominent member of the Académie des Sciences, Arago 
was responsible for the introduction of Daguerre’s process as France’s 
imperial gift to the world, recognizing its historic significance imme-
diately, as well as utilizing it to promote his own political and cultural 
standing (McCauley, 1991; Levitt, 2003; Tresch, 2012).
In his framing of the many uses of the daguerreotype for archaeology, 
astronomy, biology, and the arts, Arago merits tremendous recogni-
tion as the preliminary architect of photography’s expansive cultural 
imaginary. Delivering his report to the Académie on July 3, 1839, he 
was the first to further describe Daguerre’s process to a curious pub-
lic who, since January of that year, had read scant descriptions of the 
new visual technology. Not long after, Arago’s speech was printed in 
the Académie’s journal, as well as in a separate pamphlet, and the text 
outlines the technology’s possible utilizations for the public good, the 
most specific of which was how daguerreotypy could be marshaled to 
complete the reproduction of ancient hieroglyphs of Egypt, a colonial 
project of science (and data extraction) that accompanied Napoleon’s 
ill-fated North African and Middle Eastern campaigns at the close of 
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the 18th century. Arago’s discourse on the origins and future of photo-
graphy is beholden to the history of modern France’s imperial project, 
as Ariella Aïsha Azoulay identifies. The statesman’s emphasis on arch-
aeological documentation—in spite of Egypt’s indigenous population, 
as well as their current occupation under Ottoman force—repurposes 
a desire to document into a “neutral procedure to be used by those who 
one the proper means for it, and regardless of the will of those from 
whom the objects have been expropriated.” (Azoulay, 2019: 3–4)
Walter Benjamin, almost a century later, insists on the power that 
Arago’s discourse must have played on the public’s imagination at the 
time, and likewise accepts photography’s right to record (and, by reali-
zation, the right to expropriate) as a given:
The beautiful thing about this speech is the connections it makes 
with all aspects of human activity. The panorama it sketches is broad 
enough not only to make the dubious project of authenticating photo-
graphy in terms of painting—which it does anyway—seem beside 
the point; more important, it offers an insight into the real scope 
of the invention. […] In a great arc Arago’s speech spans the field 
of new technologies from astrophysics to philology: alongside the 
prospects for photographing the stars and planets we find the idea 
of establishing a photographic record of the Egyptian hieroglyphs. 
(Benjamin, 2008: 275)
While Arago in 1839 and Benjamin a century later never doubted the 
right to reproduce by photographic means, for both interlocutors of 
photography’s history, it was the device’s potentiality that provided the 
ground upon which (imperial) modernization forged violently ahead, 
and on which modernity took shape in increasingly visual and material 
ways. In the July report, Arago stresses not a determined future but an 
open field of potentiality—of things to come: “When observers apply 
a new instrument to the study of nature, what they have hoped for is 
always insignificant compared to the succession of discoveries which the 
instrument originates. In this manner, it is on the unforeseen [imprévu] 
that one must particularly count.” (Arago, in Siegel, 2017: 238) In this 
sense, “the unforeseen” that Arago stresses as the boon of invention 
is what drives modern technologies and defines their logic of progress. 
Perhaps the unforeseen is that which complements that other genera-
tive, essential, virtual power of photography, such that the invention’s 
many contributions, while not yet physically (ac)countable are at once 
conceptual and real.
Arago’s expectations for the daguerreotype, even though denoted as 
an aspect of the unknown and unforeseen, nonetheless offer a skeletal 
reality for early photography, especially when the medium in its early 
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years was consciously identified as “in its infancy,” as Jan von Brevern 
has analyzed (Brevern, 2015). In one account of the new process by the 
critic Jules Janin, he writes, “here is an art very much in its infancy; it is 
indeed a wondrous preparation, but it is attended by so many difficulties 
of every kind as to be almost impossible to make use of.” He continues, 
deploying a telling pharmaceutical analogy:
It is at such a stage of experiment, if you will allow me the com parison, 
as characterizes drugs employed in medicine. Some drugs are simple, 
natural, and easy to use, so that any housewife may employ them: 
marshmallow, mullein, couch grass. On the other hand, other rem-
edies very useful in medicine call for great skill in preparation, mor-
phine, for example. Well, the Dagueréotype [sic], such as it is today, 
is like morphine; very few are skillful or wealthy enough to make use 
of it. It is now necessary to bring it to the condition of couch grass, 
within reach of all. (Janin, in Siegel, 2017: 209)
Janin’s remarks are from reading and reviewing the process as it was 
in its introductory state amid Arago’s overture to the Académie and to 
the public at large. The daguerreotype as both object and process, Janin 
notes, was something that had yet to transition from the possible to the 
real, despite his appreciation for its demonstration and debut. For the 
author, of course, it was a branch of medicine and (gendered) levels of 
expertise that begged consideration that the process may still yet achieve 
something greater, more democratic, more everyday, and “within reach 
of all.” In short, Janin’s analogy in 1839 suggests what he is describing 
is not a process debuting before the Académie, but photography qua an 
identifiable medium, one with the potential to become standardized, but 
also present everywhere and ubiquitous like a weed. Strangely, Janin’s 
analogy of photography to couch grass—an invasive plant traditionally 
used in herbal remedies—cannot escape its pejorative character. While 
Europeans used Elymus repens for domestic remedies, in 19th-century 
agriculture and horticulture, couch grass was considered an obstructive 
weed (as it is figured today) that required various techniques and herbi-
cides to curb its spread.
As Brevern writes, the following second generation of practition-
ers and observers “rarely imagined disappointments” in their discus-
sion of the state of photography and its future. Along with articulating 
photography’s historical forebears in lens-based technologies such as 
the camera obscura and chemical experiments with light-sensitive met-
als, “much more often, they stressed that photography’s future appli-
cations were unforeseeable.” (Brevern, 2015: 69) Thus, Arago’s notion 
of “the unforeseen” found purchase with practitioners and critics who 
ventured away from discussions of actual process or technique in order 
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to conceive of the practical field in larger, more conceptually coherent 
terms.
For photographers and other commentators in the 1850s, a bald uto-
pian rhetoric became the norm (Doucet, 2018). To speak of photography 
was to speak of its future by describing its ever-present potential for 
various applications that had yet to manifest but were nonetheless an-
ticipated, moving beyond “the unforeseen.” Photographers of the 1850s 
saw techniques, practices, and their products exhibiting only the germ 
of ideality, technical perfection, or artistry. As the critic and novelist 
Francis Wey noted in 1851, public perception of photography was that it 
functioned as “a nascent thing” whose transitive power was that “which 
promised.” (Wey, 1851: 138) The greatest coherence of photography as a 
medium was seen to emerge in its virtual elements whose actual exist-
ence was either imagined or thought as bound to emerge through the 
force of progress. In lexical terms, photography in the 19th century had 
less to do with a distant concrete time, le futur, than with the active imag-
ining of what was to come, l’avenir, an operative distinction that Jacques 
Derrida signals in remarks on language and reason (Derrida, 2005: 135).
Other examples of such futurity emerge in photography’s second 
decade. In the wake of the 1855 Exposition Universelle and the dramat-
ic expansion of photographic processes into the sphere of industry, a 
correspondent for the journal Le Photographe writes of this “novel art” 
and its prominence at the exhibition: “Photography proclaims itself a 
work of the future.” (Latreille, 1855: 11) In another account, when faced 
with examples of improved techniques on display at the exhibition, the 
critic Louis Figuier saw photography as a tangled mix of the recent past, 
the actual present, and the inchoate future: “All these methods, these 
discoveries, which are so-to-say born yesterday, and of which many still 
only remain a germ, open a whole new world to photography. What will 
be their precise influence on the future of this art? No one can know it 
yet.” (Figuier, 1859)
To remark on photography’s current position in science and culture 
was inevitably to describe aspects that required development, such as 
its ease, permanence, cost effectiveness, reproducibility, instantaneity, 
and adaptability to industry—all of which were frequent frustrations 
and lacunae for many photographers and viewers (Lewis, 2012). These 
aspects, while still unintelligible or impractical, afforded signs of a more 
expansive, more precise, yet presently unknowable definition on the ho-
rizon. Photographic discourse was, in its first decades, mostly technical 
description paired with a strong sense of a virtual, unforeseen world of 
application, or a kind of science fiction avant la lettre.
In histories of photography, a position for the virtual is conspicuously 
lacking; that is, apart from instances in which photo media is incorpo-
rated into other associative and worn apparatuses that provide a “virtual 
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reality,” a term that first gained currency in early computer program-
ming and data visualization. Yet the virtual is by no means special to 
these millennial technologies and the social relations that they reconfig-
ure. In 19th-century photography, there existed a need to define photo-
graphy, and with it to engage its virtual, conceptual elements that shaped 
the image of photography’s future in a coherent array of techniques, 
uses, and objects. In this way, photographs, like traditional works of 
art, “are immersed in a virtuality,” which Gilles Deleuze suggests “is not 
some confused determination but the completely determined structure 
formed by its genetic differential elements, its ‘virtual’ or ‘embryonic’ el-
ements.” (Deleuze, 1994: 209) These elements are conceived in terms of 
their ability to demonstrate potentiality, rather than the set of empirical 
characteristics perceptible in a given object.
Deleuze, whose early work engages with the “actual/virtual” axis 
of thought, still locates both concepts in reality. This maneuver con-
stitutes his attempt to counter the prevalence of the real/possible axis 
in philosophy, which precludes the impossible as having a home in the 
“real.” In effect, media theory necessitates an involvement with the vir-
tual since mediated images offer presence where there is no traditionally 
sensible, tangible, physical one. Moreover, the virtual in media and in 
photography make gains in proximity to the project of representation, 
which was key to Arago’s discourse—the (re)presentation of an absent 
presence, or a presence where there is no more but once was. There is 
another notion of presence, that, as the late Douglas Crimp wrote in 
relation to postmodernism, describes “the notion of a presence as a kind 
of increment to being there, a ghostly aspect of presence that is its excess, 
its supplement.” (Crimp, 1980: 92) That is, photography in its debut 
had a virtual presence, a reality in excess, a supplement in its satura-
tion—what Ernst Bloch would designate as the Uberschuss or “overshot” 
of utopian thought (Bloch, 1988). This excess first germinated in the 
pages of the Académie’s Comptes Rendus, in news articles that parroted 
Arago’s reports, and then in technical treatises, art criticism, the popular 
imagination, and finally the (ubiquitous) everywhere of photographic 
cultures to come, in particular the new amateur practice inaugurated by 
George Eastman and the Kodak camera in the late 19th century.
Nevertheless, photography’s presence-as-excess was still founded on 
the relation between human subjects and the material objects. For one, 
Arago championed the daguerreotype plate as appropriate to envision 
photography’s future precisely because of its representational power—
what Edgar Allan Poe in 1840 identified as the daguerreotype plate’s 
ability to withstand scrutiny to reveal “a more absolute truth, a more per-
fect identity of aspect with the thing represented.” (Poe, in Trachtenberg, 
1980: 38) An example of the exactitude and uncanny clarity of sight 
afforded by Daguerre’s process can be found in the physicist Léon 
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Foucault’s still life of grapes on the vine from 
the 1840s. (fig. 1.1) The mirrored daguerreo-
type surface, when paired with the aspect of a 
hyperreal natural specimen that dangles awk-
wardly before a clean backdrop, combine to 
demonstrate an account of the daguerreotype 
as an image of the world and, simultaneously, 
a thing of that same world represented there-
in. The irreconcilable figure of photography’s 
representational power can be considered an 
aspect of not only the photograph’s presence 
but also photography’s presence.
Arago’s position was in contradistinction 
to proponents of the main competitor to 
Daguerre’s invention: the “photogenic draw-
ing” and subsequent relative “calotype” process 
that William Henry Fox Talbot developed si-
multaneously in England. Arago’s ideas about 
the power of resemblance and collective vision, 
as Theresa Levitt demonstrates, placed him in 
opposition to other academicians such as Jean-Baptiste Biot, who was 
drawn to Talbot’s process not simply for its representational abilities, 
but for its potential development in sensitometry and the measurement 
of light-sensitive material (Levitt, 2003). Biot conceived of Talbot’s work 
with silver salts on drawing paper as indicative of photography’s power 
as a means to record light and to generate data for scientific purposes. 
Similarly, Biot’s emphasis on photography’s abstraction of light shares 
affinities with how in an 1839 description Talbot narrated his own pro-
cess of mental abstraction that emerged from his first experiments with 
the camera lucida, and then later with his own photographic cameras: 
The picture, divested of the ideas which accompany it, and con-
sidered only in its ultimate nature, is but a succession or variety of 
stronger lights thrown upon one part of the paper, and of deeper 
shadows on another. (Talbot, in Trachtenberg, 1980: 29)
Photography, in both its virtual and de facto forms, had to do with 
the choice of procedure and—to risk a technological deterministic 
claim here—the subject position that the chosen procedure instantiat-
ed (Crary, 1990). In contrast to Arago’s emphasis on exactitude in rep-
resentation, Biot located “the unforeseen” in the photographic object it-
self, which, with examination and measurement, would yield much more 
information beyond a first glance. Brevern characterizes the difference:
Figure 1.1
Léon Foucault, Bunch 
of Grapes [Grappes 
de raisins], c. 1844. 
Daguerreotype, ¼ plate, 
12 × 8.8 cm. Collection 
Société Française de 
Photographie.
See also Plate 3.
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for Biot, who looked to photography for new scientific discoveries, 
expectations were of much higher relevance than for Arago, who 
viewed photography as a merely reproductive medium. For the lat-
ter, it was possible to expect all kinds of unforeseeable future ap-
plications of the new medium in general; but for the former, high 
expectations existed furthermore on the level of the single image. 
Every photograph was potentially able to reveal something hitherto 
unknown. (Brevern, 2015: 76)
The distinctions conjured by Arago and Biot also signal that photo-
graphy was not only considered programmatic but also programmable 
(Flusser, 2000), residing in the control of both producers and observ-
ers—the latter privileged by Biot, and the former by Arago, both of 
whom took for granted both a right to reproduce and a right to look.
As is demonstrated by his politics and his utopian rhetoric, Arago 
was greatly influenced by the utopian socialism of Henri de Saint-Simon 
and industrialist Charles Fourier. Adherents to the movement of Saint-
Simonianism, and its subsequent iteration in Fourierism, envisioned 
modern utopian society through theoretical writings, technological in-
novations, scientific management, and iconic images and architectural 
forms (Kerr, 2012). Fourier designed a new communal structure compa-
rable to the palaces of old that he termed the phalanstery (phalanstère), 
referencing the Greek phalanx, an ancient military form, and the ascetic 
space of the medieval monastery. Within this serialized structure, la-
bors and daily tasks would rotate regularly among members according 
to universal laws of social harmony, which “intensified affections and 
rivalries, spurring production.” (Tresch, 237) Fourier’s acolyte Victor 
Considerant published a detailed plan of Fourier’s innovation after his 
mentor’s death, showing “a societal palace dedicated to humanity” that 
envisioned a communal space where hundreds of families, separate 
from and at once dependent upon a larger economy and philanthropy, 
occupied various functional and living spaces that surrounded a central 
cultivated green space. Considerant’s print carries the emboldened title 
The Future (l’Avenir), stressing the idealism and radical potentiality of 
the design for social reorganization. But its militaristic look is less akin 
to a palace; instead, it betrays similarity to soldiers’ barracks, as if an ar-
chitectural manifestation of a military term that earlier Saint-Simonian 
theorists reinvested with new meaning: the avant-garde.
In the centrist, juste-milieu political climate in which Charles 
Fourier’s work was received, as well as that of François Arago, the 
reach of utopian socialism seemed not to extend beyond philosophy and 
experimentation shared by small social networks of the cultural elite. 
Those influenced by the movement’s commitment to social reorganiza-
tion, particularly the radicals Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Karl Marx, and 
411. Early Photography’s Presence
Friedrich Engels, came to critique its lack of materialist analysis of eco-
nomic and social conditions, its scant consideration of capitalism, and 
its role in class organization. Furthermore, the technocratic ideology 
that lay behind such imagined utopias was channeled into state-making 
ventures whose extremist outcomes were not community’s salvation, 
but its violent destruction, in particular France’s colonization of Algeria 
after the 1830 invasion of Ottoman-occupied territory. Rather than the 
phalanstère, the Saint-Simonians’ most successful, lasting consequence 
was the institution of its ideas through the bureaucracy of colonial 
administration, to the benefit of France’s economic empire and to the 
violent detriment of North Africa’s Arab and indigenous populations 
(Abi-Mershed, 2010).
Maurisset’s Realism
Utopia, whether considered mere fantasy or political danger, has always 
maintained ties to the genre of satire. One need only consider Thomas 
More’s 16th-century Utopia, in which he describes an ideal society in 
the genre of a travel narrative, whose fiction also suggests its reading as 
a nascent satire of More’s own political world (Kloeg, 2016: 210). If the 
utopian impulse at photography’s inception lays embedded in the dis-
course of Arago, then the complementary actor that meets the challenge 
is the illustrator Théodore Maurisset.
A painter, lithographer, and caricaturist active in the middle of the 
19th century, Maurisset, along with Honoré Daumier, counts among a 
few figures so central to the beginnings of photography who was never 
once known to make a photograph. His most widely known lithograph 
is Daguerreotypomania!, from late 1839, showing crowds stretched into 
the distance, waiting to catch a glimpse of Daguerre’s new process and 
its explosion of cultural relevance. What Maurisset illustrates is the 
crowd, that demotic force that resists individual reason and adopts the 
“mania” of the mob. Their mania is for novelty, an ecstatic modernity, 
and material progress, akin to what Charles Baudelaire, in 1859, decried 
in his screed against photography’s newfound public:
An avenging God has heard the prayers of this multitude; Daguerre 
was his messiah. […] From that moment onwards, our loathsome 
society rushed, like Narcissus, to contemplate its trivial image on the 
metallic plate. A form of lunacy, an extraordinary fanaticism took 
hold of these new sun-worshippers. (Baudelaire, in Trachtenberg, 
1980: 86–87)
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While Baudelaire’s heavily cited words describe a critical perspective 
on his present moment—and the marginal acceptance of photography 
in (or more specifically near) the Salon des Beaux-Arts of that year—
Maurisset’s earlier image conveys not the actual state of photography 
but its “expected impact” fated to unfold in society. Jan von Brevern 
indicates that Maurisset’s image is not “a satirical comment on the 
immediate photographic craze” but “an image about the future” that 
saw Daguerre’s novelty as a cult object, a “vehicle for the visual,” and 
a robust engine of progress (Brevern, 2015: 72). Maurisset was likely as 
much influenced by the pages of the Académie’s Comptes Rendus as he 
was by speculation and rumor directed at the process, and it remains 
very plausible that Maurisset himself had yet to see an example of a 
daguerreotype, much as how Baudelaire may have never viewed the 
photographic exhibition adjacent to the 1859 Salon in advance of writ-
ing his aforementioned critique. What Maurisset described at photo-
graphy’s inception was neither Arago’s producers nor Biot’s observers, 
but the future of photography as an object of visual consumption for 
the masses, whose spectacular presence for viewers is akin to the stage 
presence of the acrobat in transit on a tightrope on the print’s far left. 
Photography is not only a presence but also a circus born of that pres-
ence, resembling pure excess.
Ten years later, Maurisset had the chance to depict once more the 
“vehicle for the visual” that was Daguerre’s invention. In the early 1850s, 
the illustrator again portrayed photography’s public in a promotion-
al lithograph for the studio operator and lens manufacturer Pierre-
Ambroise Richebourg. (fig. 1.2) No longer an image of expectation 
generating the madness of the crowd, photography’s power now rests 
in the hands of able and trusted producers. The producer in question, 
Richebourg, is seen practicing his art perched upon a giant camera and 
lens that serves as both a stage and a rampart, enticing the crowd to 
the studio and protecting him from their unwieldy numbers. Satisfied 
customers and visual consumers in the foreground busy themselves 
with looking, scanning their gaze for something in oversize works, 
photo micrographs, reproductions of paintings, and stereoscopic series 
that litter the foreground before Richebourg’s immobile giant cam-
era. In one case, the exactitude and power of representation wielded 
by Richebourg deceives a loyal dog, whose gruff matron appears upset 
that her animal companion responds excitedly to her daguerreotyped 
representation and not her real, physical presence. On the left, behind 
the cashier’s booth, laborers haul giant sacks of cash to the top of the 
ramparts (forteresse) whose caption identifies it as the business’s strong-
box, or safe (coffre fort). The desire for photography that Maurisset char-
acterizes here, then, is the desire for the commodity and the value that 
undergirds it.
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Maurisset’s return to photography’s public begs the question: are 
we faced with the same maniacal crowds that welcomed Daguerre as a 
modern “messiah”? The most dramatic change is that the earlier image’s 
unruly mob is now fully policed by imperial grenadiers and artillery of-
ficers, and photography’s public here forms standard lines that nonethe-
less stretch into the background. On the right, a guard stands at his post, 
surveilling the stream of people wending their way to the studio and 
the cashier’s depot. On the left, another official tangles violently with a 
member of the public in line who grabs on to a bayonet; yet another mili-
tary official counts himself among Richebourg’s customers as a member 
of the public. Still others in full regalia patrol on horseback as inciden-
tal staffage filling out an imperial landscape. Maurisset’s image likely 
dates to the years immediately prior to the Crimean War and Paris’s 1855 
Exposition Universelle, at which time Richebourg still prided himself as 
an early “primitive of photography,” as the portraitist Nadar describes 
him in his memoir (Nadar, 2017: 180). Unlike many early photographers, 
Richebourg adapted to new markets, promoting not only his skill in 
daguerreotypy but also his use of the “new” collodion method intro-
duced in 1851 (noted in Maurisset’s advertisement). He continued to 
operate his studio and his work as a supplier of lenses into the early 
days of the Third Republic (McCauley, 1994: 359), seeing through not 
Figure 1.2
Théodore Maurisset,  
advertisement for the 
business of optician and 
daguerreo typist Pierre-
Ambrose Riche bourg on 
the Quai de la Horloge, 
Paris, ca. 1846. Lithograph, 
image: 10.2 × 12 cm; 
frame: 19.5 × 22 cm.  
George Eastman Museum,  
gift of Eastman Kodak 
Company, formerly  
collection Gabriel Cromer.
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only photography’s inception and industrialization but also its spread 
as a middle-class collectible in the form of portraits and instrument of 
imperial statehood in the form of expedition photography.
What, then, happened to the “unforeseen” in photography in its first 
decade? An advertisement is hardly the place to discover new futures 
of photography; rather, the commercial image can be a place where one 
finds not futures but the ideologically fraught desires that undergird 
a faith in progress toward some future. That said, Maurisset’s image 
offers a further entrenched, materialist view of photography’s economy 
that leaves the utopian idealism of the past behind for a kind of critical 
description if not pessimistic realism. The same elements from the ear-
lier image are here—steamships, locomotives, carriages, banners, acro-
bats—but in the Richebourg image, the unruly crowd is hemmed in by 
desires economized, industrialized, and policed for the sake of modern 
wonder and the profits that follow. The economy of expectations that 
figured so wildly in Daguerreotypomania! are suddenly streamlined to-
ward a recognition of industrial production, surplus value, and asset 
protection.
Still, I would argue that, in Maurisset’s canny dystopia described 
in the space of a promotional print, photography nevertheless bears 
new details of the same “presence.” This virtual presence, existing in 
supplement and in excess, is proximate to the late Douglas Crimp’s de-
ployment of the term to signify a governing force in postmodern art’s 
critique of commodity culture (Crimp, 1980). The same presence, I ar-
gue, is an aspect of early photography’s identity, or at least an identity 
of aspect (pace Poe), that asserts itself in early photography’s perpetual 
shifts from virtual to actual, from utopian idealization to material re-
alization. As Vered Maimon writes in her study of early photography 
Singular Images, Failed Copies, this is about photography’s representa-
tional power transformed and harnessed by an even greater ubiquity, 
one that we cannot ignore:
It is precisely by narrowing and standardizing photographic process-
es and thereby making them ‘mimic’ pictorial conventions of rep-
resentation that photography came to be defined as a transparent 
medium of resemblance and representation. Yet this condition marks 
a shift in the discursive order of the photographic image, whose ‘in-
fancy’ was marked by difference and repetition as a function of its 
inseparability from ‘nature’s hand.’ That is, this new condition is 
not the logical outcome of the shift from the ‘artist’s hand’ to ‘na-
ture’s pencil’ but precisely the opposite: the historical displacement 
of nature in favor of the ‘second nature’ of industrial capitalism. 
(Maimon, 2015: 149)
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World’s Columbian Exposition
Annie Rudd
In Glimpses of the World’s Fair, one of several photographically illustrated 
souvenir books that were published in commemoration of the 1893 
World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago, the caption appended to 
one photograph draws attention to a figure within the frame that the 
reader is encouraged to regard as ubiquitous. (fig. 2.1) “The ever-present 
‘Kodak’ fiend,” the caption reads, referencing a woman dressed in black. 
Her back to the camera, this “fiend” is engrossed by a camera of her own. 
Her body hunches over it as she frames her shot, ostensibly a casually 
posed picture of two men who are seated on a bench at the left edge 
of the frame. In the background, crowds stroll through the Midway 
Plaisance. The ornate bamboo entry to the Java Village—an exhibition 
featuring “an exact reproduction of a village” found in West Java, spon-
sored by the Java Chicago Exhibition Syndicate, “a commercial enter-
prise with the object of introducing Java products in their pure state into 
America”—looms overhead in the distance (Java Chicago Exhibition 
Figure 2.1
“The Ever-Present  
‘Kodak’ Fiend,” from 
Glimpses of the World’s 
Fair: A Selection of Gems 
of the White City as 
Seen through a Camera 
(Chicago: Laird & Lee, 
1893), 160.
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Syndicate, 1893: 1). If the reader of Glimpses of the World’s Fair happens 
to flip back to the book’s front matter, further evidence of the Kodak 
fiend’s apparent omnipresence will be found. The book indicates, via 
a prominent credit line, that the photograph of this woman with her 
Kodak was captured by a photographer operating a Kodak No. 4 camera, 
as were the rest of the images in the book.
The closed loop of representation at work in this book—in which 
omnipresent Kodaks capture a world gathered for the leisurely visual 
consumption of ambling tourists—analogizes but also oversimplifies 
a broader shift underway in the United States in 1893. Affordable and 
easy-to-use Kodak cameras, like world’s fairs themselves, depended on 
the wide acceptance among their target market of a logic of visual ex-
traction. In other words, they hinged on the idea that the world was as 
spectacular as it was fungible: that it could be meaningfully captured for, 
and encapsulated in, a series of photogenic views. As Ariella Azoulay 
has contended, the flourishing of photography cannot be understood 
apart from the forcible assumption of imperial rights, and the World’s 
Columbian Exposition, an event whose chief purpose was to celebrate 
the world that those rights created, might fairly be understood as an un-
paralleled spectacle of imperial extraction. Given Azoulay’s provocation 
that we “[i]magine that the origins of photography […] go back to 1492,” 
the Chicago exposition, which explicitly commemorated Columbus’s 
1492 colonization of the Americas, warrants attention for the ways in 
which its organizers and visitors framed the right to take photographs. 
(Azoulay, 2019: 2–3)
Coming just as the introduction of a spate of affordable cameras 
intended for use by nonprofessionals encouraged the mass adoption 
of snapshot photography as a hobby, this event was particularly ripe 
for extensive photographic documentation. Yet to regard the scene 
that Glimpses of the World’s Fair presents as a neatly closed loop is to 
impose on that scene a degree of order and unanimity that was not, in 
practice, present. At the edges of the frame—of this particular image 
and of the aesthetic regime that it represents—uncertainty and anxiety 
about how the world is to be represented and who has the right to rep-
resent it abound. Studying these seams helps to clarify the dominant 
perspective that they surround, lending insight into what imperial views 
looked like at the fair, but also how those views were empowered and 
challenged in an age of expanding photographic abundance. This chap-
ter explores how kodakers and other photographers present at the fair 
discussed, acclimated to, and practiced the newly widespread impera-
tive to photograph in public. The semipublic spaces of fairs such as the 
1893 Columbian Exposition, which framed the world as a consumable 
spectacle, functioned as a testing ground for the large-scale incursion of 
discreet and mobile cameras into public spaces. But the complications 
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that individual photographers encountered in photographing the fair 
suggest that the shift toward a world characterized by the unabridged 
right to take photographs was partial and incremental rather than to-
talizing and immediate. While the marketing and pedagogical efforts 
of firms such as Eastman Kodak framed the world as a limitless font 
of photographic material, the representational capacities of amateur 
photographers were delimited in many unanticipated ways as they set 
about capturing the fair.
The trope of the Kodak fiend, pervasive in the popular journalism 
and visual culture of the 1890s, presents an image of snapshot photo-
graphers run amok at the world’s fair and in the wider world, photo-
graphing whatever they pleased. In reality, however, photographic prac-
tices were significantly more circumscribed than this caricature suggests, 
hemmed in by tacit conventions that shaped how snapshot photography 
was practiced even in its infancy. A few decades later, Walter Benjamin 
would famously contend that film offered a kind of perceptual training 
that acclimated observers to the sensory experiences characteristic of 
modernity. Looking back to the 1890s with Benjamin’s interpretation in 
mind, we might fruitfully read the framing of photographic practices in 
this pivotal decade—through the marketing of photographic equipment, 
characterizations of the photographer in popular journalism and the 
photographic trade press, and spectacular events such as world’s fairs—
as offering a kind of representational training. This training helped to 
code certain objects, gazes, and affects as appropriate material for 
photographic capture at a moment when photography’s future seemed 
both immensely promising and highly indeterminate, given the mass 
adoption that was underway. Looking at the expansion of photography 
in the 1890s with attention to the frames and constraints that photo-
graphers encountered—and not just to the broadening of photographic 
opportunities that these new modes opened up—we move beyond a 
popular and rather hagiographic narrative that assigns Eastman Kodak 
credit for “democratizing” photography, for creating the conditions of 
photographic freedom.1 As certain longstanding barriers to entry were 
diminished—namely, costly equipment and the need to develop sub-
stantial technical skill—subtler ideological forces continued to shape 
who photographed, what was photographed, and how photography was 
practiced.
Consumer photography’s expansion into urban public spaces raised 
a number of questions, both existential and practical. How did new 
practitioners of photography, commentators in the photographic world, 
and corporate entities involved in popularization manage and exploit 
this new photographic profusion and address its possibilities and its 
dangers? What frames and controls served to delimit the scope of the 
photographable, making an infinity of photographic possibilities more 
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controllable and graspable? What role did the particular event under dis-
cussion, the 1893 Chicago world’s fair, play in this process, coming as it 
did at this decisive stage in the popularization of amateur photography? 
And, crucially, how did amateur photographers respond to prescriptions 
and proscriptions that were intended to structure photographic activity?
We can understand the ways of seeing privileged by the fair as an 
analogy for broader modes of visual acquisition and representation that 
people on the advantaged side of imperial relationships were encouraged 
to adopt in this period. The fair’s organization and visual structure, as 
well as its official photographic record, privileged a view that was unmis-
takably imperial; in this way, imperial extraction was not only an event 
whose history the fair commemorated but also an ongoing practice of 
looking on which attending the fair was predicated. This imperial view 
positioned the world outside the individual photographic observer as a 
source of material ripe for capture. The fair’s built environment, order-
ing, and optics encouraged visitors to treat their environs as a visual 
spectacle and a photogenic event, and these structures guided spectators 
toward extractive modes of engagement, treating physical spaces and 
humans alike as objects of visual consumption that were intended for 
unimpeded, one-way observation rather than sustained interaction or 
exchange.
While this training was certainly powerful, its power was not absolute 
or unabridged in practice. In fact, an irrepressible tension permeated the 
fair, appearing in the photographs that Kodak photographers took, but 
also materializing in the form of spirited arguments and invectives on 
the pages of photographic trade journals. Given the unimpeded, ideal-
ized view that visitors to the fair were promised, many amateur photo-
graphers were surprised to find that it was challenging or simply impos-
sible to adopt this perspective in their own image-making. Instead, they 
met multiple limitations that constrained their photographic activity, 
demonstrating to them that, while this event celebrated and visualized 
imperial rights, access to what came to be known as “photographic priv-
ilege” was substantially constrained in practice.
Looking at the photographing of the World’s Columbian Exposition 
in light of Azoulay’s discussion of photography and imperial rights, it 
becomes possible to identify multiple registers of control in simultane-
ous operation. The pristine and uniform official image of the fair em-
bodied the top-down control and restriction that the fair’s administra-
tion sought to impose. To maintain the dominance of this official image, 
the fair’s photography division, led by Charles Dudley Arnold, placed 
significant limitations on unofficial photographers’ ability to photo-
graph the fair, including a ban on tripods and a daily photographer’s 
permit fee that was four times higher than the general admission fee 
to the fair itself.
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But this top-down control helped amateur photographers to justify 
their own claims to imperial rights—and to characterize the claiming 
of these rights as a valiant battle against the dictatorial power of the 
fair’s leadership. Amateur photographers who sought to photograph 
the world’s fair coded their right to take photographs without restric-
tion—including photographs of other people in public spaces—as 
a fundamentally liberatory, egalitarian act. In practice, the right that 
these amateur photographers sought was a right to go out and photo-
graphically “capture” the world. And despite invocations of collectivity 
and the commons in the photographic trade press, this right was far 
from universal: it was the province of those in positions of geographic, 
racial, and economic advantage. In this respect, the term “photographic 
privilege” was more apt than its proponents recognized. Moreover, as 
we shall see, despite amateur photographers’ tendency to frame their 
demands as an opposition to the monopolistic dominance of the fair’s 
organization, these photographers’ conceptualization of photographic 
freedom in terms of the unabrogated right to take photographs was 
highly compatible with the nearly monopolistic dominance of another 
organization: Eastman Kodak itself.
World’s Fairs and the Visual Logic of Extraction
The Chicago world’s fair, like other expositions of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, was a colossal and heterogeneous affair. Running 
from May Day through late October 1893, it was attended by about 
twenty-seven million visitors; at the time, this was close to half of the 
United States’ population.2 While the fair, like others of the period, was 
typically framed as an opportunity for democratic education and inter-
national fellowship, bringing the world together, it was also intended to 
function as a triumphal display of modernity and technological advance-
ment, and it served to consolidate ideologically a power relation that was 
also being expanded militarily in the 1890s: American imperial domi-
nance. There were powerful economic incentives at work as well; the 
fair was regarded as a means to lend prestige to a given city and improve 
its financial circumstances. Ultimately, in 1890, Chicago was chosen 
by Congress as the site to host the fair after competing with New York 
City for the opportunity, and frenetic work began to plan and build the 
expansive site. At six hundred acres, the space of the fair was enormous, 
but given its claims to offer visitors the globe in miniature—one contem-
porary proclamation that “All the world is here!” was a popular refrain 
among fair visitors—such largesse was fitting, even if the condensed 
world that fair visitors experienced made fundamental alterations to 
the original (Putnam, 1894: n.p.).
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The fair’s official title, the World’s Columbian Exposition, was a ref-
erence to what most descriptions of the fair referred to as Columbus’s 
“discovery” of the Americas, and the fair was ostensibly a celebration 
of the four hundredth anniversary of this pivotal colonial event. The 
celebration of Columbus points to a central dialectic that colored the 
exhibition and others like it. Several decades later, and in a very dif-
ferent context, Frantz Fanon would write, “The colonial world is a 
Manichaean world.” (Fanon, 2004: 6) Taking place in a metropole that 
was once a colony and reveling in its transformation from the latter 
to the former, the Chicago world’s fair presented a particularly literal 
demonstration of Fanon’s point. Incorporating a pervasive rhetoric of 
“civilization” that depended on the “primitive” as a necessary structuring 
Other, the central grounds of the fair were composed of two main re-
gions that were carefully separated: the White City, consisting of stately 
buildings rendered in stark white, which were intended to produce an 
impressive and largely uniform ideal of Beaux Arts architecture, and 
the Midway Plaisance, which was presented, in ethnocentric terms, as 
the unruly underbelly of the fair, offering an international bazaar that 
gathered the world up for the consumption of a gaze that was interpel-
lated as Western. If the White City sought to represent “civilization”—
synonymous, in this context, with whiteness—at its pinnacle, then the 
Midway encouraged spectators to observe colonized people, as well as 
people of other nations that white American visitors would consider 
foreign. It presented what one commentator called a “novel and het-
erogeneous exhibition” of people of “many nations of each continent, 
civilized, semi-civilized, and barbarous,” as well as their characteristic 
architecture, which ranged from “mosques and pagodas” to “huts of 
bark and straw that tell of yet ruder environment.” (Bancroft, 1893: 836)
The fair claimed universality, and was presented as a comprehensive 
display of the world’s accomplishments and its diversity. The official 
guidebook told visitors they should expect to see “the progress which 
the world has made in the arts, sciences, and industries,” an experience 
that would be “a liberal education assured.” (Flinn, 1893: 17) The World’s 
Congress Auxiliary, a body that was organized as the ideological and in-
tellectual heart of the fair, described its mission as assembling “a series 
of world-wide fraternities through whose efforts and influence the mor-
al and intellectual forces of mankind may be dominant throughout the 
world.” (“Preliminary Publication,” 1893: n.p.) An illustrated souvenir 
book, Martin’s World’s Fair Album-Atlas and Family Souvenir, declared, 
more pithily and in blazing caps: “IT IS A COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE 
OF THE CIVILIZATION OF TO-DAY.” (1893: n.p.) The illustrated Chicago 
publication The Graphic concurred, stating that the fair would be “a uni-
versal congress, which is no respecter of geographical boundary, race, 
color, party or sex.” (“The Congress of All Nations,” 1892: 1)
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Despite these claims of universality, the fair presented the world for 
a particular kind of spectator. The perspective consistently emphasized 
was that of the affluent, white, American spectators who were assumed 
to be its chief visitors. This particular fair was wholly typical in its insist-
ence on this point of view; world’s fairs and ethnographic expositions 
have long been a subject of interest for visual culture scholars interested 
in the politics of display, because one of their constitutive functions was 
to neatly divide and present the world’s people and objects in such a way 
that the world would be made legible to Western spectators. As Fatimah 
Tobing Rony has written, such events were both “site[s] of excess,” 
where a seemingly limitless accumulation of cultural objects were made 
visible, and also “place[s] of spectacle where detail”—including details 
about the many ethnic groups being displayed—“was ordered, classi-
fied and rationalized.” (Rony, 1992: 270) As Tony Bennett observed in 
The Birth of the Museum, expositions of this period “rendered the whole 
world metonymically present, subordinated to the dominating gaze of 
the white, bourgeois, and […] male eye of the metropolitan powers.” 
(Bennett, 1995: 83) While these displays were ostensibly intended to 
educate, they depended on a loose interpretation of education, because 
the gaze that the fair catered to was one that tended to be both acquis-
itive and impatient.
The way of viewing the world that the fair emphasized was depend-
ent on a willingness to accept a partial, selective, and authored visual 
representation as commensurate to reality, and to trust in the veracity 
of the display that was presented. In the context of the fair, this trust had 
a powerful naturalizing effect, reassuring visitors that the “dominating 
gaze” that the fair embodied and courted was the correct and default 
one. This way of seeing might productively be understood as extractive, 
because it was predicated on the capacity of imperial power to appropri-
ate and restage the people and resources of the spaces it colonized, and 
to produce out of these subjects and objects its desired image of reality.
In this respect, world’s fairs performed a function that was equally 
characteristic of photography itself. As Azoulay has argued, the medium 
of photography was “first institutionalized” on an “extractive principle” 
that privileged the right of “recognized members of imperial societies” 
to remove resources, visual and otherwise, from colonized communities, 
offering little in return. Through the process, those who claimed imperi-
al rights authorized themselves to “enjoy the power of expropriating the 
rights of others, expropriation that photography not only made visible 
but perpetuated.” (Azoulay, 2019: 147) This enjoyment of expropriation 
is at the crux of Azoulay’s definition of imperial rights.
How was this enjoyment experienced and practiced among people 
in the metropole, who were the beneficiaries of these rights but were 
geographically sheltered from those they expropriated? Photography 
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was central, particularly with its diffusion to larger and larger numbers 
of people who were the beneficiaries of imperialism. As this imaging 
practice was adopted by a critical mass of amateur practitioners in the 
West, spectators increasingly implemented and naturalized ways of 
seeing that privileged an unequal relationship between photographer 
and subject, observer and observed. While this was not a new dynamic 
in the 1890s, the growing popularity of photography as a hobby and 
the increasing ubiquity of cultural events and practices that encouraged 
unequal looking relations—such as world’s fairs, as well as a vogue for 
travel photography among Western tourists—encouraged its normal-
ization and expansion. With the increasingly widespread adoption of 
small-format cameras, one central feature of these newly extractive 
ways of seeing was the assumption among those wielding cameras of 
an unabrogated right to photograph, and the perception that any checks 
on one’s ability to do so imperiled the freedom of the photographer 
in question. The selective, unidirectional nature of this “freedom” be-
comes particularly clear when we consider that its proponents were 
disinclined to ask questions about how free their own photographic 
subjects might have been.
Images and Events
The Chicago world’s fair has been referred to by one historian as the 
“most photographed event of the nineteenth century.” (Lewis, 2010: 12) 
If this statement is true—and it is difficult to establish with any degree 
of certainty whether it is—then its truthfulness has much to do with 
the elasticity of the term “event.” In his brief book on the subject, Slavoj 
Žižek refers to the event “at its purest and most minimal” as something 
“out of joint” that “interrupts the usual flow of things.” (Žižek, 2014: 2) 
The Chicago fair was, then, an ambiguous kind of event, both proximate 
to and distant from “real life”: it was an attraction, something to visit 
and to write home about, and it initiated a festive, celebratory atmos-
phere, yet its lengthy duration meant that it was impossible to sustain a 
peak of dramatic intensity.
As a liminal event—one that was both exceptional and ongoing, and 
one that sought to reflect the world outside—the fair can be understood 
as both a pretext for a new array of photographic activity and an analogy 
for seismic shifts in the nature of photographic practice in the 1890s. The 
kinds of photography familiar to ordinary people before the Chicago 
world’s fair had necessitated spatial and temporal isolation, producing 
a distinct kind of photographic event: they took place in the cloistered 
space of the studio, and they demanded an interaction between photo-
grapher and subject that took the subject out of context. Žižek refers to 
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the event as “an appearance without solid being as its foundation”; this 
description has some analogy with Roland Barthes’s characterization 
of the making of the photographic portrait in Camera Lucida. (Žižek, 
2014: 2) Barthes describes this process as an event in which the person 
photographed creates an appearance for herself or himself, forming 
their physical corpus into an artificial, photogenic one—an appear-
ance without solid being—in order to be photo graphically represented 
(Barthes, 1981: 10–11).
Together, these formulations leave us with an understanding of the 
event as something exceptional, disruptive, and out of step with normal 
experience, and they offer a heuristic for thinking about the distinc-
tions between the event that studio portraiture entailed and the new 
representational possibilities that were opening for photographers as 
the fair took place. The expansion of snapshot photography in public 
spaces produced a different and more indeterminate kind of encounter. 
The subject could pose for the camera, but equally, the photographer 
could photograph subjects unawares, claiming the right to photograph 
another without consent. The photograph could take place in com-
mon space—always a possibility, but practiced far more frequently as 
cameras became more portable and copious in the 1880s and 1890s. The 
photograph did not have to take subjects out of the action in which they 
were embedded—the photograph could instead depict that action by 
freezing it at an interval in its unfolding. A common characteristic of 
amateur photographs made at the Chicago fair is the blurred appear-
ance of photographs taken of subjects in motion. This blurring gives 
the appearance that the activity and movement occurring around the 
photographer could not be paused to meet the camera’s demands; the 
frenetic activity of the fair instead needed to be captured as it unfolded. 
The blurred appearance of these photographs also speaks to the techno-
logical progression of instantaneous photography. By the 1890s, instan-
taneous photography had evolved from an experimental mode devel-
oped by technically skilled practitioners such as Marey and Muybridge 
to a widespread practice accessible to nearly any photographer, given 
that early Kodak cameras operated with rapid fixed exposure rates. 
Instantaneous photographic capture, an exceptional and tentative phe-
nomenon in the 1870s, was, by the 1890s, virtually everywhere.
“The World is Mine”
Because they removed the necessary connection between the phenom-
enon of being photographed and the event of posing before the camera, 
hand cameras like Kodaks made it possible for amateur photo graphers 
to travel the world with their cameras and to extract photographic 
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likenesses from unwitting or nonconsenting subjects. The marketing 
and consumer pedagogy efforts through which Eastman Kodak guided 
customers toward “appropriate” uses of photography helped to trans-
form this possibility into a given, presenting the extractive potential of 
photography as a major selling point for prospective customers.
Advertisements for Eastman Kodak products that targeted fairgoers 
in 1893 demonstrate the framing of photography as a practice through 
which spectators in a position of imperial privilege can use cameras to 
represent the world on their terms, and in so doing, possess the world 
they have photographically captured. In this respect, these ads augured 
broader strategies of representation that Eastman Kodak advocated in 
its marketing in the years that followed. “Take a Kodak with you to the 
World’s Fair,” magazine advertisements implored readers in Harper’s 
and Scribner’s, presenting an illustration of two iterations of the Kodak 
Girl, the company’s modern, adventuresome brand mascot. The ads 
emphasized the obvious appeal of roll film cameras compared with cam-
eras using individual glass plates, still preferred by most professional 
photographers and “serious” amateurs at the time, although these cam-
eras were unwieldy and heavy. These ads presented the work of photo-
graphing with a Kodak as a pleasure and a social activity, contrasted 
with the drudgery and heavy lifting associated with photography using 
glass plates. As in much of Eastman Kodak’s advertising, the use of 
young, white women as the emblematic snapshot photographers drew 
on contemporaneous associations of this demographic with particular 
lifestyles and affective qualities—as living lives of pleasure and leisure 
that might be vigorous but did not demand hard work; as engaged in fun 
and eager to be modern. This was an image of modern womanhood that 
presented the woman as a commercial agent and a creator of her own 
images, but only with the guiding corporate hand of Kodak. Political 
agency, naturally, did not figure into this dynamic.
Other advertisements from Eastman Kodak established more ex-
plicit and practical links between the fair and the photographic activi-
ties of amateurs. One advertisement issued by Eastman Kodak in 1893 
promoted “Kolumbus Kodaks”—a slightly forced alliteration, it has to 
be said—but more significantly, presented an appeal to memory that 
would become central to the company’s advertising efforts writ large. 
“What’s worth seeing is worth remembering,” the ad stated. “There 
will be so much worth seeing and remembering at the World’s Fair 
that you’ll forget the best part of it. But you can faithfully preserve each 
scene if you’ll just ‘press the button.’” (“Kolumbus Kodaks,” 1893: n.p.) 
Banal as this ad copy might appear, it introduces an idea that is highly 
questionable yet central to the logic of photographic ubiquity: “What’s 
worth seeing is worth remembering.” Suggesting that any conceivable 
view warrants photographic preservation and that mental memories are 
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faulty, particularly when faced with the onslaught of memorable visions 
that one is bound to encounter at an event as avowedly spectacular as 
the world’s fair, this ad casts the Kodak as the inevitable solution to a 
problem readers might not have known that they had: the problem of 
remembering each sight that one sees. The contention that any sight 
that appears before one’s eyes is a potentially regrettable omission and 
a missed opportunity if it goes unphotographed powerfully establishes 
as a given the idea that nothing should exist beyond the camera’s scope. 
Even as the fair itself presented a highly orchestrated and spectacular 
view, Kodak advertisements framed the snapshot photographer as an 
individual possessing the agency to personalize and appropriate that 
view, demonstrating through their photographic record a subjective en-
counter with it. The fair might be uniform, the advertisement suggested, 
but kodakers could nonetheless make it their own.
Further supporting this idea, Eastman Kodak ads targeting fairgoers 
also reassured readers that their materials could meet even the most 
exacting demands as far as a voluminous photographic record was con-
cerned. They advertised film rolls containing up to 250 exposures, to ob-
viate the need of changing the roll and disrupting the constant capture 
of potentially memorable sights, as well as the use of free darkrooms on 
site at the fair where users could change those rolls if they found they 
needed to exceed this upper limit. “We propose to leave nothing undone 
that will assist the Kodaker in getting a complete photographic record 
of the great fair,” the ads stated.
The approach that these marketing materials adopted was consistent 
with Kodak’s broader advertising strategies as they progressed into the 
early 20th century. In the years following the world’s fair, advertising 
for Kodaks not only became less instrumental and more visually com-
pelling than the text-heavy ads just discussed but also highly invested 
in the production and reiteration of a particular set of fantasies geared 
toward white, middle-class, and often female consumers. Travel was 
central to these fantasies in the first two decades of the 20th century, 
and many Eastman Kodak advertisements showed adventurous kod-
akers—usually women—viewing the world through the lens of their 
Kodaks. Even when they did not show “locals” being photographed by 
kodakers, these ads created a visual dynamic in which kodakers pos-
sessed forms of agency or social privilege that other figures in the ad, 
typically non-white people engaged in service labor, did not. For exam-
ple, a 1905 ad in Ladies’ Home Journal showed a delicate-looking white 
woman being pulled along on a rickshaw by a Japanese man while va-
cationing in what the caption calls “Fair Japan.”3 Another image, this 
one from 1912, showed the Kodak girl as a world traveler, with a Black 
railway porter lifting her well-traveled suitcase as she clutched her cam-
era. (fig. 2.2) “The World is mine—” the ad read: “I own a KODAK.” The 
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overall impression that this advertisement leaves 
is that traveling with the Kodak will allow photo-
graphers to sublate the tension between a partial, 
personalized view and the kind of visual mastery 
that comes from a godlike view from above; after 
promising the reader that the Kodak is a way to 
possess “the world,” the ad copy encourages users 
to “Take a Kodak with you, and picture, from your 
own viewpoint, not merely the places that interest 
you but also the companions who help to make 
your trip enjoyable.” On one hand, the personal 
nature of the photographic record is emphasized: 
this is the Kodaker’s subjective vision. On the oth-
er, the Kodak photographer is here positioned as 
a chronicler with unimpeded access not only to 
the world’s places but to the people that populate 
them. The labor of people assisting kodakers with 
their travels tacitly began to include the work of 
being photographed by them. This tendency in 
early 20th-century Kodak advertisements signals 
the expansion of a notion originally presented in 
Kodak’s 1893 advertising efforts, that kodakers 
could make their photographic records “their own” by supplementing 
snapshots of the expected tourist attractions with images demonstrating 
the photographer’s personal encounter with the locale they were visit-
ing. At this later stage, however, “locals” were expected to provide the 
Kodaker’s album with this personal touch—and were framed in these 
advertisements as always available for photographic capture.
The Fair’s Ideal Image
Taken together, these advertisements paint a picture of the Kodaker 
as a figure who, by virtue of possession of a camera, is granted access 
to an imperial view: one’s surroundings, and the people who populate 
them, become a source of photographic material to be mined, and the 
photographer’s viewpoint and access to desired photographic material, 
human or otherwise, is unobstructed. But in the run-up to the fair, many 
amateur photographers were frustrated—and in some cases downright 
angered—to learn that this idealized view did not align with the rep-
resentational possibilities that they were afforded in practice. The fair 
was characterized by restrictions on which photographers could cap-
ture the fair as well as how they could capture it.
Figure 2.2
Kodak advertisement 
published in Ladies’ 
Home Journal, 1912. Ellis 
Collection of Kodakiana, 
Duke University.
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While Eastman Kodak’s advertisements presented the fair as a boun-
tiful and unconstrained source of material for photographs, the fair’s 
organizational staff conceptualized a much more limited set of possibil-
ities for most photographers who sought to capture this event. Charles 
Dudley Arnold, leader of the fair’s photography division, which operat-
ed under the authority of the fair’s Council of Administration, strongly 
believed that the photographic image of the fair should be tightly man-
aged, generated through a uniform, carefully constructed repertoire of 
images that would represent the event advantageously rather than leav-
ing its photographic representation open and indeterminate. Arnold 
was immensely troubled by the idea that images of the event could be 
polyphonic and unordered—limitless photographers photographing 
the fair, each capturing it from “their own viewpoint,” was anathema 
to him—and his opposition to this approach led him to prescribe tight 
controls on photographic activity. But this attitude and this approach 
was so out of step with the increasingly heterogeneous photographic 
culture of the 1890s that it generated serious backlash.
Scholars including Julie K. Brown and Peter Bacon Hales have ex-
amined Arnold’s role in the fair, and the fair’s documentation in official 
imagery, in depth. Arnold, an architectural photographer who ran the 
fair’s photography division and produced its photographic output, was 
chosen for this role largely because fair officials trusted him to create 
a pristine and respectable picture of the event, and he spent months 
photographing the construction of the fair and the finished product, 
ultimately generating several portfolios of oversize views using cameras 
that produced negatives of up to 20 × 24 inches. Hales writes that this 
imagery was supposed to possess a “monumental grandeur befitting the 
ambitions” of the fair organizers (Hales, 1984: 135). The agreements that 
Arnold made with the fair’s governing body gave him full control over 
the photographic representation of the fair, dictating that newspapers, 
magazines, and the official fair guidebook would only be permitted to 
use photographs made by Arnold or personally approved by him. If the 
mediated visual representation of the fair is anything to go by, he was not 
liberal in permitting alternate approaches. Reproductions often added 
or subtracted incidental elements to create a more lifelike or more direct 
image, but the architectural details that his images emphasized tend-
ed to carry through in these images. As Brown has observed, “No real 
debate had taken place on the question of whether there should be a 
multiple photographic viewpoint because the Exposition’s administra-
tors had never had any intention of opening the field to competition 
[…] The main purpose of the administrators was to ensure a controlled 
viewpoint.” (Brown, 1994: 70) Arnold, who was paid a salary of $2,000 
plus a 10 percent commission on the sale of prints, benefited materially 
from this arrangement.
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The images generated by this arrangement tend to reflect in visual 
terms the desire for grandeur as well as the tight control that fair of-
ficials demanded. They largely emphasized the architectural features 
of the White City, and presented the pristinely white, grandiose build-
ings that populated this area of the fair from a distanced, detached view 
from above. The view was homogeneous and largely unpopulated by 
humans. When humans were featured, they were shown from a distance, 
existing as remote, incidental figures or else as set pieces intended to 
frame a given view in what appeared to be a carefully calibrated fash-
ion. In some cases, they lent legibility to the images by metonymically 
representing the building’s role in instances where it was unclear, as in 
an image where women are shown congregating around the Women’s 
Building. Nothing is unruly or out of place in these images, and nothing 
is left to chance.
These images—highly legible and reproducible, because they ap-
peared unrooted from a particular point of view—presented a godlike 
view from nowhere, offering a perspective sufficiently distanced that hu-
man subjects seen in the photographs never reciprocated the camera’s 
gaze. In this respect, they mirrored the formal traits of another rapidly 
growing image genre in which photographs were called on to function 
as commodities: the picture postcard. In these images, the spectator 
surveying these images looks but is not looked at. The reproduction of 
highly similar views through print mass media—in the form of halftone 
photographs but also illustrations based on photographs—served to 
reinforce and reify these views, suggesting that while slight variations 
might be possible, the official visual record showed what needed to be 
shown. (figs. 2.3a and 2.3b)
Figure 2.3a
C. D. Arnold, “Mines and Mining Building,” 1893.  
University of Chicago Special Collections.
Figure 2.3b
Mines and Mining Building as illustrated in the Youth’s 
Companion World’s Fair Extra Number, May 4, 1893.
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“Photographic Privilege”: Controlling Photography at the Fair
The controlled view of the fair presented in its official imagery was 
supported by significant restrictions on all other photographers who 
sought to depict it. These restrictions seem to have been primarily 
aimed at restricting the work of professional photographers making im-
ages intended for public audiences, which would compete with Arnold’s 
image of the fair. The fear that informed this control was a fear that 
other photographers’ images would visibly and publicly undermine the 
fair’s official image. But this top-down control over the photograph-
ic likeness of the fair could not have come at a more infelicitous time, 
given that in the early 1890s, legions of new people were beginning to 
think of themselves as photographers, and given that the public voice 
of amateur photographers in specialist journals and the popular press 
was stronger than ever.
In the months leading up to the fair, correspondents in journals ded-
icated to the photographic trade and to amateur photography began to 
speculate about, anticipate, and plan their photographic activity at the 
fair. One central subject of speculation was what the fair’s organizers 
and commentators in the press began to refer to as the “photographic 
privilege” at the fair. Photographic privilege referred to the ability to 
photograph freely at the fair: to take photographs with the camera of 
one’s choosing and to photograph what one pleased. After months of 
fervent speculation on the part of photographers both amateur and pro-
fessional, the fair’s administration announced that this privilege would 
not be granted. Restrictions on photographing the fair would include a 
ban on cameras that produced negatives larger than 4 × 5 inches, a ban on 
all tripods, and a daily photographer’s permit fee of two dollars, which 
was substantially higher than the admission charge to the fair itself, 
which was fifty cents.
Critics of these restrictions described them as arbitrary and unrea-
sonable at best, and dictatorial at worst.4 While the restrictions were 
intended to discourage unsanctioned images of the fair from circulating 
in the press, criticisms of the fair’s administrative decisions were not as 
easily censored as were photographs. Critiques of these policies quick-
ly gathered steam, driven by publications ranging from The American 
Amateur Photographer to the Scientific American, among many others.5 
These publications’ protests militated against what they described as 
undue restrictions on photographing at an event that, in critics’ minds, 
seemed not only to warrant but to demand extensive and diverse photo-
graphic representation. These critics were united in their assumption 
that the fair was an event whose photogenic possibilities were un-
paralleled, and that anyone possessing a camera would be interested in 
capturing it.
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Equally, the right to photograph at the fair was characterized as a 
cause that all photographers must want and support. The American 
Amateur Photographer, which had recently come under the editorship of 
Alfred Stieglitz, frequently reproduced excerpts from articles in a range 
of other specialist and general-interest publications to demonstrate 
these points. This effort gave readers the impression of un animous 
opposition to restrictions on photographing the fair, suggesting that it 
was not merely correspondents in specialist publications like theirs that 
opposed this rule but all photographers, however skilled or unskilled 
they might be. In this way, the restrictions on fair photography helped to 
unite the motley array of amateur photographers then in existence, from 
technically skilled members of photographic societies and experimental 
photographic artists to kodakers.
This apparent chorus of voices presented the impression of wide-
spread, grassroots opposition to these restrictions. “Every photographer, 
professional and amateur, whether he intends to visit the fair person-
ally or not, should protest against the injustice of this narrow-minded 
scheme,” asserted one commentator from the Pacific Coast Photographer, 
who also called the decision to license one firm the sole photographic 
privilege “absurd” and “ridiculous.” (“Press Comments on World’s Fair 
Photographic Privilege,” 1892: 446) The New Orleans Picayune noted 
that restrictions on photography were “arousing a general and vigorous 
protest” from members of camera clubs nationwide, and noted gravely, 
“A monster petition is being signed.” (“Press Comments on World’s Fair 
Photographic Privilege,” 1892: 446) Further afield, the British Journal 
of Photography, speaking a bit less brashly, asserted that the decision 
to restrict photographers at the fair “seems to us at present an unwise 
inhibition of the practice of photography in a direction altogether con-
trary to the spirit of the age.” (“The Photographic Blunder at the World’s 
Fair,” 1892: 753)
This last point was one that many opponents of the photographic 
restrictions emphasized, and it was in this way that large numbers of 
amateur and professional photographers, as well as the Eastman Kodak 
Company itself, positioned the “photographic privilege” as an in alienable 
right, one whose suppression was an encroachment on photographers’ 
freedom. In this way, these photographers recoded limitations on their 
ability to photograph as impositions of unfreedom, presupposing and 
helping to produce the norm of a context in which places and people 
were, by default, photographable. While the world’s fair was not a truly 
public event—it took place in a semipublic space requiring an admission 
fee to enter—photographers who sought to operate in an unrestricted 
manner nonetheless argued passionately that rules limiting their ability 
to take pictures were contraventions of the public interest. One paper 
characterized restrictions on photography as “thoughtlessly unjust 
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to the public, for whose advancement the World’s Fair is arranged.” 
(“Press Comments on World’s Fair Photographic Privilege,” 1892: 446) 
Another commentator observed, “There are some things practiced in 
connection with the World’s Fair as almost lead one to the belief that it 
is a private enterprise, run for the few.” (“Photography at the World’s 
Fair,” 1893: 212) And another commentator, echoing a pervasive talking 
point, mused, “Free America appears to be becoming the land of the 
monopolist.” (“The World’s Fair Photographic Privilege—Comments 
of the Press,” 1892: 412)
In 1893, the charge of monopolistic activity held special significance 
for American readers, given that 1890 had seen the United States pass 
its first antitrust legislation with the Sherman Antitrust Act. With con-
cern about monopolistic activity at a peak, this characterization lent 
particular rhetorical force to the claim that the world’s fair administra-
tion was defying the public interest and exerting unwarranted power. 
But curiously absent in this discussion was any attention to the fact that 
Eastman Kodak, whose cameras were central to the popularization of 
amateur photography in this period, possessed a control of the market 
for photographic equipment that was growing increasingly close to a 
monopoly. The fact that discourses surrounding photography at the 
fair painted the fair’s administration as repressive allowed Eastman 
Kodak to present their materials and their corporate identity as liber-
ators helping to encourage photographic freedom in an inhospitable 
environment.6 If amateur photographers saw any contradiction in the 
framing of Eastman Kodak’s products as tools that could be mobilized 
against photographic monopolies, they did not express their reserva-
tions in the photography journals.
Discussions of photographic restriction and freedom at the fair 
played out on multiple registers, and as they did, amateur photographers 
developed an understanding of the right to take photographs as a fun-
damentally egalitarian capability. The fair organization was interested, 
and materially invested, in restricting the visual likeness of the fair by 
constraining photographers’ activity. Yet the default assumptions that 
these constrained photographers smuggled into their commentaries in 
the press also reveal a growing assumption that photographers should 
possess full agency over the domain they photograph.
This marks an important phase in the expansion of photography as 
an imperial right, because the framing of photographing whatever one 
wishes in public space as a right that should go unrestricted implicitly 
negates rights that others, and particularly photographic subjects, might 
have wished to claim: the right not to be photographed, the right to 
collaborate with the photographer, the right to exert agency over photo-
graphic likeness. Needless to say, amateur photographers’ discussions 
tended not to countenance the fact that their unimpeded photographic 
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freedom might impinge on the rights of others. In rejecting the idea 
that photography should be a limited privilege subject to negotiation, 
these photographers may have been balking at a powerful institution 
aiming to control their photographic expression for financial gain, but 
they were also positioning a right that was, in practice, typically limited 
to those in a position of imperial privilege as a universal right whose 
curtailment was a threat to the public interest. The implicit agent and 
ideal subject of these rights was the photographer, not those who were 
photographed, and this dynamic perpetuated and dramatically expand-
ed a tradition that predated the fair and stood at the crux of the link-
age between photography and imperial rights: the refusal to consider 
the photograph’s subject as an equal participant in the photographic 
encounter.
Conclusion: Undermining Imperial Views at the Fair
A common fixture of commentaries written by photographers at the 
fair was the complaint that the restrictions they faced on their photo-
graphic activity prevented them from seamlessly reproducing the ide-
alized view from above that characterized much of the fair’s official 
imagery. Yet in looking at these commentaries and at the images that 
unofficial photographers produced, it becomes possible to identify 
some new representational possibilities that are born from limitations 
on photographers’ inability to replicate this view. In particular, these 
images break, by necessity, with the detached, godlike perspective that 
characterized official images of the fair.
This perspective is often absent or limited in the work of amateur 
photographers at the fair, because, in addition to asserting their con-
trol over photographic activity not only legally, through regulations 
restricting the photographic privilege, the fair’s administration also 
reinforced it conceptually, through their exclusive command of certain 
views. One photographer, Fred Felix, reported that, when he climbed 
atop the colossal Administration Building to make a panoramic view 
of the entire fairgrounds from an elevation of 150 feet, a point “from 
which the view was imposing,” he was apprehended by a member of 
the Columbian Guards, the semi-military police force in charge of 
overseeing the fair. The officer instructed Felix that Arnold, the official 
photographer, “was the only man who could take pictures there.” (Felix, 
1892: 410) In this way, the fair’s organization claimed exclusive authority 
over dominant views of the whole grounds, denying Kodakers and other 
unofficial photographers these capacities.
This perspective possessed exclusively by the fair’s controlling body 
was one that, much like the scopic regime that Nicholas Mirzoeff has 
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termed “imperial visuality,” was predicated on an increasingly vast dis-
tance between the gaze of imperial powers and the subjects they depict-
ed, and on the attendant capacity of colonists to look in a surveillant, 
unreciprocated way (Mirzoeff, 2011). But instead of thinking of kodak-
ers’ inability to approximate this view as a limitation or privation, it is 
worthwhile to consider the generative potential of camera views that did 
not adopt this imperial viewpoint, whether they explicitly refused it or 
merely failed in their efforts to approximate it.
A photographic album from Jos. E. Hartman, one amateur photo-
grapher active at the fair, points us to a few representational possibilities 
generated through the denial or refusal of an imperial view. Hartman’s 
photographic activity at the fair appears to have been limited to a single 
day—June 15, 1893—and it resulted in an album of cyanotype images, 
each accompanied by a handwritten caption in red ink.7 (fig. 2.4 and 2.5) 
Hartman’s decision to produce cyanotype positives of his own making, 
rather than ordering gelatin silver prints produced by Eastman Kodak’s 
labs, demonstrates not only a pragmatic interest in cost-cutting but also 
an assertion of individual ownership of the production process.8 Many 
amateur photographers’ albums and snapshots of the fair hint at a 
thwarted interest in mimicking the grand views captured by Arnold, pre-
senting the stately architecture of the White City from perspectives that 
are partially obstructed, with guardrails, balustrades, and errant shrub-
bery denying the spectator the impression of having total command over 
the view.9 But Hartman’s perspective is different. Presenting views from 
the level of the street, these images are decidedly situated, placing the 
spectator directly within the action taking place on the ground. At times, 
the images dramatize the spectator’s smallness and inability to encom-
pass the view, as in one photograph, ostensibly of the Administration 
Building, which is mostly blank foreground. In other images, we see fair 
visitors glancing at one another as they pass, adjusting their parasols, 
and craning their necks to look at the East Indian Palace and the Java 
Village. We also see performers dressed in an array of forms of native 
attire and laborers operating sedan chairs.
While the looking that we, like the photographer, engage in some-
times goes unnoticed, presenting a voyeuristic view of this common 
space and the people who fill it, that gaze is frequently reciprocated by 
subjects within the frame who look directly at the camera at the moment 
of exposure, as in an image of the Turkish Mosque. (fig. 2.4) The left 
side of the frame is dominated by a female passerby in a plaid skirt and 
unbuttoned jacket who appears to have just caught sight of the camera. 
Similarly, in a set of two photographs captioned “Sedan Chair Carriers,” 
an undetected side view of men carrying a sedan is complemented, and 
its perspective undermined, by another shot that shows another group 
of carriers from the front as they look at and address the photographer 
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directly, with one carrier raising his arm and appearing to call out to 
the photographer, as another figure—a white man in a suit and derby 
hat—strides across the picture’s foreground. (fig.2.5) Rather than taking 
pleasure in viewing these subjects surreptitiously or observing them 
placed by the photographer into “characteristic” poses, the spectator 
looking at this photograph is hailed directly by the sedan chair carriers. 
Though they still appear within this image as representatives of a puta-
tively “foreign” culture rendering a service to privileged fairgoers, the 
spontaneity of this image’s capture and the photographer’s inability to 
control or predetermine the reactions of his subjects means that, even 
though they are denied the capacity to deliberately pose themselves, 
they are able to reciprocate the photographer’s gaze on their terms, 
and address him, and us, directly, substituting direct visual address and 
exchange for an appropriative view from above. These photographs do 
not radically depart from, or even explicitly challenge, the imperial logic 
at the heart of amateur photographers’ efforts to depict the fair and 
the world unimpeded. What they succeed in doing is analogizing that 
logic: rendering it visible and therefore providing concrete grounds for 
its critique. Making visible the social relations that play out between 
those who Kodak as they go and those who are captured by the Kodak, 
and between those who must carry the sedan chair and those who are 
positioned to occupy it, these photographs demonstrate the disingenu-
ousness of the idea, presented increasingly vocally in the 1890s, that the 
right to snap photographs unchallenged and without limits was a right 
anyone could conceivably exercise. By its very nature, these photographs 
tell us, not everyone could enjoy the photographic privilege.
Figure 2.4
Page from an album of 
photographs, mostly 
cyanotypes, taken by Jos. 
E. Hartman at the Chicago 
World’s Fair on June 15, 
1893. Chicago History 
Museum.
See also Plate 4.
Figure 2.5
Page from an album of 
photographs, mostly 
cyanotypes, taken by Jos. 
E. Hartman at the Chicago 
World’s Fair on June 15, 
1893. Chicago History 
Museum.
See also Plate 5.
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Notes
1. While it is common, this hagiographic narrative is 
not uncontested; Don Slater and John Tagg presented 
critical evaluations of the Kodak model in the 1980s.
2. The 1890 U.S. census estimated the country’s pop-
ulation at sixty-three million. In his 1893 essay “The 
Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 
first presented at the Chicago world’s fair, Frederick 
Jackson Turner began his discussion with a gesture 
toward a bulletin released by the Superintendent of 
the Census in 1890, which stated that there could 
“hardly be said to be a frontier line” as of 1890 (1). 
For Turner, this statement signaled “the closing of a 
great historic movement”—and presented a troubling 
threat to the “expansive power” that he considered 
crucial to American identity (7). This anxiety among 
thinkers like Turner over the sudden lack of proximate 
space that Americans could colonize offered them a 
way to rationalize the United States’ sharp turn toward 
imperial intervention at the end of the 19th century.
3. Space constraints prevent me from reproducing this 
striking image in the Figures section for this chapter, 
but it can be found online, as of 2020, from Duke 
University’s Ellis Collection of Kodakiana at https://
repository.duke.edu/dc/eaa/K0431.
4. An untitled lead article in The Photo-American 
(1892: 266) for instance, asserted, “it does not seem 
right in this age of photography to prohibit the public 
at large from using a camera on the exposition grounds 
[…] The camera is the note book of the modern travel-
er, and there seems to be no more justice in forbidding 
him to use it than there would be in interfering with the 
use of his pen or his field glass.” The article concluded 
by encouraging readers to sign a petition being sent to 
the Ways and Means Committee of the World’s Fair.
5. The American Amateur Photographer (1893a: 367) did 
not mince words in its critiques of the fair’s adminis-
tration: “A recent visit to the Fair grounds convinced us 
of the folly of the absurd restrictions enacted against 
the camera of the amateur and of the journalist,” 
one article stated. “The incompetency of the [fair’s] 
present Department of Photography is so notorious 
among all well-informed persons in Chicago, that it is 
invariably alluded to as a disgrace to the Exposition,” 
the commentator added, noting that the department 
was run by “men totally unskilled in the science.”
6. In the 1890s, Eastman Kodak’s domestic sales grew at 
a rate of about 17.5 percent per year, amounting to 40 
percent of all photographic sales in the United States 
by 1909. Christina Kotchemidova has observed that 
George Eastman’s control over a number of crucial 
patents meant that the market for amateur cameras and 
film became “virtually a Kodak monopoly.” (Kotchemi-
dova, 2005: 4)
7. This album is in the collections of the Chicago History 
Museum, with the accession number G1983.222.
8. My thanks to Jacob Lewis for this insight.
9. This assertion is based on my examination of col-
lections of amateur photographs of the fair held in 
repositories including the Chicago History Museum, 
the Chicago Public Library, the Newberry Library, and 
George Eastman House.
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3. Material Ecologies in the Géniaux 
Brothers’ Picture Archive of Brittany, 
ca. 1900
Maura Coughlin1
Around 1900, brothers Paul (1873–1930) and Charles (1870–1931) 
Géniaux assembled a documentary archive of images, picturing both 
traditional and industrial forms of work, including the harvesting and 
processing of materials such as hemp fibers, salt, and slate in their native 
Brittany. In their realist approach to photography, the Géniaux broth-
ers echoed established visual tropes of rural labor and locale, as they 
pictured the artisanal and industrial skills of extracting and processing 
natural resource materials. Using the tools of ecocriticism, I examine 
the ways that the Géniaux conceptualized material ecologies (a seem-
ingly endless abundance of natural resources) and the extractive labors 
connected to them. Despite the ubiquitous proliferation of their photo-
graphs in the early 20th century, their collective projects have, until 
recently, been but a footnote in French photography.
Contemporaries of early 20th-century documentary photographers 
Lewis Hine, Jacob Riis, and Eugène Atget, the Géniaux brothers grew 
up as privileged bourgeois residents of the Breton city of Rennes. Their 
father was a military doctor, and their mother had income from several 
rental properties. As well-educated, bourgeois Bretons, they lived very 
different lives alongside their peasant subjects; they had multiple resi-
dences within France (in Brittany, Paris, and the south of France) and the 
privilege to travel and vacation. The peasant laborers they photographed 
only left home out of necessity to follow employment whether within 
Brittany, to Paris, or along the North Atlantic. Contradictory imbalanc-
es of power mark their engagement with many different communities 
throughout the region and their fascination with the particularities of 
working-class labor. Ariella Azoulay insightfully describes photography 
as a sample of relationships between people in which bonds of obliga-
tion and responsibility are generated between the subject photographed 
and the potential viewer (Azoulay, 2014). Taking Azoulay’s insight to 
heart, and expanding this sense of responsibility to nonhuman life, the 
following ecocritical analysis of their works brings to the surface an 
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entanglement of materials, places, and people. Furthermore, I suggest 
that the newly accessible digital archive of the Géniaux brothers’ photo-
graphs offer 21st-century viewers a greater understanding of our social 
and ecological connections to “natural resources.”
In Rennes in the early 1890s, the Géniaux brothers converted an 
old greenhouse in the garden of their family home to a shop for the 
photomechanical printing of their photographs. In 1893, they launched a 
journal devoted to literature and photography in Brittany titled Bretagne 
Revue (later renamed Revue Pittoresque de Bretagne) (Goujard, 2019: 68). 
Their photographs of Brittany had many material incarnations in a 
short succession: they sold them as souvenirs in sets, and many were 
later photomechanically reproduced in books as collotypes (Wright, 
2004: 31; Boulouch, 2019: 46). Using printing technologies that had re-
cently become widespread, the brothers accumulated an image base of 
rural peasant typologies; stock figures who stood for the labors, trades, 
traditions, and local communities of the region. Their sharp-focused 
gelatin silver prints had a detailed depth of field and a reproducible 
gray scale (which ranged from velvet blacks to crisp whites), resulting 
from shooting their subjects in natural light. A naturalistic, seemingly 
objective representation was at the heart of the Géniaux photographic 
practice, and this set them apart from many of their contemporaries 
whose themes may have been similar, but whose techniques tended to-
ward a more graphic form of Pictorialism. The postcard explosion of 
the turn of the 20th century was timed perfectly for the Géniaux broth-
ers’ images to contribute to a flood of photographic images of Brittany 
that were consumed in France and parts beyond (Croix et al., 2012: 109). 
Charles, who is perhaps better known as a regionalist author, frequently 
re produced their Brittany photographs in his later texts, using them as 
stock imagery to illustrate his nostalgic narratives. The title of his illus-
trated book, The Old France That is Vanishing, clearly articulates a lament 
for a traditional way of life that remained in Brittany but was rapidly re-
treating from the modern world (Boulouch, 2019: 46). Charles declared 
in this text that their “photographs will be like the living corollary of a 
study which has no other merit than to have been written from nature.” 
(Géniaux, 1903: 209)
Charles gave up photography in preference for his career as a writ-
er, according to an unpublished biography written by his widow Claire 
Géniaux (Prod’homme, 2014: 19).2 Paul remained dedicated to photo-
graphy; in the early 20th century, he started a project photographing 
Parisian street trades (in the same archival manner as the Brittany 
photographs) and in the 1920s turned to fashion photography in Paris. 
An exhibition in the Carnavalet Museum in Paris in 1984 put Paul 
Géniaux’s Paris work in dialogue with the roughly contemporary street 
photographers Eugène Atget and Louis Vert for their shared interest 
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in the popular traditions of markets and small merchants that were 
either surviving or dying out in Haussmannized Paris (Prod’homme, 
2012 and 2014; Grossiord and Reynaud, 1984). Until quite recently, Paul 
Géniaux’s Paris photographs were far better known than the brothers’ 
Brittany archive. In the past decade, with several gifts of forgotten neg-
atives and prints, the Musée de Bretagne in Rennes has greatly enlarged 
its photographic holdings and has contributed to the recovery of the 
history of the Géniaux brothers, as demonstrated in its 2019 retro-
spective exhibition of many formerly unknown photographs, curated 
by Laurence Prod’homme. Most recently, the images in the Musée de 
Bretagne database have been opened to the public domain and have 
begun a new circulation, this time as a freely reproducible digital cache 
of recovered regional memory. This essay is indebted to the current 
accessibility of these images.
Etudes Bretonnes: Representing Brittany
As rural types, the brothers’ images of working Bretons are rooted in 
(and are conversant with) French realist and regional imagery at the turn 
of the century. The following overview of the visual representation of 
Breton culture in France illuminates the context of their images and the 
proliferation of their reproductions. As a photographic subject, Brittany 
had a great appeal to French audiences: even in 1900, it seemed to be a 
latecomer to modernity. This peninsular region was relatively isolated 
from France (with sea on three sides and marshland to the east); it had 
formally joined France in 1532, but remained relatively autonomous until 
the French Revolution. From the 1790s onward, travelers had described 
the people of Brittany as a remnant of a “pure” Celtic race, independent 
of France or any other culture. However, Brittany had always been net-
worked with other coastal regions on the northeast Atlantic, whether 
by its connection to the British Isles in the low sea level of prehistoric 
times, sea trade with the Roman Empire, or its long maritime history in 
the medieval and early modern period. And yet the depopulated, rural 
landscape was viewed by many tourists as a relic region, existing in a 
suspended state of cultural ruin; its prehistoric past at once mysteriously 
distant and uncannily alive (Young, 2012: 139; Menzies, 2011: 21).
However, it is historically misguided to focus on Brittany as a 
space of primitivism in opposition to metropolitan France (Coughlin, 
2013: 75–76). Seafaring Brittany, with its long coastline and many ports, 
was a participant in early modern Atlantic capitalism as it emerged; it 
had an age of great prosperity from both fishing and the production 
of textiles from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Early mod-
ern communities of coastal Europe repeatedly caused (and suffered) 
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the depletion of fish stocks; these collapses, as anthropologist Charles 
Menzies argues, are entirely continuous with our present “globalized” 
world (Menzies, 2011: 20–21). As French fishing fleets exhausted wild 
food commons of the ocean, they moved ever westward to Iceland and 
Newfoundland. In the 16th century, on France’s Atlantic coast, cod fish-
ing and marine trade supported population growth and brought great 
wealth to ports such as Penmarc’h in the Bay of Audierne (Finistère) be-
fore the local fish stocks disappeared. Like the elaborate sculpture pro-
grams of the enclos, or parish church compounds in Finistère that were 
funded by merchants in Brittany’s cloth trade, many other 16th-century 
churches and pilgrimage sites are testament to the region’s past wealth, 
tied to its fishing and agricultural ecologies. By the 19th century, inland 
areas of Finistère had already deindustrialized following the collapse 
of the early modern textile industry. From the 1850s onward, there was 
a boom in industrial canned sardines from Brittany that traded on a 
global market: workers left impoverished villages on the interior of the 
peninsula to work in factories on the coast. Cod fishing had also become 
a global endeavor: boys from poor families in the interior were shipped 
off to work on the shores of Newfoundland, just as boys from coastal 
towns were sent for six-month journeys on cod boats (Coughlin, 2020). 
As these examples show, for many centuries, Brittany’s economic for-
tunes had been tied to both global trade and planetary ecologies.
Before train lines opened up the provinces of France to mass tour-
ism in the 1880s, many notable illustrated social panoramas (and travel 
texts) published on Brittany, including Les Français Peints par eux-mêmes 
(1840–1842), inventoried its climate, geography, and the effects of this 
local nature on the cultural character of the region and its inhabitants 
(Coughlin, 2003). In these volumes, peasant types were presented as 
markers of the landscape—like local landforms or indigenous plants, 
their festive costumes, labors, ways of speech, moral character, and their 
dwellings are described as timeless local features of the place. Some of 
the earliest popular photography in Brittany, such as the well-known 
album of 233 stereoscopic views from 1857 by Charles-Paul Furne and 
Henri Tournier, repeats imagery from these earlier visual mediums 
(Croix et al., 2012: 44; Jeaneau and Berthelom, 2006: 52; Prod’homme, 
2014: 91). Early photographs of regional figures—as seen in early albu-
men prints mounted like cartes de visite—are posed to display their cos-
tume and physiognomies, but their labor is not the narrative (Jeaneau 
and Berthelom, 2006: 20). Photography historian Lucie Goujard ex-
plains that the French preference for images of working peasants in the 
later 19th century was influenced by the midcentury visual language of 
realist painting: French photographers cultivated “the naturalist para-
dox of photography,” creating carefully posed scenes. In part, Goujard 
argues, this comes from the fact that some photographs made “after 
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nature” were intended as studies for artists to copy (Goujard, 2009). 
Art historian Griselda Pollock concurs that, as the visual language 
of photography emerged, it was “heavily indebted to existing visual 
conventions and practices” but it also “offered a new kind of visuality 
when it restaged those poses and gestures in its own, emergent semio-
sis.” (Pollock and Florence, 2001: 204) Salon painting, from the 1870s 
onward, had favored representations of Breton peasants in holiday 
costume, at times either anachronistic (using men’s prerevolutionary 
costume) or unrealistic (e.g., women working in the fields in high lace 
festival coiffes). The Brittany that the Géniaux offered their public both 
partook of convention and, occasionally, broke with it.
In Belle Époque Brittany, amateur photo associations proliferat-
ed, especially in the cities of Nantes and Rennes. In an encyclopedic 
publication that draws from museum, regional, municipal, and private 
collections, Alain Croix, Didier Guyvarc’h, and Marc Rapilliard dis-
cuss this era in which the availability of cameras and gelatin silver print 
materials permitted amateur and professional photographers an un-
precedented agency in selecting the particular aspects of Breton culture 
that they found picture-worthy (Croix et al., 2012: 101). Photographing a 
peasant performing a traditional task or métier was a commonplace in 
France by 1900, as the exhibition in Le Faouët, 100 Métiers Vus Par Les 
Artistes en Bretagne, demonstrated (Bellec et al., 2017). Some of these 
compositions were made by artists such as André Dauchez, who used 
his photographs as studies for paintings and prints. In the early 1890s, 
Edmond Rudaux took photos in Brittany to translate both to engrav-
ings and for his book illustrations for Pierre Loti’s wildly popular novel 
An Iceland Fishermen (Croix et al., 2012: 117). Charles Lhermitte (son of 
rustic painter Léon Lhermitte) filtered his Pictorialist images through 
the paintings of Millet, Corot, and Breton. Also notable are Gustave 
Gain’s autochromes made around 1900 in Brittany. Lastly, there is the 
documentary work of Paul Gruyer, which most closely resembles that 
of the Géniaux brothers. Gruyer was among the earliest photographers 
to work directly with an author to produce book illustrations, as seen in 
his ambitions 1905 volume La Bretagne, a collaboration with regionalist 
writer Gustave Geffroy (Geoffroy, 1905; Croix et al., 2012: 107).
Much Belle Époque Breton photography repeats tropes of an archaic 
place lost in time: laundresses crouch at rustic lavoirs (washhouses), 
there are festive marriages, religious pardons, seaweed collectors at the 
shore, beggars, drunks, widows, witches, and peasant women selling 
their hair to nefarious wigmakers. And yet there are hints that a form of 
modernity is visible in Brittany: we occasionally see new trains, bridges, 
and modern clothing creeping into the compositions. Curator Laurence 
Prod’homme states that, in spite of the fact that many of their images 
seem nostalgic today (and indeed they repeated many of the tropes just 
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mentioned), the Géniaux brothers were not interested in mythologizing 
Brittany as archaic or unwilling to modernize (Prod’homme, 2019: 77). 
Even as they did not escape conventions established in earlier visual cul-
ture, they often documented themes of rural life that the Pictorialists 
avoided, such as ruined landscapes, child labor, and routine work. The 
brothers were clearly aware of the continuing appeal of Breton imagery: 
their images both trade upon popular and academic images and (oc-
casionally) resist them. Charles, for an egregious instance, exploited 
clichés of Brittany’s exoticism and sold some of his stories abroad 
(illustrated with photographs) to journals such as the sensationalist 
Wide World Magazine in London, which ran his essay “Naia, the Witch 
of Rochefort,” in 1899, and a tale of the predatory wig industry, “The 
Human Hair Harvest in Brittany,” the following year (Géniaux, 1899; 
Géniaux, 1900). In cases like this, the Géniaux brothers’ images were 
themselves extracted resources that circulated and perpetuated the 
ubiquitous image of Brittany as the exemplary case of old France being 
lost to modernity.
The peasants photographed by the Géniaux were rarely named 
individuals; most of them would not have been in the habit of posing 
for a camera apart from wedding portraits or other formal occasions 
(Bourdieu et al., 2004). Yet most are aware of being photographed, and 
very few seem at ease. The brothers often photographed peasant subjects 
at work, performing skilled labor such as salt harvesting, spinning flax, 
or splitting slate. As the images were repurposed and relabeled on the 
way to mass reproduction, they lost much of the specific detail of their 
identities, locale, trade, and materials. For instance, Charles Géniaux’s 
Figure 3.1
Charles Géniaux, 
Tisserand et des fusées 
(Weaver and spools in 
Muzillac (Morbihan)), ca. 
1900–1903. Glass nega-
tive, Musée de Bretagne, 
Rennes.
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photograph Weaver and Spools in Muzillac, ca. 1900–1903, depicts an 
unnamed, older male weaver who stands beside three wreaths of drying 
skeins that hang on his stone workshop wall. (fig. 3.1) The vest he wears 
identifies him as a Breton; more importantly, it appears to be made of 
industrially woven cloth (likely wool and velvet) and is typical of clothing 
associated with local Breton identity at that time. Charles then used this 
photograph as an illustration of a chapter “Chez le Tisserand” (“At the 
Weaver’s House”) in his nostalgic book of 1903, La Vielle France qui s’en 
va. Among other exacting details about the relationships between weav-
ers, their materials, and their customers, he notes that weavers work 
only for commissions and do not create work for a prospective market. 
A weaver, he tells us, must carefully gauge how much cloth will result 
from the spools of wool that he purchases from a farmer. Géniaux adds 
(without reference to the decline of the textile industry), “if we insist on 
the description of this manufacture, it is to emphasize the exceptional 
ingenuity of these modest weavers.” (Géniaux, 1903: 86) When repro-
duced as a postcard in the series “Breton Customs and Costumes,” with 
only the subtitle “A Weaver and Spools,” the image of the weaver further 
lost personal and regional identity. Géniaux’s text never reflects upon 
the divergence between its advocacy for the artisanal labor productive of 
a handmade or bespoke item and the industrialized material processes 
that made the image reproducible and widespread.
Many of the Géniaux brothers’ photographs of Breton workers em-
phasize labor and routine gesture. The working body is a persistent motif 
of early 20th-century documentary photography, whether in the mills of 
Lewis Hine’s images, the agricultural fields of the American South and 
West for Farm Security Administration photographers, or in the many 
typologies of German workers collected by August Sander. Annales 
school historian Lucienne Roubin describes peasant physical encul-
turation in peasant know-how as including both “familial” knowledge 
(secrets shared only among family members) and technical skills that 
were “corporative” (shared by those who practiced a métier) (Roubin, 
1977). Applied to realist visual imagery, her work encourages a reading of 
working peasant bodies as enculturated by their daily realities and by the 
specificity of their corporeal demands and practices (Roubin, 1977: 97). 
Describing a photograph by Sander (ca. 1914) of German peasant men 
in suits, John Berger continues this line of thought, noting that the “char-
acteristic physical rhythm which most peasants, both men and women 
acquire […] [is] related to the energy demanded by the amount of work 
which has to be done in a day, and is reflected in typical movements and 
stance.” (Berger, 2009: 33) The imagery of the Géniaux brothers can be 
read as a collection of regionally specific labor typologies that articulate 
corporatif knowledge and of routine gestures that work to transform the 
matter of the natural world.
78 Ubiquity: Photography’s Multitudes
Cheap Nature
Photography historian and critic Michelle Henning proposes that we 
accept photography from the outset as an impure category, a congeal-
ing of nature and culture, of human and non-human, of material stuff 
and images and discourses, of a range of technologies, practices and 
effects. To treat it, in other words, as an imbroglio in the sense that 
Bruno Latour uses it: a tangled knot of human social practices and 
concepts and of the material, technical, chemical properties of things. 
(Henning, 2018: 6)
As Henning suggests, Latour’s emphasis on entanglement is a 
productive starting point for examining the relationships, dependen-
cies, and networks that are pictured in the Géniaux brothers’ Brittany 
photographs. The growing field of ecomaterialist criticism is an inter-
disciplinary perspective drawn from the work of Latour, Alfred Gell, 
and Jane Bennett (among many others) to encourage thinking about re-
lational networks of the human and more-than-human worlds and the 
ways that objects can afford action (Latour, 2005; Gell, 1998; Bennett, 
2010). In addition to Latour’s notion of entanglement discussed above, 
Donna Haraway extends the ecocritical vocabulary of inseparable rela-
tion further with her term “natureculture.” This neologism effectively 
collapses previously opposed terms and recognizes their inseparabil-
ity in ecological relationships that are both biophysically and socially 
formed (Haraway, 2008: 66). Feminist ecomaterialist Stacy Alaimo 
gives us the useful concept of “trans-corporeality […] material inter-
changes across human bodies, animal bodies, and the wider material 
world.” (Alaimo, 2012: 476) And further, ecomaterialists Serenella 
Iovino and Serpil Oppermann summarize basic tenets of “new materi-
alist” thought as
a pronounced reaction against some radical trends of postmodern 
and post-structuralist thinking that allegedly ‘dematerialized’ the 
world into linguistic and social constructions. The new attention paid 
to matter has […] emphasized the need for recalling the concrete-
ness of existential fields, with regard to both the bodily dimension 
and to non-binary object-subject relations. (quoted in Alaimo, 76)
In my research, ecomaterialism has provided critical tools for think-
ing through relationships rather than binary terms, thwarting previous 
critical conflations of all representations of rural life with mere nostal-
gia. The widespread critique of social construction that pervaded visual 
culture studies in the 1990s today seems coldly disengaged, as Alaimo 
writes, “with lived, biological bodies and the actions and significations 
of the nonhuman world.” (Alaimo, 2016: 542)
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Ecocriticism has come more recently to studies of art history and 
visual culture. Alan Braddock was an early advocate for ecocritical read-
ings of 19th-century visual culture; he notes that “ecocriticism empha-
sizes ecological interconnectedness, sustainability, and environmental 
justice in cultural interpretation. It asserts the imbrication of all beings, 
artifacts, and matter-including humans and their creative works-within 
a dynamic mesh of relations, agents, and historical forces.” (Braddock, 
2015: 448) The importance of an ecocritical approach is at the heart of 
the volume Ecocriticism and the Anthropocene in Nineteenth-Century 
Art and Visual Culture, which I coedited with Emily Gephart. We 
brought together essays that explored, among many other things, the 
paradox that, just at the times when “resources were extricated irrevers-
ibly from their surroundings, scientists studied evidence of in extricable 
ecological relationships and postulated comprehensive narratives of 
the world’s deep time, vast scale and dynamic flux.” (Coughlin and 
Gephart, 2019: 5) Ecocriticism emphasizes that monetizing our rela-
tionship with this thing we call “nature” has resulted in a loss of under-
standing of our connections to the nonhuman world. As Raj Patel and 
Jason W. Moore write, the Cartesian revolution of the Enlightenment 
accomplished four major transformations: the valorization of binary 
thinking about nature and culture, the primary conception of sub-
stances as things (while ignoring the relationships between sub stances), 
the domination of nature through science, and the colonial project of 
global mapping and domination (Patel and Moore, 2017: 54). In the 
environmental humanities, the term “Capitalocene” has gained trac-
tion as an epochal term descriptive of this logic that has underscored 
human responsibility for the climate crisis. Moore (and many others) 
have critiqued the current use of the term “Anthropocene” to mark our 
era, because it focuses too strictly on the effects of fossil fuel usage 
that begins in the years around 1800: “this narrative is shaped by a pe-
culiar kind of past/present binary: the whole of history, at least since 
the Neolithic Revolution, is cast into the dustbin of the ‘pre industrial.’ 
Most scholars are well aware that human civilizations transformed 
environments in significant ways well before the nineteenth century.” 
(Moore, 2016: 90)
“Capitalocene” shifts the focus to the longer story of the global 
capitalist exploitation of “cheap nature” that harnessed naïve faith in 
modernity and progress to accelerate the extraction of monetary value 
from natural resources. Science played a role, from the Enlightenment, 
of making nature a thing, an Other in which capital accumulated, some-
thing that could be assessed, traded, and sold. Philosopher Timothy 
Morton deploys his own term “agrilogistics” to refer to this utilitarian 
attitude toward “resources”: “agrilogistics promises to eliminate 
fear, anxiety and contradiction—social, physical and ontological—by 
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establishing thin rigid boundaries between human and nonhuman 
worlds and by reducing existence to sheer quantity.” (Morton, 2016: 43)
Examining the extraction of value from “cheap nature” in the 
Géniaux brothers’ picturing of landscapes and labor reveals the cen-
turies-old nature of this relationship in the entangled cultures of their 
worked Breton landscapes and laboring Breton bodies. Paradoxically, 
the widespread reproduction of their images rendered rural Brittany 
as both a ubiquitous image of the marginal survival of rural life and a 
material extraction site of seemingly endless natural resources drawn 
from the land and sea. What the material ecologies of their images ar-
ticulate so clearly is the nature of materials and their transformations 
through human and animal labor. Matter that is dried, sliced, picked, 
reaped, quarried, boiled, and separated from its original form repeats 
throughout their work. For the remainder of this essay, I turn to par-
ticular images by the Géniaux that detail the extraction, production, or 
cultivation of three materials: hemp, slate, and salt.
Hemp and Other Plant Matter
In their photograph Paysage de Landes, ca. 1902–1905, the Géniaux de-
pict a typical Breton lande or moor. It depicts only a grazed, uneven, 
and eroded field with a worn path through the spare ground cover and 
a gray sky above. (fig. 3.2) Although the term lande roughly translates 
as moorland or heath, it also connotes other uncultivated or “waste-
lands” without evident agricultural productivity. Despite its appearance 
Figure 3.2
Paul or Charles Géniaux, 
Paysage de Landes 
(Waste Landscape), ca. 
1902–1905. Gelatin silver 
print, Musée de Bretagne, 
Rennes.
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of wild and empty desolation, this was a thoroughly worked, human 
space: landes like this had been used by humans and animals for mil-
lennia. Peasants used every available plant that grew on the landes. Peat 
was dug from bogs for heating; even spiny gorse, broom, heather, and 
ferns were harvested for fuel or animal fodder and bedding. Farmers of 
the area cleared and burned these commons. Fields lay fallow for a time, 
then were planted and grazed in rotation in a relatively balanced practice 
that maintained and worked with their limited fertility. Through formal 
clearing or défrichement, rural spaces that were not already put to use 
in hedgerow-enclosed bocages either became extraction sites or were 
transformed to arable worked lands. Coastal wetlands and interior bogs 
were gradually drained to create grasslands or were worked for shellfish 
farming or salt harvesting. Although many of these sites were modest 
in acreage, the cumulative result was devastating. Over the course of 
the 19th and 20th centuries, 98 percent of Britany’s landes were cleared, 
primarily for agriculture.
Prior to industrial agriculture and the production of chemical ferti-
lizers, few crops flourished on the landes except for buckwheat (sarrasin) 
and hemp. Both of these crops appear in the Géniaux brothers’ photo-
graphs. In one photograph, a child, perhaps already a harvester, stands 
in a field of flowering buckwheat, which stretches beyond the frame. 
(fig. 3.3) In two others (ca. 1902–1905), two young men use a horse-
drawn mowing machine to harvest a buckwheat field. Originating in 
Asia, buckwheat was introduced in Europe sometime in the Middle 
Figure 3.3
Géniaux brothers, Champ 
de Sarrasin (Buckwheat 
Field), ca. 1902–1905. 
Glass negative, Musée de 
Bretagne, Rennes.
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Ages—blé noir or “black wheat” was a foodstuff synonymous with the 
poverty of Brittany, as it gave peasants buckwheat crepes and black 
bread instead of refined baked goods made with white flour. Not a true 
grain, but a plant in the same family as sorrel, knotweed, and rhubarb, 
buckwheat grows well in sandy soil with a low nitrogen content, much 
like hemp. The Géniaux present the cultivation of buckwheat as an as-
pect of the everyday agricultural landscape.
Breton hemp and linen (which grew well on the coast) brought great 
wealth to Finistère in the booming textile trade of the 16th and 17th 
centuries. These crops were grown, processed, and finished in Brittany 
and were the materials from which nets, lines, ropes, and sails were 
made; these materials were central actors in France’s maritime trade.3 
As Moore notes, the cloth trade is central to the emergence of capital-
ism, because both peasant labor and naturally derived resources were 
conceived as “Cheap Nature […] [which] toward the end of the sev-
enteenth century […] reached deep into the countrysides of western 
Europe through protoindustrialization, centering on textiles.” (Moore, 
2016: 99) Until English cotton was industrially produced cheaply 
enough to become ubiquitous in the mid-19th century, Brittany ex-
ported textiles globally as an Atlantic trade commodity, especially to 
Latin America. Once Brittany’s textile trade died out, the interior was 
deindustrialized (Ford, 1993: 34–36; Martin and Le Noac’h, 1998: 189). 
What the Géniaux show us in images of weavers, spinning linen, or bind-
ing hemp is the residual presence of a once profitable exploitation of 
the land. A product that was once global has now only local use, but it 
nevertheless persists in small-scale cultivation. As if re-enacting a page 
Figure 3.4
Charles Géniaux, Jeune 
fille au dévidoir (Young 
girl with a linen skein 
winder), ca. 1902–1905. 
Glass negative, Musée de 
Bretagne, Rennes.
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from Diderot’s encyclopedia of preindustrial production, whose images 
repeat routines of rote labor in each stage of artisanal production, chil-
dren wind linen skeins by hand (fig. 3.4); men and women bind bundles 
of raw hemp for drying that others later beat to loosen the seeds and 
to separate the usable fiber from the woody core of the stem (Sennett, 
2008: 92). (figs. 3.5a and 3.5b)
Figure 3.5a
Charles or Paul Géniaux, 
Confection de bottes de 
chanvre (Making hemp 
boots), ca. 1902–1905. 
Glass negative, Musée de 
Bretagne, Rennes
Figure 3.5b
Charles Géniaux,  
Moisson battage  
(Harvest threshing), 
ca. 1902–1905.  
Glass negative,  
Musée de Bretagne, 
Rennes.
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Slate
In contrast to the images of small-scale hemp processing or the weaver 
who works at home, Paul Géniaux produced very different images of 
the slate industry. Breton slate had been exploited since Middle Ages 
in sites all over the peninsula, but before the 19th century, sea transport 
was the only viable route. The early 19th-century canal system running 
from Nantes to Brest facilitated more mobility, and train lines that 
were extensive by the 1880s widened the market for Breton slate into 
Normandy and even to Paris. Most Breton slate was used for roofing; 
it rapidly replaced thatch as it became more accessible. Breton slate 
quarries reached their peak production in 1923 (Musset, 1940: 238). 
Paul photographed series of images of actively exploited slate quarries 
in 1895 and 1910 in Rochefort-en-Terre (in Morbihan, near one of their 
family homes) and in the village of Trélazé (near Angers). Rochefort 
was one of many Breton slate producing towns; in 1900, the quarry em-
ployed about five hundred people. In 1887, its four open quarries pro-
duced about sixteen million slates annually that were shipped out all 
over France (Lukas, 1978). Géniaux pictured a combination of manual 
and mechanized work. Men use equipment to slice slates; a boy in heavy 
wooden clogs gently taps out an individual slate; winches tow boxes of 
slate across an open quarry; or a machine is the only actor, standing in 
for human labor. (fig. 3.6) In an 1895 photograph of the slate works at 
Rochefort, a workplace with slate huts is temporarily vacated by its work-
ers. (fig. 3.7) Dramatic diagonals emphasize both extraction and trans-
port: a ladder perilously points downward into a quarry pit from which 
more slate will be extracted, and train tracks indicate the destination 
Figure 3.6
Paul Géniaux, Ardoisières 
de Rochefort-en-Terre 
(Slate Quarries in 
Rochefort-sur-Terre), ca. 
1895. Gelatin silver print, 
Musée de Bretagne, 
Rennes.
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of the finished slates. In later photos from the quarries of Rochefort, 
ca. 1910, a quarry worker rides a large wooden crate (reinforced with 
metal) as it is being winched skyward to travel along a horizontal ca-
ble. (see fig. 3.8) In another shot, this same box is suspended above the 
horizon, and we understand the enormity of this endeavor through the 
relational scale of the human body. Quarries are unusual subjects for 
visual representation; they are removed landscapes, ruins, places whose 
Figure 3.7
Paul Géniaux, Ardoisières 
de Rochefort-en-Terre 
(Slate Quarries in 
Rochefort-sur-Terre), 
ca. 1910. Paper photo-
graph, Musée de 
Bretagne, Rennes.
Figure 3.8
Paul Géniaux, Ardoisières 
de Rochefort-en-Terre 
(Slate Quarries in 
Rochefort-sur-Terre), 
ca. 1910. Paper photo-
graph, Musée de 
Bretagne, Rennes.
See also Plate 6.1.
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material constituents have been “sourced” elsewhere (Coughlin, 2009). 
These later quarry photographs owe nothing to a picturesque notion of 
“primitive” Brittany, rather they picture the Capitalocene utility of its 
landscape as a site of material extraction that will be pursued as long as 
it is economically viable.
Salt
Salt making in the area of Guérande and Billiers is perhaps the most 
materially engaged labor and one of the industries most extensively 
photographed by the Géniaux brothers. Salt had been made in this 
region of France for millennia and, despite its large-scale production, 
harvesting techniques had changed little in 1900 (Kurlansky, 2002: 117). 
Gildas Buron, curator of the Musée des Marais Salants (Batz-sur-Mer) 
and the foremost historian of salt in the Guérande region, describes the 
first discovery of salt extraction in the area: crystals formed naturally in 
tidal pools and on rocks, and these were doubtlessly noticed by Neolithic 
people who gradually worked with this natural process in the Bay of 
Morbihan to produce more salt (Buron, 2001: 11).
Ecologically speaking, marais salants are encultured and controlled 
landscapes, marsh realms carved, directed, and maintained explicitly 
for the extraction of salt. Seawater is channeled through canals and ba-
sins to concentrate the salinity but also to lose its organic matter. In the 
process, the potential ecologies of the salt marsh (fish, eels, algae) are 
removed or blocked from the reservoirs that precede the final pans. Only 
in the heat and wind of summer was the evaporation of water possi-
ble in this area. Like an open-air factory, the salt marshes of Guérande 
were landscapes carved out of the wetlands, formed and maintained 
explicitly for the extraction of salt. Brittany’s economy had long been 
entwined with salt production on its south coast. Historically, Breton 
saltworks had been enormously profitable as they answered both French 
and global demands for sea salt, especially in the North Atlantic cod 
fisheries (whose home ports were on Brittany’s north coast) that grew 
in scale from the 16th century onward. It was not until after the French 
Revolution that the taxing of salt was reformed and the economics of 
salt making no longer favored Brittany (Buron, 2001: 108).
The Géniaux brothers followed male and female salt harvesters 
(paludièrs and paludierès, respectively) working alone as they rake the 
crystallized minerals from the surface of the pools (fleur du sel) or from 
the bottoms of the pans (sel gris). Most of their salt-making images are 
in the collection of the Musée de Bretagne, Rennes and the museum 
dedicated to saltworks, the Musée des Marais Salants, Batz-sur-Mer. 
In two photographs of women who balance on the edge of the gridded 
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pans, there is an uncanny, commanding monumentality to the figures’ 
confident stances. (figs. 3.9a, 3.9b) We see again a set of corporatif bodily 
movements that were learned through repetition, the result of collective 
knowledge and local practice. This careful bodily array is clearly demon-
strated the use of the long-handled lousse that each harvester displays 
to the viewer in a pose that Géniaux might have encouraged or asked to 
her to hold. By showing the learned technique of her métier to the lens, 
she invites us to think about the material consequences and productivity 
of her actions.
Figure 3.9a
Paul Géniaux, Marais sal-
ants de Billiers prise de la 
fleur de sel (Salt marshes 
of Billiers, harvesting fleur 
de sel), ca. 1900. Gelatin 
silver print, Musée de 
Bretagne, Rennes.
See also Plate 6.2.
Figure 3.9b
Paul Géniaux, Marais sal-
ants de Billiers prise de la 
fleur de sel (Salt marshes 
of Billiers, harvesting fleur 
de sel), ca. 1900. Gelatin 
silver print, Musée de 
Bretagne, Rennes.
See also Plate 6.3.
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In the image of the paludière in profile, material contrasts are par-
ticularly striking. (see fig. 3.9b) Silver salts on this image’s surface only 
needed a short exposure on this blazingly sunny day to register the dark 
skin of her face, long exposed to the same summer sun and wind that 
had crystallized the salt she skims from the surface. Her face and hair 
are framed by a light cotton kerchief (protecting her bright white coiffe 
beneath it). Over a somber dress is a striped apron, long since new or 
clean. Unlike painters or illustrators who preferred to depict Bretons 
in their most exotic festive costumes, these clothes are dirty, mended, 
and everyday.
Their salt-making technique had changed little over the centuries, 
yet the visual contrasts in the Géniaux brothers’ image depend upon 
a modern suspension of light-sensitive silver on a dry plate in a gelatin 
emulsion. This technique, initiated in the 1870s, had, by 1900, replaced 
earlier salted paper prints. But it was no less material: one of George 
Eastman’s findings of the 1880s, in the early manufacturing of dry 
plates, was that the bones of cattle raised on mustard plants produced 
superior, light-sensitive gelatin (Simmons, 2008: 33). Animal matter, 
crudely bioengineered, is crucial to the ubiquity and seeming inorganic 
(precise) nature of the gelatin silver print. The details of the Géniaux 
photographs ask viewers to consider and to associate the sensitivity of 
salts in the silver gelatin dry plate, the sensitivity of skin to sun, and 
sensation of tough and cracked feet desensitized to walking on salt. As 
Serenella Iovino writes:
‘materiality’ is the condition through which bodies act with and re-
late with each other, shaping other bodies […] Reflecting on matter 
means reflecting on the modes of production and consumption of 
nature(s) as reservoirs of usable elements; it means reflecting on the 
way the matter of the world is embodied in human experience, as well 
as in human ‘mind.’ (Iovino, 2012: 76)
Apart from the image of the individual paludière—a favorite motif of 
both 19th-century artists and illustrators—another series of salt-making 
images depicts a much more massive scale of production. One image of 
salt piles or mulons presents huge, white, spiral mounds of salt that sit 
outside in rows on the edge of the marsh’s grids, uncanny monuments 
to accumulation and extraction. (fig. 3.10) A windmill and horse-drawn 
cart in the background point to the animal labor in this landscape and 
the energy of the wind that aids the crystallization of the salt and powers 
the mill that pumps water or grinds grain. The foreground salt pile that 
initially resembles the output of modern manufacture is the result of 
thousands of human gestures of scooping, hauling, and dumping salt 
from pools of water. Although the massive mound mimics an eternal 
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monument, its matter, shaped through corporatif labor, only holds this 
form temporarily before being refined, packaged, and sold in small 
quantities. In 1900, Paul photographed inside the massive Benoît salt 
storehouses and refinery (Buron, 2001: 159). In these photos, workers 
rake, bag, and weigh salt. As Buron explains, at the time of the photo-
graphs, the Benoît brothers had recently opened their processing plant 
to standardize, bleach, and wash their product so that it might com-
pete on a national market with mined salt from eastern France and sea 
salt from the Mediterranean. Like the slate quarry photos, there are a 
few examples from the salt factory where the gears and structures of 
the machinery seem to stand in for human labor, implying the modern 
mechanization of work. These images are not well known, and, as far as 
I have been able to discern, they were not widely distributed as were the 
images of traditional, individual labor in the salt pans.
Conclusion
With the rediscovery of so many of the Géniaux brothers’ photographs 
in the past decade, we have just begun to evaluate the ways in which the 
brothers represented Brittany and its material ecologies. Material eco-
criticism is one tool that may aid in describing the relationships between 
Bretons, their work, and their environment articulated in some of the 
Géniaux brothers’ least studied images. Their images dematerialized 
Figure 3.10
Charles Géniaux, 
Marais salants de Billiers 
prise de la fleur de sel 
(Salt marshes of Billiers, 
harvesting fleur de sel), 
ca. 1900–1915. Glass 
negative, Musée de 
Bretagne, Rennes.
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through reproduction from analog indexicality to ubiquitous stock and 
postcard imagery in a way that was thoroughly modern, just as the ma-
teriality of the world they pictured in Brittany often seemed, on the sur-
face, to be timeless. At times, the brothers collected images that broke 
away from the aesthetic of the picturesque and primitive, and revealed 
something of the changing relationships of the modern working-class 
people of Brittany to their immediate environment.
Notes
1. All translations from French mine unless otherwise 
noted. The majority of this essay was written in re-
sponse to the 2019 exhibition of the Géniaux brothers’ 
photography at the Musée de Bretagne, Rennes and 
the publication of the accompanying catalog. I could 
not have researched this essay without the generous 
collegiality of scholars in Brittany including Laurence 
Prod’homme, Gildas Buron, Hubert Chermereau, 
Gérard Berthelom, and Caroline Boyle-Turner. Bryant 
University librarian Sam Simas was an invaluable ally 
as was my dear colleague, Emily Gephart, and photo 
historian Joanne Lukitsch. Thanks also to research li-
brarian Marie-Rose Prigent at the Centre de recherche 
bretonne en celtique (the Breton and Celtic Research 
Center) in Brest. Many thanks to the participants of 
the Ubiquity: Photography’s Multitudes symposium 
in Rochester, New York, especially Jacob Lewis and 
Kyle Parry. Funding for this project was generously 
provided by a research stipend from Bryant University.
2. Prod’homme cites an unpublished biographic manu-
script by Claire Géniaux, Charles’s wife, who notes 
that he rejected what he thought of as the “low trade” 
of both photography and journalism, preferring to 
think of himself as a novelist or poet. She does not 
provide dates for his decision. See Claire Géniaux, 
La vie d’un homme de letters Charles Géniaux, (n.d.), 17.
3. The role of linen and hemp was extensively explored in 
a 2013 exhibition in Douranenez and in the accompa-
nying volume, Anne Guirado, Fibres Marines: Chanvre 
et Lin, hier et aujourd’hui (Quimper: Editions Palan-
tines, 2013).
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of Sunlight”: Photography and 
Technologies of Light
Niharika Dinkar
With the demise of analog photography, the workings of light, which 
seemed an obvious and transparent modality in an earlier era, have 
acquired a new salience. Instead of a transparent medium that seam-
lessly links seeing and knowing, light is shown as having agency and 
a textured materiality, both of which inflect bodies and spaces.1 This 
resurgence is indicated in the recent spate of scholarship on the social 
and material cultures of light, the infrastructures enabled by light, colo-
nial practices of light (which is my own point of entry into the subject), 
anthropologies of luminosity, and geographies of darkness.2
These interventions have questioned the apparent transparency and 
invisibility of light to examine the material culture it has spawned. They 
have also evaluated relationships between light’s material forms and 
its symbolic valences. Such interdisciplinary dialogues have examined 
practices of light that move beyond its scientific role and its ideological 
and religious connotations, and instead pose questions about light’s 
place in modernity, marked by the remarkable explosion in lighting 
technologies and the instrumentalization of light for the media and 
communication industries.
This chapter explores what lessons such material and cultural his-
tories of light might hold for photography, which, as a medium borne 
of light, is necessarily implicated in those histories. There has been a 
resurgence of interest in considerations of light in photography from 
wider environmental histories, such as Joanna Zylinska’s recent work 
on Nonhuman Photography (Zylinska, 2017). In this reappraisal of photo-
graphy, Zylinska turns away from photography as “things humans do 
with cameras” to embrace imaging processes from which the human 
is absent, arguing for the existence of a “photographic condition,” in-
asmuch as we are “all part of that photographic flow of things that are 
being incessantly photographed.” (69) Zylinska poses the ubiquity of 
photography by viewing photographs as fossils and recognizing the 
formative role of light across various media—stone, clay, wax, or even 
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skin (as in either sun or sunless tanning)—consonant with the emer-
gence of the discipline of geology that saw the earth as a recording 
medium, or inscribed by light. This leads her to view photography as not 
a new process but a “‘modern, mediated extension’ of the ancient-long 
‘impressioning’ activity enabled by light, soil, and various minerals.” (111)
Around such an expanded definition of photography as an ubiqui-
tous event enabled by the autonomous inscription of light upon various 
media, a host of claimants to the term “photography” have been posed 
in recent scholarship, in which the work of natural light supplements the 
common definition of photographs as imprints on paper. Scholarship 
on fossils as photographs has been the most prominent strand of these, 
examining the fossil as a product of the originary gesture of photo-
graphy as a trace of light (Michaels, 2007). Geoffrey Batchen has mused 
upon photosynthesis as an organic world of light writing, and the 
Singaporean artist Ho Rui An has explored sweat as a bodily response 
to the sun to consider colonial labor as a particular form of sun writing 
enabled by empire (Batchen, 1997: 163; An, 2014). Such organic instanc-
es of light writing have been supplemented by studies such as that by 
Tania Woloshyn, which has examined the popularity of light therapy in 
Britain around the turn of the 19th century, when the health benefits 
of sunlight were sought to be replicated by devices such as the mercury 
vapor lamp and ultraviolet lamps (Woloshyn, 2017). While Woloshyn’s 
book is an exception delving into relationships between natural light and 
artificial light, the emphasis on natural light in this strand of scholarship 
has posed an understanding of the autonomous agency of light and its 
production of material traces to reconsider photography as an organic 
process with little authorial intervention.
While this new direction of research, which is frequently propelled by 
ecological concerns, has encouraged an engagement with natural light 
in photography, there has been a simultaneous exploration of specific 
technologies of light. Among the earliest and most widely researched is 
the X-ray, which had been announced as a “new kind of light” by William 
Roentgen in 1895. The X-ray is nevertheless understudied given the 
phenomenal instrumentalization of light in contemporary media and 
society. Studies have built upon the specificity of X-rays as a form of 
light that lies outside the visible spectrum, and this has expanded to 
consider later technologies including CT scanning, magnetic resonance 
imaging, and positron emission tomography.3 This work on medical 
technologies has been supplemented by scholarship on infrared light 
and its role in the surveillance and communication industries (Pierotti 
and Ronetti, 2018). Most significantly, Kate Flint’s recent history of the 
flash and the particular modes of vision it has enabled, notably its role 
in crime and celebrity culture, has raised the question of visibilities en-
abled by artificial light as fundamentally different from that of the sun 
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(Flint, 2017). In tying together a material and cultural history of the flash 
as a specific technology of light, Flint’s work also asks questions beyond 
essentialist material formulations of photographic light as comprised of 
and limited to photon activity (Frizot, 2007).
This second set of discussions on specific technologies of light has 
initiated a debate beyond solar light to consider questions around what 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch had deemed “the industrialization of light” in 
the 19th century and the place of photography within that (Schivelbusch, 
1988). Indeed, as I suggest below, from its earliest days, photography 
had occasioned experimentation with artificial light employing a range 
of materials including saltpeter, quicklime, and magnesium, which 
were implicated in global networks of trade, scientific experimentation, 
commercial patents, and had wide-ranging uses in industries and activ-
ities that ranged from war to theatre. This history features prominently 
in photographic and trade journals in discussions about appropriate 
lighting, night photography, and the efficacy of different materials and 
devices for artificial lighting, yet it is rarely included in contemporary 
discussions of photographic light, where it is assumed to be an un-
differentiated element that marks photographic paper.
Mikkel Bille and Tim Flohr Sørensen have argued for a need to “un-
ravel how the actual matter and the use of light shapes experiences 
in culturally specific ways and why.” (Bille and Sørensen, 2007: 266) 
Accordingly, instead of the historical predominance of solar metaphors 
that have dominated photographic discourse, this chapter asks how we 
might consider a more material history of photographic light, rooted 
in a terrestrial economy and distributed through commercial and trade 
networks, and what that might tell us about our modern experience of 
light and its industrial past. Photographic writing and imagery on light 
in the early decades of photography have traditionally foregrounded 
solar light, evinced in the names for photography as heliography or 
sun pictures, and this is accompanied by metaphorical associations of 
light with truth and divinity. Against such an allegorical approach to 
light, this chapter will draw upon a more prosaic material history of 
light for photography by examining three primary materials (quicklime, 
saltpeter, and magnesium) that were used for photography in its early 
history. The use of these materials brings photographic light into con-
versation with wider practices of artificial illumination in public life, be-
cause these materials were used for a wide range of activities that ranged 
from lighting homes and streets to theatrical lighting and practices of 
military mapping. Such an approach to photographic light attempts to 
follow Bille and Sørensen in tying the specific material economies of 
light to its cultural practices in public life. This aligns this study with 
the wider developments in lighting technologies in modernity to posit 
plural sources of light at the dawn of photography.
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Photographic Heliotropism
We have long known that early photographic discourse was explicitly 
concerned with the sun. This is indicated in the early names of “sun 
painting” or “heliograph,” both of which foreground the role of sun-
light in materializing the photographic image. First used by Nicéphore 
Niépce, who presented his findings to the Royal Society in 1827 in a 
“Notice sur l’heliographié,” the word heliograph invokes the powers of 
the sun. Of course, Niépce simultaneously confessed to being unsatis-
fied with the word. A notebook entry from 1832 toyed with alternatives. 
Among the seven potential terms and the twenty potential prefixes and 
suffixes he offered, neither helio nor light figured at all. Instead, he fa-
vored the Greek term phusis, or nature, which was conjoined with vari-
ations of copy as the suffix (Batchen, 1993).
Figure 4.1
Handbill for A. S. South-
worth and Company, 
“Daguerreotype, Miniature 
Rooms, No. 5 1/2 Tremont 
Row, Boston, Mass.,” 1844. 
Courtesy of Historic New 
England. 
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Batchen presents the naming of photography as an epistemological 
choice, and it is intriguing to imagine how we may have viewed photo-
graphy without the central role accorded to light. Among the numerous 
potential terms thrown up, alternatives like “sciagraph” (writing with 
shadows) or “calotype” (from the Greek kalos, or beauty) were briefly 
considered, but the adoption of John Herschel’s term “photography” 
(first used in 1839 after Talbot’s “photogenic drawing”) drew upon the 
more capacious idea of light rather than the sun, even though, as I argue 
below, the overt equation of the sun with light did not entirely disappear.
The centrality of the sun in early photographic discourse was indi-
cated in the many solar metaphors that abounded in writings and in 
caricature. In “Doings of the Sunbeam,” Oliver Wendell Holmes paid 
homage to the “honest sunshine,” endowing sunlight with the power to 
represent truthfully because the photograph “permanently recorded in 
the handwriting of the sun himself.” (Holmes, 1863) Writers invoked the 
solar pencil, sun pictures, and “sunbeam art” in their paeans to photo-
graphy, and visual imagery explicitly called attention to the sun.
The Boston-based daguerreotype studio Messrs. Southworth 
and Hawes employed a much-reproduced caricature of a flaming sun 
holding a palette painting the earth upon a standing canvas. (fig. 4.1) 
In use as early as 1844, it featured in advertising and handbills at trade 
fairs, and the same motif was also used by the New York–based Scovill 
Manufacturing Company for their advertising in 1850. Across the 
Atlantic, Cuthbert Bede, an English writer and illustrator who contrib-
uted to Punch, included variations of this jovial sun painting the earth in 
ink drawings included in Photographic Pleasures Portrayed with Pen and 
Pencil (1855), extending this popular understanding of the sun as the 
artist. In one version, Phoebus Apollo portrait painter to General Earth, 
he posed the flaming sun as the Greek god Apollo, or, explaining that if 
we were to “trace the science to its source, we might perchance discover 
that it arose amidst the sun-worshippers of the East, and its mysteries 
were presided over by the high priests of Apollo.” (Bede, 1855: 16)
The sun was deemed the active agent in the photographic process 
that marginalized the role of the photographer. “The sun was the artist, 
the camera the vehicle, and the silver plate the canvas,” claimed a mem-
ber of the Liverpool Photographic Society in 1856 (cited in Green-Lewis, 
1996: 60). Douglas Nickel notes that such invocations of the “sun as the 
artist” relied upon well-established literary, theological, and mystical 
tropes of the creative energies of the sun that shored up authority for 
the photograph as more than human (Nickel, 2002). Elizabeth Eastlake 
presents this view in describing the photographer as a “pilgrim of the 
sun,” a magician who “attempted to enlist the powers of light in his ser-
vice.” (Eastlake, 1857: 246–247) Melissa Miles argues that this idea was 
consonant with Victorian ideas of gendered creative potential; Eastlake 
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portrayed it as a distinctly masculine force impregnating the collodion 
film or the albumen-sheathed glass with its gaze:
the great luminary concentrates his gaze for a few earnest minutes; 
with the albumen-sheathed glass he takes his time more leisurely still; 
but at the delicate film of collodion which hangs before him finer than 
any fairy’s robe, and potent only with invisible spells—he literally 
does no more than wink his eye, tracing in that moment, with a detail 
and precision beyond all human power, the glory of the heavens, the 
wonders of the deep, the fall, not of the avalanche, but of the apple, 
the most fleeting smile of the babe, and the most vehement action of 
the man. (Miles, 2008b: 42)
If the sun as the artist arrogated a divine authority to the photo-
graph, it also popularized the photograph as an objective representation 
against the subjective fancies of the painter. “Portrait painting is not 
what it used to be,” lamented one account from 1843, “for since the sun 
has turned artist and taken to photography in partnership with Messrs. 
Claudet and Beard [a popular London studio], all the portrait paint-
ers under the sun have had a very powerful rival to contend against.” 
(The Comic Album, 1843) It went on to mock the sun for not having the 
tact to “disguise any of those little defects of the countenance” that a 
painter would (The Comic Album, 1843).
The analogy of the “solar pencil” metonymically extended this 
imagery of the sun as the artist to the realm of language and writing. 
Commonly used in scientific contexts, it was adopted into popular 
writing by Lady Elizabeth Eastlake and Marcus Aurelius Root, among 
others, taking from Henry Fox Talbot’s Pencil of Nature. Catherine 
Rogers has drawn attention to the long history of the idea of a “pencil 
of light,” which natural philosophers since the 17th century had used 
to signify a ray of light striking an object (Rogers, 2002). Cuthbert 
Bede featured this imagery of the camera as writing with light quite 
literally on the cover of his Photographic Pleasures, which portrayed a 
man hunched over carrying his camera and a large pencil on his back 
as the sun smiles above them. The writing below adds, “Start into light 
and make the lighter start,” lines drawn from contemporary poetry on 
the theatre and which signified the onset of sudden and instantaneous 
change (Rejected Addresses, 1813: 104).
Julia Margaret Cameron’s photograph Cupid’s Pencil of Light (1870) 
draws upon this legacy of the solar pencil but is notable in that it does 
not feature imagery of the sun itself; instead, it renders the power of 
solar light allegorically in the figure of Cupid bathed in a golden light, 
magically activating a photograph with a stylus. Both the Cupid fig-
ure and the mystical use of light grant the photograph a radiance that 
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draws upon well-established mythological and divine attributes of light. 
In his examination of Talbot’s epistemological presumptions, Douglas 
Nickel writes that the photograph was understood to be “responding to 
divine light and, by its very workings, manifesting divine intelligence,” 
showcasing the technique as “human and divine, empirical and esoteric: 
“It united the two great divinities—the Sun and Nature—with Cartesian 
optics to engender a new form of natural magic.” (Nickel, 139)
Melissa Miles has closely examined the romantic language asso-
ciated with light in early photographic writing to similarly argue that 
there is a slippage between sunlight or natural light, the divine light 
of God and the objective truths accorded to the photographic image, 
in the coalescence of ideas attached to light in early photography. She 
points to the evidence of wide-ranging metaphors of light that populate 
photographic history, but contends that contemporary photographic 
discourse continues to reinscribe light “as a stable, fixed and extra dis-
cursive point of origin for the medium” in a heliotropic movement that 
consistently returns to the sun as a point of origin (Miles, 2008a: 98). 
Within this luminous foundation, relations of difference between light 
and dark, feminine and masculine, human and divine are resolved 
to reaffirm the sun as a masculine father figure and point of origin 
for photography, its creative energies usurping feminine generative 
powers (Miles, 2008a: 97–132).
Miles extends this heliotropic agenda of photography to a wider 
philo sophical tradition, drawing upon Derrida’s designation of meta-
physics as essentially heliotropic in its conflation of light and truth. 
Derrida writes that “natural light, and all the axioms which it enables us 
to see, are never subjected to the most radical doubt,” equating the sun 
with a divine light that serves as the founding metaphor of metaphysics: 
“The founding metaphor not only because it is a photological one—and 
in this respect the entire history of our philosophy is a photology, the 
name given to a history of, or treatise on, light—but because it is a meta-
phor.” (Derrida, 1978: 27)
Miles’s charge of an indifference to the mutability of light in photo-
graphic discourse is borne out in the heliocentrism of contemporary 
environmental histories of photography that continue to reinscribe light 
“as a stable, fixed and extra discursive point of origin for the medium.” 
(Miles, 2008a: 98) The following section attempts to dispel the helio-
centrism of discourses on photographic light by engaging with a materi-
al account of lighting sources for photography, employing materials that 
were aligned with wider developments in artificial lighting technologies 
and its transformations of urban spaces.
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Technologies of Light
The well-established narrative of the central role of sun at the origins 
of photography has, however, ignored the simultaneous popularity of 
artificial lighting that was increasingly becoming an indispensable part 
of modern life, extending its tentacles into technologies and spaces that 
ranged from the military to theatre. In this section, I will take a look 
at three primary sources of light that photography relied upon in the 
early decades of photography (quicklime, saltpeter, and magnesium) to 
indicate how artificial lighting for photography was present at its ear-
liest origins, and how these lighting technologies were in conversation 
with wider practices of illumination—for homes, theatres, public spaces, 
lighthouses, and magic lantern shows, for example.
As city spaces embraced public lighting projects that sought to con-
quer the night, the idea of “night photography” found increasing popu-
larity, with the experimentation of materials and devices intended for its 
use after dark and in the long winter months, when sunlight could not 
be assured. Despite the paeans to solar light in canonical photographic 
histories, artificial lighting was used as early as 1839, and the desire to 
use commonly available lighting sources such as gas was voiced early on 
(“Drawing by the Agency of Light,” 1843: 328). The first portrait photo-
graphs were taken by Antoine Claudet in 1840 with an oxy hydrogen lamp 
and soon featured commonly in exhibitions hosted by the Edinburgh 
Society of Arts.4 Artificial light was acknowledged in contemporary ac-
counts as well—while listing the exciting developments in “Photogenic 
[drawing] or the art of Photography,” the American Journal of Science 
and Arts carefully pluralized the sources of light as “Pictorial delinea-
tions by light: solar, lunar, stellar and artificial.” (American Journal of 
Science and Arts, 1839) In a paper read to the Society of Arts in February 
1839, Andrew Fyfe listed his own experiments with a range of artificial 
sources including an oxyhydrogen blowpipe (limelight), “concentrating 
the light of a common fire with metallic mirrors,” gas lamps, and a fish-
tail gas burner, noting the photographs had longer exposure times but 
“all the richness of those taken by solar light.” (Fyfe, 1839: 179)
The earliest photograph taken by artificial lighting is generally con-
sidered to be one by Captain Levett L. B. Ibbetson, a geologist and sol-
dier. His daguerreotype of a coral taken through a microscope relied 
upon limelight as a source. However, this well-known factoid does not 
consider the use of artificial lighting for processing the photograph, 
either the preparation of photographic paper for calotypes, such as 
iodized paper that was crafted in candlelight, or the fixing process. 
Discussions of appropriate lighting in the darkroom were cautious 
about using artificial light such as candles or lamps, whose actinic rays 
(blue light) were hard to control; orange-colored glass was suggested 
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as a more reliable method of blocking actinic rays (“A Catechism of 
Photography,” 1858: 90).
Limelight or Drummond light was first exhibited between 1822 
and 1823 at the Royal Society of the Arts by the scientist and chemist 
Goldsworthy Gurney, who displayed its brilliant effects produced by the 
special oxyhydrogen blowpipe he pioneered. It was obtained by pass-
ing a jet of oxygen through a flame of hydrogen, which was made to 
impinge upon a disk or cylinder of lime, to produce a bright light when 
brought to an incandescent state. The Scottish army officer and civil 
engineer Thomas Drummond saw a demonstration of this by Michael 
Faraday and engineered it to be used for the trigonometric survey of 
Northern Ireland he was working on. Early uses for mapping had relied 
upon Bengal light (a saltpeter-based compound) in Argand burners with 
parabolic reflectors; however, this was inadequate for measuring long 
distances. With the use of Drummond’s apparatus, the survey, which 
depended upon a triangulation process to measure spaces, was able 
to cast light from a heightened space that could be observed up to six-
ty-eight miles away, with strong shadows visible at a distance of thirteen 
miles, greatly aiding the process of mapping in low or unstable light. 
This early use of limelight for the military mapping of the land was then 
extended to the exhibition of microscopic objects by projection onto a 
screen and thereafter gained greater popularity as part of magic lantern 
demonstrations.5
In 1839–1840, Captain Ibbetson used limelight for photographing 
microscopic objects, claiming that he made a daguerreotype in five 
minutes, when it would have taken him twenty-five in normal daylight. 
Reported in the Westminster Review, the article was accompanied by an 
engraving of the daguerreotype—an enlarged section of coral magnified 
twelve and a half times, which claimed to be the first daguerreotype to 
use artificial light (“Electrotype and Daguerreotype,” 1840). The best-
known use of limelight was, however, for theatrical performances; it 
was first used for an outdoor juggling performance in 1836 and then 
for stage illumination at the Covent Garden theatre in 1837. It contin-
ued to be popular through the mid-19th century, pioneering the use of 
spotlights for important characters that persists in its metaphorical use 
today. Among the most interesting experiments with limelight on stage 
included Charles Babbage and Michael Faraday’s presentation of a ballet 
about natural science research and the rainbow in 1847. It employed daz-
zling limelight illumination using rotating glass filters in different colors, 
so the dancers’ dresses reflected different colors without a change in 
costume (Gest, 1948).
While the bright light of oxyhydrogen lamps continued to be used for 
microscopic objects, magic lanterns, or cave photography, commercial 
uses of artificial lighting in the early decades employed the so-called 
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Bengal light patented in February 1857 by John Moule as Photogen. 
A compound that emitted a bluish light (that was sensitive to the wet 
collodion plates) and had a combustion time of about fifteen seconds, 
it allowed for shorter exposure lengths. It was particularly advertised 
to studios for portrait photography, and Moule claimed that, only four 
years after its patent, more than three hundred thousand portraits had 
been made in London alone, attesting to its popularity (“Newcastle 
Photographic Society,” 1861: 224). Photogen was advertised broadly as 
“The special wonder of the age—the rival of the sun,” even though critics 
deemed the results as “hideous portraits—ghastly and gravelike.” (cited 
in Gernsheim, 1969: 427)
Like limelight’s origins in military mapping, Bengal light also had a 
history in war. Bengal light’s vital ingredient was saltpeter, a pyro technic 
that was also used in gunpowder, and which had long been used for 
signaling at sea. In the early 17th century, Bengal emerged as the world’s 
leading supplier of saltpeter for gunpowder with English, Dutch, and 
French competing for its sources, and there is a rich colonial history of 
its extraction and trade that has been well chronicled (Frey, 2009; Brown, 
2005: 25–50; Buchanan, 2005). Inasmuch as saltpeter fueled the military 
ambitions of colonial powers, its role in international trade cannot be 
emphasized enough, but it also had wide-ranging industrial applications 
from tanning and textile bleaching to metallurgy and food preservation. 
Bengal lights were used extensively for signaling in the American Civil 
War, and the term “blue light” acquired traction in military parlance, 
borne from its bluish flames of saltpeter, suggesting a host of meanings 
around patriotism and treason (Bartlette, 1859: 39).
Even as Photogen was patented for indoor studio use using a hex-
agonal glass lantern that channeled its smoke, Bengal lights continued 
to be used for celebratory outdoor lighting. At the inauguration of 
the Universal Exposition on May 6, 1889, the Eiffel Tower was lit up 
with Bengal lights, producing what one account called an “absolutely 
enchanting effect” with the wind blowing the flames, so it looked like 
the iron structure was on fire. A beacon on top of the tower and two 
projectors with carbon lamps added to the spectacular effect, indicated 
in the photograph taken at 9:30 at night, an engraving of which accom-
panied the report published in The Scientific American. The photograph 
showcased experiments with artificial lighting for photography outside 
the studio, and how that developed in conversation with public lighting 
projects (“Eiffel Tower,” 1889).
Another significant source of artificial lighting in the early decades 
was magnesium, a metal whose volatility was noted in early laboratory 
experiments but was envisioned for photographic use only in 1859, with 
the first patent taken out in 1862. It was initially greeted with enthusiasm 
with reports deeming it “bottled sunshine!—portable daylight!”6—yet 
1034. “Our Best Machines Are Made of Sunlight”: Photography and Technologies of Light
it was expensive to produce. In 1863, the Magnesium Metal Company 
was established in Manchester, and the first photograph using magnesi-
um was taken in 1864, during a demonstration of its possibilities at the 
Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society.
Magnesium was easy to use inasmuch as it did not require a com-
plicated apparatus and by 1865 was generally sold as both a ribbon and 
a wire that could be lit to produce a strong light. The development of 
the dry gelatin plate with faster emulsion speeds greatly reduced the 
amount of magnesium required, and the ease of a handheld wire made 
it a popular lighting source. In 1877, the cost of burning magnesium for 
over an hour was reduced to under one mark in Germany, the equivalent 
of around six dollars in 2020 (Vogel, 1887: 44–45). Experiments with 
burning powdered magnesium with potassium and sodium chlorate 
salts were pioneered by the firm Messrs. Gadicke and Miethe at the 
Berlin Society for the Advancement of Photography in 1877 pioneering 
“instantaneous photography.” A brilliant burst of light that allowed for 
exposure times of one fortieth of a second allowed for photographing 
moving objects and the fumes were contained within a glass lantern 
(“Instantaneous Photography,” 1887: 169–170). In 1883, a mixture of 
powdered magnesium and potassium chlorate was used as a flash, pio-
neering the flashlight technology we know today.
Among the most popular uses of magnesium in the early decades 
was the illumination and photography of underground caves and mines, 
which were a great source of fascination and could only be photo-
graphed using artificial light. In 1844, Henry Fox Talbot had hoped 
that photographs of the underground would “reveal the secrets of the 
darkened chamber” anticipating infrared photography and its techno-
logical promise of making visible hidden truths (Howes, 1989: xxi). 
While Photogen had also been used for this purpose—in 1861, Moule 
had sent two devices to Bengal to be used to photograph caves in India—
magnesium was more widely adopted because of its dazzling brightness.7 
The Manchester-born photographer Alfred Brothers used magnesium 
to take photographs of the Blue John Cavern in Derbyshire in 1864, and 
this was followed by Charles Piazzi Smith’s photographs of the Great 
Pyramid in Egypt in 1865. Across the Atlantic in 1866, Charles Waldack 
produced stereoscopic views of the Mammoth Caves in Kentucky, 
which were seven miles deep, using a mixture of magnesium filings and 
pulverized gunpowder to rave reviews: “Oh! Is not photography a great 
power? What else could creep into the bowels of the earth, and bring 
forth such pictures therefrom, as these?” (Cited in Flint, 2017: 22)
It was Nadar, however, who drew the greatest publicity for his 
photographs from the bowels of the Parisian catacombs using electric 
arc lights. Arc lights employed two carbon rods between which an elec-
tric current was passed, producing a spark, which caused the carbon 
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to become incandescent and glow producing a brilliant white light. 
Talbot had experimented with this in 1851, and arc lights were adapted 
for studio photography using parabolic reflectors in 1854, with largely 
unfavorable results. Nadar toyed with arc lights from 1858 for studio 
photography, supplementing it with magnesium light and, in 1861, took 
a pile of fifty Bunsen batteries into the Parisian catacombs to power the 
arc lamps. Confronted with longer exposures of up to eighteen minutes 
in the dark passages, he was forced to give up on live models for man-
nequins, to emphasize the drama of living bodies against the ghastly 
bones hidden in the subterranean depths. He produced seventy-three 
photographs of the catacombs and twenty-three of the sewers, which 
were exhibited at the international exhibition in 1862 in London, where 
they captured the public imagination as some of the first photographs 
taken underground.
Chris Howes writes that, despite the popularity of Nadar’s balloon 
photography, it was a secondary interest, the first being an investigation 
of the underground (Howes, 1989: 1). As Nadar himself affirmed: “The 
world underground offered an infinite field of activity no less interesting 
than that of the top surface. We were going into it, to reveal the myster-
ies of its deepest, most secret caverns.” (Cited in Howes, 1989: 13) Like 
the “aerial vision” his balloon photographs produced, his interest in the 
underground equally represents a technology of sight aimed at unveiling 
hidden truths.8 Rosalind Williams has attested to how journeys into the 
netherworlds represented “a modern version of the mythological quest 
to find truth in the hidden regions of the underworld,” and photographic 
evidence of hidden interiorities likewise affirmed its powers to illumi-
nate unknown worlds (Williams, 2008: 23).
Nadar’s use of arc lamps pointed to the direction artificial lighting 
would take with the adaptation of arc lamps for street lighting with the 
Yablochkov candle in 1876, named after its founder Pavel Yablochkov. 
By 1878, major cities including Paris, London, and Los Angeles initiat-
ed public lighting projects using arc lights installed in exceptionally tall 
structures called moonlight towers. The harsh glare of the arc lamp was 
modified for studio purposes in London in 1877 by using reflectors to 
soften the light, and this use of electric light for studios gained ground 
at the Universal Exposition in Paris in 1878; by 1882, in addition to Paris, 
Vienna, Brussels, and Berlin had electric light studios.
To pull up some of these well-known sources of artificial lighting 
at the dawn of photography is to emphasize how they were part of the 
earliest experiments with light, of which we may consider photography 
itself as the best-known example. As such, what I have indicated is how 
closely these technologies of light for photography were in conversation 
with the wider practices of light, which extended from public lighting 
projects to theatre and military applications. What such a widespread 
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use of lighting technologies suggests is that the familiar narrative of the 
role of light in photography was by no means limited to the sun and 
natural light—in fact, photography sits amid these wider conversations 
on technologies of light. My intention here is not to pit natural light 
against artificial light as two different sources, but to indicate the mu-
tual imbrication of the two, to suggest that what was at stake here was 
an instrumentalization of light through a wide range of materials and 
devices. It is also to undermine narratives of the autonomous agency of 
light and the inevitability of the traces, to indicate that light was in fact 
manipulated in terms of the materials used. Crucially, light’s manipula-
tion was contingent upon economic and trade factors.
Investigating photography through its immersion in experiments 
with lighting technologies displaces the centrality of the sun in its ori-
gin narratives to pose a plurality of sources of light at play. While one 
may, in the final event, defer to the sun as what Michel Serres has called 
“the ultimate capital,” it is imperative to acknowledge and situate the 
terrestrial attempts to replicate the sun, as it were (Serres, 1982: 173). 
Reza Negarestani takes a more radical approach in advocating against 
what he calls “heliocentric slavery” by proposing an ecology outside 
the empire of the sun: “The idea of ecological emancipation must be 
divorced from the simultaneously vitalistic and necrocratic relationship 
between the Earth and the Sun.” (Negarestani, 2010: 3) Envisioning 
both the sun and the earth as dying, he calls for an end to the “monoga-
mous relationship” that has been corrupted by capitalism’s commerce 
in fossil fuels, by calling for opening up terrestrial life to wider cosmic 
contingency and play. Essentially a tragic acknowledgement of finitude, 
both human and earthly, Negarestani’s views complicate the seemingly 
disparate economies of the sun and the markets it has sponsored. He 
deems oil the “black corpse of the sun” inasmuch as it is a product of 
sunlight and organic matter; in doing so, he ties the problematic fossil 
fuel industry to a solar history associated with divine light and truth 
(Negarestani, 2008: 26).
Negarestani’s radical displacement of the sun encourages us to think 
critically about solar light as a source of energy as well as its formative 
role as a medium of photography and in photographic thinking. A re-
cent initiative on “solarity” has similarly urged a critical look at solar 
energy, cautioning against its utopian promises and highlighting the 
unequal infrastructural distribution within which such promises are 
couched (Szeman and Barney, 2021). The authors bring up instead the 
question of how solar light is mediated by technologies and institutions, 
to pose solarity as a social condition that follows as a result of the polit-
ical and economic choices made. Nicole Starolienski proposes that, in-
stead of thinking of sunlight as a natural, universally available resource, 
we need to account for it as both a socially mediated resource and a 
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potential weapon, paying attention to the solar regimes it establishes 
(Starosielski, 2021).
While I have explored early photographic history’s reliance upon 
solar light as a divine light, it is important to point out that even later 
re-evaluations, such as Zylinska’s expansive understanding of an ubiqui-
tous nonhuman photography that delineates a “photographic condition” 
beyond art practice, are also heliocentric in ignoring the developments 
spurred by the industrialization of light and its implications for photo-
graphy. Zylinska is careful to note the altered character of light in the 
Anthropocene, inasmuch as it is reflected through the particulate mat-
ter and human-induced pollution that forms part of the atmosphere. 
However, inasmuch as the argument is driven by the primacy of a “light 
induced process of fossilization” as the ontology of the photograph, it 
does not acknowledge other technologies of light (Zylinska, 104).9
However, the origins of photography coincided with an industriali-
zation of light, most visible in public and domestic lighting projects, but 
also heavily invested in the scientific and practical applications of light, 
which have only grown more entrenched in our contemporary world. 
The scientific instrumentalization of light has explored technologies of 
light beyond the visible spectrum for photographic imaging, and this 
has in fact been the source of some of the most dramatic new applica-
tions of photography. For instance, the shorter wavelengths of X-rays 
and ultraviolet light have spurred the photographs of bodily interiors 
associated with medical technologies, and the longer wavelengths of 
infrared light have been exploited for night vision cameras and thermal 
imaging associated with the surveillance and security industries, two 
of the most rapidly advancing industries that employ photographic im-
aging. Similarly, photolithographic technologies now used for the mi-
croprocessor and semiconductor industry (the manufacture of chips or 
integrated circuits that form the base of our current computing devices), 
have progressed from using the mercury vapor lamps of the 19th century 
to sophisticated excimer ultraviolet laser light. To consider the ubiquity 
of photography today is to engage with these developments in photo-
graphy that employ technologies of light outside the visible spectrum 
or the electromagnetic spectrum.
Rahul Mukherjee’s project on “radiant infrastructures” has taken 
this discussion of the electromagnetic spectrum further by addressing 
the vast architecture that has arisen around nuclear energy and the ra-
dioactive energy fields within which our lives are enmeshed (Mukherjee, 
2020). While nuclear radiation itself is a product of the nonvisible 
spectrum of light, the detonation of atomic bomb releases a light that 
“exceeds all other man-made sources of light and is appropriately lik-
ened to a tiny star, indeed like a very small segment of the sun.” (Butler, 
1962: 489) Mukherjee’s project does not address photography per se, 
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but a number of artists and scholars have explored the impressioning 
acts of atomic light and the particular mark making it produces (Brian, 
2015; Flash of Light, Wall of Fire, 2020). To disregard such sophisticated 
and consequential technologies of light in assessments of photography 
today is to ignore its widespread applications in military, industrial, and 
commercial culture. An examination of the ubiquitous “photographic 
condition” of our time therefore needs to contend with the multiple 
technologies of light beyond and within the solar in which our lives are 
enmeshed.
Our Best Machines Are Made of Sunshine
Hito Steyerl’s video Factory of the Sun (2015) addresses many of these is-
sues concerning the new applications of light for industrial and military 
use, warning us of a dystopian future in which light is wielded as a weap-
on. Like the initiative on solarity, the video expresses a disenchantment 
with the utopian promise of solar light and instead presents a narrative 
in which the control and capture of solar light defines contemporary 
and future modes of power. Factory of the Sun was first shown at the 
German Pavilion at the Venice Biennale in 2015 and poses a state in 
which Deutsche Bank officials have sped up the speed of light to gain ad-
vantages in financial trading and happen to kill three anti-accelerationist 
protestors in a drone strike. “Our machines are made of pure sunlight,” 
begins the video, “electromagnetic frequencies / light pumping through 
fiberglass cables […] the sun is our factory.”
Figure 4.2
Hito Steyerl, Factory of 
the Sun, 2015. Single-
channel high-definition 
video, environment, 
luminescent LED grid, 
beach chairs, 23 minutes. 
Image CC 4.0, Hito Steyerl. 
Courtesy of the artist; 
Andrew Kreps Gallery, 
New York; and Esther 
Schipper, Berlin.
See also Plate 7.
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Steyerl presents continuities between natural light and artificial light 
to reveal that, rather than the binaries of nature and culture, what is at 
stake is the instrumentalization of light—who is using light for what 
ends. (fig. 4.2) She takes Donna Haraway’s dictum “Our best machines 
are made of sunshine” from “A Cyborg Manifesto” to frame a futuristic 
world where sunshine powers image economies of light that are con-
trolled by a corporatized state. In Haraway’s words:
Our best machines are made of sunshine; they are all light and clean 
because they are nothing but signals, electromagnetic waves, a sec-
tion of a spectrum, and these machines are eminently portable, mo-
bile—a matter of immense human pain in Detroit and Singapore. 
People are nowhere near so fluid, being both material and opaque. 
Cyborgs are ether, quintessence. (Haraway, 1991)
Haraway asks us to consider sunlight beyond the visible spectrum 
including electromagnetic waves and their transmission of signals as the 
medium powering electronic communication devices. Steyerl’s video 
adds in the perspective of human labor to ask how bodies are implicated 
in this image economy of light.
Steyerl’s presentation of the sun as a factory powering the economy 
takes away the natural glow appended to the sun in early photographic 
discourse, but also in more contemporary paeans to clean solar energy. 
Instead, what it proposes is a world where the sun is not only the source 
for organic life, but also a factory that powers postindustrial commu-
nication and exchange. The protagonists in gleaming golden bodysuits 
serve as instruments of light dancing to house music against the remains 
of the Teufelsberg tower in Berlin. Used by the U.S. National Security 
Agency during the Cold War as a listening station to intercept communi-
cation across the Berlin Wall, the tower is rendered as antiquated ruin of 
surveillance mechanisms of the industrial past, amid the new economies 
of light. In this bleak technofuturist landscape that is Steyerl’s distinc-
tive topos, she presents dancing bodies as forced laborers as a motion 
capture studio grabs and converts their movements into energy—dance 
is not the joyous free movement of the body but a forced labor that ex-
tracts energy.
Steyerl presents a dystopic world powered by sunshine, where bodies 
are harnessed by the corporate state that has weaponized and instru-
mentalized light as an accessory of power. Yet, despite the futuristic 
topos that sets it within a world yet-to-come, such weaponization of 
light was foretold in the past. In his book Atomic Light, Akira Lippit had 
pointed to the nuclear bomb as a technology of light forged by the state, 
that burned “brighter than a thousand suns” in Robert Oppenheimer’s 
memorable words (Lippit, 2005). There is now a considerable body of 
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work that has explored the links between photography and nuclear light 
and the particular forms of indexical markings produced by radiation 
(Brian, 2015; Marcoń, 2011; Matheson, 2018).10 I conclude, then, with the 
warning that this example represents—that a simplistic view of natural 
light in photographic studies and the paeans to “honest sunshine” have 
occluded more critical questions of technologies of light. If extinction 
and ecological concerns form a new horizon for photographic discourse, 
atomic light asks equally urgent questions about writing with light that 
an expanded definition of photography needs to address.
Notes
1. For a philosophical contestation of light as a transpar-
ent medium, see Cathryn Vasseleu, Textures of Light: 
Vision and Touch in Irigaray, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty 
(New York: Routledge, 1998).
2. See for instance, Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Disenchanted 
Night: The Industrialization of Light in the Nineteenth 
Century, trans. Angela Davies (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988); Brian Bowers, Lengthening the 
Day: A History of Lighting Technology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Craig Koslofsky, Evening’s 
Empire: A History of the Night in Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
See also the special issue edited by Tim Edensor 
“Geographies of Darkness,” Cultural Geography 
vol. 22, no. 4 (2015): 559–565; Mikkel Bille and Tim 
Flohr Sørensen, “An Anthropology of Luminosity: 
The Agency of Light,” Journal of Material Culture 
vol. 12, no. 3 (2007): 263–284; Tim Edensor, ed., 
“Sensing and Perceiving with Light and Dark, Special 
Issue,” The Senses and Society vol. 10, no. 2 (2015); 
Chris Otter, The Victorian Eye: A Political History of 
Light and Vision in Britain, 1800–1910 (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2008); Noam Elcott, Artificial 
Darkness: An Obscure History of Modern Art and Media 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016); and 
Hollis Clayson, Illuminated Paris: Essays on Art and 
Lighting in the Belle Epoque (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2019).
3. A number of studies have explored the role of X-rays 
and later medical technologies, including Lisa Cart-
wright, Screening the Body: Tracing Medicine’s Visual 
Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1995); Bettyann Holtzmann Kevles, Naked to the 
Bone: Medical Imaging in the Twentieth Century (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997); and Akira 
Lippit, Atomic Light: Shadow Optics (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
4. Sir W. Newton’s views of Undercliff, Isle of Wright, as 
enabled by artificial light are listed in “Photographic 
Exhibition at the Society of Arts,” The Art Journal vol. 
5 (1853): 56.
5. The association between the camera and the gun noted 
in many accounts is affirmed in the close relationships 
that emerge between the development of lighting 
technologies for military practices and their adaptation 
for photography. See, for instance, Paul Virilio, War 
and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception, trans. Patrick 
Camiller (New York: Verso, 1989).
6. An “old Edinburgh professor” is said to have exclaimed 
this on seeing its dazzling light. See “Magnesium: The 
True Method of Using It,” British Journal of Photogra-
phy vol. 23, no. 18 (January 7, 1876): 2–3.
7. See Photographic News (May 10, 1861): 224.
8. On the evolution of an aerial vision, see Caren Kaplan, 
Aerial Aftermaths: War Time from Above (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2018).
9. The postscript to the book considers laser imaging 
technologies, deeming them postphotographic and of-
fering the possibility to rethink our sources of energy 
and light; see pages 195–201.
10. See also the documentary film Chernobyl: Chronicle of 
Difficult Weeks (1986) dir. Vladimir Shevchenko, and 
Susan Schuppli, Material Witness: Media, Forensics, 
Evidence (Boston: MIT Press, 2020).
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Figure 5.1
Joseph Moore, Oversight/Rendered no. 18, 2016.  
Silver gelatin print, 8” × 10”. Courtesy of the artist.
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5. Managing Time: Nonhuman Animal 
Labor in Photographic Images
Joseph Moore
In 1882, the French physiologist Étienne-Jules Marey captured the 
image of a gull in flight using his chronographic gun (Braun, 1993: 57). 
Contributing to the development of both cinema and camera-based bio-
metrics, Marey utilized this apparatus to create a chronological record 
of birds in flight using a series of photographic images. In subsequent 
photographic inventions, Marey improved the level of detail captured as 
well as the precision of control of time intervals between images, making 
the graphing of the movement in later analysis more exact. Exposed in 
the meeting of Marey, the camera, the negative, and the bird is a web of 
social relations between human animals, nonhuman animals, and tech-
nology. These actors are not separate but overlapping and intersecting, 
from certain viewpoints conceptually, from others on a more material 
basis. The environment also belongs to this web of relations: an environ-
ment produced by these relations and, in turn, reproducing them. While 
the white, black, or metrological gridded background against which 
many of scientific photography’s subjects during this time were photo-
graphed communicates an appearance of neutrality, it is neutral in ap-
pearance only. What appears as background or incidental is mobilized 
according to the desire to maximize positivist knowledge, on the one 
hand, and to use that knowledge in the accumulation of capital through 
the exploitation of labor, human and nonhuman, on the other.
In 2014, I began working on a photo series titled Oversight/Rendered. 
This work relies on an archive of images taken using unsecured Internet 
Protocol (IP) cameras connected to the internet. IP cameras are photo-
computational devices, digital cameras that receive commands from and 
send images to other computers over a network. The image feed can be 
recorded and analyzed, often using a separate device, or simply used as 
a tool for nearly real-time observation. IP cameras are found in varying 
types of environments in locations around the world. I discover these 
feeds on an ongoing basis using a variety of tools, including software 
I developed. This mostly automated process of discovery ends with 
downloading a single image from each camera found. At the end of each 
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session, I usually have between one hundred and two thousand images. 
I then shift to examining what I have found. I’m looking for cameras 
focused on nonhuman animals, and among each set, I usually find a few. 
Once I’ve found the kind of image I’m looking for, I record the camera 
that produced that image for twenty-four hours at one frame every ten 
seconds. This results in approximately 8,640 images that are added to 
my archive, which, as of January 2020, consists of around 3.5 million 
images. If the recording meets certain criteria, I then move on to the 
next part of the process. From 8,640 images, I select four to combine 
in digital image editing software, their layout always following a two by 
two grid. While certain formal aspects of my work seek to show histor-
ical continuity by referencing early motion photography and the aes-
thetics of conceptual photography, others attempt to disrupt any easy 
narrativization or easy placement within a historical continuum. This 
antinarrative aspect is carried out in the nonchronological placing of 
the four images. The images never follow the common narrative order 
found in various written languages of left to right, top to bottom or 
right to left, top to bottom. That composite digital image is then used 
to create a negative. Finally, I contact print the image onto silver gelatin 
paper in a traditional darkroom setting. This process and the resulting 
project come out of experimentation, an investigation into the materials 
of photography, the nonhuman animal’s relationship to photography, 
(pre)cinema, and certain methods of camera-based analysis in develop-
ment since the late 19th century.
In the work of Eadweard Muybridge, Étienne-Jules Marey, Félix 
Regnault, and others investigating the use of the camera as a tool for 
studying motion, photographic devices are produced to dissect continu-
ous time into discrete moments. The freezing of bodies in motion would 
give scientists and artists ways of apprehending “nature,” to be followed 
later by its conditioning. The best-known example is Muybridge’s photo-
graphic sequences of horses in motion created in 1878 (Braun, 2010: 141). 
Although these sequences represent an important achievement in the 
development of camera-based biometrics, it is worth noting that the 
time intervals at which they were made were too irregular and the sam-
pling rate too low to accurately graph and analyze movement without 
introducing the aliasing of motion. For example, the downstroke of a 
horse’s hoof in an image might appear to be part of an upstroke (Braun, 
1993: 53). Marey, inspired by Muybridge’s work, would develop more 
sophisticated approaches that overcame the limitations of Muybridge’s 
method. The first would be his fusil photographique, or camera gun, ca-
pable of recording a series of images at regular intervals of 1/720 of a 
second (Braun, 1993: 57). He would use this and other photographic 
tools of analysis to study birds in flight as well as other types of human 
and nonhuman animal movement. His findings and techniques would be 
1155. Managing Time: Nonhuman Animal Labor in Photographic Images
used by his contemporaries and in future camera-based systems of anal-
ysis. For example, in 1895, contracted by the French military, Regnault 
applied Marey’s findings in muscle elasticity to the study of military 
paces as a way to clarify the most efficient movement of troops (Braun, 
1993: 104). Out of these techniques, the scientific management of indus-
trial labor was also born, inspired by Marey but often carried out in a 
pseudoscientific manner by people such as Frederick Taylor and later by 
Frank and Lilian Gilbreth, who utilized and patented some of Marey’s 
inventions but to very different ends. Whereas Marey wished his work 
to be used to establish universal scientific principles for the betterment 
of humankind, Taylor’s and the Gilbreths’ ultimate objective was the 
maximization of capital through the disciplining of labor. As Marta 
Braun writes in Picturing Time:
Whereas Marey studied fatigue to increase the endurance of the indi-
vidual, Gilbreth aimed at determining the standards for maximizing 
labor efficiency for the benefit of the company. Implicit, therefore, in 
Gilbreth’s ‘science’ was the removal of such potential from the indi-
vidual’s own control. For Marey, science would unleash the energy 
of the animate machine. For scientific management, workers were 
part of a larger mechanism. Their potential was for the accumulation 
of capital; it could be made available only by fixed hours, systematic 
control, and the reorganization of labor. (Braun, 1993: 347–348)
In the above meeting of Marey, the bird, the camera, and the nega-
tive, the importance of distance should not be overlooked. Importantly, 
the chronographic gun allowed Marey to complete his analysis without 
making a physical intervention into the bird itself. Conforming to cer-
tain ideals of science that emerged during the second half of the 19th 
century—including an ideal in which science attempts to free itself from 
the subjective though the use of machines—Marey’s work can be seen 
as emblematic of what Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have termed 
“mechanical objectivity.” (Daston and Galison, 1992: 82) In this and 
similar scenarios of scientific investigation and recording, standards of 
nonintervention, unbiased representation, and moral asceticism often 
come together in the representation of phenomena though photograph-
ic means. Mechanical objectivity attempts to negate the mediating pres-
ence of the observer, to remove human intervention. Standardization 
and averaging are an important part of these techniques as is the sep-
aration of the normal from the pathological. Much of the camera’s 
valorization as an objective observer is still with us. Photographs are 
regularly used as evidence in the courtroom and other forums where 
deliberation and the building of consensus may be required. But when 
found in contemporary automated systems using artificial intelligence, 
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the forum and the audience are replaced with computers whose goals 
range from deboning fish fillets (Mery et al., 2011) to discovering “threat 
objects” in luggage (Riffo et al., 2017). When seen as a passive receiver 
of reality—as a “pencil of nature”—the camera, when coupled with a 
computer, takes on additional value as a device for reporting a series 
of objective facts to be acted upon. The rationality of the camera and 
computer replaces causality with probability.
According to various estimates, the number of photographs taken 
every year is now over one trillion. Of course, this number is based on 
images taken by people for consumption by people: images coming from 
digital single-lens reflex cameras, tablets, camera phones, and other de-
vices; images shared though services such as Instagram and Flickr. Other 
images go uncounted, such as those images not created for direct human 
consumption but used in various computer-controlled and comput-
er-assisted processes, such as X-rays used in the non destructive testing 
of materials and objects in semiautomated and automated systems of 
inspection. The one trillion figure also doesn’t take account of photo-
graphs used in street cameras set up to automatically detect instances 
of petty crime (that is, if one can argue that these collections of data 
are ontologically photographs) (Tagg, 2009: 19). Jonathan Crary stated 
thirty years ago that
[m]ost of the historically important functions of the human eye are 
being supplanted by practices in which visual images no longer have 
any reference to the position of an observer in a ‘real,’ optically per-
ceived world. If these images can be said to refer to anything, it is 
to millions of bits of electronic data. Increasingly, visuality will be 
situated on a cybernetic and electromagnetic terrain where abstract 
visual and linguistic elements coincide and are consumed, circulated, 
and exchanged globally. (Crary, 1990: 2)
This is a situation in which traditional notions of photographer and 
audience unravel. Alongside the cultural artifacts of photography and 
cameraless photography, we have photographerless photography.
The kind of images I find in the video streams I record are both ubiq-
uitous and unseen by most people. Like radio transmitted though the 
electromagnetic spectrum, we are surrounded by these images even if 
we lack direct access to them. Digital images are at once easy to dis-
tribute though the internet and so plentiful that they become hidden, 
concealed by design or eclipsed though their sheer mass. Through this 
work, I slow down some of these images—to hold them for a moment. 
I also wish to create a constellation of historical aesthetics and processes 
that are found in early motion studies, techniques dependent on this 
previous work, contemporary images, and the human and nonhuman 
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labor required in their formation. My desire to see the unseen, to bear 
witness to something missed or in the state of being lost, is accompa-
nied by a knowledge of limits, that is, that which is lost and can never be 
found. Like a letter from the deceased, the past comes to us already too 
late. In the end, things remain shattered and fragmented. The whole is 
unavailable.
The word oversight in the title of my work draws on the double mean-
ing of this autoantonym, a word with multiple meanings with at least one 
of those meanings being the reversal of another. Two of the definitions 
of oversight in the Oxford Dictionary of English are
2. a. The action of overseeing something; supervision, inspection, 
authority, management.
3. b. An accidental omission; a mistake made through inadvertence or 
negligence. Also: a person or thing which is passed over.
“Oversight” aptly describes the use of IP or webcams. These cameras 
are found in domestic settings, in places of work such as restaurants 
and shops, in settings of industrial production, and in places of places 
of leisure such as parks and sports arenas. Networked with other de-
vices on the internet, they are among the billions of computational ma-
chines that make up the Internet of Things. These photocomputational 
objects work within disciplinary systems of inspection, authority, and 
Figure 5.2
Joseph Moore, Oversight/
Rendered no. 31, 2017. 
Silver gelatin print, 8" × 10". 
Courtesy of the artist.
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management for laborers. They are tools within the standardization of 
work and leisure time. Their proliferation into nearly all aspects of life 
appears, at times, total and unblinking. At the same time, these often 
poorly secured, unsecured, or incorrectly secured devices inadvertently 
allow anyone to view their transmissions with relative ease, an oversight 
that in some cases undoes the imagined security associated with these 
devices when they are marketed as “security cameras.”
Using the camera as a means of discovering the unseen—of dissect-
ing the part from the whole for further analysis—finds theorization in 
Walter Benjamin’s notion of the optical unconscious. The optical uncon-
scious might be described as the potential for increasing apperception 
though photographic means as an extension of the human sensorium. 
Benjamin lauds the ability of still photography and cinema to give view-
ers access to dimensions of scale and time previously unavailable, such 
as breaking down the continuous movement of a person into its constit-
uent parts or magnifying the size of a flower. Each alteration gives the 
viewer access to something previously unknowable. In “Little History 
of Photography,” he writes:
Whereas it is a common-place that, for example, we have some idea 
what is involved in the act of walking (if only in general terms), we 
have no idea at all what happens during the fraction of a second 
when a person actually takes a step. Photography, with its devices of 
Figure 5.3
Joseph Moore, Oversight/
Rendered no. 27, 2016. 
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slow motion and enlargement, reveals the secret. It is through photo-
graphy that we first discover the existence of this optical unconscious, 
just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through psychoanal-
ysis. (Benjamin, 1999: 510–512)
Following Shawn Michelle Smith’s work on the optical unconscious, 
I am interested in what can be revealed through photography and how 
this revelation is accompanied by a sense that there is always an addition-
al unrecorded image. An excess in seeing is accompanied by an excess of 
the unseen. The chasm around each image remains. Like the edges that 
separate images in motion studies, their discontinuity is at once known 
and invisible. One might imagine that this knowledge of limit could sa-
tiate the appetites of certain positivist strains in still photography and 
moving images, especially those found in systems of criminal justice 
and the natural sciences. Instead, the seemingly infinite number of po-
tentially knowable unknown images provides a reservoir to be tapped 
until the resources required for their production is exhausted. Where a 
world once existed, only its analogy remains. (fig. 5.4)
That last part of oversight’s definition—“a person or thing which 
is passed over”—brings to mind other reasons for not seeing, such as 
a passing over due to forgetting, trauma, disavowal, or simply being a 
free or unpaid resource within capitalist accumulation. In Capitalism and 
the Web of Life, Jason Moore characterizes cheap and unpaid labor as a 
Figure 5.4
Joseph Moore, Oversight/
Rendered no. 37, 2018. 
Silver gelatin print, 8" × 10". 
Courtesy of the artist.
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necessary aspect in the accumulation of capital and as immanent in the 
capitalist form of organizing relationships within nature. For Moore, 
this appropriated labor makes exploitation of wage workers possible. 
The online image world I draw from in Oversight/Rendered includes 
many such instances of appropriated human and nonhuman animal 
labor. These expand beyond the farm and include domestic spaces of 
affective labor in the family home, the human workers and nonhuman 
animal workers or performers at zoos and carnivals, and the animals 
engaged in scientific inquiry as workers or subjects in laboratories. As 
Moore states, “Every act of exploitation (of commodified labor-power) 
therefore depends on an even greater act of appropriation (of unpaid 
work/energy).” (2015: 54) Moore’s account links with Smith’s. Consider 
the exploitation of both unpaid and paid labor power in Moore and the 
optical unconscious as the perception of a “world only partially per-
ceived” in Smith (2013: 4). In both cases, we have something that is seen, 
counted, noted as well as something that is unseen, unrecognized, and 
obscure. There are physiological limitations to sight and to imaging 
technologies. (For instance, film is a discrete medium and therefore does 
not capture the motion between frames.) But there is also a bracketing 
off of the world, consciously and unconsciously. The camera is pointed 
in a direction that corresponds with a need or desire to register that 
part of the world. What lies beyond the periphery is always more and 
required by this center, but its weight goes unregistered.
I borrow the other term in the title, rendered, from Nicole Shukin’s 
book Animal Capital. Shukin traces the imbricated relationship between 
nonhuman animals and capitalist production on both the level of ma-
terial production and in an economy of signs not separate from their 
material instantiation. Shukin writes that
[r]endering signifies both the mimetic act of making a copy, that is, 
reproducing or interpreting an object in linguistic, painterly, musi-
cal, filmic, or other media […] and the boiling down and recycling 
of animal remains. The double sense of rendering—the seemingly 
in commensurable (yet arguably supplementary) practices that the 
word evokes—provides a peculiarly apt rubric for beginning to 
more concretely historicize animal capital’s modes of production. 
(2009: 20)
The photographic prints in Oversight/Rendered engage with animal 
labor on both representational and material levels. The images of the ani-
mals, created though the reaction of silver halides to light, are embedded 
into the gelatin surface of the paper. This gelatin coating is made from 
the bodies of rendered animals: from bone, tendon, and offal. While the 
gelatin acts as a glue to coat the paper or celluloid with light sensitive 
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material, the gelatin also increases the “animation” of the silver halide 
material. In 1925, a scientist working at Kodak, Dr. Samuel Sheppard, 
discovered that cattle who had eaten mustard seed produced gelatin that 
yielded better film speeds (Shukin, 2009: 109). This knowledge would 
in turn be used by producers of photographic materials in their high-
ly controlled and systematized supply chain, which included Kodak’s 
purchase of the American Glue Company in 1930, to be renamed the 
Eastman Gelatine Corporation (Shukin, 2009: 110). As a material that 
actively influences the sensitivity of silver halides, gelatin is “dead” at 
the same time that it actively “works” to create an image. This “work,” 
both represented as an image and as a material substance, recalls a living 
being and its bodily labor congealed, creating a dialectical tension be-
tween life and death. In discussions of photography, the tension between 
the living and the dead is often remarked upon, but rarely with regard 
to nonhuman finitude or bearing in mind the at once dead and animate 
material of the photograph itself. Marx’s notion of dead labor seems 
important here: the ossification of living labor in commodities such as 
machines and capital. There is an opportunity here to expand this to 
include the nonhuman as living labor in this process and to trouble easy 
ontological divides between life and death. (fig. 5.5)
In the creation and maintenance of this often unseen and sometimes 
invisible photographic landscape, we still find the appropriated labor of 
the animal. While silver gelatin paper might be seen as an anachronism 
Figure 5.5
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Rendered no. 20, 2016. 
Silver gelatin print, 8" × 10". 
Courtesy of the artist.
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in contemporary digital imaging practice, the use of gelatin and other 
animal-based products in the imaging industry has not disappeared 
(Kopacek, 2010: 436). The development of the color LCD television 
relied on previous discoveries in photography. For example, William 
Henry Fox Talbot’s realization that dichromated gelatin and gum ar-
abic became insoluble to water after exposure to sunlight formed the 
basis for a number of 19th-century photographic processes such as gum 
dichromate and carbon printing. Following Talbot over one hundred 
years later, the first color LCD television, sold by the Seiko Corporation 
in 1983, utilized a dichromated gelatin and dye to produce RGB color 
filters (Nishikawa, 2014: 75). That the Seiko Corporation was also a ma-
jor manufacturer of lens shutters and watches serves as another point 
of intersection and overlap between the analog and digital, rather than 
a revolutionary break, as do the various recent patents filed that use 
gelatin in LCD production by the FujiFilm Corporation (Saneto et al., 
2016). Likewise, one can see how Muybridge’s camera-assisted analysis 
of a horse’s gait in 1878 might be constellated with more recent uses of 
gait as an identifying attribute of individuals captured by CCTV cameras 
in criminal justice systems (Nirenberg et al., 2018: 293).
Through its use of web-based imagery and traditional printing, 
Oversight/Rendered points to the historical overlap between contempo-
rary image-based technology—CCTV, image tracking, and biometrics, 
for example—and these techniques’ historical precedents. Under this 
Figure 5.6
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analytic, the labor of the cashier, the gestures of a pedestrian, and the 
lives of nonhuman animals exist to be recorded, graphed, and examined. 
The banal and the transcendent are distilled into a set of points in time. It 
is the lifeworld subjected to the efficiency of a slaughterhouse. Although 
Oversight/Rendered relies on the fragmenting of continuous time into 
the discrete in a way that echoes the historical examples previously men-
tioned, unlike them I wish to problematize the ordering and control that 
accompany a settled order and arrangement. (fig. 5.6)
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6. In 1973: Family Photography 
as Material, Afective History
Mette Sandbye
We tend to equate the idea of ubiquitous photography with the digital, 
the internet, and the smartphone.1 But the spread of photography into 
everyday life has happened in steps and phases ever since the invention 
of the carte-de-visite photograph in 1854, when portraiture became an 
integrated part of middle-class family life, identity formation, and the 
interchange and negotiation of social relations.2 A major leap in terms of 
the production, consumption, and pervasiveness of ubiquitous everyday 
photography took place in the 1970s alongside the rapid development 
and expansion of capitalist welfare and consumer society in the Western 
world and concomitant technological improvements of camera techno-
logy. Nevertheless, relatively little has been written on this seminal 
period in the history of private photography.3
In the early 1970s, amateur photography exploded into what I will 
call a major period of “ubiquitous private photography,” anticipating 
the much later digital revolution. The aim of this chapter is to point to 
the importance of this period in the history of everyday photography 
and, at the same time, to argue in favor of the family photograph as an 
important source for a material, affective understanding and writing of 
history. I will do this through a specific case study of one particular year, 
1973, in one particular European country, Denmark. Inspired by Hans 
Ulrich Gumbrecht’s In 1926: Living at the Edge of Time, I will simply ask 
how a study of private family photographs can add to a description of 
one particular year. With this specific year 1973 as my point of departure, 
I will study a sample of private everyday snapshot photographs with 
the aim to analyze what could be called complex affects of the everyday. 
Inspired by Gumbrecht’s “take” on history, my aim is to dig out a slice 
of history of the Danish everyday in the 1970s, colored by a phenomeno-
logical interest in affect, feelings, bodies, and things, inspired by Daniel 
Miller, Richard Chalfen, and Raymond Williams, among others.
I thereby claim that the ubiquitousness of photography started much 
earlier than the advent of the digital and the internet. On the other hand, 
the new—digital—technologies and affordances have made us—and 
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visual studies as such—regard photography not only or primarily as 
a representational technology. Rather, they have made us look into its 
“nonrepresentational,” but nevertheless extremely important, aspects, 
to regard photography as a relational, dynamic, and transient practice 
creating material objects related to emotions and phenomenology. As 
such, the idea of ubiquitous photography is relevant for the whole histo-
ry of photography. Insights from different periods, from the early Kodak 
heyday through the 1970s to “the digital now” can cross-fertilize each 
other across chronology. In many ways, it is the advent of digital photo-
graphy that has made researchers look into photography—also of the 
past—as “a doing” related to being in social life and in the world (Larsen 
and Sandbye, 2013; Sandbye, 2013). Or, as the two editors of a recent 
anthology on Digital Photography and Everyday Life put it: “We suggest 
that photography is tied to both ways of seeing and representing, as well 
as to ways of acting and performing.” (Cruz and Lehmuskallio, 2016: 4) 
The insights of digital and social media photography have made us look 
back into history and ask, as a pioneer in this field, Richard Chalfen, 
does: “What do ordinary people do with their cameras and personal 
pictures, as part of everyday life?” (Chalfen, 2016: xv)
The Digital Makes Us Look to History
Although the practice of everyday, personal photography is related to 
depicting the family, until recent decades, few have taken an interest in 
studying family photography. This “ubiquitous” genre of photography 
has been conceptualized in dualistic terms, considered either highly 
conventional, ritual, and selective in terms of motifs that are extreme-
ly redundant across class, gender, and geography or as invested with 
deeply emotional and highly individual, as well as private, psychological 
content. This duality is exemplified in the oppositional takes on photo-
graphy by sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and phenomenologist Roland 
Barthes in their influential works, Photography: A Middle-Brow Art 
(1965) and Camera Lucida (1980), respectively. Whereas Barthes un-
derlines the highly personal and emotional qualities in photographs, in-
cluding the never-shown “winter garden photograph,” Bourdieu and his 
fellow socio logists—studying family and amateur photography from 
the late 1950s and early 1960s—argue that family photography is an ex-
tremely coded, regulated, conventional, and ritualized genre. “The most 
trivial photograph,” Bourdieu writes, “expresses, apart from the explicit 
intentions of the photographer, the system of schemes of perception, 
thought and appreciation common to a whole group.” Bourdieu con-
tinues: “there is nothing more regulated and conventional than photo-
graphic practice and amateur photographs.” (Bourdieu, 1990: 6–7)
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In an article from 1980 in The American Scholar, James C. A. 
Kaufmann articulates this duality in an overall argument against tak-
ing an interest in “Learning from the Fotomat,” as the article is called. 
Kaufmann’s article is written in the aftermath of the explosion of the 
everyday photography that is the focus of my study. Kaufmann begins by 
recognizing the pervasiveness of family photography and family photo 
albums, but he warns that “comprehensive history is never the aim of the 
family photograph album.” (Kaufman, 1980: 244) He argues that those 
kinds of photographs certainly represent feelings and emotions and that 
they serve as an aid to personal memory and can thus be of immensely 
personal value to those who take them and own them. However, to 
outsiders, they appear as “endless acts of conformity.” (245) “Because 
family snapshots have deep meaning only for those who have somehow 
participated in their creation, they defy analysis by outsiders on all but 
the most superficial levels,” Kaufmann argues, and we should therefore 
“feel hesitant about trying to interpret family snapshots in these albums. 
As traces of the past, they are virtually beyond our comprehension, un-
less, of course, they are our own albums.” (246)
The background of Kaufmann’s criticism is the image collection 
American Snapshots, published in 1977 (Graves and Payne, 1977). This 
book represents an early institutional interest in everyday snapshots 
that seemed to grow during the 1990s and early 2000s.4 Common to 
most of these museum exhibition books and catalogues that were pro-
duced in this period was avoiding a deeper analysis of these images or 
including their sociological narratives. These ordinary snapshots were 
regarded and treated as a kind of poetic, semiartistic amateurism, as am-
biguous haiku poems or open images with narrative indeterminacy. This 
is how, for instance, curator at the San Francisco Museum of Modern 
Art Douglas R. Nickel described them in the museum’s 1988 catalogue 
Snapshots: The Photography of Everyday Life (Nickel, 1998). Alternatively, 
these images were seen as profoundly innocent, simple, and direct im-
ages, as collector Thomas Walther defines them in the catalogue for the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art’s 2000 exhibition of private snapshots 
(Walther, 2000).
But the advent of Web 2.0 photography practices and albums in the 
2000s forced academia to address the understanding and use of every-
day photography and to therefore revise longstanding theoretical un-
derstandings of photography. These uses and distributions of digital 
images taught us to regard snapshot photographs as primarily social—
and sometimes highly political—images, made to be shared with and 
looked at by other people, more than they are made as solitary, poetic, 
rarefied moments of domestic living. Cruz and Lehmuskallio argue in 
relation to digital practices:
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Focusing contextually on material and visual practices helps us in 
reconsidering both photography (What is it? How should it be under-
stood, especially when taking digital forms into consideration?), and 
everyday life (What roles does digital photography take within everyday 
life?). Digital photography, understood broadly, can thus be studied 
as a nexus that connects people in emotionally significant ways, as 
a family or as a group of friends, but, increasingly, also to current 
social and political movements. (Cruz and Lehmuskallio, 2016: 4)
The new digital practices can therefore also shed light on the use 
of albums and photographs before Web 2.0. In that sense, amateur or 
snapshot practices in the digital age can be said to theorize photography, 
making us realize aspects that we knew but that were not clear or explicit 
to us until after the advent of the digital. Here, photography is conceived 
and used as a primarily social, participatory, performative, and cultural 
phenomenon.
With industrialization and urbanization in the 19th century, the 
urban nuclear family was cemented as the main family unit. The family 
photo album dates back to the late 1850s, and it became common in both 
Europe and the United States in the 1860s among the new urban middle 
classes. In these early decades, the album typically included carte-de-vis-
ite portraits as well as commercially produced and sold portraits of ce-
lebrities. With the introduction of the Kodak camera in 1888, the family 
album became even more common and widespread, and it changed into 
a much more personal, often scrapbook-like, and more narrative format 
celebrating either the family as an entity or the story of the individual 
member. The practice of making family albums grew steadily through-
out the 20th century, until the digital production, as well as storage, took 
over in the early 2000s (although the concept of “album” is often still 
used in digital storage formats). With the internet and social media, the 
“photo album” became a phenomenon often addressed to a wider public 
audience, whereas it—until then—had been a private object in the home 
primarily addressing the family members. From the late 19th century, 
members of the middle class were targeted as the prime consumers of 
the albums. Most often, men were the family photographers, but his-
torically, women have been the primary producers of the material album 
(Siegel, 2010).
The family photo album is about social exchange and sharing, and 
it is an act of love and belonging. More philosophically put, studying 
family photographs historically through the insights provided by digi-
tal media might change our concepts of what authenticity and identity 
mean in relation to photography and make us develop a more thorough 
understanding of photography that is simultaneously an aesthetic medi-
um, a historical document, and an emotional, existential, dynamic social 
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practice. Today, photography taken with camera phones and shared 
via social media is used and represented as presence maker, family 
genealogy, identity construction, self-therapy, mourning work, social 
act of “reaching out,” and a great deal more. Faced with these simultane-
ous and varied practices, we are forced to re-evaluate the museum prac-
tice represented by the examples mentioned above and to take another 
look at the kind of material that Kaufmann resisted in his criticism of 
the American Snapshots book.
The practice of “doing” digital photography has demanded new 
approaches to photography, keeping the many aspects of photography 
alive. At the same time, digital photography and social media have raised 
new problems related to the storage and archiving of photographs and 
therefore also for historical memory. I will thus argue that it is urgent to 
look into older forms of photography—as I do here—armed with these 
newer insights in order to keep both personal and collective memory 
alive, as Nancy Van House has argued: “A more traditional use for 
photos that is threatened, I argue, is personal and collective memory 
[…] I fear that, as inaugural acts, digital technologies and social me-
dia have disrupted our memory regimes and the integrity of personal 
and collective archives and threaten images’ traditional role as memory 
objects.” (Van House, 2016: 276)
Keeping the Duality of the Material Floating
Martha Langford and Elizabeth Edwards both stress the way that 
family photographs are related to orality, to talking about the images. 
Edwards calls them “performative objects,” and she invites us to think of 
them as material objects and to include processes of intention, making, 
distributing, consuming, discarding, and recycling photographs 
(Langford, 2001; Edwards, 2005: 39).
It is important to keep the dual sides of everyday photography not 
as separate and different approaches but as simultaneously existing 
aspects: the sociological, generic, cultural aspects as well as the high-
ly individual side of family photography as a practice related to phe-
nomenological aspects such as emotions, affects, and feelings. As an 
anthropologist interested in material culture, Daniel Miller has argued 
for keeping a constant eye on the diversity of materiality. In his 2010 
book Stuff, Miller criticizes the philosophical division between particu-
larity and universality, arguing that “one of the major dangers that besets 
the world today lies in the increasing dissociation of the two extremes.” 
(Miller, 2008: 9)
Where Kaufmann isolates the aspects of emotions and feeling to 
something exclusively individual and private, more recent affect studies 
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have taught us to look at feelings as deeply embedded in our experi-
ence as well as our construction of society.5 It is important to regard 
family photography as a “structure of feeling,” to use a much-cited term 
by Raymond Williams, which dates back to the production of my case 
study material. In a 1977 essay with that title, Williams argues against 
the Marxist cultural studies tradition of exclusively focusing on ideo-
logy, institutions, and systems to the exclusion of consciousness, lived 
experience, feeling, everyday social relations, and “what is actually being 
lived”—in short, structures of feeling. “We are talking about character-
istic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone,” Williams writes, “specif-
ically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feel-
ing against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical 
consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity.” 
(Williams, 1977: 131–132)
The “Third Leap” in Everyday Photography
Williams’s advocacy for feelings and his bridging of feeling and thought 
as practical consciousness are highly relevant for my case study: the year 
1973. Let me go back to this period that initially made Kaufmann react 
to the ubiquitousness of “Fotomat,” as he calls the abundance of family 
photographic “material.” In his 1983 book La photo sur la cheminée: 
Naissance d’un culte moderne, French photography historian Bertrand 
Mary analyzes popular photography’s two major “leaps.” The first 
takes place in the wake of Kodak’s launch of the Kodak camera and the 
roll film in 1888 with the advertising slogan “You press the button, we 
do the rest,” which made it easy and affordable for ordinary people to 
photograph. The second leap, according to Mary (who focuses mainly 
on Europe), was around World War I, when all the soldiers and their 
family members wanted to be photographed before the soldier went to 
war. The third leap, as I see it, and following the genealogy initiated by 
Mary, must be the late 1960s and the 1970s, when color film, the film 
cassette, the flash cube, and cheap camera types were introduced, first 
in the United States and shortly after also in Europe.
In her book Irresistible Empire, Victoria de Grazia describes how 
“America’s hegemony was built on European territory,” because the 
United States initiated a global traffic in values as well as commodities 
throughout the 20th century (de Grazia, 2005: 4). She has analyzed how 
what she calls the U.S. “Market Empire” established a new European 
democracy of consumption targeted at the middle class, and how 
American society represented an attractive model of society and mod-
ern life to European consumers, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. This 
can also be seen in the popularization of family photography in Europe. 
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In both Europe and the United States, the vast middle class was targeted 
as the prime consumers of photography and photo albums.
Mary states that, out of fifteen billion private photos produced world-
wide in 1970, the United States alone produced six billion, so one could 
argue that this is the first period of really “ubiquitous photography.” 
A fourth leap is, of course, today, when amateur snapshots flourish in the 
billions on a daily basis on the internet (Sandbye, 2014: 3–4). However, 
as already mentioned, not much has been written about the important 
third leap in the history of the family snapshot. The main reason is the 
abovementioned dual positioning of this kind of material in general. 
Another reason is that material from the 1960s and 1970s has not yet 
really been included in public archives. It is still mostly to be found in 
private homes. Further, it is likely that a lot has been thrown out due to 
the growth of the amount of photographs taken in the 1970s onward.
In 1963, Kodak launched its series of inexpensive, easy-to-load 
Instamatic 126 and 110 cameras, which immediately became immensely 
popular, also in Denmark (Sandbye, 2004). (fig. 6.1) Between 1963 and 
1970, more than fifty million Instamatic cameras were sold; this was 
the biggest success in Kodak’s history (Tobin, 2013). Up until this point, 
Figure 6.1
Anonymous, confirmation 
gift table with a Kodak 
Instamatic camera, 
Denmark, 1972.
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people had trouble loading the camera with the film themselves; many 
things could go wrong, including false light and the film not rolling 
forward with each exposure. The Kodak Instamatic film came in an 
easy-to-load cartridge. At the same time that photography became ac-
cessible to people with low technological skills, even to smaller children, 
began the “black-boxing” and rendering invisible of the photographic 
technology, a process that seems to have culminated in today’s everyday 
digital photo practice with the smartphone (Lister, 2016: 269). In 1970, 
Kodak introduced the flash bulb cube, and in 1972, came the much small-
er compact Pocket Instamatic. More than twenty-five million Pocket 
Instamatics were produced in less than three years. Since the intro-
duction of the “Kodak girl” right after the Box Brownie camera in year 
1900, Kodak had underlined its cameras as easy-to-access-technology, 
and even in the early years, ads included images of children as camera 
operators. But with the Instamatic cameras, Kodak more directly tar-
geted children in their advertisements, either showing them as photo-
graphers themselves or using their idols to pose with the camera, as with 
Michael Landon, the lead actor from the then globally popular television 
series Little House on the Prairie (1974–1982). To celebrate Kodak’s 1980 
centennial jubilee as “American Storyteller,” as the campaign was called, 
multiple advertisements with the smiling actor posing with a pocket 
camera in hand stating experiences such as “Easy really does it…” were 
published in a variety of magazines such as National Geographic, People, 
Time, Sports Illustrated, Reader’s Digest, and TV Guide.
Looking at Danish camera advertisements in the late 1960s and 
1970s, this technological ease is most often underlined as well (Sandbye, 
2004). In 1977, six programs were shown on Danish national television 
with the title “Better Images,” all of them targeting these new amateur 
“shooters.” Already in 1960, at least 20 percent of all Danish citizens 
owned a camera, a number that continued to grow through the following 
decades (239).
“What Did Your 1970s Look Like?”: A Case Study
Since 1994, a private organization funded by public support has arranged 
a biannual (and now annual) history festival in Copenhagen, the capital 
of Denmark, under the title “Golden Days.” Each festival focuses on a 
specific historical period. It started out with a focus on the last half of 
the 19th century, which was called “The Golden Days” in Denmark, but 
has since taken up periods in the 20th century as well. In 2016, the festi-
val theme was the 1970s. The festival organization serves as an umbrella 
for events, concerts, and exhibitions arranged by museums and other 
cultural institutions, mostly with a focus on history and the fine arts, 
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and these museums and institutions curate a few 
events themselves. Because I had been working on 
family snapshot photography from the 1960s and 
1970s, but had had some problems finding material 
to study in public archives, I suggested a small pro-
ject in collaboration with the festival in which we 
asked people to contribute their own private photo-
graphs under the headline: “What Did Your 1970s 
Look Like?” During the summer, people could up-
load their own private photos to the festival website, 
which was made public. When the festival opened 
in September (it lasted September 9–13), we had 
curated a selection of them to be published in the 
festival newspaper (twenty thousand copies), in an 
exhibition at the Copenhagen main public library, 
and as posters people could bring home from the 
exhibition. (fig. 6.2) When uploading, people could 
add small explanatory texts, which were used in 
the various public presentations as well.6 Before 
writing the call for photographs, I identified four 
subthemes or recurrent motifs central to family 
photographs: holiday, family, home, celebration. 
People uploaded their photographs under these 
headlines. The exhibition was popular, the posters and the newspapers 
were widely distributed, and I presented a public inter pretation of the 
material at the library.
Gumbrecht’s Study of 1926
I do not have direct access to the owners of my case study material (at 
least not anymore), but I do have their written comments. Many theo-
retical and methodological approaches can be used to address every-
day photographs. To get my bearings on this heterogeneous material, 
I found inspiration in Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s book In 1926: Living at 
the Edge of Time. This is a study of one (apparently randomly chosen) 
year, 1926. Gumbrecht calls for looking at the sensual side of histori-
cal experience in a study of the everyday worlds, lived experience, and 
public culture in this one year. He subtitles the book “An Essay on 
Historical Simultaneity,” with the intention “to bring out dominant 
surface perceptions as they were offered by certain material phenom-
ena” and to ask, “What can we do with our knowledge of the past once 
we have given up the hope of ‘learning from history’?” (Gumbrecht, 
1997, ix, xi)
Figure 6.2
Layout from the exhibition 
at the Copenhagen main 
library during Golden 
Days, September 2016, 
including the free 
newspaper.
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Whereas Kaufmann regards the surface-ness of photography as an 
obstacle to even talking about photographs unless they are your own, 
Gumbrecht advocates for attention to surfaces,7 although not surfaces 
that have to be penetrated to reach “Truth.” (421) Gumbrecht’s interest 
in surfaces is rather related to bringing forth “the sensual side of his-
torical experience.” (419) According to Gumbrecht, we have trespassed 
the idea of learning from history and understanding the past. Therefore, 
in principle, we can write about any year; we don’t need to legitimize 
the specific moment of the past we choose to write about, which is why 
he simply made the choice to write about the year 1926. With a focus 
on “surface phenomenon” and “lived experience” (Erleben) as opposed 
to “experience” (Erfahrung) (431), Gumbrecht’s book has an encyclo-
pedic structure with the aim to construct “a rhizome rather than a to-
tality” (435), because he realized the impossibility of representing the 
past. Inspired by Walter Benjamin’s The Arcades Project and Gustave 
Flaubert’s Dictionary of Received Ideas, he lists in alphabetical order a lot 
of surface appearances and objects related to “everyday-worlds.” (418)8 
They are organized and presented alphabetically in three major sections. 
The first is what he names “arrays,” meaning all sorts of rather concrete 
phenomenon and objects such as airplanes, bullfighting, and telephones. 
Common to them is that they are all related to artifacts and activities 
involving the body. Secondly, Gumbrecht orders them into what he calls 
“codes,” which are binary pairs of feelings or abilities related to the arrays, 
such as action/impotence, male/female, silence/noise, and authenticity/
artificiality. He also uses the terms “discourses” and everyday cultures 
in connection with these “binary codes,” which he sees as “principles of 
order within the unstructured simultaneity of everyday-worlds.” (435) 
Finally, as his third ordering principle in this encyclopedia of early mo-
dernity, he looks for phenomena that imply what he calls “codes col-
lapsed” (349) These are areas where the “codes” he so apparently easily 
identifies seem to disappear into “areas of malfunction and entropy.” 
(435) An example could be male-female oppositions, resulting in gender 
trouble, often implying “a potential for change.” Exactly the collapse of 
male-female codes—as Gumbrecht calls it—were typical for the 1920s 
(for instance, seen in the concept of the new woman and the boyish 
la garçonne) as they were in the 1970s (in the wake of the women’s lib-
eration movement), which my case material also showed, but pairing 
of the authenticity/artificiality or the individuality/collectivity can be 
recognized as well.
This method of framing a whole year, and indirectly a larger period 
around it, as I intend to do on a much smaller scale as well (although 
Gumbrecht strictly warns about making diachronic interpretations), 
is described in the introductory chapter called “User’s Manual” as well 
as in the chapter called “After Learning from History” toward the end 
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of the book. In these two explanatory chapters, Gumbrecht states that 
he aims for a strictly descriptive discourse to bring out the surface per-
ceptions offered by the material as concretely as possible, to avoid the 
traditional didactic idea of “learning from history.”9
Strangely enough, Gumbrecht is not interested in including photo-
graphs in his compilation of 1926 “surface” phenomenon and objects 
“because they produce an effect of immediacy which easily overwhelms,” 
as he puts it (425). He is also eager to underline that he is not developing 
a method to analyze history. Nevertheless, in search of a take on my 
material from the Golden Days event, I am inspired by Gumbrecht’s 
“ordering” method, combined with a wish to challenge him on his 
aversion toward photography. What I take from Gumbrecht is a dual 
attentiveness both to the discourses, or codes, in which ordinary photo-
graphs are enmeshed, and to the complexity of the very same discourses 
or codes, which most ordinary photos contribute to, too, and which 
therefore also make them transgress more traditional sociological strata. 
Photographs are much more than discourse.
Everyday Photography in the 1970s
The images in my case study date from the whole decade. But 1973 was 
a rather focal year in the period. After a 1972 referendum, Denmark 
entered the European Union in January 1973; the government agreed to a 
law about free abortion; car-free Sundays were decreed for almost three 
months at the end of the year due to the global oil crisis; two lesbians 
were married on national TV—just to mention a few events pointing to 
the fact that “The times they are a-changin’,” as Bob Dylan had predict-
ed in 1964. All these facts can be studied in history books, but I would 
argue that a “surface” study of “ubiquitous” everyday photography from 
the 1970s can complement history books and bring forth subtle details 
and insights—“structures of feeling”—related to bodies and their inter-
action with ordinary objects in their lives.
Let me describe two pairs of photos that were chosen for both the 
newspaper and the exhibition. The first pair appears under the theme 
“Family.” Both images are from 1972. (figs. 6.3 and 6.4) One is called 
“Father matching the baby carriage”; the other, “My family.” The father 
photo was sent in by the mother of the baby in the carriage. In the rather 
long accompanying text, she explains that the father had time to take 
care of the baby, because he had refused going to military service, that 
the baby carriage was given to them as social aid, and that they had 
painted the black carriage yellow and red. The couple used the carriage 
to agitate against the E.U. referendum later the same year; the mother 
describes people’s surprise when they looked into the carriage and 
Figure 6.3
Anonymous, Theme 
Family: “Father matching 
the baby carriage,” 
Denmark, 1972.
See also Plate 8.1.
Figure 6.4
Anonymous, Theme 
Family: “My family,” 
Denmark, 1972.
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found a baby instead of propagandist material. We see the longhaired 
young father wearing a hat and a yellow T-shirt and red pants matching 
the colors of the carriage. They are walking in a botanical garden. In 
another photo from 1971, we meet the newlywed couple in front of the 
city town hall dressed informally in ponchos and “unisex” clothes. The 
other family-themed photo comes with a short text written by the now 
adult daughter in the photo: “This photo is taken at the photographer’s 
studio, it shows my family (before they divorced in 1975).” In many ways, 
this seems like a more “ordinary,” middle-class family compared to the 
“hippie” father. They are standing close together, holding each other 
as a triangular unit with the mother as the center, smiling. However, 
whereas the “hippie” couple is newly wedded and thus sticking to the 
idea of the nuclear family, this second couple is approaching divorce. 
Where the hippie father has long hair, here the mother seems to slowly 
be breaking up conventions with her short hair and her patterned loose 
blouse. The mother of this family had a job as manager at a childcare 
institution and earned more money than the father of the family, which 
enabled her to move to a larger house when they divorced. Here, we 
might bring Gumbrecht’s binary codes of what is considered typically 
male versus typically female into mind and his pointing to the subtle 
collapse of binary codes seen in everyday culture.
The second pair is from the “Holiday” section. (figs. 6.5 and 6.6) The 
first is entitled “Swedish twist bread, 1977.” The text, written by a now 
seventy-two-year-old man, describes how “my partner and I often spent 
vacations at a farm in Sweden with good socialist friends.” It asks us to 
notice the pile of cigarettes and cigars in the middle of the photo and 
the little boy’s Chinese cap, which his father had brought home from 
a long train trip from Copenhagen to Hong Kong. In the photo, we see 
two women and a boy making twist bread at a bonfire. In the middle, we 
see a man taking a photograph in the direction of the photographer of 
the “Swedish twist bread” photo. Both the little boy and the photograph-
ing man have rather long hair, and both are wearing caps. The latter 
could be taken for a 19th-century prop, but it was a socialist fashion 
at the time. All are wearing jeans and sweaters, no matter gender and 
age. The other photo is called “Car trip to Austria, 1972.” The text is 
written by of one the now adult girls in the photo, “Camping equipment. 
Photo of my father and two elder sisters, I am wearing a Tyrolean dress.” 
The photo represents the major wave of ordinary people traveling to 
southern Europe in the late 1960s and 1970s, either in their own car or 
by charter flights, as many of the other color photos in my case study 
represent. (Another annotation to another photograph reads “First trip 
to ‘the South.’”) Photography has always been related to traveling, but in 
this period, there was a growth in tourism and travel, and photography 
became a particularly important and widespread part of conquering 
Figure 6.5
Anonymous, Theme 
Holiday: “Car trip to 
Austria,” Denmark, 1972.
See also Plate 8.2.
Figure 6.6
Anonymous, Theme 
Holiday: “Swedish twist 
bread,” Denmark, 1977.
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and understanding the new and the foreign. As opposed to today, when 
people would probably not have lunch with their own camping equip-
ment that close to the car, there seems to be a certain pride in including 
the car in several of the photos. Together with other newly acquired 
status symbols such as the refrigerator, television, and record player, 
this is often seen in family photos in the period. In addition, we see a 
change in dress codes with the older girls’ short, “streamlined” dresses.
Of course, the case study sample includes formal and ritual family 
posing. Nevertheless, most of the photographs, in fact, show much more 
ordinary situations, objects, and interiors: cooking (with new electronic 
equipment) among parents and children; father and son digging out soil 
in front of the newly constructed standard house; the new record player; 
a whole family playing in the first snow; the teenager’s own photograph 
of her room including a cat poster, smart new furniture, and her beloved 
older male cousin dressed in purple, pink, and yellow; a toddler eating in 
a very “dirty,” independent way in a living room in front of both a poster 
of Karl Marx and an old-style bourgeois-looking piece of furniture; a 
smoking father playing chess with his daughter; going to a music festival; 
close-ups of new (often homemade, often colorful) clothes; a father in 
his forties and teenage daughter sowing and knitting together. These 
motifs also point to the ubiquity of photography at the time: that it has 
become much cheaper to produce and thus also a much more common 
part of everyday life, where people photograph their everyday doings.
Arrays, Codes, and Breakdown of Codes
It would lead too far in this context to go into a deeper, close analysis 
of the many photographs and the small texts. Rather, my contribution 
here is exemplary and more meant for inspiration than it is compre-
hensive. More recently, there have been many movies about the 1970s, 
most often centered on the rebellion of the young hippies against their 
bourgeois backgrounds or parents. This duality was also clear in the 
photographs, and some of them were probably chosen by their owner 
in retrospect exactly because they seemed to underline this particular 
and most often talked about aspect of the 1970s as a time of unrest and 
upheaval. However, as my two apparently “opposing” samples articulate, 
the oppositions were not all that clear.
In line with Gumbrecht’s notions, several “arrays” appear in the 
material. These include new forms of clothes, patterns, and colors; 
new bodies such as topless women at the beach, men with long hair, 
a man with a baby carriage, a man sewing informal wedding dresses; 
an interest in the “exotic” related to traveling, such as belly dancing, 
camel riding, airplanes, and mountains; modern implements, which 
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had suddenly become affordable, such as cars, record players, new 
one-floor standard houses in the suburbs, new electronics. A variety of 
codes can be outlined related to these motifs and themes: eternal values 
versus modernity, nonmateriality versus (welfare society and consumer) 
material ity, past versus present, sticking to the local versus interest in 
difference and the exotic, authenticity versus artificiality, active women 
versus posing women, the beautiful versus the insignificant, formality 
versus informality, children as children versus children as small grown-
ups, feminine men versus active, masculine men.
These oppositions are not necessarily played out in different images 
but can be seen in the same image, which therefore also points to a “break-
down of codes” in the period related to notions of gender (male-female), 
generations (children-teenagers-young adults-older adults), the value of 
consumer society goods such as cameras, cars, and Kitchen Aids. For 
instance, in Figure 6.1 (1972), the confirmation gift table, clearly photo-
graphed in a new, one-floor, suburban, mass-produced, middle-class, 
standard house, we see the new Kodak Instamatic, a cassette tape re-
corder, a poster with the American cartoon figure Snoopy, a color scale 
of green, brown, red, and orange, and then the big box wrapped in red 
cellophane. It is a wooden, old-fashioned beer box, provided (the text 
explains) by the uncle, who owned a grocery store. In the 1970s, this kind 
of recirculation of “ordinary” things and materials was in fashion and, 
at the same time, seen as a political statement (as it is today).
In one image from 1970, we meet two topless women (mother and 
daughter) at the beach with their boyfriends. (The mother’s partner was 
not the father of the daughter.) The daughter writes that her mother 
filed for divorce after more than twenty years of marriage, “because 
mom had had enough of being a housewife.” She and her new partner 
in the photo were “Rudolph Steiner enthusiasts and vegetarians.” In an-
other photo, a woman poses with her two sons in the living room of their 
new house. The furniture is a mixture of heavy 1930s armchairs (prob-
ably inherited), new streamline design furniture in leather and steel, a 
“Morocco” leather pillow (maybe bought on vacation), and a wall “rya” 
rug showing the “Sun Chariot,” a well-known Danish national heritage 
museum object dating back to the bronze age. The living room has a 
huge window, probably facing the garden. It is covered by a thin white 
curtain in a modern kind of polyester material, which lets some of the 
exterior light in, but also closes out the outside. Here, Gumbrecht’s code 
pair authenticity/artificiality is highly relevant, as well as modernity/
tradition. In this image alone, a lot of the abovementioned codes and 
breakdown of codes take place, as I see it. The old heavy furniture, the 
curtains, and the Sun Chariot motif point to maintenance of traditions 
such as history and the family as a private unit sealed from the outside, 
modernity, and change. The Morocco pillow, the streamline modern 
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furniture, and the many modern materials in the house all point to 
modernity and openness to the new and unfamiliar—just as the two 
vacation images described above do.
Much more could be said from a close reading of how the bodies in 
the photos pose, behave, wear themselves, are clothed, and touch each 
other (or not); what people find worth taking pictures of; how homes 
are decorated, and so on. As already mentioned, historically, women 
were album producers and thereby the prime narrators of the family 
history. In Gender of Modernity, Rita Felski has argued that we should 
take an interest in domestic experiences as well as alternative outcomes 
expressing women’s experiences such as diaries or magazine novellas 
in order to complement and give nuance to the now canonized story of 
modernism and modernity written from the perspective of male as well 
as avant-garde culture (Felski, 2009). As Daniel Miller has pointed out 
in his study of material culture in British households, it is important to 
focus on the diversity of what is studied, so that one “does not reduce to 
sociological categories or labels, or for that matter colloquial categories 
or labels.” It does not matter “what one learns from knowing the class, 
gender, and origin of people” as much as “what one doesn’t learn from 
these things.” (Miller, 2008: 292)
Conclusion
Family and everyday photographs represent both cultural differences 
and sociological strata. They also represent unarticulated differences to 
those, as well as more universal and philosophical endeavors to articu-
late questions of emotions, identity, memory, and family. Whether taken 
by a child or an adult, they have clearly also been used to understand, 
come to terms with, and negotiate the “codes” of the period, and many 
of my examples from the 1970s represent much more subtle nuances 
and breakdown of codes within a single image. This kind of material has 
not really been collected in public archives. As I argue, this period likely 
represents the first period of ubiquitous everyday photography. For this 
reason, it might never be included in “the archive,” simply because of 
the already huge amount of images from the period in peoples’ homes 
and personal archives. Or because they have already been thrown out.
Therefore, the ubiquity of everyday photography is double. It—“the 
digital period” in particular—has opened our eyes to new approaches 
to photography as a social, communicative event. A major achievement 
of the tradition of visual culture studies in general has been a shift of 
interest from structural to more cultural concerns at the level of every-
day life and a focus on images not as static entities but as social and 
dynamic objects and cultural doings, such as my short analysis above 
142 Ubiquity: Photography’s Multitudes
has shown. As Lisa Cartwright and Marita Sturken underline in their 
visual culture reader,
as we humans give meaning to objects, so too do the objects we create, 
gaze on, and use for communication or simply for pleasure have the 
power to give meaning to us as well as in the dynamic interaction of 
social networks. The exchange of meaning and value between people, 
on the one hand, and the objects and technologies in their worlds, 
on the other, is interactive and dynamic. This means that artifacts 
such as images and imaging technologies have politics and agency. 
(Cartwright and Sturken, 2009: 3)
However, this development has also had consequences, and the stakes 
are therefore not only methodological but also a matter of storage, of 
keeping photographs alive as memory keepers and identity supporters, 
both on a personal and on a societal level. It seems that a companion 
to the increasing ubiquity of photography is a decline in the actual ar-
chiving of photography. This is partly due to the enormous amount of 
images threatening to bury us in unorganized piles, partly due to tech-
nological challenges—from 1970s color photographs losing their quality 
(or being kept in plastic folders that threaten to destroy the images after 
some decades) to the increased speed of new digital storage systems 
replacing each other. Nancy Van House, Martin Hand, and others have 
pointed to this dilemma regarding digital photography. However, one 
of my points here is to draw the attention even further back into history, 
to the “ubiquitous phase” of the 1960s and 1970s, still important for 
the memory construction of modern lives in the decades that followed. 
Pointing to photography as a “doing” and as a social activity does not 
exclude talking about memory and the archive in relation to everyday 
photography, and we must keep both intentions in mind when we deal 
with everyday, ubiquitous photography.
Family photos from the 1970s have not yet entered public archives. 
Today, where private family photos are stored in digital forms and 
shared on social media, it is also imperative to collect and to take an 
interest in the materials that came before, and which might otherwise 
disappear in attics or trash bins and thus lose their role as “mirrors with 
a memory,” as the early pioneers named photography.
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Notes
1. See, for instance, Martin Hand, Ubiquitous Photogra-
phy. Here, in fact, Hand also suggests that “this is not 
the first moment in history when photography has 
been considered ‘ubiquitous.’” (Hand, 2012: 4)
2. See, for instance, Elizabeth Anne McCauley, A. A. E. 
Disdéri and the Carte de Visite Portrait Photograph.
3. Terms such as private photography, amateur, personal, 
vernacular, snapshots, family photography, and 
everyday photography are all used about more or less 
the same kind of images—as they will be used in this 
contribution. I have chosen not to use one term but the 
term that fits best in the context of the sentence con-
text. Therefore, I will primarily use the terms “family” 
and “everyday.”
4. Some examples are Snapshots: The Photography of 
Everyday Life (San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, 
1998); Other Pictures (Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
2000); Close to Home: An American Album (J. Paul Get-
ty Museum, 2004); Snapshots: From the Box Brownie 
to the Camera Phone (Museum of Photographic Arts, 
2005); The Art of the American Snapshot (National 
Gallery of Art, 2007); Michel Frizot and Cédric de 
and Veigy, Photos trouvées (Phaidon, London: 2006); 
Christian Skrein, Snapshots: The Eye of the Century 
(Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2004).
5. By such names as Sianne Ngai, Sarah Ahmed, Judith 
Butler, and Lauren Berlant.
6. When uploading, people agreed to have their text and 
photos published during the festival. Each person 
could upload a maximum of ten photos. We discussed 
how we could most easily collect the material, and, for 
economical and practical reasons, we opted for the 
digital upload. People’s private photos from the 1970s 
are analog, so we were dependent on people making 
the effort to either scan or take a digital re-photograph, 
which of course was an obstacle. Due to this, and due 
to the fact that the call for photos was announced 
during the summer vacation period, only around sixty 
people participated in sending in their private photos. 
I realize that this is not at all a complete and general 
survey of “typical” (if this would even exist) Danish 
family photos from the 1970s. Nevertheless, it was 
enough material and of such a variety that we could 
make the exhibition and that I allow myself to draw 
some conclusions, as I do here.
7. In the introductory “User’s Manual.”
8. The notion of everyday world is inspired by Husserl’s 
notion of “Lebenswelt.”
9. At the same time, Gumbrecht polemicizes against Fou-
cault’s discourse theory, New Historicism’s “poetic” 
subjectivity (416), and Constructivism. Summing up 
this criticism would require more space than I have in 
this context.
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7. Where Is My Photo? A Study of the 
Representation of Tehran in the Work  
of Contemporary Iranian Photographers
Mohammadreza Mirzaei
Photographing Tehran
The second half of the 2000s is the period of Iran’s photographic 
revolution, fostered by an environment in which digital cameras and 
social media led to the photographic process becoming less expensive 
and more democratic.1 Greater internet access allowed young people to 
discover more about topics in international photography, one of which 
included documenting the city and its historical and human dimen-
sions. In this first decade, a new generation of artists chipped away at 
the unified front of contemporary Iranian art, creating pieces outside 
of the common assumptions of work by Iranian artists represented in 
Western art institutions (that is, Iran’s domestic contradictions, human 
rights issues, cultural characteristics and symbols, primitivism, politics, 
and exoticism).2 Following this development, the domestic audience for 
contemporary art grew. In response, a new group of buyers and gallery 
owners emerged with different motivations apart from the global art 
market. In turn, this made the art scene of Iran seem even more active 
than usual.
New social, technological, and economic conditions led to a surplus 
of interest in photographing Tehran. The city that had been neglected 
and ignored for years by Iranian photographers became a foundation for 
art, supported by the city’s gallery scene. By studying notable examples 
of gallery photographs of Tehran, I will question the reasons behind the 
emergence of the urban landscape as a popular genre in Iranian photo-
graphy. This emergent genre stands in stark contrast to mainstream 
Iranian photography from the previous decade, which had given pri-
ority to staged photography and pictorial approaches that expressed 
particular political messages. While political conflicts in Iran are still 
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effective in the formation of urban documentary, I intend to position 
these photos in their social context. These new photographs of empty 
streets in Tehran can be seen as a response not only to the political 
situation but also to the changes in the policies of photographing Tehran.
Following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s second victory in the 2009 
presidential election, the massive crowd of protesters that took to the 
streets of Tehran testified to the political power of those who believed 
the election result was fraudulent. As with any political protest of the 
modern era, the representations of the protests that the media transmit-
ted were as important as the protests themselves. In a country with re-
strictions imposed on foreign and domestic reporters, images captured 
on the streets by ordinary citizens and published on the internet became 
a window into the bustling streets of Tehran. Clearly, under such cir-
cumstances, those in power enforced restrictions on the distribution 
and circulation of photography. Therefore, photographing life on the 
street, even with a cell phone, was not be as easy as it had been before.
Protest photographs taken by these citizen photographers are un-
archived and are still in dire need of scholarly attention. However, we 
still have access to some examples to understand the phenomenon bet-
ter. The available pictures found under the hashtag #iranelection on 
Twitter can clarify the restrictiveness of photographic ubiquity in 2009 
Tehran.3 For instance, there is a photo, with crooked framing, perhaps 
because the photographer was hiding the camera to not be caught by au-
thorities. Taken in downtown Tehran, the photograph shows the street 
full of people, with some holding banners of green, a symbolic color for 
the 2009 protesters. Reading this picture, it is essential to recognize 
the streets full of people as evidence of political power. As the Iranian 
writer Amir Ahmadi Arian writes, “any political conflict between peo-
ple and the government in any era is and will be about the place of poli-
tics.” (Arian, 2014: 33) As he discusses, the government attempts to limit 
such activity to specific buildings, such as the ministries and the related 
buildings. To occupy the streets, therefore, is to show disembodiment, 
“to show an emergence of a desire to change.” (34) That is why even the 
photographic representation of such a desire is considered dangerous 
by the government.
It is in the context of the 2009 protests that photographing Tehran 
became a trend for Iranian art photographers such as Mehran Mohajer, 
Mohammad Ghazali, and Sasan Abri. While the political references in 
the titles and statements are bold, do these images have the same func-
tion of the mentioned images transmitted in social media? Images pro-
duced and shared by citizen photographers were both a form of infor-
mation and a means of resistance, while photographs displayed on the 
walls of the city’s galleries resist the label of documentary in a variety of 
ways. Inspired by Mehran Mohajer, an established Iranian photographer 
1477. Where Is My Photo?
who has taught in several institutions in Tehran, several emergent 
photographers used urban landscapes to reflect on the medium of 
photography. These artists chose viewpoints and manipulated the rep-
resentational qualities of their images to create a void with an absence 
of details in their images. As T. J. Clark writes, the medium can appear 
“most characteristically as the site of negation and estrangement.” (Clark, 
1982: 152) As Clark identifies, the medium dialectically represents the 
materiality of the work of art and also a place to explore negation. This 
negation comes from the absence of certain qualities such as depth, 
figuration, and details. Such absences become meaningful in the works 
of Iranian photographers showing in galleries after 2009, making the 
audience acutely aware of what these photographers are not supposed 
to show in their pictures. What we have instead is a glimpse into a rarely 
seen face of Tehran as a defamiliarized city.
The statements accompanying the projects or the titles could fill 
these spatial and visual absences with sentiments of grief and fear such 
that the manifestation of the desire to change turns to an image of fail-
ure and its emotional implications. In those cases, the distinction is 
beyond the one between the representation of the presence of people 
with pictures of empty streets; it is indeed in making the representation 
of empty streets an elegy for the packed ones. Of course, it is fair that, 
with limited political discussion, the relevant discourse could be reduced 
to the expression of feelings. However, as I will discuss, such romantic 
approaches by Iranian photographers are challenging, as demonstra-
tions of fear and representations of empty streets can be in line with the 
wishes of the “power.”
Where Is My Photo?4
Mehran Mohajer’s Tehran, Undated is an important series in Iran’s 
photography scene, because it shifts the urban landscapes of Tehran 
from the margins to the center of the art scene. In the 1990s and in 
the early 2000s, straight photography—and to be more precise, works 
that examined medium specificity—rarely played a central role in an 
Iranian photo series. Audiences and critics approached photograph-
ic works instead through painterly criteria (as in Bahman Jalali’s later 
series Image of Imagination, 2000–2008), performance (like Sadegh 
Tirafkan’s Persepolis, 1995–1998), or studio mise-en-scène (such as 
Shadi Ghadirian’s Qajar, 1998). In contrast, Mohajer’s practice involves 
testing the different capacities of the medium, selecting the apparatus 
as one of the consistent subjects of his photography. In this way, we can 
define his photography as emerging from a practice about “photography 
itself” that aligns with the historical ideals of straight photography.
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In 2008, Mohajer began the series Tehran, Undated, examining the 
process and act of taking pictures. (fig. 7.1) In this project, he used a 
pinhole camera, a primitive version of a photographic apparatus with-
out a true lens. The main limitation of this practice is that it requires a 
long exposure time, which means that a lot of detail and motion will 
be lost in the resulting images. This is quite in line with Mohajer’s in-
terest in absence, which is a theme found in different formal and con-
ceptual arrangements throughout his work. For instance, absence takes 
priority in his use of vast, centrifugal negative spaces in some of the 
photographs of Tehran and Isfahan in Urban Landscapes (1990); in these 
images, with emphasis on the photograph’s frame, he chose the space 
between buildings as the subject of his photographs, leaving what we 
know as the image of these cities out of the frames. Emphasizing photo-
graphy’s power of transparency, he photographs newspapers in enve-
lopes in Photograph/Newspapers (2000), or a damaged TV covered with 
a newspaper in The Light is Out, The Room is Dark (2003). Alternatively, 
he deploys an exaggerated shallow depth of field to force an absence of 
detail in Nothingness (2012). Pressing further, Mohajer chooses to omit 
the bustle of city life quite effectively in Tehran, Undated. The formation 
of weird reflections due to the long exposure time, or the creation of vast 
negative space caused by the photographer sticking either to the walls 
or the ground, helps the photographer to make it a “concept”: hiding a 




2008. Pigmented inkjet 
print on fine art paper, 
76 cm × 76 cm. Courtesy of 
the artist.
See also Plate 9.
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Mohajer’s photographs of the city were exhibited in 2009, during 
a period when Tehran experienced protests and unrest for months. 
Mohajer frankly said that he took the photographs a year before those 
events, and in a note accompanying the exhibition, he identified his work 
as an homage to the early 20th-century photographer of Paris, Eugène 
Atget (Mohajer, 2019). The context in which any photograph is exhibited, 
however, changes its meaning. Mohajer’s photographs were like imag-
es of an abandoned, burned-out city with no sign of the noisy tumult 
of Tehran’s unrest in them. Due to the long exposure times, Mohajer 
leaned on walls or situated the camera on the ground, which gives these 
photographs their extraordinarily unusual angles. Could these perspec-
tives be the various viewpoints of the protesters? Furthermore, the lim-
ited detail of the photographs is eerily similar to those taken by mobile 
phones in Tehran, which at that time were the only means available for 
broadcasting what unfolded in the streets.
Journalist and critic Fabio Severo wrote an essay in Dide Magazine 
about Tehran, Undated. Severo writes, “Our visitor always seems to be 
seeking protection from a wall, a shop window, sometimes by lying on 
the ground. The spaces are wide, but the view is oddly narrow, almost 
hindered. And yet those places feel like they’re inhabited by countless 
stories, events, lives.” Referring to the 2009 unrest, Severo reiterat-
ed that what one first makes out from the low-quality mobile photos 
taken by protesters in Tehran at that time was something wholly ab-
sent in Mohajer’s photographs: the streets were packed with people. 
He continues:
Tehran, Undated puts us in front of that image, empty roads filled 
with movement, memories, thoughts. It also asks the viewer to fill 
them again, to picture how to walk on them, which turn to pick, 
which shelter to seek. There is a stillness full of noise in those alleys. 
But the truth is that, from where we stand, we can only imagine it. 
(Severo, 2010)
Interpretations and glosses laid onto Mohajer’s photographs by their 
display context changed the series from an homage to Atget to an urgent 
political commentary. Consequently, it caused younger photographers 
such as Mohammad Ghazali and Sasan Abrit to notice this sociopolitical 
potential, founded upon the photographer’s subjectivity in interacting 
with his society, specifically through the genre of the urban landscape. 
Mohajer was already active in teaching in the leading art universities in 
Tehran, and many of these photographers were his former pupils.5 These 
young photographers were interested in Mohajer’s questions on the 
photographic medium, and they tried to express the theme of absence 
through various pictorial tactics. Nevertheless, instead of seeing what 
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was happening in Tehran’s streets, they chose “not seeing” as their strat-
egy. While these photographers were numerous, the result of their work 
was quite unlike the ubiquity of images by citizen photographers, which 
escaped censorship to be transmitted in the first weeks of the protests. 
Those pictures of a turbulent, animated city, with people occupying the 
streets, were antiaesthetic yet nonetheless striking given their historical 
importance. In direct contrast, art photographers remade the city to 
be empty and in many ways aestheticized this emptiness. Nevertheless, 
these photographs are implicitly claimed by the photographers them-
selves to be political and resistant to a disciplinary force, just like those 
images by citizen photographers. Mohajer’s work, however unwittingly, 
benefited by providing an open-ended visual equivalent of the muted 
voice. In the projects that followed, the political tone became apparent, 
and the photographers then directed the audience’s reading.
Sassan Abri’s Conjunctivitis is one of those projects and was exhib-
ited at Silk Road Gallery in 2012. (fig. 7.2) Like Mohajer’s earlier series, 
Abri’s photographs lack detail and photographic sharpness. To achieve 
the abovementioned absence, Abri used a Polaroid camera and manipu-
lated the image during the photographic processing stage. Afterward, he 
scanned his images before blowing them up on a computer to print in an 
oversize format (86 × 84 cm). In spite of their size, there is little concrete 
detail to see in these large, reproduced Polaroids. Representation in the 
photographs is problematized, yet their extreme red and blue tones 
manage to create formal harmony.
Figure 7.2
Sasan Abri, Conjunctivitis, 
2012. Pigmented inkjet 
print, 86 cm × 84 cm. 
Courtesy of the artist.
See also Plate 10.1.
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A distinction between Abri’s and Mohajer’s projects is that Abri 
has recognizable symbols of and references to the Iranian regime—the 
Islamic Republic of Iran’s flag, for instance, or a watchtower. These 
signs provide the context for political readings of the photographs. 
Abri names the series Conjunctivitis with reference to an infection of the 
eye, and with a vague, cautiously worded statement, Abri connects the 
photographs and their title to the experience of fear. He writes, “This is 
no simple chemical reaction; it is fear’s insidious effect. A fear born from 
the constant view of distant states extended so very near. So distant that 
they are invisible, indecipherable, yet so close, that their shapes create 
fear.”6 Here, the series’ title and its statement restrict and orient the 
viewer’s reading, filling the void in the pictures by creating a cause-and-
effect relationship between image and word. While the statement issues 
a claim to confront and critique authority, the image ends up showing 
what “power” hopes to see: empty streets—that is, the negation of 
what previous citizen photographers captured of the crowded protests 
in 2009. It is no accident that these highly aestheticized photographs 
found their display in a gallery in Farmanieh, one of the most expensive 
neighborhoods of Tehran; its market proximity offers a sense for how 
such works, even with their political connotations, could be sellable to 
a particular social class in Tehran.
Figure 7.3
Mohammad Ghazali, 
Tehran a Little to the 
Right, 2010–2013. 
Expired Polaroid film, 
8.5 cm × 10.5 cm. Courtesy 
of the artist.
See also Plate 10.2.
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Mohammad Ghazali’s series, Tehran a Little to the Right, exhibited at 
Assar Gallery a year after Conjunctivitis, shares similarities with Abri’s 
own project. (fig. 7.3) For this series, Ghazali stands in the middle of 
the street while capturing his photographs. In most of them, we are 
faced with a similar perspective. He, too, makes use of formal and spatial 
absences, here created within an emphasis on chemical manipulation. 
He uses expired Polaroid film and bleaches the left-hand side of his im-
ages erratically. The damage is less severe in some of the works of the 
series, but the process nevertheless continues. In the last few images 
of the series, with the sequence suggested by Ghazali in the show and 
the PDF provided on his website, almost nothing is definite, and most 
of the frames are empty.7 Like Abri, Ghazali invokes Tehran’s unrest 
in the series text, written by the writer Akram Afshar as a letter to the 
Czech novelist Milan Kundera. Facing opposition from the gallery, the 
text wasn’t displayed in the gallery but was published a year later in the 
journal Landscape Stories. Afshar writes:
To be honest, this isn’t a typical letter. It is a friendly heart-to-heart, 
perhaps written to draw your attention to the events, which took 
place in … Tehran is the capital city of my country, Iran. And the 
reason for …, which shared results similar to those of the Prague 
Spring. (Ghazali, 2014)
The letter’s censored parts—replaced in the text with ellipses—find 
an analog in the bleached spaces of Ghazali’s photographs, and, as with 
the text, the viewer is compelled to fill them with specific political ref-
erences. The photographs represent city streets whose connotations 
and connections to recent events remain unclear, just as unclear as the 
reasons behind his use of expired film. Nevertheless, under one im-
age, the artist writes the location and date, “Tehran, 2010,” linking the 
photographed locations and the content of the text. What is the link 
between the bleached left side of the photos and political parties in Iran? 
Although Ghazali risks several indirect references to Tehran’s turmoil, 
this reading depends greatly on Afshar’s text. A different exhibition 
statement, or the absence of Afshar’s letter (which did occur for the 
exhibition), turns these photographs into another project entirely. For 
instance, let’s imagine that this is a series in which the photographer has 
been photographing locations where he made memories with an ex-lov-
er. The burned-out parts of photos could be both a symbol of burning 
love and a loss of memory. In this reading, the left side, of course, is 
the place from where the heart of our sensitive photographer would 
have been torn out. Thus, this speculative context doesn’t let the au-
dience fill the absence with their own experience of post-2009 Tehran. 
Yet one does not have to imagine an alternative scenario or speculate 
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further, given the Polaroid’s colorful saturation and warmth, and the 
obsolescence of the film that Ghazali chooses. Ghazali’s photographs, 
like Abri’s, first and foremost look beautiful and desirable. Their ro-
mantic aesthetics stand in stark contrast with images taken by citizen 
photographers and the social realities of the time.
So far, I have discussed the influence on contemporary photography 
by Mehran Mohajer’s Tehran, Undated, which came to incorporate new 
meaning in the context of Tehran in 2009. Mohajer himself was also 
influenced by a certain mood in Iranian photography, creating a series 
called Closed. (fig. 7.4) In this series, some obstacles are placed in the 
camera’s way, in front of the views of the city; for instance, a piece of 
tape placed in front of the camera’s view that works like an obstructive 
dam. We can consider the series as a response to the closed social and 
political atmosphere of Iran in those days. This time, unlike in Tehran, 
Undated, Mohajer offers his clear intentions in his statement: “These 
photos are the result of these years.” (Mohajer, 2013) The refusal of 
simple readings, which we can see in Mohajer’s best works, is instead 
replaced here with a cause-and-effect relationship between the title and 
text, on the one hand, and the photographs themselves, on the other. 
Also, the visibility of certain objects, such as a satellite dish—a media 
Figure 7.4
Mehran Mohajer, Closed, 
2013. Pigmented inkjet 
print on fine art paper, 
60 cm × 90 cm. Courtesy of 
the artist.
See also Plate 10.3.
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broadcast technology that is illegal in Iran—leaves no choice but for the 
audience to read a certain political meaning. While the series is visually 
appealing, almost like a modernist monochrome, its sociopolitical 
function tends to demonstrate the claustrophobia of the contemporary 
social atmosphere.
The artist Ehsan Barati takes a different approach in The Other City, 
which was exhibited at Azad Art Gallery in 2013. (fig. 7.5) Just like 
Abri and Ghazali, Barati is Mohajer’s pupil. Unlike his mentor and his 
peers, however, his work does not critique the representative qualities 
of photography through formalism. Like the Situationist International 
of 1960s Paris, he plots four paths in four different directions in Tehran. 
Following these new cardinal directions, Barati tries to distance his cam-
era from Tehran’s official face, forcing him to portray the city’s real-
ity that is perhaps less visible. His photographs are empty of people, 
too, but in this case, because he encounters urban spaces that are left 
empty. Despite the fact that Barati photographs the city of Tehran, he 
omits geographical indicators and recognizable landmarks as much as 
possible. There is no statement or title to invoke a political reading, yet 
interestingly, viewers are compelled to see the works as commenting 
on Tehran’s general political atmosphere in the wake of 2009. The last 
photo in the series shows a dead-end alley, where we find an abandoned 
green block (again, green was the symbol of Iran’s freedom movement 
and the protesters of 2009). There are some slogans written by the police 
on the walls, which, ironically, have become unintelligible. Toward the 
background stands a building whose windows are all broken. This image, 
Figure 7.5
Ehsan Barati, The 
Other City, 2012–2013. 
Pigmented inkjet print on 
enhanced matte paper, 
70 cm × 100 cm. Courtesy 
of the artist.
See also Plate 11.
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and the spirit in the architecture, gives news of an ending. Presenting 
this series in 2013, when the protests of that time had faded, it seems 
to portray a city with no life in it. The only things left are boredom, 
violence, and the disappointment of empty streets.
Photographers Mehrdad Naraghi and Hannaneh Parvin (the latter 
another pupil of Mohajer) infuse Tehran with atmospheric mystery 
and emotional intensity in their recent series. In The City, which was 
exhibited at Ag Galerie in 2015, Naraghi gives an apocalyptic quality 
to Tehran, too, but with two significant differences from Barati’s The 
Other City. The first is that Naraghi works with Tehran’s official face, 
including photographs of Tehran’s recognizable urban views that are 
rendered in deep grays or blacks. Whether through digital manipula-
tion or camera exposure, Naraghi obtains deliberately underexposed 
photographs. The result is similar to Mohajer’s expression of absence 
in Tehran, Undated. Secondly, the urban void is then filled with the 
photographer’s own words, accompanying the photographs as his 
statement. At first glance, the project seems to address issues such as 
air pollution and other environmental concerns, but upon further ex-
amination, it becomes clear that the photographer’s desire is to relate 
these urban environments to postelection turmoil. Here is Naraghi’s 
short statement:
My city is one ravaged by the storms, an unrecognizable city, 
with undefined inhabitants concealed within its grayness. Dazed 
and confused, with gaping mouths and struggling to breathe. 
Unconcerned but smiling at another’s misery. Neither breaths sighed 
return to be breathed nor are desires fulfilled; greyness overwhelms. 
My city is the endless rule of grey.8
The tone is primarily emotional, expressing the grays of the photo-
graphs. One considers a symbolic quality to them as well; gray is sup-
posed to be symbolic, not simply a symptom of the camera’s exposure 
or evidence of air pollution. The reduction of Tehran to an emotional 
condition is a risky approach, and instead of confronting the viewer, it 
might appease them. This affect, when perceived in the series as a whole, 
draws away from the striking form of the first few photographs.
A work by Hananeh Parvin, exhibited at Ehsan Gallery in 2015 as 
The Glass City, is similar to Naraghi’s The City. If Naraghi attempts to 
cover up detail with either exposure or processing, Parvin takes to the 
urban landscape as already full of visible and invisible barriers. Here, 
glass always stands between the lens and the city, from the windshield 
of a car to the plateglass of a bus station. This reminds us of Mohajer’s 
Closed, while for Parvin the layer between lens and cityscape has be-
come transparent here. It also has similarities with Abri’s Conjunctivitis, 
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because signs with everyday meanings are emphasized in Parvin’s 
pictures. This includes a red cross emblazoned on glass that offers 
atmo sphere to the city, or a “No Parking” sign amended with “sending 
students abroad” written underneath, speaking to the brain drain of the 
city’s citizens. Other photographs of lines and scratches on glass take 
the image into abstraction, distorting the relationship between figure 
and ground. Yet Parvin’s Tehran also gets caught up in sentimentality, 
and it seeks to represent absence in the city. Some pictures lapse into 
pictorialism, and others fail to avoid a different trap: one of sociopoliti-
cal sloganeering, pointing to the citizens’ brain drain. Like other series 
discussed in this chapter, The Glass City tends to distance itself from 
the burst of ubiquitous representations of Tehran following the political 
turmoil in 2009.
One long-term project among these cityscapes is Arash Hanaei’s 
The Capital, which began in 2009 and lasted until 2015.  In practice, 
Hanaei chooses a similar strategy in escaping the documentary photo-
graphy of Tehran that recorded the political moment, using pictorial 
exaggerations like those employed by Parvin and Naraghi. The results, 
however, cast Hanaei as completely distinct from those photographers. 
He uses a process of graphic elimination, and his pictures avoid faith-
fully representating Tehran. However, he boldly emphasizes specific 
details that open up the possibility for more complex questions to 
emerge. Employing detailed digital techniques, he removes parts of the 
photos, and he turns the leftovers into surfaces or architectural out-
lines. Hanaei’s images ultimately become similar to panels from a two-
tone, black-and-white comic strip, a format that achieves textual com-
prehension through captions and speech bubbles. In Hanaei’s work, 
however, there is no sign of such texts to guide us. We are faced with a 
location in a cartoon world where the only legible signs are advertise-
ments and religious slogans, which seem to have been reborn in this 
world from scratch. In Hanaei’s Tehran, commercial billboards and 
murals of war martyrs are not dissimilar, and the juxtaposition of ide-
ological messages and brand slogans veer toward the absurd. Putting 
comic strip graphics—often cast as immoral, sexually promiscuous, 
and violent by critics—to work on a city rife with conflicted messages 
points to what is eliminated from the official face of the city. Putting 
real-life heroes in a medium that is home to fantastic and imaginary 
stories creates a striking contradiction. Hanaei tacitly suggests that 
those heroes, who have always been displayed prominently on the me-
dia outlets of authority, are characters in a larger story, suggestive of a 
comic narrative that goes beyond the history of art photography and its 
subjective connotations.
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Conclusion
In the past decade, more than at any other time, Tehran has been one 
of the more vibrant subjects of photography in Iran. The presence of 
Mehran Mohajer, as an active photographer and as an educator in the 
leading Iranian institutions, compelled a new group of Iranian photo-
graphers to represent Tehran within particular medium-specific ap-
proaches meant to capture the city and its many absences. Absence in 
post-2009 Tehran became more meaningful and representative of many 
events, emotions, and stories that do not project the official face of the 
city. However, as discussed in this chapter, many Iranian photographers 
fill this absence with specific narratives and poetics, which seems to be a 
challenging strategy. Aestheticized images, with overloaded emotional 
statements about sadness and fear, thus became a commodity in the 
Iranian art market.
A criticism often leveled at contemporary Iranian art since the 
1990s—namely, its oversimplification of sociopolitical issues to be 
quickly packaged and transmitted to an international audience—can 
also be applied to the way in which these photographers interact with 
Tehran.9 Both of these manifestations of new Iranian art can be strangely 
considered as visually attractive products for their respective audiences 
with different tastes, especially in the context of the growth of galleries 
and the art market in Iran since the mid-2000s.
While this chapter analyzes photographic series exhibited in Iran’s 
artistic mainstream, displayed on the walls of various Tehran galleries, 
there were also series that, for different reasons (including censorship), 
never had the chance to confront audiences in such spaces. (Mehraneh 
Atashi’s Tehran’s Self-Portraits is one significant example of a series 
missing gallery exposure.) Yet we should not forget how photography 
today is produced and consumed on monitors or mobile screens and 
finds its audience in this way. The images of Tehran recorded by cit-
izen photographers did so without thinking about the main currents 
of Iranian art, and their work necessitates its own historical and crit-
ical analysis. While there have been restrictions on the transmission 
of such images, photos of the 2009 protests can still provide necessary 
context for understanding the capabilities of the medium today. Those 
intrepid photographers of the street have just as much to add to our 
definition of documentary photography as they do to that of contem-
porary art photography.
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Notes
1. The cheaper process helped many photographers 
who did not attend BFA programs to work without 
needing to learn the darkroom process or have access 
to it. Many Iranian photographers hold workshops in 
private institutions (such as the Mahe Mehr Institution 
in Tehran), and young photographers still benefit from 
this critical and theoretical environment.
2. These categories are borrowed from an analysis by 
Iranian critic Iman Afsarian (Afsarian, 2016: 507).
3. Unfortunately, not everyone used a hashtag with their 
pictures.
4. “Where is my vote?” was a motto used during the 
protests in Tehran after the 2009 Iranian presidential 
election, in which protesters demanded the removal of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from office.
5. For instance, University of Tehran, Art University, 
Azad University, and the Mahe Mehr Institution.
6. This statement was installed on one of the walls in the 
gallery.
7. See http://mohammadghazali.com.
8. This statement was presented in the gallery accompa-
nying Naraghi’s photographs.
9. For instance, see the articles by Majid Akhgar, Iman 
Afsarian, and Vahid Hakim in Herfeh Honarmand 
Quarterly Magazine no. 33 (2010).
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8. Evidence of Feeling: Race, 
Police Violence, and the Limits 
of Documentation
Catherine Zuromskis
Over the weekend of June 8, 2019, another cell phone video briefly went 
viral. As it begins, William Ewell, a twenty-four-year-old Black man, 
is seen kneeling on a street corner in Hawthorne, California, with his 
hands behind his head. Behind him are a cluster of police cars and armed 
police officers. At least five of the officers are sheltered behind the open 
doors of the police cars, pointing their guns at Ewell. The videograph-
er, Sky Holsey, introduces the scene to her viewers, panning across the 
intersection and pointing out the officers and their guns. She then tries 
to de-escalate the situation, alternating between announcing that she 
is filming, coaching Ewell to not to move or resist because “they will 
shoot you,” and asking the officers “is all that really necessary?” As the 
situation continues, she becomes increasingly distraught. She states that 
her boyfriend was killed by police in 2015 and pleads, “Can somebody 
put your guns down and please come get him?” After about two minutes, 
the police approach Ewell, handcuff him, and lead him over to a police 
car. One officer approaches Holsey in an apparent attempt to both calm 
her down and block the view of her camera. He explains mildly, “We are 
just detaining him, OK? We’re not saying he’s a suspect, but we are just 
trying to figure out what’s going on, alright?” She continues to film for 
another few minutes as Ewell is questioned, and once it is apparent that 
the mortal danger has passed, the video switches off.
Holsey’s video follows a long and troubling history of images of the 
exploitation, suffering, and death of Black citizens that goes back to the 
dawn of photography, and even before. But the current prevalence of 
cell phone cameras and social media networks has made the production 
and circulation of such videos ubiquitous and relentless. Increasingly, 
citizens have sought to mobilize technology to document and publicize 
the ongoing harassment, assault, and killing of Black civilians by mostly 
white law enforcement, and once recorded, individuals feel increasingly 
compelled to watch and share. Over the past decade or so, the murders of 
George Floyd, Eric Garner, Oscar Grant, Antwon Rose, Keith Lamont 
Scott, Alton Sterling, and Walter Scott have all been captured on cell 
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phone video by relatives, friends, or bystanders. Diamond Reynolds 
livestreamed the death of her boyfriend Philando Castile on Facebook 
to an audience of millions after he was shot in his car by a cop during 
a traffic stop. Police dashcam, body camera, and surveillance camera 
footage surrounding of the deaths of Daniel Prude, Tamir Rice, Michael 
Brown, Christian Taylor, Terrence Crutcher, Laquan McDonald, 
Stephon Clark, and Atatiana Jefferson circulate in the news media and 
proliferate on video-sharing sites such as YouTube. And there are other, 
less lethal but equally unjust examples—Sandra Bland’s cell phone video 
of Texas state trooper Brian T. Encinia threatening her with a stun gun 
at a traffic stop before her arrest (she later died in jail of an apparent 
suicide); a teenage bystander’s video of McKinney, Texas police officer 
Eric Casebolt physically assaulting fifteen-year-old Dajerria Becton at 
a pool party; a Rochester, New York police officer’s body camera doc-
umented his handcuffing and pepper spraying of a nine-year-old-girl 
when she resisted being put into a police car. Indeed, by comparison, 
Holsey’s video of the arrest of William Ewell barely registers. It received 
some coverage in the twenty-four-hour news cycle immediately after the 
video surfaced, but given the comparative lack of sensational content 
(no one was killed or seriously injured, Ewell was released with a cita-
tion shortly after his arrest), the media and the public quickly moved on.
The impulse to make, share, and view these documents seems fair-
ly straightforward. Cameras have long been figured as ideal witnesses. 
They are distinct from other media technologies, because they offer a 
mechanical, indexical, and indiscriminate trace of what appears before 
the lens. As Roland Barthes famously insists of photography, one “can 
never deny that the thing has been there.” (Barthes, 1981: 76) Andre 
Bazin takes it even further, describing the photograph as “the object 
itself” and cinema as “objectivity in time.” (Bazin, 1960: 6) And while 
the digital video of a cell phone camera lacks the true indexicality of an 
analog photograph or film frame, Janna Houwen has convincingly pos-
ited, evoking Barthes, a “rhetorical reality effect […] by way of formal 
features that signify veracity, documentary, and authenticity.” (Houwen, 
2017: 27) Thus, even as recent scholarship has begun to raise questions 
about the primacy of indexicality in theorizations of lens-based media 
(Elkins, 2007) and the accuracy of journalism has been called into ques-
tion in the “post-truth” era, our practical understanding that the camera 
image is an objective representation of reality appears largely unaffected. 
The documentary trace is still figured as a factual account of the incident 
it depicts. This faith in the evidentiary function of the camera, combined 
with the increasingly ubiquitous presence of cameras in everyday life 
has spurred a flourishing culture of citizen journalism and advocacy for 
police body cameras in hopes that increased visibility will lead to a more 
transparent and just exercise of police (and other) authority.
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Yet while our faith in camera technologies to provide incontro-
vertible evidence persists, the legal authority of the camera witness is 
less assured. On early New Year’s Day of 2009, several passengers on 
a stopped Bay Area Rapid Transit train in Oakland, California docu-
mented with their cell phones as, on the platform, transit police officer 
Johannes Mehserle shot a handcuffed and prone Oscar Grant in the 
back. Harrowing as the footage was, at trial, Mehserle verbally testified 
that he had meant to reach for his taser and not his gun, which largely 
outweighed the damning visual evidence. Mehserle served less than 
fifteen months in prison for involuntary manslaughter. Despite the 
livestream of Philando Castile’s suffering and death after being shot 
five times at point blank range—the video received nearly 2.5 million 
views on Facebook within the first twenty-four hours—as well as dash-
cam footage of the shooting, officer Jeronimo Yanez was acquitted of all 
charges related to Castile’s death. After viewing Ramsey Orta’s graphic 
cell phone footage of officer Daniel Pantaleo pushing Eric Garner to 
the ground and choking him to death, a Staten Island Grand Jury failed 
to produce even an indictment for Pantaleo.1 Video documentation has 
also failed to produce a conviction, and in some cases even an indict-
ment, in the deaths of Keith Scott, Alton Sterling, Terrence Crutcher, 
Tamir Rice, Freddie Gray, Michael Brown, Sandra Bland, Christian 
Taylor, Antwon Rose, Stephon Clark, and Daniel Prude, and officers 
who were convicted in similar cases have, overall, received remarkably 
light sentences for their crimes. Indeed, as Louis-George Schwartz has 
compellingly shown, motion picture documentation has long required 
strategic positioning to serve effectively as evidence, and it is equally 
susceptible to counterpositioning by attorneys who seek to call this 
kind of evidence into question. (Schwartz, 2009) As in the case of the 
failed prosecution of the four Los Angeles Police Department officers 
who were captured on video beating Black motorist Rodney King in 
1991, the camera image of the crime may be emotionally moving, it may 
bring the viewer viscerally close to the horrific act, sparking anguish 
and public outrage, but as hard legal evidence, such traces prove to be 
stunningly unstable and open to interpretation.
The ubiquity of such videos paired with their repeated legal in efficacy 
has significant implications for the presumed evidentiary function of 
lens-based media. The issue here is not simply that the promise of 
objectivity and juridical authority in the camera image is and has long 
been a false one. Almost from the moment of its invention, photo-
graphy’s potential as a form of visual evidence was met with equal parts 
enthusiasm and skepticism. (Mnookin, 1988) From photography’s in-
ception, critics have understood that the camera could lie and embellish. 
Visual documentation of crime scenes has evolved accordingly, devel-
oping an extensive list of rules, procedures, and best practices designed, 
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among other things, to minimize the distortions and biases injected 
into the image by the human camera operator. Citizen journalists of-
ten fail in this regard. In one radio interview, for example, Carlos Miller, 
author of The Citizen Journalist’s Photography Handbook and founder 
of the organization Photography Is Not a Crime, was asked to offer a 
quick primer on amateur cell phone documentation. Miller cautioned 
would-be citizen journalists, above all, to keep quiet. All too frequently, 
he states, cell phone videos of police brutality are corrupted by vocal-
ized expressions of outrage, empathy, and despair on the part of the 
videographer (Gladstone, 2015). Yet, as Miller’s guidelines suggest, it 
is difficult to keep quiet. American politics, particularly surrounding 
issues of race, have so long operated in the realm of affective relations it 
is difficult to consider an alternative response.
I argue that, even as it has the potential to undermine the legal 
authority of the evidentiary trace, this affective response is also central 
to the appeal of this form of documentation. At once an impassioned 
plea for justice on the part of the videographer and, for the viewer, 
a means of confronting and “experiencing” the brutality of that injustice 
by proxy, these viral videos of police violence constitute a complex new 
form of visual evidence, one that is defined not by the ontological prop-
erties of lens-based media producing factual accounts, but by various 
and intersecting histories, social conventions, and political ideo logies 
grounded in emotional response. In what follows, I will situate this 
evidentiary form within historical debates surrounding documentary 
images of atrocity, conventions of vernacular film and photography, and 
the visual culture of race in America. In so doing, I suggest that, contra 
the culturally constructed fantasy of a disciplined democratic society 
maintained through the ubiquity of citizen journalists with cell phones 
and police body cameras, this evidentiary mode privileges affective 
connection to, over legal justice for, the victim. And while these images 
have the potential to galvanize resistance to the institutional forms of 
white power they represent—as so vividly occurred around the docu-
mentation of the murder of George Floyd in summer of 2020—they also 
demand a more complex, situational, and ambiguous understanding of 
evidentiary technologies.
Images of Violence
The camera image of Black suffering and death as both a touchstone 
for emotional experience and a site of interpretive negotiation has a 
long history in America. From the daguerreotypes and cartes-de-visite 
of Black slaves circulated by the abolitionist movement, to the graphic 
lynching photographs of the late 19th and early 20th centuries used to 
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propagate narratives of white supremacy and Black criminality in the 
Jim Crow–era south, to the photographs of Emmett Till’s mutilated re-
mains published in Jet magazine—widely cited for catalyzing the civil 
rights movement—the indexical image of Black suffering and death has 
been effectively mobilized both for and against Black communities in 
the United States.2 But while such images of Black death may be, as 
Leigh Raiford suggests, an iconic part of American visual culture, the 
proliferation of smartphones and surveillance cameras, and the fluid 
accessibility of digital networks and social media, have increased the 
visibility of such images and brought new and distinct contexts of artic-
ulation to their consumption. Almost everyone has a cell phone camera 
in their pocket, and the impulse to pull it out and start shooting is now 
ingrained in everyday culture.3 Once captured, social media platforms 
such as Facebook and Snapchat, as well as dedicated software and net-
works like the American Civil Liberties Union Mobile Justice app and 
the Photography Is Not a Crime website facilitate the wide and imme-
diate circulation of these images to an eager public.
This, in turn, has given birth to a thriving secondary culture of ap-
propriations, re-enactments, and memes from both the right and the 
left. Video stills and snapshots of victims grace murals, shrines, and 
clothing as forms of mourning and remembrance. They inspire artis-
tic interpretations such as Henry Taylor’s painting, THE TIMES THEY 
AINT A CHANGING FAST ENOUGH! (2017) included in the Whitney 
Biennial, and Ryan Coogler’s heart-wrenching 2013 film Fruitvale 
Station (winner of the Sundance Grand Jury Prize and Best New Film 
at Cannes). They guide the language of protest against the structur-
al inequalities that sanction these crimes. Hoodies like the one worn 
by young Trayvon Martin on the night he was shot by neighborhood 
watchman George Zimmerman were donned in protest by the Miami 
Heat basketball team and members of Congress. Eric Garner’s last 
words, “I can’t breathe,” became a rallying cry for Black Lives Matter, 
inspired a song by the feminist punk band Pussy Riot, and emblazoned 
an iconic T-shirt worn publicly by athletes and celebrities from National 
Basketball Association all-star LeBron James to acclaimed filmmaker 
Ava DuVernay.
At the same time, reactionaries and countermovements such as Blue 
Lives Matter create their own rhetoric and iconography around these 
images. After Garner’s death, counterprotesters wore and sold shirts 
emblazoned with the slogans “I CAN breathe, thanks to the NYPD” and 
“Breathe easy, don’t break the law.” Videos of police violence ground what 
Donte Newman calls the “ambivalent discourse” of conservative posters 
on social media, who present themselves as sympathetic and unbiased by 
stating sympathy for the individual Black victim, while maintaining that 
“the shooting had absolutely nothing to do with race.” (Sangillo, 2018) 
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Conservative media pundits frame evidentiary traces as subject to inter-
pretation, describe victims of police shootings as “no angels,” and cite 
instances of petty theft, resisting arrest, or perceived moral failings as 
justification for murder. While presented under the thin veil of rational 
interpretation, these counternarratives from the right stoke, and are, 
in turn, fueled by race panic and righteous anger over the potential 
loss of white power held in the promise of racial justice. Thus, like the 
activism and outrage from the left, these reactionary responses draw on 
the visual spectacle of Black death as a symbolic anchor for impassioned 
and affective political discourse.
Questions about the political implications of looking at images of 
violence and atrocity have long concerned scholars of photography. On 
the one hand, as Susan Sontag emphatically argued, photographs of suf-
fering and violence are no mere passive representations, and are often 
constructed and wielded to humiliate and subordinate the photograph-
ic subject, as was the case with lynching photography or the more re-
cent example of photographs of prisoner torture at Abu Ghraib prison. 
(Sontag, 2004)4 If we take this idea to heart, then the act of looking itself 
implies a form of participation in the spectacle of Black suffering and, 
with it, the subtle effacement of the white violence that causes that suf-
fering.5 As John Berger cautions in his still bracing essay on the graphic 
photojournalism of the Vietnam War, even if one is troubled by such 
images, the moment of arrest or shock inspired by photographs of agony 
may also be the very thing that distracts the viewer from engaging in 
real political change. (Berger, 1991) Worse still, images of suffering may 
inure us to violence such that we cease to feel much at all.
On the other hand, failing to confront the severity of the problem 
and tuning out bad feelings that may also undermine new political 
realizations is equally problematic. In her book The Civil Contract of 
Photography, Ariella Azoulay posits an obligation on the part of the 
spectator to acknowledge the insistent presence of the subject and heed 
the call to “recognize and restore their citizenship.” (Azoulay, 2008: 17) 
Moreover, as Sharon Sliwinski demonstrates, photography is itself 
foundational to human rights, a concept that “did not emerge from the 
abstract articulation of an inalienable human dignity but rather from a 
particular visual encounter with atrocity.” (Sliwinski, 2011: 58) As Meg 
McLagen and Yates McKee suggest, central to this activist potential of 
photography is precisely its ability to provoke emotional response; the 
photograph combines “evidentiary truth value” with “affectual address 
[…] to mobilize sentiments of anger, shame, and outrage.” (McLagen 
and McKee, 2012: 19)
Ultimately, as these scholarly debates make clear, the question of 
whether it is just to look at images of atrocity has no clear answer, and 
the social and political value of such traces has everything to do with 
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the particularities of the image and where and how it is encountered. 
In her book Humane Insight, for example, Courtney R. Baker finds in 
images of atrocity instances of both exploitation and political resist-
ance. (Baker, 2017) The lynching photographs of the early 20th century 
were originally produced by professional photographers and amateur 
snapshooters alike as a means of asserting white dominance over Black 
populations in the American South. Yet they were also significantly 
repurposed first by Ida B. Wells and the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People and later in the exhibition and book 
Without Sanctuary in efforts to raise awareness and bring the violent 
practice to an end. (Allen, 2000) While none of the many antilynching 
bills proposed in U.S. Congress ever passed, it is clear that the visceral 
response to these violent images helped coalesce a national community 
of opposition through the iconic visual representation of the lynched 
Black male body.6 By offering a less restrictive and, importantly, more 
situational consideration of how specific images have been presented 
and represented over time, Baker demonstrates various ways that images 
of Black suffering and death have been used effectively, if imperfectly, 
to inscribe Black bodies within the ideological construct of humanity.
However, for all the echoes of iconic images of past Black suffering 
and death in contemporary images of police violence, the latter is also 
distinct, both for the technological frameworks in which it circulates 
and the sociopolitical phenomena those frameworks help to facilitate. 
Indeed, in a later essay in the Los Angeles Review of Books, Baker offers a 
decidedly less measured response to recent depictions of police brutality 
against African Americans. Titled “The E-snuff of Alton Sterling and 
Philando Castile,” this essay suggests that the current twenty-four-hour 
news cycle and the proliferation of social media platforms wrest imag-
es of Black suffering and death from the control of those who might 
present them in a sympathetic or effective manner. She writes:
Contexts of care and of justice are absent and at times anathema 
to the mass media entities that carelessly circulate these images for 
titillation or profit […] As long as these images and videos are pub-
lished alongside cries that blue lives matter and queries about black-
on-black crime and recitations of the victims’ irrelevant criminal 
histories, they have no place in the public sphere. (Baker, 2016)
The indexical image of Black suffering and death, then, is neither 
inherently exploitative nor fundamentally humanizing—or rather, it is 
perhaps always a bit of both—but vital to its meaning and political effi-
cacy (contra the totalizing rhetoric of theorists like Sontag) is a careful 
consideration of the media frameworks through which one en counters 
the image.
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In this regard, the issue is not just that digital media platforms are un-
ruly or careless (though they often are), but that lens-based media both 
analog and digital, as well as the digital networks through which images 
circulate, are themselves ingrained with racial bias. (On the racial bias 
of the internet, see Daniels, 2018; Nakamura, 2008; and Noble, 2018a.) 
From the oft-cited Google Gorilla Glitch (where Google’s image al-
gorithm repeatedly identified images of Black people as apes), to the 
Shirley cards created by Kodak to calibrate their color film to best rep-
resent white skin tones, visual media technologies have so long been 
encoded with racial bias, that it is all but impossible to separate the two. 
As Lisa Nakamura argues, “racism is less a virus in the internet’s body 
than it is that body.” (Nakamura, 2014: 269–270) These media biases are 
all the more insidious for being naturalized via the rhetoric of technolog-
ical objectivity—the mechanical camera-eye that looks indiscriminately, 
or the algorithm that supposedly circumvents implicit bias. And while 
the internet and social media have, in certain instances, proved a vital 
network for progressive political activism and reform—many cite the 
Arab Spring uprisings between 2010 and 2012—as Nakamura and Safiya 
Noble have shown, the biases embedded in these technologies serve 
equally as a cover for racist representations circulated under the guise 
of good digital citizenship and free markets. (Nakamura, 2014; Noble, 
2018b: 147) Whatever original intentions lie behind the production 
and dissemination of images of police violence against Black civilians, 
they cannot be considered outside of the technological and algorithmic 
frameworks of the internet and social media that circulate, promote, and 
even monetize their consumption.
First Person
Equally important to the contextual meaning of these cell phone videos, 
as well as their ubiquity and viral appeal, is their vernacular status. 
I use the term “vernacular” here to describe the agency of the amateur 
cameraperson as opposed to the professional journalist or automated 
surveillance camera. While vernacular photography, film, and video are 
most often associated with the private or domestic realm (family snap-
shots and home movies), it is useful to consider the effect of vernaculari-
ty on citizen journalism, in which the amateur camera captures an event 
of historical and political import. Imagery such as Alice Seeley Harris’s 
photographs of colonial atrocities in the Congo Free State, the Zapruder 
film of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the Rodney King tape, and 
cell phone documentation of the ravages of the 2004 tsunami in Aceh 
province, Indonesia are justly iconic as instances in which an amateur 
bystander with a camera was able to capture what the press could not 
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or chose not to.7 As this range of examples suggests, citizen journalism 
also has a long history, and while the ubiquity of the camera is often 
cast as a digital phenomenon, the development of amateur snapshot, 
home movie, and video cameras, beginning with the introduction of the 
Kodak camera over a century ago in 1888, has had an equally profound 
in fluence on the proliferation of lens-based media and in daily life. Yet 
the popularization of cell phone cameras has dramatically facilitated 
this kind of documentation in recent years. The term “citizen journal-
ism” suggests a kind of crowdsourcing of gathering news. More every-
day people on the ground with cameras means more coverage and more 
diversity of perspectives; thus, citizen journalism is often celebrated for 
its democratic potential in creating a more open and transparent society. 
However, it is also necessary to emphasize the way the vernacular status 
of these images frames what they depict.
On the one hand, the cell phone video, like various lens-based media 
before it, gives the assurance of truth, based in its ability to depict real-
ity with technical precision, indiscriminateness, and objectivity. While 
in actuality, the truth value of lens-based media is less an ontological 
certainty than a system of beliefs surrounding technology, empiricism, 
and social control, this does not diminish their utility as cultural indi-
cators of truth across social institutions from the sciences to systems 
of disciplinary control to the press. (On the shifting epistemologies 
of photographic indexicality, see Gunning, 2008 and Kember, 1998.) 
In the words of the popular hashtag, “pictures, or it didn’t happen.” 
Moreover, vernacular traces often seem even more incontrovertibly 
true, because, as spontaneous, sometimes even accidental documents 
produced outside the conventions and ideologies of the professional 
press, they function as “raw data,” free of media spin. Like much of the 
rhetoric surrounding the naïve “snapshot aesthetic” in late 20th-century 
art photography, citizen journalism is often framed as a kind of journal-
ism at degree zero, completely absent of motive, style, or ideology and 
thus factually pure.8 As such, the amateur status of the image or footage 
seems to enhance the evidentiary authority of the camera.
At the same time as its vernacular status seems to purge the cell 
phone video of media bias, it also, somewhat paradoxically, emphasizes 
the subjective point of view of the person behind the camera and thus 
invites the viewer to experience what it shows in a more intimate way. 
This is particularly pronounced in instances like Reynold’s livestream of 
Castile’s death or Holsey’s video of Ewell’s arrest, in which the person 
filming also narrates the unfolding events from an individual perspec-
tive. In both cases, the video is a manifestation of the videographer’s 
own trauma, one that the viewer is invited to engage and experience 
through the video (however impoverished it may be in comparison to 
the actual event). But even in cases in which the videographer stays 
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silent, the knowledge alone that a video was shot by an amateur am-
plifies what Barbie Zelizer has described as the “subjunctive voice” of 
the news image, one that invites speculation, interpretation, and emo-
tional engagement with the event it represents. (Zelizer, 2010: 23) While 
documentary and photojournalism have long employed narrative and 
sentiment to engage and inform the public—John Grierson, who coined 
the term, candidly defined documentary as “the creative treatment of 
actuality”—no genre is more suffused with affect and intimacy than ver-
nacular snapshot photographs and home movies and videos. (Grierson, 
1933: 8) These kinds of images are both products and representations 
of interpersonal intimacies. (Zuromskis, 2013) Citizen journalism fus-
es the sentimental narrative of public events conventionally associated 
with documentary visual media with the more personal and individu-
alized intimacies of the snapshot or home movie. These traces seem to 
put the viewer at the scene of the crime in a specifically embodied and 
affecting way. To view the video is to bear witness and to feel along-
side the bystander on the sidelines of history. As a result, these amateur 
traces seem both more authentic and more poignant, compelling the 
sympathetic citizen to connect viscerally and emotionally to the victim’s 
humanity, innocence, and suffering.
This is not to say that this is the conscious intent of the person behind 
the camera. Many of the cell phone videos currently circulating online 
were filmed by anonymous bystanders, so when it comes to the motive 
to film, one can only speculate. And in cases where the videographer 
is known, media coverage tends to focus on the violent act itself rather 
than the choice to document it, indicating that, at least from the point 
of view of a major news outlet, the need for visual documentation is a 
given. However, what little has been reported suggests that, for docu-
menting witnesses who are also people of color—such as Diamond 
Reynolds, who livestreamed the aftermath of the shooting of her boy-
friend, Philando Castile; Ramsay Orta, who filmed the death of Eric 
Garner; and Rakeyia Scott, who documented the shooting of her hus-
band Keith Lamont Scott—turning on the camera was first and fore-
most a defensive act. The New York Times reported that Reynolds began 
to livestream the aftermath of Castile’s shooting, because she feared for 
the well-being of herself and her young daughter in the back seat of the 
car. (Smith, 2017) A feature on Orta in The Verge states that, while Orta 
now regrets making the video (in large part because of alleged retaliation 
from the New York Police Department), he “knew from experience that 
anything could happen during these interactions. And so, for him, it had 
become a form of self-defense to film the police.” (Jones, 2019) And as 
CBS news anchor Gayle King recounted from her interview with Scott, 
the choice to pull out her phone came out of fear and anticipation of a 
violent outcome: “she said ‘that’s what you have to do these days.’” (CBS 
1698. Evidence of Feeling: Race, Police Violence, and the Limits of Documentation
This Morning, 2016) In such instances (we might also include Holsey’s 
video), the mobilization of the camera is as much about the act of filming 
itself as a form of nonviolent resistance against an aggressor empow-
ered by legal authority as it is about creating factual legal evidence for 
a future date. As David LaRocca argues, considering both Scott and 
Reynolds among other amateur documentarians:
The motivation—the ‘ethical impulse’—to grab a camera and start 
rolling […] does not issue from some noble desire to ‘bear witness’ 
for history, or some political motivation to advocate for a position 
[…] Rather, the ethical impulse in these cases appears to emerge 
at a private, existential level […] The camera […] becomes a kind 
of proxy force for private inscription, and thereby a space in which 
to encode one’s ownmost potentiality (always a matter of life and 
death). (Larocca, 2017)
This suggests that, in keeping with other instances of vernacular film 
and photography—family snapshots and home videos—the cell phone 
video, even in a life-and-death situation, functions as a form of affective 
retaliation and self-preservation. (Zuromskis, 2013) The act of filming is 
as much about making a signifying gesture in the present as it is about 
producing a stable objective document for the future. Even in the face of 
death, Reynolds’s impulse to film asserts some modicum of control over 
the narrative and connects her traumatic experience to those of others.
Once produced, however, the vernacular status of these videos is cen-
tral to their virality. For many, the circulation of this particularly com-
pelling and affecting kind of footage represents a sympathetic political 
act. For outraged liberal citizens, the videos may be troubling and diffi-
cult, but the lure of bearing witness, of seeing through the eyes of the 
bystander and testifying to that experience is strong and goes largely 
unquestioned. Yet this same impulse to click, to view, and to share can 
never be entirely separated from the violence that the images represent, 
and indeed, the racist ideologues that circulate and consume imag-
es of Black suffering to fuel and profit from racist sentiment. As one 
conflicted reader of Baker’s Los Angeles Review of Books piece wrote 
in the comments section, “In a moment of outrage, I posted the video 
[of Castile’s death] and my horror. Then little by little I felt worse and 
worse until it was clear to me that I was perpetuating violence. I took it 
down and apologized, too late, I am afraid.” (Baker, 2016) Often, and 
even with the best of intentions, the emotional impulse, grounded in 
the conventions of vernacular documentation, is first, to look, to show, 
to share, and to bear witness, so one might acknowledge the feelings that 
looking engenders. Only later does one consider what the implications 
of that need to see might be.
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Evidence and Feelings
While I do not mean this essay as a challenge to the felt encounter with 
a documentary image, it is nevertheless important to emphasize the 
ways in which the same qualities that we may find particularly moving 
in cell phone videos of police violence, prompting us to click and share, 
may also undermine their function as evidence. Feelings have an in-
sidious way of undermining factual evidence. In her book The Emotional 
Politics of Racism, Paula Ioanide explores contemporary epistemologies 
of white ignorance and how obscure evidence of structural racism in 
society. She notes that “being presented with evidence about systemic 
injustices of […] racism rarely has the effect of changing the minds and 
actions of people who are emotionally invested in holding onto their 
beliefs, identities, and worldviews.” (Ioanide, 2015: 11) In her analysis 
of yet another case of police brutality against a Black man, the torture 
of Haitian immigrant Abner Louima by New York Police Department 
officer Justin Volpe in 1997, Ioanide shows how the retelling of an event 
may engender sympathies only for specific victims, or worse, tap into 
“guilty enjoyments of voyeuristic sadism or other emotional economies 
that justify Black people’s violation.” (Ioanide, 2015: 64) This is equally 
an issue in the legal arena. On the face of it, a video documenting a crime 
in progress would seem to be a powerful and damning piece of evidence. 
Yet, as Baker and others make clear, the impact of the image is always 
contingent upon its framing. The grand jury investigating the case of 
Eric Garner were clearly able to look at Orta’s video and see something 
other than an innocent Black man strangled to death by a police officer 
on a public street.
And while the transcripts for the Garner grand jury remain sealed, 
we may gain insight into how this came to be by looking at the 1992 trial 
concerning the Rodney King beating. As numerous studies of the case 
have discussed, the acquittal of the four officers who brutalized King 
was not in spite of, but facilitated by, the vernacular video of the crime. 
(Nichols, 1994; Gooding-Williams, 1993; Alexander 1994; Schwartz, 
2009) The defense presented the jury with numerous stills from the 
video, dissecting it in detail to make the case that an obvious act of police 
brutality was instead a procedurally legitimate act of law enforcement 
to restrain a potentially dangerous civilian. As even a passing familiarity 
with the present media environment makes clear, no evidence is imper-
vious to interpretation and ideological reframing, and stereotypes of 
menacing Black men are routinely trotted out in legal and media dis-
course as justification for racist violence. As Khalil Mohammed argues, 
the entrenchment of white racial imaginings about Black criminality is 
so strong that even in the face of hard data—a ProPublica report that 
Black men are twenty-one times more likely than white men to be killed 
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by law enforcement—attitudes remain unchanged (Muhammed, 2014). 
Returning to the evidentiary failures of these documentary traces, we 
might say that, despite its obvious indexicality, the photographic or 
filmic image may, paradoxically, fail to show us what it shows us and 
only affirm what we already feel we know.
Why, then, do these images continue to have such cultural currency 
even among those who are appalled by what they represent? Certainly 
the feelings of outrage and injustice that one may stir through the visual 
consumption of images of Black suffering can lead to political action, as 
they did, quite effectively, for the abolitionist movement, the civil rights 
movement, and most recently Black Lives Matter protests in the after-
math of the deaths of Eric Garner, George Floyd, and others. At best, as 
Azoulay argues, images of suffering and atrocity place an obligation on 
the spectator to redress the wrongs depicted in the image. But this “civil 
contract of photography” requires one to push beyond affective modes 
of “empathy or mercy,” toward a more regulated and political “covenant 
for the rehabilitation of [the subject’s] citizenship.” (Azoulay, 2008: 17) 
We must be wary, then, about too easily associating emotional response 
with ideal outcomes and action. Moreover, as Baker suggests, the mur-
ders of Castile and Sterling disseminated to the world via cable news and 
social media are entirely different from Mamie Till-Mobley’s decision to 
allow postmortem photographs of her son Emmett to be published in a 
weekly news magazine geared explicitly to African American readers. 
That the Sterling or Castile footage was made as an act of documenta-
ry resistance and may be viewed with sadness or outrage, does not, in 
itself, control the framing of these images in a way that imagines useful 
alternatives. Moreover, the ubiquity of these sensational images of Black 
suffering in the current media landscape may ultimately reiterate, or 
worse, intensify, comfortably familiar narratives of static and systemic 
racial inequality in America.
Western culture has long employed representations of victimized 
Black men and women to drum up white sympathies. In Seeing Through 
Race, his groundbreaking study of photography and the civil rights 
movement, Martin Berger points to the long history in the United States 
and abroad of making the complexities of racism more accessible and 
digestible to a sympathetic white audience through images of passive 
Black men (or women), victim to white aggressors and beholden to 
white defenders. (Berger, 2011) As vital as photography was to the civil 
rights struggle in the United States, Berger makes clear that image 
of stoic Black children marching to newly desegregated schools or of 
Black men standing passively in front of lunging police dogs and fire 
hoses, equally “impeded efforts to enact—or even imagine—reforms 
that threatened white racial power.” (Berger, 2011: 7)9 Media narratives 
surrounding the deaths of figures such as Grant, Garner, Castile, and 
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Floyd often conform to similar tropes, tacitly reiterating conventions 
of white power and conditioning the behavior of Black citizens. Press 
surrounding the death of Castile, for example, often highlights his job 
as a nutrition services supervisor at a Montessori school as evidence of 
his gentle and caring character. A widely circulated smiling photograph 
of him and a colleague from the school yearbook shores up accounts of 
his disposition. Garner’s apparent genial nature makes him a similarly 
appealing, tragic figure. In the tributes following his death, Garner was 
frequently described not only as a dedicated husband and father but also 
as gentle, kind, a “big teddy bear” and “a neighborhood peacemaker.” 
(McDonald, 2014; Peltz, 2014) In Orta’s video, though Garner is clearly 
agitated, he is at pains to stay reserved, even polite in his encounter with 
Pantaleo in both word and gesture. Fruitvale Station presents yet another 
portrait of a genial but passive Black character in Oscar Grant (played 
by Michael B. Jordan). Availing himself of many familiar tropes—child 
victims; the kid from the wrong side of the tracks who just wants to make 
good; stoic, mournful Black mothers (two of them); and, in the Grant 
character, a “magical negro” figure shown on multiple occasions selfless-
ly helping and protecting white people—director Coogler constructs a 
deeply affecting but uncritically normative depiction of racial injustice. 
And countless media reports on the death of George Floyd emphasize 
the poignant detail that he called out to his late mother with his dying 
breaths. In comparison to other, more “complicated” victims—Michael 
Brown, for example, whose death seemed easier for the media to justify 
because of his altercation with a convenience store clerk and Darren 
Wilson’s grand jury testimony that he had a face “like a demon” (State 
of Missouri v. Darren Wilson, 2014)—the stories of Floyd, Castile, Garner, 
and Grant fit the familiar mold of Black martyrdom.
I mean this in no way as a challenge to the characters of these men 
or a critique of nonviolence as a mode of political resistance. Nor am I 
immune to the emotional lure of these narratives. But I do want to draw 
attention to the way that such cultural texts operate via existing racist 
conventions that highlight white agency—as both aggressor and po-
tential liberator—and necessitate the polite subservience of Black cit-
izens. While Berger shows that the emotional politics of Black suffer-
ing is nothing new, it seems particularly urgent in the present moment, 
when liberal feelings of righteous outrage are provoked and expressed 
through the same images and technological networks that have also fa-
cilitated a powerful resurgence of white nationalism. By simply ignor-
ing this contiguity, by desiring encounters with bad feeling and assert-
ing them in public forums like social media and popular culture, white 
liberals (myself included) also cultivate good feeling about ourselves 
as white liberal political agents and ultimately reinforce the structures 
of white power.
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Conclusion
We arrive, then, at something of an impasse. Cell phone videos chron-
icling the epidemic institutional violence against Black civilians in 
the contemporary United States both reiterate the spectacle of Black 
suffering and hold the potential to coalesce opposition to institutional 
racism. They allow for a profound and affecting mode of bearing witness 
to crimes that they also fail to redress. As such these images both am-
plify a sense of social and political urgency surrounding race and high-
light the failures of technology and visual culture to effect political 
alternatives. Yet returning to Azoulay’s civil contract of photography, 
I am compelled to explore the possibility that these contemporary im-
ages of police violence might be framed and presented in other, more 
effective ways, ways that might check the carelessness and individuali-
zations of the current media landscape and oblige its viewers to engage 
the humanity and complexity of its Black subjects on a structural level. 
Such a project requires a more considered and situational engagement 
with the nature of documentary technology, the frameworks in which 
they are presented, and how we receive and interpret them.
This means, first, that we must question our remarkably persistent 
faith in indexical media. It may seem counterintuitive given how much 
more publicized these kinds of incidents are thanks to the ubiquity 
of the cell phone camera and the fluid networking of social media. 
The revolutionary potential of such technological forms is enticing, 
but, as is evident in the case of the Rodney King video, no techno-
logy is self-determining. Our relationships to cameras and the traces 
they produce have always been historically contingent, economical-
ly motivated, and politicized, be it the citizen journalist’s cell phone 
video or the police body camera. To understand these media as sim-
ply objective, indexical, and therefore productive of knowledge (rather 
than reflective of ideology) is to grossly oversimplify their social func-
tion. While there is potential in turning cameras on those in power to 
monitor their behavior, advocating for more police body cameras or 
sharing video evidence on social media has not and will not, in itself, 
prevent police violence merely by exposing it. In a moment when feel-
ings override facts, we must resist the notion of an uncomplicated, 
authentic visibility.
Second, we must attend more carefully to our agencies as specta-
tors. This could mean heeding Azoulay’s directive to “watch,” rather 
than simply look at the photograph, activating our engagement with 
and responsibility to the subject in videos of police violence, resisting 
the spectacle of Black suffering and seeking out and indicting systemic 
white violence. It could also mean following Baker’s lead and delib-
erately turning away, not as a refusal to engage but as an intentional 
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engagement via refusal. Or we might follow the brilliant work of Tina 
Campt, who urges us to “listen” for the frequencies of tension within 
images that do not fit so neatly into binaries of honorific and repressive 
(Campt, 2017). Citing Allan Sekula classic essay, “The Body and the 
Archive,” Campt’s argument builds on the idea that both honorific and 
repressive images occupy the same “shadow archive” in which everyone 
is marked and identified (Sekula, 1986). Rather than get caught up in 
the binary opposition of honorific and repressive, good and bad images, 
Campt’s work suggests that we seek out more complex and ambiguous 
visualizations of Black futurity, images that highlight the tensions and 
“effortful equilibrium” of Black life.
I will close, then, with one example of what this kind of complex and 
ambiguous visualization might look like in the work of Black American 
cinematographer and video artist Arthur Jafa.10 Jafa’s lauded video 
works are assembled largely from still images and video footage found 
on internet platforms such as YouTube (alongside instances of Jafa’s 
own lyrical footage) and set to musical accompaniment. Jafa’s work 
presents images, vernacular and otherwise, in what John Akomfrah 
has dubbed “affective proximity” to one another to create a more com-
plex and crafted visual experience, one that complicates the stability of 
any single depiction within it and immerses the viewer in the “effortful 
equilibrium” of Black life. Jafa’s best-known work, the joyous, trau-
matic, beautiful, gutting 2016 single-channel video Love is the Message, 
The Message is Death immerses the viewer in a range of intimate and 
iconic images of Black life and culture. In addition to familiar videos of 
police brutality and Black suffering, Love is the Message, The Message is 
Death includes powerful images of uplift, as well as many that encom-
pass both joy and trauma: President Obama singing “Amazing Grace” 
during his eulogy for Reverend Clementa Pinckney after the Emanuel 
African Methodist Episcopal shooting in 2015; dreamily static footage 
of iconic powerful Black women like Hortense Spillers, Angela Davis, 
and Aretha Franklin; shaky home videos of Black people death dropping 
and twerking in clubs and living rooms; a Black couple wading through 
the floodwaters of Hurricane Katrina. Huey Copeland has described 
Love is the Message, The Message is Death as a form of antiportraiture. 
While the piece is replete with images of both beauty and suffering, the 
images come so rapid-fire that, Copeland suggests, they “hedge against 
the visual capture of Black folks, while throwing light—and shade—on 
viewers’ implication in the digital ecologies through which those images 
circulate and dis/appear.” (Copeland, 2018)
Jafa’s video work is steeped in all kinds of affects. While Love is 
the Message, The Message is Death is ecstatic and traumatic, his 2013 
video APEX, is more anxiety-provoking and unsettling. An eight-min-
ute sequence of still images (mostly photographs) set to a relentless, 
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mechanical techno track (“Minus” by DJ Robert Hood, which feels like a 
heartbeat racing out of sync with itself), APEX offers split-second glimps-
es of monsters from science fiction and horror movies, the microscopic 
and the telescopic, David Bowie and Mickey Mouse, and brutal histor-
ical images of Black bodies tortured and mutilated. The effect is quea-
sy-making, pulse-quickening, and exhausting. It challenges the impulse 
to keep looking and to turn away, simultaneously.11 When images of true 
horror appear, they emerge and disappear too quickly to be fully com-
prehended. They function neither as transparent evidence of specific 
historical events nor as affective spectacles of Black death—instead, they 
haunt me, obliging me to recognize the civil contract of photography 
without the catharsis of full understanding.
The affective response to Love is the Message, The Message is Death 
in particular has been so strong that Jafa himself has expressed ambi-
valence about its success. In an interview with The Guardian, he mused, 
“I started to feel like I was giving people this sort of microwave epiphany 
about blackness […] After so many ‘I cried. I crieds’, well, is that the 
measure of having processed it in a constructive way? I’m not sure it 
is.” (Gebreyesus, 2018) Yet considered alongside his other works, Love 
is the Message, The Message is Death seems less epiphanic and more 
elusive. Images of Black suffering and death (particularly explicit in 
APEX) are contextualized through Jafa’s affective proximities, but in such 
a way that they can remain necessarily fluid and unfixed, visible, but 
also, to evoke Krista A. Thompson’s groundbreaking work on “video 
light” in Black diasporic culture, interrupting, disrupting, and blinding. 
(Thompson, 2015) Rather than seeking out uncomplicated innocent 
victims as icons for mourning and outrage, it is in contexts like these 
where indexical traces of Black experience are replicated and reframed 
within a more complex, contradictory, and fluid space of consumption.12 
In these aesthetic frameworks, the vernacular video of Black suffering 
and death may begin to find the necessary contexts of care and control 
that might reconfigure technological networks of consumption and dis-
play and challenge the dominant narratives of white power. And perhaps 
it is here that we might begin to feel and imagine a future that is different 
from the present.
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Notes
1. Perhaps the only decisive action the video produced 
was the New York Police Derpartment’s possible 
retaliation against Orta, who has repeatedly alleged 
police harassment and trumped-up arrests for minor 
offenses. Orta completed a four-year prison term in 
2020, making him, as reporter Juan Gonzalez noted in 
2016, “the only person at the scene of Garner’s killing 
who will serve jail time.” (Goodman and González, 
2016)
2. As Leigh Raiford suggests (citing Coco Fusco), not 
only do such photographs “produce race,” but “the 
negation/annihilation of black people in act and image 
is constitutive of American identity.” (Fusco, 2003: 60; 
Raiford, 2011: 17)
3. This is not exclusive to instances of police violence. As 
one feature on Diamond Reynolds reported, “She had 
always found it cathartic to broadcast her life” and con-
tinued to do so, via friends’ social media accounts even 
after her lawyers advised her to close her own. (Saslow, 
2016)
4. Sontag also explored this idea in On Photography, 
where she highlighted what she saw as the essential vi-
olence and incrimination of photography as a medium. 
Citing the distance it imposes between photographer 
and subject and the visual dominance of photographer 
over subject, she likens the camera to a gun, describes 
the photographic act as “sublimated murder,” and 
declares unequivocally that “there is an aggression 
implicit in every use of the camera.” (Sontag, 1973: 15)
5. As Richard Dyer has argued, Whiteness has long 
been constructed as an invisible racial position (Dyer, 
1997). Parallel to the invisibility of Whiteness is what 
Hortense Spillers describes as the “theft of the body” 
of Indigenous and African peoples during the coloni-
zation of the New World and the slave trade. (Spillers, 
1987: 67) The objectification and othering of the Black 
body, absent Black subjectivity and agency, in Ameri-
can visual culture is central to the ongoing invisibility 
and dominance of Whiteness as a racial category.
6. Leigh Raiford describes lynching imagery as iconic for 
the way they have been reproduced by Black agents in 
both art and culture and have come to be “a constitu-
tive element of black visuality.” (Raiford, 2011; 18–19) 
While the practice of lynching in America had largely 
ended by the 1960s, racially motivated torture and 
murders like those of Michael Donald in Mobile, Ala-
bama (1981), James Byrd, Jr. in Jasper, Texas (1998), 
and Alize Ramon Smith and Jarron Keonte Moreland 
in Moore, Oklahoma (2018) bear many of the features 
that distinguished lynching as a practice earlier in the 
century. What is notably missing is the integral func-
tion of visual spectacle. As Dora Apel notes in case of 
Byrd, the crime was so horrific and shameful that no 
photographs of the body were ever published. (Apel 
and Smith, 2007: 74–75)
7. The history and political actions spurred by citizen 
journalism was chronicled in the Bronx Documentary 
Center’s 2016 exhibition New Documents.
8. Here, I evoke Geoffrey Batchen’s use of the term 
“photography degree zero,” after Roland Barthes’s 
1953 book Writing Degree Zero, to describe an 
approach to writing “that attempts to achieve a neutral 
or ‘zero degree’ of form—a form of writing that, like 
most photographs, denies it even has a form.” (Batch-
en, 2011; 5) For an extended discussion of the purity 
and naïveté of the snapshot aesthetic, see Jonathan 
Green’s special issues of Aperture on the topic (Green, 
1974: 6).
9. Similar arguments about the narrative conventions 
surrounding representations of the civil rights move-
ment have been made by Raiford (2011) and various 
authors (particularly Edward Morgan) in Raiford and 
Romano (2006).
10. I am grateful to Tina Campt for introducing Jafa’s work 
to me in her thoughtful and compelling keynote at 
the Reframing Family Photography conference at the 
University of Toronto, September 21–23, 2017.
11. It bears noting that others have very different respons-
es. In Jafa’s massive recent monograph, John Akomfrah 
describes dancing with joy at a screening of APEX 
(Akomfrah, 2018: 71).
12. On the liquidity of Blackness in the cultural sphere, 
see Raengo et al. (2019).
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Derek Conrad Murray
In fact, everyone will agree that desire is not only longing, a clear and 
translucent longing which directs itself through our body toward a 
certain object. Desire is defined as trouble… troubled water remains 
water; it preserves the fluidity and the essential characteristics of wa-
ter; but its translucency is ‘troubled’ by an inapprehensible presence 
which makes one with it, which is everywhere and nowhere, and 
which is given as a clogging of the water itself.
 —Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Sartre, 1993: 378)
In a 2019 New York Times op-ed entitled “What Does It Mean to ‘Look 
Like Me’?,” philosophy professor Kwame Anthony Appiah pondered 
the importance of recognition in visual culture—and more pointedly, 
the potential impact of seeing one’s physical corollary represented on 
screens and in popular forms of media. As Appiah recounts, the refrain, 
“I just want to see someone like me” represented in mainstream visual 
culture is a commonly uttered—if not entirely cliché—retort, so often 
recited by entertainers of color when asked why they do what they do:
The playwright Tarell Alvin McCraney, explaining what drove him 
to create the new television drama series ‘David Makes Man,’ which 
follows the life of a black boy in a public-housing project, observed: 
‘John Hughes made several movies that depicted the rich interior lives 
of young white American men and women. I just want the same for 
people who look like me.’ The comedian Ali Wong inspired the writ-
er Nicole Clark to confess that she ‘didn’t think she liked stand-up 
until a few years ago, when I realized the problem was the lack of 
comedians who look like me and tell jokes that I “get.”’ (Appiah, 2019)
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Appiah is right to point out that this popular notion alludes to what the 
philosopher calls a “kinship of social identity”: it functions as a means to 
express in-group cultural commonalities. Though it may speak to a de-
sire for recognition that is easily articulated, we must also acknowledge 
that group identity and the solidarities it calls for have always been more 
aspirational than a tangible reality. Appiah’s consideration of this rep-
resentational problem argues that we may need to complicate what it 
means to see people who “look like me,” while acknowledging the falla-
ciousness and impossibility for images to capture the complexities and 
ideological slippages of identity.
The aspirational dimensions of recognition in the visual realm, 
of which Appiah speaks, resonates in many ways with self-imaging 
online, most commonly articulated in the visual form known as the 
selfie, or digital self-portrait. The now ubiquitous term has become 
synonymous with our 21st-century, techno-crazed society, even while 
the act itself has been maligned as a puerile and largely vacuous visual 
expression. Common on social media sites such as Facebook and 
Instagram, the selfie has become a powerful means of self-expression, 
encouraging its makers to share the most intimate and private moments 
of their lives. The popularity of self-imaging online is unprecedented, yet 
within popular journalism, the selfie is reviled and regarded as a shallow 
expression of online narcissism. I have written previously about the 
more political and socially engaged dimensions of online self-imaging, 
while considering the gendered implications of both the act, and its com-
mon (mis)characterization as a largely female-driven form of communi-
cation (Murray, 2015). While many of the more radical mobilizations of 
the selfie are produced by women, it is not, contrary to dominant discus-
sions, a uniquely female act. Despite that fact, popular discourses have 
largely characterized the selfie as a symptom of a narcissistic society, or 
they have asserted that those who make selfies are themselves suffering 
from mental health disorders (Murray, 2020).
In response to the aforementioned tendency, this chapter argues for 
a reassessment of digital culture’s impacts on contemporary life, while 
simultaneously considering how certain constituencies have responded 
to the increasing presence of new technologies. I acknowledge that the 
utopian promise of digital culture has, in many respects, contributed to 
the dismantling of democracy and is complicit in the rise of inequality 
and the erosion of privacy. By exploring the impact of digital utopia-
nism in the visual realm, this research explores how young women 
have responded to the ubiquity of new technologies as a means to as-
sert a sense of personal value, recognition, and empowerment. The 
representational expressions of marginalized groups online have often 
functioned as a counterpoint to the dominant culture’s tendency toward 
devaluing, misrepresentation, and erasure—though these expressions 
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have nonetheless absorbed digital mediums, making productive use of 
their participatory networks and interactive platforms. One of the more 
generative aspects of self-imaging online is its engagement with new 
forms of image-making in the 21st century that utilize (and often weap-
onize) individuated, participatory, and interactive practices as a power-
ful means for social engagement. Ultimately, the aim is to explore the 
impact of digital technology on contemporary life from an anti-utopian 
perspective that is lucid about the implicit identity politics expressed 
within the often fraught and misinterpreted act of online self-imaging.
The critical framework for this essay explores the notion of desire 
under the ubiquity of digitalism. In contemplating this thematic, I tend to 
think of desire (and the self-image) in terms of desiring the self. Moreover, 
I critically position the selfie as one of intense intimacy: as a form of 
self-fashioning that is often about attempting to assuage feelings of lack, 
of isolation, and of alienation—as a means to love oneself. For that rea-
son, this essay takes a more speculative approach that investigates the 
self-imaging of women of color, not as an effort to generate external 
sexual desire (something that beckons), but rather to create a framework 
in which they begin to desire themselves: to create a representational 
system of value for subjectivities who experience persistent devaluing 
and/or erasure—a phenomenon that we might regard as a romance with 
the self. These expressions flourish under a constant pejorative threat of 
ridicule and pathologizing rhetoric. For that reason, there is a great need 
to understand the logics that drive the ubiquity of self-imaging in online 
cultures as a tool for self-definition.
The Ubiquity of Culture
As a 21st-century social phenomenon, the selfie has an interesting re-
lationship with both technology and culture. The degree to which one 
bears down upon the other historically, and in the present, is a com-
plex and enduring discussion. In this case, however, I question wheth-
er the selfie tends to prioritize culture over the concerns of techno-
logy—ultimately, propelling the self-image to the forefront of social 
discourse. My engagement with ubiquity is informed by recent debates 
concerned with the conjunction between identity and culture—as 
well as by a more generalized set of popular characterizations of the 
selfie as an ever-present, inescapable, and insidious social scourge. My 
formulation breaks from film scholar Christian Metz’s well-known 
writings on ubiquity, which are more specifically engaged with the 
psychodynamics of cinematic spectatorship (Metz, 1982; Hodge, 
2015: 55). That said, the derisive, often articulated characterization of 
the selfie has greatly impacted my writing on the topic, in addition to 
182 Ubiquity: Photography’s Multitudes
my thoughts on the photographic self-portrait in general. Metz has dis-
cussed what he calls cinemas “gifts of ubiquity,” which alludes to the 
all-consuming omnipresence of the camera; its uncanny ability to “be 
anywhere and see anything.” (Hodge, 2015: 54) In photographic dis-
course, the ubiquity of digital imaging in online cultures has ushered in 
what could be characterized as a postphotographic media landscape—
in which the photographic medium thrives, but without the veracity 
of its more traditional use value. Utilizing Metz’s theorization, the 
spectator’s identification is with the camera, and therefore, a greater 
attention should perhaps be given to unpacking the viewers relation-
ship to the act of looking, as opposed to the perceived narcissism of the 
representational subject.
Metz’s formulation of the scopic regime explores the relation be-
tween cinema and voyeurism, as a means to rethink psychoanalytic 
framings of fetishism and the complexities of subjectivity. Many of his 
observations can illuminate the psychodynamics of self-imaging online. 
For Metz, “the practice of cinema is only possible through the perceptual 
passions: the desire to see,” which suggests it is implicitly interconnect-
ed with the scopic drive, scopophilia, and voyeurism (Metz, 1982: 58). 
What I find most salient in Metz’s concept is the notion that cinematic 
spectatorship (which is essentially an act of looking) is voyeuristic, yet 
interpolated by exhibitionism by the subject of representation. In other 
words, there are two drives that compel the act of cinematic spectator-
ship: a desire to be seen and a voyeuristic gaze. These interconnected 
drives are equally complicit and not dissociated from one another. As 
Metz suggests, the subject of representation (the one who is looked at) 
is not a passive presence, which implies a certain consent. He argues 
that this form of looking is an inherently participatory act. Voyeurism, 
in a strictly Freudian sense, obviously suggests an active viewer and a 
passive, unaware subject. Metz, on the other hand, looks at cinematic 
spectatorship as reciprocal in the sense that subjects perform with an 
awareness that they will be looked at. In his formulation, however, there 
is a distinction to be made between the cinema and live theatrical per-
formance, as it pertains to consent: “In the theater, actors and spectators 
are present at the same time and in the same location, hence present one 
to another, as the two protagonists of an authentic perverse couple.” (63) 
The scholar makes a delineation between the theatre and the cinema, as 
it pertains to consent, suggesting that cinema is perhaps more voyeuris-
tic than theatre, largely due to the absence of the subject/performer: “In 
the darkened hall, the voyeur is really left alone (or with other voyeurs, 
which is worse), deprived of his other half.” Ultimately, Metz intimates 
that (as it pertains to theatrical and cinematic spectatorship) there are 
both active and passive roles in the exercise of the scopic drive. In the 
context of viewing cinema, the spectator is
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still a voyeur, since there is something to see, called the film, but 
something in whose definition there is a great deal of ‘flight’: not 
precisely something that hides, rather something that lets itself be 
seen without presenting itself to be seen, which has gone out of the 
room before leaving only its trace visible there.
Cinema therefore exercises what he calls an unauthorized scopophilia.
The selfie is implicitly consensual, or perhaps it encourages what 
could be called, following Metz, an authorized scopophilia. Despite the 
perceived narcissism, there is a kind of agreement between the subject 
and viewer; there is an implied consensus that one is to look, and the 
other to be looked at. The tension around, or societal loathing for, selfies 
taps into a relation that Metz illuminates, which is the perversity of look-
ing. Metz’s scopic drive acknowledges something very base in the act 
of looking, which is its connection to desire and ultimately to sexual 
drives. Freud characterized these sexual impulses as “ego drives,” which 
he linked to narcissism. There are, of course, many reasons why look-
ing at others would imply the sexual, but as Freud insisted, the sexual 
drives are perverse, and paradoxically, always remain more or less un-
satisfied (59). Perhaps it is the perverse dimension of looking at others 
(the never-satiated sexual drives), and not the narcissism of the subject 
of representation, that vexes. In keeping with Metz’s formulation, there 
are two drives that compel the act of producing and consuming selfies: 
a desire to be seen and a voyeuristic gaze. Therefore, the selfie is also 
intertwined with the perceptual passions. What is so socially treacher-
ous about the desire to be seen? Is it the narcissism of the image-maker/
subject, or is it something more connected to the viewer’s desire?
Within popular discussions of online self-imaging, it is precisely the 
way the act tends to recuperate the politics of identification that gener-
ates tension. And as mentioned, the apparent narcissism of the selfie is 
commonly referred to as something that cheapens and demeans. In my 
critical approach to the highly personal and intimate expressive dimen-
sion of the selfie, I see the possibility for self-transformation: a form 
of identification that is not a series of fixities and reductions (a kind of 
dumbing down of the self), but rather a subjectivity that is changing 
and in constant flux—what we might characterize as a transcendental 
subject. But, reduced to its most base and pejorative interpretations, the 
selfie is perhaps a sign of culture run amok, a symptom of a societal 
descent into the politics of identity.
The idea of culture has consistently been a much-debated topic 
throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, if not also an issue of increasing 
contestation. In the last two decades in the United States, visual culture 
studies has emerged as a vibrant cross-disciplinary field spanning the 
arts, humanities, and social sciences. Informed, in many respects, by 
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cultural studies in the United Kingdom, visual studies (in its current 
form) has not always been embraced, despite its increasing prevalence. 
In certain respects, visual culture studies, at least within art history, was 
treated as an unwanted guest that arrived late and stayed too long. But 
as scholar Margaret Dikovitskaya reminds us, visual culture studies has 
been around since the 1960s, despite its seeming newness:
An interdisciplinary field, visual studies came together in the late 
1980s after the disciplines of art history, anthropology, film studies, 
linguistics, and comparative literature encountered poststructuralist 
theory and cultural studies. Deconstructionist criticism showed that 
the academic humanities were as much artifacts of language as they 
were outcomes of the pursuit of truth. The inclusive concept of cul-
ture as ‘a whole way of life’ became the object of inquiry of cultural 
studies, which encompassed the ‘high’ arts and literature without 
giving them a privileged status. As a result of the cultural turn, the 
status of culture has been revised in the humanities: It is currently 
seen as a cause of—rather than merely a reflection of or response to—
social, political, and economic processes. (Dikovitskaya, 2006: 6)
To Dikovitskaya’s point, what we now call visual culture studies has 
also been informed by the interrelated fields of visual communication, 
visual anthropology, and visual sociology: all arenas concerned with 
both culture and the visual. Without belaboring the debates, contes-
tations, and disciplinary and methodological boundaries, it arguably 
goes without saying that the tensions around visual culture studies are 
perhaps more related to culture than to its visual dimension. That cul-
ture is the source of antagonism is not a huge surprise. Cultural studies 
in Britain, most notably associated with Stuart Hall’s post-Gramscian 
theoretical approach to hegemony, has gone on to define current con-
ceptualizations of visual culture studies across the arts and humanities. 
However, Hall’s writings on cultural identity tended to view identity not 
as static, but determined by a process of perpetual transformation. The 
notion that identity is not a fixed essence—but rather a chosen identi-
fication or a means of positioning—had a profound impact on the de-
velopment of visual culture studies in the United States. But, among its 
many interventions, cultural studies enabled the study of visuality to be 
expanded in terms of its objects of study, its geographic scope, and the 
deepening of its engagements with identity and representation (Hall, 
1990; Hall, 2007).
However, British cultural studies, despite its early formulations in 
the 1950 and 1960s, really took shape as a multicultural-era response to 
the horrors of political conservatism under Margaret Thatcher’s reign 
as prime minister (1979–1990). Among its lasting interventions, British 
1859. On Photographic Ubiquity in the Age of Online Self-Imaging 
cultural studies solidified a set of theoretical and methodological ap-
proaches for the consideration of race, gender, and sexuality. The rise 
of identity discourses in U.S. universities, and the increasing presence 
of departments in the arenas of gender and sexuality studies, African/
African American and Black studies, as well as Chicano/Latinx and 
Asian studies (among other disciplinary formations), have brought with 
them needed change within the academy—while also facing persistent 
institutional instability. A dimension of that instability is, at least in 
part, due to an increasing sentiment both in academia and within cul-
tural politics that the academy has become irrecoverably entrenched in 
a toxic brand of liberalism. The spectrum of these concerns reflects a 
range of often contrasting agendas—from the self-reflexivity of nota-
ble left-leaning scholars, to the ideological demagoguery of the political 
right. Nonetheless, such critical reflections have become increasingly 
pre valent and now threaten the institutional longevity of these depart-
ments. This threat has been exacerbated by the rise of neoliberalism 
within the U.S. university system and the continued diminishing of the 
arts and humanities, in favor of the science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics fields. But arguably what is more important here is the per-
ception that academic liberalism has become hackneyed and trite: that it 
has devolved into a kind of liberal dystopia, which engages in institution-
al hand-wringing around a set of lefty positions on diversity, inclusion, 
and tolerance—while lamenting the presence (or absence) of the under-
represented and the vulnerable. These terminologies have become the 
lingua franca of liberal tolerance as institutional optics (Vedder, 2018). 
Within certain segments of the intelligentsia (perhaps most no toriously 
reflected in the work of scholars such as Jordan Peterson, professor of 
psychology at the University of Toronto), there is an increasingly vocal 
pushback against academic liberalism. These counterarguments often 
lament the presence of institutional browbeating around politically 
correctness, such as race discourse and feminism, or the use of proper 
pronouns for transgender and genderqueer constituencies. Of course, 
these positions are well known, as they populate the national media and 
extend far beyond academia.
The problem is that culture itself has gone on to signify the evils of 
identity and diversity: terminologies that are arguably more reflective 
of intellectual and institutional positioning—and the galvanizing of a 
progressive image—rather than any substantive commitment to equity. 
While the liberal university has become a bastion of tolerance-based 
sentimentality, on a structural and demographic level, it has a long 
way to go in its commitments against forms of discrimination. British 
Australian scholar Sara Ahmed suggests that the function of so-called 
“diversity work” within liberal institutions is the need to both generate 
and project the right image, as a corrective to the wrong one: arguing that 
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perception is more important than the problem itself, which is the con-
tinued presence of structural inequity (Ahmed, 2006: 104). Slavoj Žižek 
has leveled an even more pointed critique of this apparent problem in his 
questioning of the tendency toward tolerance-based posturing within 
liberal multiculturalism. Žižek’s more cynical position argues that the 
liberal multiculturalist’s basic ideological operation is the “culturaliza-
tion of politics,” a condition upon which the celebration of (and identifi-
cation with) cultural differences masquerades as political action (Žižek, 
2008: 660). This tendency toward tolerance, as opposed to equity, is cer-
tainly the problem, because it represents a contradictory or hypocritical 
tendency toward an institution’s stated commitments (its progressive 
ethos) and the continued presence of structural inequality and bias.
To the above point, culture masquerading as politics has become a 
dominant feature of far-left scholarship, particularly in the humanities, 
and to a certain degree in the arts. In fact, the term culture is a trigger 
that (for many intellectual and cultural commentators) signifies what is 
increasingly regarded as a kind of hysterical or psychotic liberalism that 
is ultimately ineffective. In his writing on the ubiquity of culture, Jefferey 
Williams argues that culture has extended beyond the perception of its 
nonessential function—its ornamental role, so to speak. “In classical 
aesthetics,” he writes, “culture is defined precisely by its uselessness and 
detachment from ordinary life.” (Williams, 2014: 45) The scholar’s ar-
gument is interesting, largely because he initially characterizes culture 
as a frivolity:
The traditional idea of culture as high art conceives of culture as 
something like the flowerbed. While we might appreciate and value 
artifacts we deem beautiful, they are not essential to our primary 
physical needs. In a no-nonsense, colloquial view, culture is ornamen-
tal, secondary to if not a frivolous distraction from the real business 
of life.
Williams draws upon this analogy as a means to explore the rise 
of culture as central to intellectual and social life: that it has become 
politics. Informed by a Marxist framing, he laments that culture has, in 
his estimation, reached beyond its intellectual and historical positioning 
as tertiary to politics, economics, and business.
Williams’s initial framing of culture as a kind of aesthetic diversion, 
and not as a central historical antagonism, is fascinating. In a sense, it 
captures a certain frustration around the contradictions of academic 
liberalism and its particular mobilization of culture (as politics). On 
the other hand, it tends to step around the toxic weaponization of 
culture—as a potent form of social engineering—throughout the 19th 
and twentieth 20th. It is clear, however, that Williams is more concerned 
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with the phenomenon of culture’s increasing predominance and politi-
cization in contemporary life:
We speak of proclivities within a society, such as ‘sports culture,’ ‘car 
culture,’ ‘hip-hop culture,’ or ‘mall culture.’ In political discourse, 
culture describes the tenor of society, such as ‘the culture of com-
plaint,’ ‘the culture of civility,’ or ‘the culture of fear,’ and societies are 
defined by their cultures, such as the ‘culture of Islam,’ ‘the culture of 
democracy,’ or ‘the culture of imperialism,’ which generate their pol-
itics. In criticism and theory, culture, whether indicating race, class, 
nationality, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, abledness, locality, or taste, 
determines human identity, which in turn designates political inter-
est. In short, ‘culture’ has shifted from ornament to essence, from 
secondary effect to primary cause, and from a matter of disinterest-
ed taste to a matter of political interest. Consequently, pursuits that 
study culture, like literary or cultural criticism, have claimed greater 
political importance to society. (46)
Fifty years ago, Raymond Williams charged criticism to look at the 
conjunction of “culture and society.” Now it seems that culture is society, 
interchangeable as a synonym for social interests, groups, and bases. 
Culture has shifted from a subsidiary (if special) role to primary ground, 
inverting the standard model of base and superstructure. Even a social 
theorist such as Pierre Bourdieu, who persistently foregrounded the 
significance of class, conceived of class less as a matter of material means 
than of taste, disposition, and other cultural cues.
The ubiquity of culture that Williams speaks of holds a special res-
onance when considering self-imaging in the 21st century, because, as 
mentioned, it is an expression that (in the case of certain constituen-
cies) encourages the mobilization of culture, as a political or socially 
engaged act. If we give credence to the feminist mantra, the personal 
is political, then we can begin to understand why the “selfie,” for many 
young women, generates such malice in public discourse. I argue that 
what the selfie does (its operation, so to speak) is to make culture vis-
ible—to render it indispensable and of foremost importance. Culture 
is always the problem; but it’s not what the selfie is, but what the self-
ie does that is the vexation. So, when we ponder the ubiquity of the 
online self-image, perhaps what we’re seeing is Žižek’s “culturalization 
of politics” rendered visible via an extremely personalized engage-
ment with digital technology. The very act of making oneself a public 
spectacle has undeniably political ramifications and associations, par-
ticularly when mobilized by minoritized and socially maligned com-
munities. The almost hysterical fixation with self-articulation, identity 
formation, and self-fashioning—not to mention the rapacious need 
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for fame and cool—is indeed troubling. I have no argument there. 
Yet we might think of these expressions of technological self-affection 
not merely as the visual culture empire or as empty expressions of 
narcissism, but rather as a means to simply exist in a profoundly alien-
ating and extremely intolerant world.
The Selfie and Its Discontents
In 2013, the Oxford Dictionary of English announced selfie as the word 
of the year—a distinction that has inaugurated its introduction into the 
public consciousness. A selfie has been defined as a photograph that one 
has taken of oneself, typically one taken with a smartphone or webcam 
and uploaded to a social media website. Despite the increasing ubiquity 
of the term—and the popularity of the act itself—the tendency has been 
to position online forms of self-imaging as culturally corrosive, patho-
logical, and even mortally dangerous. As a result, the selfie debate has 
evolved from a lighthearted discussion about the perils of technology 
and consumption to the pathologizing of the image-maker. The aim here 
is to give insight into a contemporary discussion about the impact of 
technology and social media as a means to disseminate and share images. 
The term selfie, in its popular usage, is meant to delineate a particular 
engagement with technologies of image-making, a phenomenon that 
has led to public debate about the potentially corrosive effects of techno-
logy on our individual and collective selves.
There is, on the other hand, a continued need to explore the politi-
cal, ideological, and aesthetic complexity at the heart of the selfie phe-
nomenon, and contemplate whether the urge to compulsively self-im-
age in the 21st century is mere narcissism or if it holds the potential for 
more redemptive meanings. Moreover, there is a significant amount of 
serious scholarship being done on the subject of digital self-portraiture 
(primarily in the social sciences and communications), but most of it is 
not engaged with the visual. While there is a need for scholarship that is 
innovative, knowledgeable, and insightful about online self-imaging as a 
social, economic, and technological phenomenon, there is a paucity of 
research that is engaged with digital self-portraiture as representation. 
Scholars Edgar Gómez and Ellen Thornham make a contrasting argu-
ment, suggesting that placing undue attention on self-representation is 
to ultimately miss the point:
We argue that contemporary understandings of selfies either in re-
lation to a ‘documenting of the self’ or as a neoliberal (narcissistic) 
identity affirmation are inherently problematic. Instead, we argue 
that selfies should be understood as a wider social, cultural, and 
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media phenomenon that understands the selfie as far more than a 
representational image. This, in turn, necessarily redirects us away 
from the object ‘itself,’ and in so doing seeks to understand selfies 
as a socio-technical phenomenon that momentarily and tentatively 
holds together a number of different elements of mediated digital 
communication. (Gómez and Thornham, 2015: 1)
Gómez and Thornham’s position is a widely held one across the 
spectrum of social sciences research—even while the selfie, as a highly 
personalized representational act, speaks directly to discourses around 
recognition, as well as to the kinship of social identity that Appiah de-
scribes: that pesky need to see oneself imaged. Needless to say, the in-
terpretive quandary posed by these contrasting approaches alludes 
quite troublingly to the relation between the individual consumer and 
the rapacious forces of technocapitalism that bear down upon them. 
Scholar Henry Giroux compellingly argues that “freedom has be-
come an exercise in self-development rather than social responsibility,” 
further intimating that the tendency toward neocapitalist privatization 
and voracious consumerization have served to erode the public good 
(Giroux, 2015: 155).
Giroux tends to view the selfie phenomenon as a troubling sign that 
“a vision of the good society has now been replaced with visions of in-
dividual happiness characterized by an endless search for instant grati-
fication and self-recognition.” (156) He further states that “the personal 
appears to be the only politics that matters in providing both emotional 
gratification and a tangible referent for negotiating social problems.” 
Giroux’s central concern here is the decimation of in dividual privacies, 
engendered by the state and the corporate sphere. He argues compelling-
ly that there is an “increasing view of privacy on the part of the American 
public as something to escape from rather than preserve as a precious 
political right.” To that point, the willingness of consumers to give over 
their most personal information is a hallmark of the social media phe-
nomenon: a feature of 21st-century life that, as Giroux laments, accultur-
ates the masses into the intrusion of consumer-based surveillance prac-
tices. There is really no productive counterpoint to this argument, as 
we come to grips with the manner in which technology has created new 
and more invasive means to exert its control. The scholar ack nowledges 
that, while the selfie does not offer up the types of information that 
is most concerning, it does, in fact, transform the self into a matter of 
public concern. “Privacy has mostly become synonymous with a form 
of self-generated, non-stop performance—a type of public relations in 
which privacy is valued only for the way it makes possible the unearth-
ing of secrets, a cult of commodified confessionals and an infusion of 
narcissistic, self-referencing narratives.” (157) Many commentators have 
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lamented what is perceived as a societal descent into self-obsession and 
the shallowness of individual posturing. And the selfie is the perfect foil 
for these concerns. We can, of course, utilize online self-portraiture and 
image-sharing as a barometer for the hegemonies of state and corporate 
surveillance. But perhaps, we need to look more closely, particularly as 
we acknowledge that, throughout history, the tools meant to dominate 
have often been weaponized against those very dominating forces. 
While not attempting to uncritically redeem the selfie phenomenon of 
its troubling dimensions, I argue that the personal is still political, even 
while the capitalist subject wrestles with the threats posed by techno-
capitalist aggression.
The more cynical interpretations of the selfie/influencer debate share 
a central conceit that concerns me, which is not simply what I would 
characterize as a careless, or callous, disregard for the deeply personal 
motivations for self-imaging—but rather the disdain articulated around 
the private desires expressed in individual images. There is much more 
interest in viewing the selfie judgmentally as a social scourge of sorts, as 
a representational phenomenon defined by a society in which private 
citizens don’t feel they exist without photographic evidence. In fact, the 
negation of individual desire extends beyond this contemporaneous dis-
cussion. Yet we must come to terms with this insistent need to charac-
terize desire as a disruption or as a regressive tendency that fosters, as 
Judith Butler argues, “philosophical myopia, encouraging one to only 
see what one wants, and not what is.” (Butler, 1999: 3) Within this par-
ticular discussion, such attitudes take the shape of expressed misgivings 
about the rapaciousness of neoliberal capitalism, while ignoring the 
human longings and desires for recognition that emanate from these 
forms of representation. Butler expresses a critical concern regarding 
the philosophical tendency to “obliterate” desire through the formula-
tion of “strategies to silence or control it.” (2)
The domestication of desire in the name of reason or, more apt-
ly, the constructed philosophical split between reason and desire, is 
the subject of Butler’s ire—as it expresses a contradictory moralism. 
Desire is in fact the operation implicit to the act of self-imaging; desire 
is its modus operandi. The envisioning of desire is not the antithesis 
of tacit knowledge, any more than there is an irrational desire. And 
as Butler asserts, “there is no necessarily irrational desire, no affec-
tive moment that must be renounced for its intrinsic arbitrariness.” 
That implicit arbitrariness of desire externalized is what intrigues me 
about online self-imaging: that tension between consciousness and 
self-consciousness that offers up the intimacies and longings of an in-
dividual. The photographic self-portrait is an intensely psychological 
image that mobilizes (or, more aptly, weaponizes) the returned gaze in 
the process of self-conception.
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In response to less charitable characterizations of online self-imaging, 
I argue that it is not just desire (the desire of the Other) that unsettles, 
but rather the self-eroticizing and objectification: what is perceived 
as a narcissistic self-display that positions the female body as a fetish 
object. This articulated expression of female agency is scopophilic, but 
its voyeuristic pleasures are self-fixated—even while visually acknowl-
edging (through a performed femininity) that the female body (in rep-
resentation) is not her own, but a matter of public concern. Female bod-
ies are always subjected to the gaze and always rendered the object of 
popular representation. Even though the visual codes of female display 
are manipulated to grand effect, there is an implied pleasure in directing 
the gaze back upon itself, while playing with the “to-be-looked-at-ness” 
that Laura Mulvey theorized in her famous essay on visual pleasure 
(Mulvey, 1989). Rather than reject the passive female/active male binary, 
implicit to the selfie is a claimed pleasure—an active jouissance of sorts—
that gestures toward a femininity that is beyond repression, despite its 
many glaring contradictions.
Lacan’s jouissance (or the pleasure principle) functions as a limit of 
enjoyment. It is a repressive law meant to prohibit the subject from ex-
periencing too much pleasure, but the consequence is that the subject is 
locked in an eternal struggle to transgress the imposed boundaries. The 
subject’s attempt to transgress the pleasure principle does not lead to 
more pleasure, but pain itself: a type of suffering or painful pleasure. This 
suffering is what Lacan calls jouissance. In essence, jouissance represents 
a paradox, in that subjects becomes conflicted with their own pleasure 
and derive satisfaction in the suffering brought about by the pleasure 
experienced (Lacan, 1981: 183).
Jacques Lacan first developed his concept of an opposition between 
jouissance and the pleasure principle (what Sigmund Freud calls the 
pursuit of enjoyment) in his seminar The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 
(1959–1960). Lacan argued there is a jouissance beyond the pleasure 
principle, a jouissance that compels subjects to constantly attempt to 
transgress the prohibitions imposed on their enjoyment—to go beyond 
the pleasure principle. Yet, according to Lacan, the result of trans-
gressing the pleasure principle is not more pleasure, but pain, because 
there is only a certain amount of pleasure that the subject can endure. 
Beyond this limit, pleasure becomes pain, and this painful principle is 
what Lacan calls jouissance. Jouissance is therefore suffering.
Female Jouissance, Self-Love, Desire, and Recognition
Lacan’s model has become a powerful metaphor for the contradictory 
tensions between pleasure and guilt: a paradox that informs individual 
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action, but also larger social relations. It is precisely the opposition be-
tween enjoyment and pain, vis-à-vis the imaging and visual consump-
tion of Otherness that is of interest to this investigation. What happens 
when difference (in this case, the female body) enters into the realm of 
representation, in a cultural climate in which gender inequity is a per-
sistent problem? As a key psychoanalytic concept in Lacan’s building 
upon Freud, the concept of jouissance is phallocentric and rooted in the 
repression of masculine pleasure. However, as woman is configured as 
lack (as nonuniversal), there is what can be called a female jouissance, or 
more appropriately the jouissance of the Other. Lacanian feminism has 
been extremely generative in terms of our application of this concept—
not least because the French philosopher’s writing was instrumental 
to the linguistic turn in poststructuralism of the 1980s. As Nina Lykke 
points out, “French theorists became important sources of theoretical 
inspiration for the continued feminist struggle against biological de-
terminism.” (Lykke, 2010: 97) She continues: “Some feminists found 
Lacan’s orientation toward language a particularly useful aspect of his 
reinterpretation of Freud’s psychoanalysis.”
French feminist writer Hélène Cixous’s formulation of Lacan’s 
jouissance is more concerned with a woman’s pleasure: asserting that 
jouissance is the root of a woman’s creative power, and its suppression 
restrains the female subject’s expressive potential. Therefore, we might 
think of feminist jouissance as a kind of transcendent state that signifies 
freedom from societal repression. Scholar Jane Gallop offers a similar 
interpretation:
When jouissance becomes an emblem of French feminine theory, 
however, it is specifically identified as non-phallic, beyond the phallus. 
But even though jouissance is specified as feminine, the tendency 
to stiffen into a strong, muscular image remains. The difference be-
tween jouissance and pleasure is generally understood to be one of 
degree: jouissance is stronger and so the person who experiences it is 
stronger, braver, less repressed, less scared. Fear also appears in con-
junction with jouissance in an English translation of French feminism, 
but in a different form. The editors of New French Feminisms state, 
in a footnote, that “[jouissance] is a word used by Hélène Cixous 
to refer to that intense, rapturous pleasure which women know and 
men fear.” Here, the two are conjoined but divorced: we have jouis-
sance, and they fear it. If jouissance is defined, as it is by Barthes and 
the women, as a loss of self, disruption of comfort, loss of control, 
it cannot simply be claimed as an ego-gratifying identity, but must 
also frighten those who “know” it. As jouissance becomes a banner 
and a badge for French feminine writing, the accompanying fear or 
unworthiness is projected outward and we—militant and bold—lose 
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the ambiguous link to fear and emotion, which are catapulted beyond 
the jouissance principle where it might even be their momentary fate 
to take up residence in that mediocre and unworthy word, “pleasure.” 
(Gallop, 1984: 114)
In response to Gallop and the critical framings of other notable 
Lacanian feminists, we can see how jouissance can be mobilized in the 
service of dismantling gender-based repressions. Jouissance holds a 
particular fascination when unpacking the role that difference plays in 
the representational schemas of a society in which gender hierarchy is 
fundamental to the social, economic, and political order. I find these 
theorizations incredibly useful when contemplating the psychological 
implications of the photographic self-portrait. As Amelia Jones asserts, 
there is “something fundamental about the body in relation to the image, 
something that, indeed, provided the major impetus to the development 
of photographic technologies: the desire for the image to render up the 
body and thereby the self in its fullness and truth.” (Jones, 2006: xiv) 
Jones makes a salient point about the technology of the camera as means 
to render the body via the manipulation of light:
Being an indexical trace of the body before the camera, then, the 
photograph promised to return the represented body to some kind 
of authentic state. Because the photographic portrait documents 
the embodied trace of the self (with the mind made visible only 
through its body-sign), it highlights both the inextricability of body 
and mind and the fact that we often access the self via its visible—
corporeal—form, a form we want to serve as guarantor of the body. 
The photographic portrait seems to reaffirm the body’s never-ending 
‘thereness,’ its refusal to disappear, its infinite capacity to render up 
the self in some incontrovertibly ‘real’ way. (xiv–xv)
What Jones argues for here is a more nuanced engagement with our 
relation to the representation of bodies—further suggesting that we have 
an attachment to their presumed legibility, that there is a desire for the 
body and image to function as a clear reflection and indicator for ideo-
logical meanings. In other words, we often interpret and engage others 
through their appearances, which is the basis for stereotyping, racism, 
and forms of social discrimination (xvii). Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
in his thoughts on recognition and popular representation, suggests 
something similar, that the need for a representative image of ourselves 
similarly requires certain reductions that are ultimately less about see-
ing someone who looks like me, as they are a dubious confirmation of 
one’s existence. The types of self-images circulating online (selfies and 
influencer portraits) “deploy technologies of visual representation to 
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render and/or confirm the self (paradoxically: objectifying the self so as 
to prove its existence as a subject), and the way in which these techno-
logies expose the inexorable failure of representation to offer up the self 
as a coherent knowable entity.” (Mulvey, 1989: 19) The self-fashioning of 
desire implicit to the online self-image fulfills that “primordial wish for 
pleasurable looking” that Mulvey articulates, fully indulging the scopo-
philic and narcissistic pleasures of recognition.
The vast and ubiquitous landscape of selfies and influencers is by 
no means strictly female, though I assert that the most urgent and 
progressive interventions online are driven by women. In fact, I have 
written before that, within the female-driven landscape of “selfie-laden” 
blogging and influencer culture, the spectacle of female bodies is the 
dominant driving force. But these images may constitute a new love affair 
(to borrow Mulvey’s terminology) between the image and self-image. 
And it is true that the visual power of online self-portraiture is rooted 
in a type of pleasure that is voraciously claimed: an oppositional desire 
and enjoyment in oneself as a response to a culture of devaluing and 
misrepresentation (Murray, 2015: 22). This enjoyment is bound up in 
a conglomeration of intersecting affects around self-love, desire, and 
the need for a mutual recognition: one in which both the subject of 
representation and the viewer/consumer enjoy the visual pleasures of 
the self as spectacle. This reciprocity is likely the driving force behind 
the selfie/influencer matrix: that it enables both the subject and viewer/
consumer to gaze lovingly upon that which has historically been de-
nied—the imago of the devalued and the underrepresented, presented 
within the glitzy motifs and the vacuity of consumer technocapitalism.
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10. Parafiction and the 
New Latent Image
Kate Palmer Albers
What do you think of when you imagine a photograph? What does 
it look like? Do you conjure one from your past, perhaps a favorite 
childhood photograph, or one of a parent or a grandparent before 
you knew them? Or perhaps it is one you anticipate making, imagined 
in the moment that you pull out your phone to snap a picture. Either 
way, whether for remembered, imagined, or anticipated photographs, 
our cognitive faculties enact a complex set of associations to con-
jure such a mental image: we not only draw on our own networks of 
personal images (our own archives), we also draw on the vast sea of 
photographic images we have encountered. Nearly all of these images 
exist in correspondence with other forms of information, whether 
memories of events, particular sensory experiences—of smell, of 
emotional warmth or distance, of physical movement or other visceral 
encounters, of music or sound—or knowledge gleaned through words, 
text, captions, narratives, histories. On occasion, we might imagine 
photographs that don’t exist, may never exist, or once existed but 
don’t any longer; these may be moments of inspiration, speculative 
fantasies, or ruminations filled with longing or loss.
In two recent projects, WDCH Dreams (2018) and Archive Dreaming 
(2017), the media artist Refik Anadol (b. Turkey, 1984) extends the 
para meters of this imaginative exercise, asking what would happen 
if a computer imagined a photograph based on all the photographs 
and information it had encountered. Would that image be a memory? 
A dream? A hallucination? Would it be a photograph at all? Throughout 
his projects, Anadol has brought his fascination with the expressive 
potentials of data into the realms of human memory and architecture, 
asking how viewers might engage with the relatively abstract complex-
ities of algorithmic possibility via a physical immersion in the perhaps 
more recognizable realms of human-scaled architecture. Anadol’s 
work consistently seeks to operate in a newly defined space, one that 
pivots precisely at an intersection of massive quantities of data and 
human perception.
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These particularly photographic questions emerge from a distinct set 
of material operations and experiments in visualizing archives (and, thus, 
history and memory). Andadol’s provocative refiguring of what “counts” 
as photographic reflects a current inability of language to describe, and 
thus perhaps to fix, the meaning of a new form of generated image pro-
duction. Language in this uncertain state reflects, too, the assumptions, 
the expectations, and the desires of makers and viewers.
WDCH Dreams premiered in downtown Los Angeles as public art 
installation, urban spectacle, and community event. Each night, for 
ten nights, architect Frank Gehry’s iconic Walt Disney Concert Hall 
was activated by Anadol’s forty-two projections, each meticulously 
calibrated to the dynamic shapes of the building’s extraordinary ex-
terior. Unfolding in a sequence of three visual chapters given struc-
ture by periodic textual interludes (Chapter 1: Memory; Chapter 2: 
Consciousness; Chapter 3: Dream), the projected images collectively 
told, in a twelve-minute narrative cycle, the story of their own creation. 
(figs. 10.1 and 10.2) At the start, scrolls of color photographs travel up the 
sides of the building’s facades; they are familiar and repetitive, evoking 
the scores of personal snapshots on any iPhone or computer desktop, 
echoes of our own visual archives, writ large. Images of photo albums 
and outdated recording technology scroll by as well, and always more 
photographs, in escalating quantities. In this early sequence of the per-
formance, the building’s exterior reflects (via projection) the data that 
Anadol’s neural network has received. Like many other institutions, 
Walt Disney Concert Hall has digitized its extensive analog archives, a 
Figure 10.1





lation, 12-minute loop. 
Courtesy of the artist.
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material shift that can have a profound effect not only on the accessibili-
ty of those records but also on the manner in which they are interpreted 
and, thus, understood. The source material of this newly configured 
archive, all told, comprises nearly forty-five terabytes of image, video, 
audio, and metadata, all in digital form.
The initial projection of this original material comprises Chapter 1: 
Memory. The chapter concludes with the visualization of its own jarring 
upload sequence: a cacophony of chaotic sound, data, video, and image. 
From here, the network is activated and Chapter 2: Consciousness 
begins. Individual images become a mass of data, layered into im possible 
quantities, images that merge into a sinuous geometric structure, ab-
straction in motion, a series of viscerally dynamic yet technologically 
cool biomorphic forms and structures that play upon the exterior skin of 
Gehry’s architecture. The visuals become swirling, porous, and organic, 
evoking a mix of the embodied and the networked. They are irresistibly 
photogenic, as they morph through an inventory of forms. Nearly all of 
the spectators are compelled at one point or another to record, with their 
own phones, these strangely beautiful and sensuously abstract images. 
Finally, Chapter 3 launches the dream, the neural network’s generative 
mode. A thick neural net evokes movements and pathways; it reveals 
an interior architecture that leaks and seeps forms. It is a moment of 
strange vulnerability (and, even stranger, of empathy) for the neural 
network, as it offers its own imaginings for public view, extending a 
notion of “this is what I can do, this is how I imagine a photograph.” 
The projected images become strangely hallucinogenic and a little bit 
Figure 10.2
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See also Plate 12.
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unnerving as not-quite-human forms seem to struggle to cohere into 
something recognizable. The intriguingly experimental moment soon 
yields to a return to both narrative and visual familiarity, a grand and 
celebratory finale featuring the (recognizably human) conductors of the 
Los Angeles Philharmonic.
Anadol’s collaborators matter: in this site-specific commission, he 
operates within the relatively safe harbor of an august cultural insti-
tution (the Los Angeles Philharmonic) in a celebratory moment (its 
hundredth anniversary) for an audience (Angelenos) who, outside of 
the opening night gala, have likely had only a cursory engagement with 
the Los Angeles Philharmonic’s long history. And while both the core 
and crescendo of Anadol’s narrative adheres to the celebratory and 
triumphant nature of the work’s commission, the project nevertheless, 
and perhaps despite itself, fundamentally evokes counternarratives of 
authority, the ethics of representation, and the emerging possibilities—
both poetic and fraught—of human–machine collaboration.
The point is illustrated in some alternatives. To start, imagine that 
Anadol’s custom technology, developed in collaboration with Google’s 
Artists and Machine Intelligence program, was directed toward a dif-
ferent institution and with a different commission in mind. What if 
the projection, rather than dwelling on the archives of an august cul-
tural institution, had dwelled instead on the archives of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, or, more locally, the Los Angeles Police 
Department—a department with a deep legacy of racial profiling and 
violence? If the data set were comprised of mug shots, crime scene docu-
ments, and psychological profiles, what different interpretive languages 
might be necessary? How might audiences react to “dreamed” or “im-
agined” or “fictive” archival photographs in those contexts? Given the 
deep history of critical texts on the restrictive nature of representation 
within archives of power (Tagg, 1988; Sekula, 1986), and the strong res-
ervations even a casual observer might have about the ethics of “produc-
ing” “memories” from archives that have already been shown to be sys-
temically racist and oppressive both in origin and practice, dramatically 
different stakes would be at play. The Los Angeles Philharmonic pro-
vides a kind of cover for the more rigorously ethical and philosophical 
questions that the technology suggests, but that the project evades and, 
to some degree, actively resists. Indeed, in Anadol’s vision, “the archive” 
is performed, and made spectacularly visible. The public work is, by its 
very terms of existence, separate from the archive’s material origins. 
Viewers are not meant to actively engage or explore, but to be spectators.
In the public performance, the “look, but not too closely” spirit of the 
piece is a matter of practicality that the demands of large-scale public 
installation art may seem to require. Yet the ethos extends into the 
smaller, interactive installation. Inside the Walt Disney Concert Hall 
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lobby, viewers may spend up to ten minutes at a time with smaller-scale 
iterations of the archive visualizations, which are, in an intimate gallery 
space, parceled into visual and auditory components, accessible as a cu-
rated subset. As with the exterior projections, Anadol is at his best con-
veying the awesomeness of massive scale. Not unlike the philo sophical 
and art historical emergence of the concept of the sublime, Anadol’s 
visualizations are both beautiful and somewhat terrifyingly vast in their 
complexity. A viewer of either is not unlike the figure in Caspar David 
Friedrich’s classic Wanderer Above the Sea of Fog (ca. 1818), standing 
apart from, yet awed by, the massive scope of nature’s beauty and terror. 
In the radically more intimate scale of this smaller viewing gallery, a 
viewer—feeling figured as a discrete individual rather than a participant 
in a public community spectacle—experiences the visualizations close at 
hand. In one, a vast network slowly reveals itself, as the viewer seems to 
move dimensionally “through” clusters of data, which are comprised of 
vast quantities of individual photographs visualized in a kind of space-
time dimension. When encountering the unexpected sight of this star 
cluster visualization of the photographic archive at hand, I was as awe-
struck as I’ve ever been at the (latent) potentials of volume and depth of 
an archival accumulation. Yet in Anadol’s projections and visualizations, 
the viewer is continually held at arm’s length, simultaneously beckoned 
and kept at a distance. The question arises whether this distance indi-
cates safety or a dangerous unknowability. Archives have the capacity 
to serve as powerful sites of historical engagement, with material that 
can be mobilized to facilitate critical inquiry into complex historical 
dynamics, such as the relationship of preservation and cultural value. 
But collections don’t do this on their own: they must be activated, and 
the method of that engagement can produce vastly different results.
At their most effective, Anadol’s projections provide a space from 
which to reimagine the ethics and aesthetics of memory production 
and historical engagement, our relationship to images and even what 
it means to see. Moreover, given the newly configured material di-
mensions of Anadol’s data, these questions require frameworks and 
language to both evoke and address the complexities at hand, whether 
visualized or suggested.
To that end, Anadol’s machinic collaboration may be situated within 
the long trajectory of artists drawn to the generative possibilities of the 
fictive photograph. We can go back to nearly the origins of the medi-
um to establish this persistently fertile territory: to the French photo-
grapher Hippolyte Bayard’s irresistible, and entirely fictional, Portrait 
of a Drowned Man, a direct positive print made at the tender date of 
1840. On the front of this print is a portrait of Bayard himself, feigning 
death—slumped, shirtless, open to interpretation. On the back, Bayard 
addresses the viewer directly via a lengthy text. Showing his dark sense 
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of humor, he starts with a complaint that he has not received enough 
credit for his efforts in the project of photography’s invention. He then 
explains that the dead body in the photograph is his own, as he playfully 
recognizes the limitations of photography—it can’t evoke the sense of 
smell, for instance—and he uses a mix of text and image to engage the 
viewer in his dark photographic fantasy.
Bayard’s gesture, his combination of text and image, played on the 
delightfully proximate, yet ultimately tenuous, relationship between re-
ality and its photographic representation. This photograph also suggests 
a foundational contradiction in the medium: because of photographs’ 
enduring and persistent adhesion to some kernel of “truth” or reali-
ty, photographic images are all the more compelling and provo cative 
a medium through which to conjure—whether slyly or blatantly— 
speculative scenarios.
This type of fictive archival engagement persists widely in the con-
temporary realm.1 To cite one example, the artist Zoe Leonard cre-
ated The Fae Richards Photo Archive in the early 1990s. The series is 
exhibited as an installation of an apparent photographic archive and 
was published as a little book, too, a form that establishes a connection 
to the personal album. (fig. 10.3) Leonard visually refers to past photo-
graphic processes, and much of the delight of the project comes from 
the skill and thoroughness with which she mines and mimics particular 
photographic genres, whether scrapbook imagery, publicity stills, or 
newspaper photojournalism. In The Fae Richards Photo Archive, Leonard 
masterfully spoofs the look of a range of types of photographic prints 
one might find in an archive: 1930s commercially printed snapshots, for 
instance, faithfully reproducing the format and tone of the time; or a 
midcentury film still; or a candid from the 1950s, which differs from 
those from the 1930s.
Fae Richards, it turns out, despite this persuasive photographic evi-
dence, is fictional. She was initially created for The Watermelon Woman, 
a 1996 film by Cheryl Dunye. In the film, the protagonist goes on an 
archival hunt to discover a Black lesbian actress from the 1930s and 
1940s. The actress’s life is inspirational to the protagonist, who speaks 
movingly about the thrill of finding a role model, a predecessor in the 
film industry whose identity and experience as a Black lesbian woman 
she really relates to, and the power of that precedent. Though a viewer of 
the archive in exhibition or a reader of the book may never learn this, in 
the film it is ultimately revealed that it’s all made up: there is no archive, 
no actual historical figure for her to relate to, no history or document to 
discover. As a narrative, the story of Fae Richards is equal parts heart-
breaking and optimistic; it is the fantasy that a queer woman of color 
would have achieved fame and success in 1930s and 1940s Hollywood. 
As Dunye has noted, “Sometimes you have to create your own history.”
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The art historian Carrie Lambert-Beatty has usefully described 
these realms of practice as the “parafictional,” describing a rich his-
tory of artists’ engagement at the slippery, yet fertile, intersections of 
plausibility and fiction. The parafictional, for Lambert-Beatty, is “a bit 
outside” the category of fiction. It “has one foot in the field of the real”; 
it is a mode in which “real and/or imaginary personages and stories in-
tersect with the world as it is being lived”; and it produces fictions that 
“are experienced as fact.” (Lambert-Beatty, 2009: 54) As these exam-
ples suggest, parafictional practices activate the work of artists, cultur-
al critics, historians, archivists, and curators; they disrupt and redirect 
discourse through cultural interventions, art performances, creative 
hacking, invented histories and documents. These legions of conjured 
identities and invented personas are given voice to achieve political and 
aesthetic ends, often connected to the redressing of historical omissions, 
marginalized histories, or otherwise suppressed stories and narratives 
not easily found in either archival record or public discourse. At its most 
potent, the parafictional achieves the daunting challenge of maintaining 
a productive and uncomfortable uncertainty while shattering the possi-
bility of a pre-existing status quo.
Figure 10.3
Zoe Leonard, The Fae 
Richards Photo Archive 
(detail), 1993–1996. 78 
black-and-white photo-
graphs, 4 color photo-
graphs, 6 pages of typed 
text on typewriter paper, 
dimensions variable. 
Installation view, 1997 
Whitney Biennial, Whitney 
Museum of American Art, 
New York. © Zoe Leonard. 
Courtesy of the artist; 
Galerie Gisela Capitain, 
Cologne; and Hauser & 
Wirth, New York.
See also Plate 13.
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But core to Lambert-Beatty’s analysis is an unspoken assumption 
that the creators of the parafictional are human. In Anadol’s work, his 
collaborator in the creation of parafiction is distinctly machinic: the 
artificial intelligence capacity of a neural network that, while initially 
“trained” by a human programmer, operates one step away from human 
control. While Anadol controls the information from which the neural 
network learns as well as the coding for that information to be regen-
erated into new images and sounds, what happens between input and 
output is the opening up of a new terrain. I would like to suggest that 
this terrain functions effectively—both conceptually and practically—
as a new mode of the latent image. In analog chemical photography, the 
latent image is the image that has been recorded on film but has not yet 
been developed, is not yet visible. The latent image exists as a physical 
and chemical reality yet is not visible to human eyes; as such, it exists 
slightly outside of time, in a distinct yet unfixed temporal relationship 
with both the original subject and the viewing audience.
One of Anadol’s collaborators describes the neural network’s hallu-
cinated (or dreamed, or imagined) images as “inter-images.” (McDowell, 
personal conversation, 2019) These “inter-images” function as a new 
form of latent image. That is, “inter-images” emerge from spaces be-
tween the data, existing as possibilities adjacent to the images of human 
memory (i.e., photographs), likely to appear but not already existing. 
This spatial description of the emergence of dream images is not a bad 
description of how humans, too, conjure and create new images, from 
latent spaces adjacent to the images we already know and understand. 
Incrementally, we add to a collective set, and hopefully, from time to 
time, new forms emerge, and we recognize an original quality. In a 
parallel way, Anadol’s projections may be most provocative when they 
open a space for considering that temporal relationship between images 
not existing and existing. That creation is just as fundamentally myste-
rious in the machinic as in the human.
Although “photographic” images that are generated from the data 
memories of other, earlier images might seem futuristic, in fact, they are 
already being generated. Speaking to the algorithmic technology already 
in the basic visual processes of the phones we carry and use every day, 
artist Hito Steyerl has described a distinction between representational 
and newly speculative modes of photography:
A representational mode of thinking photography is: there is some-
thing out there and it will be represented by means of optical tech-
nology ideally via indexical link. But the technology for the phone 
camera is quite different. As the lenses are tiny and basically crap, 
about half of the data captured by the sensor are noise. The trick is to 
create the algorithm to clean the picture from the noise, or rather to 
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define the picture from within noise. But how does the camera know 
this? Very simple. It scans all other pictures stored on the phone or on 
your social media networks and sifts through your contacts. It looks 
through the pictures you already made, or those that are networked 
to you and tries to match faces and shapes. In short: it creates the pic-
ture based on earlier pictures, on your/its memory. It does not only 
know what you saw but also what you might like to see based on your 
previous choices. In other words, it speculates on your preferences 
and offers an interpretation of data based on affinities to other data. 
(Steyerl, 2014)
Like the neural network that works as Anadol’s collaborator to 
“dream” or “hallucinate” new images, these speculative images can also 
be conceived as “inter-images.” In these cases, Steyerl continues:
The link to the thing in front of the lens is still there, but there are 
also links to past pictures that help create the picture. You don’t really 
photograph the present, as the past is woven into it. The result might 
be a picture that never existed in reality, but that the phone thinks you 
might like to see. It is a bet, a gamble […] a mixture of conservatism 
and fabulation. (Steyerl, 2014)
In this new form of latency, this “mixture of conservatism and fab-
ulation,” the temporal interlude between not existing and existing is 
characterized not by a pause of anticipation, but by a productive mode 
of association impossible to disassociate from prior sight and know-
ledge. In this framework, the activity of interpreting the archive is deeply 
embedded in the act of image creation. The emerging project of how 
we understand and interpret these images is an open question. If we, as 
a culture, are going to have any meaningful critical engagement with 
the data systems that are growing all around us, and, by extension, the 
massive quantities of images they are producing, reconfiguring, and in-
venting, we can start with the sense of awe that Anadol elicits. But we 
must go one step further: we must also have experiences that give us a 
sense of ownership, a sense of investment, and a sense of critical engage-
ment with the copious data that surround us, with the possibilities and 
potentials of activating these documents and these histories in creative 
and generative modes that inspire agency rather than passivity. We can’t 
just be captivated by a sense of awe. We must be propelled by it.
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Notes
1. Other notable projects in this realm are as varied and 
diverse as William DeLappa’s The Portraits of Violet 
and Al (1973), Joan Fontcuberta’s Fauna (1987) and 
Sputnik (1997), Yinka Shonibare’s Diary of a Victorian 
Dandy (1998), and Christian Boltanski’s early books, 
to name a few.
Bibliography
Carrie Lambert-Beatty, “Make-Believe: Parafiction and 
Plausibility,” October, 129 (Summer 2009): 51–84.
Allan Sekula, “The Body and the Archive,” October, 39 
(Winter 1986): 3–64.
Hito Steyerl, “‘Politics of Post-Representation’: 




John Tagg, The Burden of Representation: Photographies 
and Histories (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1988).
20711. Dispersal and Denial: Photographic Ubiquity and the Microbial Analogy
11. Dispersal and Denial: Photographic 
Ubiquity and the Microbial Analogy
Kyle Parry
“Pictures succumb to uniformity as they flow ceaselessly across our 
screens, going viral and generating an omnipresent sense that we are 
being submerged or surveilled. Photography is everywhere.” 
— from the introductory wall text for Snap + Share: Transmitting 
Photographs from Mail Art to Social Networks (2019)
“Everything is everywhere: but the environment selects.” 
— Lourens Baas-Becking, Geobiologie of Inleiding Tot de Milieukunde 
(1934)
Is photography really everywhere now? What drives so many observers 
to insist that it is? Why do so few resist the notion? What advantages 
might there be in nuancing received wisdom around the supposed 
pervasiveness of cameras and photographs? For whom could a better 
grasp on forms of digital photographic dispersal—and their inevitable 
corollary, forms of digital photographic denial—matter most?
That critics, curators, and scholars increasingly portray photography 
as ubiquitous is far from surprising: there isn’t just more photography 
with each passing year—millions more cameras, trillions more images, 
ever faster and more frequent photo sharing—there are also ever more 
occasions through which to see, talk about, visualize, and sell photo-
graphy. With the rise of digital cameras, smartphones, and social media, 
seemingly everyone is a shareholder in what Susan Sontag called the 
“photographic enterprise,” and seemingly no situation is immune to the 
possibility of a photograph being taken. (Sontag, 1977: 3) Images can 
travel with incredible speed from one corner of the globe to the other. 
To use your computer or smartphone is to have a lens staring at you. On 
certain apps, you don’t just post photos as a form of expression; you 
rapidly exchange photos as a means of conversation, or you regularly 
share photos as a matter of social survival. The institution of photo-
graphy is now as much about representing the world as it is about being 
in all places and for everyone who would want to speak and show and 
remember. Even when actual cameras are not physically present, there 
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are still effects from the awareness of the possibility of being photo-
graphed (Azoulay, 2015: 19). In short, ubiquity claims persist because 
photography is hypercommon, hyperabundant, and hyperinfluential.
Still, it remains curious that there is so little critical questioning 
around the manifestly dramatic proposition that photography is now 
everywhere. Indeed, at least as far as I am aware, only a handful of writers 
have voiced alternatives, and only briefly at that, effectively referring to 
differences of degree.1 None of this would be much cause for concern 
were it not for the ubiquity claim’s considerable vulnerability to critique. 
For one thing, there are plenty of meaningful gaps in the map. There are, 
for instance, many locations across the globe that photography either 
barely reaches or does not reach at all, such as places beset by poverty 
or war, or contexts in which cameras cannot physically operate, such 
as the Earth’s interior. There are also numerous social, political, and 
cultural restrictions around photography across the planet: who can use 
cameras and social media (by age or gender or economic access); what 
types of photographs can be taken and distributed (whether because of 
censorship, copyright, or other barriers); what kinds of subjects or gen-
res will receive attention and endorsement (based on prevailing norms 
or what type of person presents what). If anything, the sheer abundance 
and availability of photography makes it all the more plain that many 
types of events and circumstances continue to not receive photographic 
treatment, whether because of active restrictions (archival materials, 
museum holdings, secret prisons, secret wars) or because of forbidding 
conditions (such as events of slow and structural violence, the dispersed 
natures of which make them difficult to photograph).2 In other words, it 
doesn’t take much to see that the proposition that photography is every-
where is an exaggeration in the extreme. Although photography is in 
many, many places, it is by no means in all places.
The ubiquity claim is also vulnerable along critical and conceptual 
lines. This is the potential that ubiquity claims are fantasies of imagined, 
final circumstances rather than politically and philosophically nuanced 
interpretations of actual, unfolding ones. Such flights of analysis do not 
necessarily warrant approval, as though they were basically forgivable 
instances of hyperbolizing through the frame of everywhereness (of the 
kind one might know from when something spills in the kitchen, and 
a family member heartily exclaims that the offending substance has 
gotten everywhere). Indeed, to say, without qualification, that photo-
graphy is ubiquitous risks reinforcing an implicit premise that the 
only worlds that truly matter are those in which this appears to be the 
case, those worlds in which selfies, espresso snaps, sunsets, or other 
seemingly hallmark digital photographic forms are frequent and per-
vasive. Everything else (and everyone else) falls outside the everywhere 
that matters to apprehend and interpret.
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The point here is that, even if one were to accept the hyperbolic 
nature of ubiquity claims as necessary or forgivable, one would still have 
to answer for what Ulrik Ekman, speaking of ubiquitous computing, has 
characterized as the ubiquity concept’s silent freight (Ekman, 2011: 7).3 
Whether applied to computing, photography, or still other institutions, 
ubiquity is not, in this rendering, an empty and neutral conceptual vessel. 
Instead, it is an insidious vehicle for premises and orientations that serve 
to warp and limit perceptions and interpretations of culture, people, and 
place. Unqualified ubiquity endorses a false sense of universality (such 
and such is everywhere, as in everywhere that matters to me to think 
about). It produces a sense of finality (reaching the status of everywhere 
means reaching an effectively uncontestable, total presence). And it un-
dermines the essential question of differential distribution—the actual 
variation and inequality in the reach of photography or, in the opposite 
sense, the legitimate desire among certain publics to avoid or contest 
some or all aspects of that reach. So often couched in terms of demo-
cratization, unqualified ubiquity claims work against that very ambition.
The problem at hand, then, is how to respond to a persistent paradox 
within the world of contemporary photography: the simultaneous abun-
dance of digital ubiquity claims and the dearth of critical questions there-
by. The first and most obvious way to respond would be to refuse the 
above lines of critique and simply fall in line. One would accept as given 
the real-world applicability and necessity of the notion of ubiquity, and 
one would proceed to invoke that notion as necessary, either ignoring 
or dismissing the supposed problems of silent freight. A second option 
would be to do the opposite and refuse all ubiquity claims tout court. 
One could argue, for example, that it is absurd to claim that anything—
apart from, say, gravity—is everywhere. Alternatively, one could elabo-
rate the critique I have only just sketched, linking the problem of ubiquity 
with long histories of racialized, ethnocentric, neoliberal, and imperial-
ist discourses. As books like Provincializing Europe attest (Chakrabarty, 
2000), such discourses take contingent particulars as essential givens. In 
so doing, they undermine and forestall more vibrant, democratic, and 
liberatory conceptions and conversations.
As sympathetic as I am to both takes on ubiquity, I nevertheless 
favor a more uncertain, middle path. Rather than accepting or rejecting 
ubiquity claims outright, we find ways to critically reconceptualize them. 
We do so on the idea that there must be some reason that the concept of 
ubiquity has had its way, yet this needn’t mean that the concept ought 
to continue to have its way in exactly the same way. Other approaches 
to this essential matter of radically wide distribution must be possible. 
The question is how we ought to construct those alternative approaches, 
and what we ought to do with them in turn. Somehow, these approaches 
must do justice to the manifest abundance and influence of digital (and 
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nondigital) photographic forms while also negotiating the inaccura-
cies and harms—universalization, naturalization, erasure—in exactly 
such an enterprise. Such newly vivified theories of ubiquity will not, it 
seems to me, emerge through strict adherence to available modes of 
analysis and debate. Rather, they demand rethinking the terms through 
which we conceive questions of hypersaturation and hypercommonality 
in the first place. What is needed, in short, is direct, unorthodox, crit-
ical, transversal, and pragmatic thinking capable of reframing ubiquity 
without failing to recognize the undeniable attraction, actual real-world 
responsive ness, and critical and intellectual advantages of the concept.
Strange as it feels to write, I find crucial means for such thinking 
by shifting away from the most obvious dramatis personae—camer-
as and photographs—and instead moving toward the creatures that 
tend to dwell within and upon these and countless other objects: mi-
crobes. (fig. 11.1) Also called microorganisms, microbes are organisms 
(and organism-like entities) that defy human vision. Among the ear-
liest life forms to have evolved, they include familiar entities like bac-
teria, fungi, and viruses as well as less familiar ones like archaea and 
protists. Microbes can be single-celled, multicellular, or acellular, and 
there are interesting cases of microbes that form colonies of many dif-
ferent organisms unified into a living whole that is, nevertheless, not 
considered an individual organism. Microbes serve all manner of critical 
ecological functions, from the recycling of nutrients to the removal of 
Figure 11.1
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contaminants. As the COVID-19 pandemic made tragically plain, how-
ever, certain microbial forms can radically undermine or even destroy 
bodies, communities, and economies.4 (Of course, the pandemic also 
made plain that there are factors other than the pathogen, many of them 
preventable and many of them unevenly distributed across race, gender, 
and class, among other categories.) Estimates of the number of species 
of microbes vary widely, from hundreds of millions to perhaps even 
one trillion species in total, with hundreds of thousands of these being 
viruses in the oceans and something on the order of five million species 
of fungi (Bakalar, 2016; de Jesus, 2019; Hawksworth and Lücking, 2017). 
The distribution of these hyperabundant life forms is nothing short of 
astonishing. Where there is water—and this includes mineral veins deep 
beneath the ocean floor—there is microbial life.5
As things stand, the intellectual association between photography 
and microbes is both rich and restricted. On the one hand, there is the 
problem of material decay; certain microbes eat pictures (Puškárová et 
al., 2016). On the other hand, there is the microbial analogy of virality: 
certain images (or events or ideas) manage to become extremely wide-
spread in a manner reminiscent of both computer viruses and actual 
viruses.6 First used in 1999 in relation to marketing, the viral analogy 
provides a crucial frame through which to understand aspects of con-
temporary photography and indeed digital photographic ubiquity. 
Among other things, virality speaks to the events of spread that fur-
ther entrench the presence of not just certain images but of images in 
general. Not only that, the metaphor of virality serves as a waypoint 
for a host of important lines of inquiry around contagion in which, as 
Tony D. Sampson summarizes, “financial crisis, social influence, inno-
vations, fashions and fads, and even human emotion are understood 
to spread universally like viruses across networks.” (Sampson, 2012: 2)7 
Nevertheless, metaphors of virality and contagion are not themselves 
sufficient for a direct inquiry into the conceptual foundations of digital 
photographic ubiquity. This is because those metaphors tend to empha-
size networks, events, and transmission (key for understanding digital 
visual culture) rather than geographies, conditions, and densities (key 
for understanding questions of pervasiveness). Indeed, rather than ex-
plicitly address the broad “sea of content” (or what I prefer to call the 
dispersal and denial of photographic forms), virality tends to empha-
size (Sampson’s book notwithstanding) the remarkable “exception” that 
manages to achieve visibility and spread (Nahon and Hemsley, 2013).8 
By contrast, my own current notion of a valuable microbial intervention 
into debates around photography turns on precisely this question of 
what is—and isn’t—“everywhere.”
By way of a chance encounter amid research for this book, the alter-
native I have in mind is a nearly century-old concept in microbiology. 
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Commonly called the “ubiquity hypothesis,” the concept first took 
root in 1934, when the Dutch scientist Lourens Baas-Becking sought 
to expand upon ideas first promulgated by his predecessor, Martinus 
Beijerinck.9 “Everything is everywhere,” Baas-Becking writes, “but the 
environment selects.” (Baas-Becking, 1934) The gnomic statement be-
came something of a mantra for microbial biogeography, the field of 
scientific study that explores the distribution of microbial life across 
the planet. This statement indicates a key difference between the dis-
tribution of macroorganisms, which includes creatures such as crows 
and redwood trees, and what Baas-Becking is here calling “everything,” 
which means any microbial “taxon”—any group of one or more popula-
tions seen by biologists to form a unit—from bacteria and fungi to virus-
es and protists. For macroorganisms, history and geography play crucial 
roles in which taxa are found where. For instance, although crows can 
travel many places (at times seemingly “anywhere”), they cannot neces-
sarily get to or sustain themselves in all places; both how they evolved 
and where they evolved continually condition where members of the 
species can and cannot arrive and reside. With microorganisms, the sit-
uation is far different. Microbes can travel by wind, water, and other 
means throughout all manner of planetary habitats, from clouds and 
forest canopies to mammals’ guts and the bottom of the ocean. (One of 
the more striking examples of the dispersal capacity of microbes I have 
come across is a form of bacteria that thrives near deep sea vents lodged 
in a person’s belly button.10) In other words, microbes confront little 
to no dispersal constraints. And thus, according to the Baas-Becking 
hypothesis, microbial taxa should be understood as fundamentally and 
characteristically ubiquitous. (This term is indeed specifically employed 
by microbiologists.)
What is crucial here is the generative double move: the simultaneous 
assertion and qualification of the proposition of ubiquity. Everything, as 
in every microbial taxa, can disperse anywhere, but this does not mean 
that there are no observable differences in local and global distributions 
of particular types of microbes. It’s just that the key determining factor 
in which taxa endure where is neither history nor geography (as is the 
case with macroorganisms). Rather, it is what is here called “environ-
ment.” Particular taxa persist where they persist due to the features of 
particular habitats, which is to say because of distinct, local, life-sustain-
ing conditions, such as temperature, availability of water and nutrients, 
or levels of sunlight.11 Certain conditions support certain microbial taxa 
and not others. In a phrase, microbial taxa can arrive anywhere, but they 
don’t necessarily endure everywhere.12
Over the nearly one hundred years since its introduction, the ubiquity 
hypothesis has occasioned both perennial citation and increasing skepti-
cism within its field of origin. Some microbiologists see the hypothesis as 
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accurate at best or necessary at worst, as though microbial bio geography 
would not now enjoy the legitimacy or productivity it now does with-
out this core principle. Others, calling attention to strong evidence of at 
least a few instances in which geographical factors affect the distribution 
patterns of particular microbes and microbial communities, portray the 
proposition as imprecise and misleading, with one scientist going so far 
as to argue that “everything is everywhere” is a “siren song” that “gets 
us nowhere” (Fierer, 2015) and several others using their studies, such 
as one on the distinct makeup of microbial life in Antarctica (Vyerman 
et al., 2010), as occasions to assert the unreliability and false allure of 
the aphoristic claim.
From the position of concern I have laid out—that is, this concern to 
respond through critical reconceptualization to the paradoxical abun-
dance of and lack of criticality around digital ubiquity claims—a turn 
to the Baas-Becking hypothesis could seem both odd and precarious, 
not only because I risk converting a scientific concept into mere meta-
phor but also because, as I have just indicated, the concept itself is (ac-
cording to some at least) outdated and unreliable. However, there is 
good precedent for exactly this kind of exercise. Among the most thor-
oughgoing is found across the work of the philosopher Gilles Deleuze. 
For Deleuze, the apparent trouble with a given scientific proposition 
might be a sign of its conceptual potential.13 That is to say, there are 
what Deleuze describes as “inexact yet completely rigorous” scientific 
notions that “scientists can’t do without” but “which belong equally to 
scientists, philo sophers, and artists.” (Deleuze, 1995: 29) These notions 
are marked by an “excess of sense” that “can be mobilised in contexts 
that are distinct from the one in which they are usually (and justifiably) 
used.” (Voss, 2013: 201) Although this practice of conceptual transplan-
tation does come with “dangers”—for instance, the scientific concept 
might be uncritically applied, or it might simply function as a fruit-
less metaphor—careful use can yield considerable philosophical and 
pragmatic reward.14 The key thing to do is to take from these inexact 
concepts “a particular conceptualizable character which itself refers 
to non-scientific areas.” (Deleuze, 1986: 129)15 That “conceptualizable 
character”—that quantum of insight or provocation, that useful refram-
ing, whatever it might be—can then take on new life. As a result of such 
transference, inexact scientific concepts come to generate, as Daniela 
Voss puts it, “a movement of thought that transcends their usual sphere 
of application and arouses a synthesis with new conceptual components 
in another sphere.” (Voss, 2013: 201)
Following on Deleuze and others’ precedents, my contention isn’t 
that this enduring aphorism from the world of microbial biogeography 
holds some magical solution to the silent freight of photographic and 
other ubiquity claims. Nor am I saying that the time has come to finally 
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recognize that photography equals microbes (how ever willing to pursue 
this analogy I remain). Rather, I look to the Baas-Becking hypothesis 
for what it can imperfectly afford. This is an “inexact” concept that can 
lead to better thinking and conceptualizing than has heretofore been 
possible. It is an unsteady means toward useful “movements of thought” 
that have otherwise proved elusive.
Dispersal is one key, microbe-inspired starting point for a new move-
ment of thought around ubiquity. By and large, when writers or cura-
tors say that photography is ubiquitous or “everywhere” (such as in the 
statement I’ve used as the first epigraph to this chapter), they leave the 
central term unspecified. “Photography” is a kind of conceptual mass 
or critical abstraction without much if anything in the way of qualities, 
components, or tensions. It is as though photography were some uni-
vocal thing à la God or seawater, the same in every place, not differing 
in what it is, just a perpetually reproduced and continuous entity that 
stretches across the entire globe with only the most minor variation. The 
notion of “everything is everywhere” does not provide some readymade 
rejoinder to that blunt casting of a complex, internally contradictory, 
and still evolving medium, institution, practice, and enterprise. But it 
does point to a viable, interesting, and indeed necessary alternative. 
It does this because “everything” refers to all manner of different species, 
subspecies, and species assemblages, in other words, to taxa. These taxa 
are everywhere not because they are actually everywhere, but because 
there is a constant, remarkable, and powerful “dispersal capacity” at 
work among them. Microbes disperse with spectacular speed and ease 
across all manner of habitats, spaces, climates, and times.
Such an emphasis pays off when “inexactly” translated into the con-
text of photography. To speak of photographic ubiquity in a more precise 
and productive fashion is not to speak of photography in its pervasive 
and continuous presence; it is to speak of the stunning and proven dispersal 
capacity of photographic forms, a capacity that is not strictly limited to 
the digital era, but, which, as this collection shows, has manifested 
throughout histories of photography and undergone a recent, massive 
intensification. Early on, it is the remarkable, border-crossing dispersal 
of the fervor to fix a lens-based image. Soon, it is the slow but steady 
(and frequently destructive and exploitative) distribution of cameras 
to ever more places across industrial and imperial worlds. Then it is the 
flying fast of snapshot photographs, not absolutely widely saturated but 
present in an increasing number of homes and hands. And yet further 
on, reaching into the digital era, when smartphone cameras are readily 
snatched out of pockets and into situations, there emerges the apparent 
lack of immunity of any time or place or event from photography, with 
seemingly all places touched with at least one or the other photographic 
form that is, in turn, ready to assert and even reproduce itself.
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Although the concept and metaphor of virality to some degree 
alludes to photography in this fashion, at the end of the day it is a meta-
phor dedicated to single, sudden, fast, and exceptional dispersal. What 
really needs emphasis is the constant spreading and distribution of 
many different types of photographic forms. That constancy, that way 
in which not some but effectively all hours of the day, one can bear wit-
ness to the dispersal and perpetuation of one after the other photo-
graphic “taxa”—that is what deserves to occasion the otherwise risky 
and freighted frame of everywhere. Without such a dispersal-centered 
vision of photographic ubiquity, we fall short in our vision of abundance 
and saturation, stuck with the beginnings of a hyperbole, not actually 
attending to the sprawling and multifaceted force that we imperfectly 
gather under the banner of “ubiquitous photography.” With a disper-
sal-centered vision, on the other hand, both the history and the theory 
of photographic hyperabundance open to more possibilities for descrip-
tion and questioning. Like (but not exactly like) a strain of bacteria in 
people’s guts, the habit of making a “peace” or “V” sign for the camera, 
once largely concentrated in certain regions in East Asia has become 
a physical commonplace. (fig. 11.2)16 Like (but not exactly like) a virus 
that mutates into more transmissible variants, the smartphone camera 
comes to variously mimic, supplement, and kill off forms of personal 
memory across increasingly many cultural settings. Like (but not exactly 
like) an invasive fungus, technologies for the surveillance of communi-
cations, locations, and faces (including one that creates a “temporary 
Figure 11.2
Mariam Soliman, 
“‘We Want It Peaceful!’,” 
February 9, 2011.  
Licensed under  
CC BY-SA 2.0.
See also Plate 14. 
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surveillance scene”) ride the winds of profit and power from one country 
to another.17 Time and again, that is, photographic forms (as well as 
their cognates in other media) find ways to spread and to perpetuate, 
sometimes causing surprise and consternation for the extent to which 
they now reach, other times functioning all too quietly and successfully 
to yield much in the way of attention or fear, much less countermeasure. 
Extraordinary dispersal, effectively ignorant of social and cultural bor-
ders, persists with such speed, reach, and variegation as to seem to add 
up to an uninterrupted “everything is everywhere.”
And yet dispersal isn’t everything. Once again, the Baas-Becking 
hypo thesis provides an imperfect but necessary resource for conceiving 
of why this is so. In the first half of the aphorism, one gets a powerful 
notion of the incredible and effectively ubiquitous dispersal capacities 
of microbial species and of particular species assemblages, a notion 
which can then translate into a transformed vision of photographic 
forms circulating and reproducing with remarkable global reach. In 
the second half of the hypothesis, however, is a more agonistic picture: 
a fact of any habitat across the planet is the simultaneous receiving and 
repulsion of microbial taxa. That is to say, the members of certain taxa 
will not be welcomed into the fold; they will not persist and reproduce 
in this habitat, because that habitat does not provide sufficiently condu-
cive conditions. These microbes stop short, they die, they go dormant. 
As much is happening all the time and “everywhere.” And this leads to 
an important, alternative movement of thought. Zooming out to the 
widest possible perspective, working to consolidate something of a 
potentially “conceptualizable character,” one comes to the proposition 
that the inevitable other side of widespread dispersal is widespread denial. 
Microbial taxa are constantly and pervasively spreading; microbial taxa 
are also constantly and pervasively failing to take hold.
In this observation about the microbial world is a valuable excess of 
sense. That excess can be directed toward an alternative and extended 
vision of photographic abundance in which the facts of sheer quantity, 
speedy dispersal, and widespread presence are also the reality of all manner of 
negative processes: spurning, refusing, blocking, losing. Something as sim-
ple as a selfie stick provides an immediate entrance into this way of think-
ing. For a long time, the selfie stick was a quite limited form, restricted 
to a few inventive people extending the reach of their cameras through 
improvised means, or, in the case of Hiroshi Ueda, through a “telescopic 
extender” for a “compact camera,” invented in the early 1980s, that nev-
er took off.18 (fig. 11.3) Soon after the smartphone became “ubiquitous,” 
however, the now mass-produced selfie stick (un fortunately for Ueda, 
not his patented version) found its most appropriate vector; the practice 
of extending an appendage outward to produce a photograph of one’s 
self, one’s background, and potentially some fellow travelers became a 
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widely dispersed (if also often derided) presence on the photograph-
ic scene. While critics spoke of seeing selfie sticks “selling out every-
where,” the apparatus only further incited the general mockery launched 
at self-imaging. Of course, it didn’t take long for this fervor to subside. 
A telescopic apparatus for self-imaging became less common, necessary, 
or desirable. A period of considerable spread—the participation of an 
evanescent photographic form (a tool and a practice) in digital photo-
graphic ubiquity qua dispersal—gave way to a period of denial and decay. 
Not only did fewer people find themselves wanting to carry selfie sticks 
around, but numerous museum and tourist sites saw fit to ban their use.19 
The selfie stick continued to “arrive” in various contexts of social life, 
from the solemn memorial to the rowdy sporting event, and it also con-
tinued to be useful for certain bodies at certain times. But the selfie stick 
did not endure in the numbers it once did. Instead, an alternative suite 
of photographic forms remained dominant in these and other places 
(including long-tested forms like simply extending one’s arm to take a 
self-image or even the habit of partaking in a social experience without 
self-imaging at all). Meanwhile, adjacent and competing forms, such as 
Snap’s “selfie drone,” lay in wait, preparing themselves for both disper-
sal and (presumably) eventual denial.
If one way to observe the interplay of dispersal and denial is to focus 
on a formerly widespread photographic form, another is to dwell on a 
particular site at which ubiquitous (as in ever and widely dispersing) 
forms intersect and interact. Serving to frame Snap + Share, a rich 
Figure 11.3
From Hiroshi Ueda 
et al., “Telescopic 
Extender for Supporting 
Compact Camera.” 
Patent US4530580A, 
filed January 17, 1984.
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(though markedly apolitical) exhibition led by Clément Chéroux on 
the history of photography through the lens of sharing, the chapter’s 
first epigraph emerged at one such site, the San Francisco Museum of 
Modern Art (commonly called SFMOMA).20 (Selfie sticks were banned 
there, too.) Sure enough, until the uncontrollable spread of a virus called 
SARS-CoV-2 made it impossible, to look around this museum on any 
given day was to see the workings of hyperabundant photography, with 
photos as likely to be taken and shared across the galleries as out in the 
courtyards or even within the colorful bathrooms.21 Watched by both 
official surveillance cameras and the photography-ready eyes of smart-
phone users (and, during Snap + Share, those of Eva and Franco Mattes’s 
taxidermy version of the internet’s viral ceiling cat), the museum space 
was effectively pervaded by the consciousness of the possibility of being 
seen and photographed, or what the exhibition refers to as “an omni-
present sense that we are being submerged or surveilled.” (fig. 11.4) 
(One could also ask whether certain artists represented in this muse-
um and others have tended to negotiate ubiquity by creating works 
that lend themselves to visual travel by way of official and unofficial 
documentation.)
Nevertheless, like any other “environment,” SFMOMA was also shot 
through with various kinds of actual and consequential photographic 
denial. Visitors’ desires aside, photos could be taken but only at particu-
lar times and at particular distances. Certain kinds of photos did not fit 
the general habit. Certain kinds of photographers, whether due to socio-
economic or other factors, rarely arrived to take photographs. For all the 
availability of photography, certain artworks received little to no photo-
graphic attention, or, if they did, those photographs did not see much in 
Figure 11.4
Eva Mattes and Franco 
Mattes, Ceiling Cat, 
2016. Taxidermy cat, 
polyurethane resin, hole, 
San Francisco Museum 
of Modern Art, photo-
graph by Katherine Du 
Tiel, CC0 1.0 Universal 
(CC0 1.0) Public Domain 
Dedication.
See also Plate 15.
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the way of public circulation. At the same time, certain artworks within 
SFMOMA also spoke to forms of rejection and selectivity that take place 
beyond the walls of the museum, including differential access to place 
and image, which is to say the photographic selection (or deselection) 
enforced by violent restrictions on citizenship, movement, and agency. 
In Where We Come From, for instance, Emily Jacir undertakes actions 
that her work’s immediate protagonists, Palestinians exiled from their 
homeland, cannot, from watering a tree in one person’s village to play-
ing soccer with the first Palestinian boy the artist encounters.22 (fig. 11.5) 
As Jacir documents these actions through individual photographs yoked 
to the protagonists’ requests, she propels these images across borders 
to share and reshare them, initially through museum display alone but 
eventually also through the digital reproduction of excerpts from the 
artwork and, in the vein of ubiquity, through the ongoing documenta-
tion and social media sharing undertaken by museum visitors. Although 
it is not Jacir’s intention per se, as her work assembles the profoundly 
uneven distribution of citizenship and agency, it also testifies to a per-
sistence of photographic negation that SFMOMA, like many other agents 
of photographic discourse, has heretofore tended to overwrite through 
its more normative framing of photography as a “fundamentally demo-
cratic” and universally available medium.23
Figure 11.5
Emily Jacir, Where We 
Come From (Iyad) (detail), 
2001–2003. American 
passport, 30 texts, 32 
c-prints, and 1 video, 
dimensions variable. 
© Emily Jacir. Courtesy of 
San Francisco Museum of 
Modern Art.
See also Plate 16.
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Beyond following a form and contemplating sites lie several other 
means of mapping and analyzing the dynamics of dispersal and denial 
that constitute digital ubiquity, including comparing distributions 
across cultural and geographic contexts. Alternatively, one could shift 
from an empirical to a prescriptive mode, considering both what photo-
graphic forms ought to ubiquitously disperse and what photographic 
forms ought to be resisted, refused, drawn down, denied. Of course, 
certain projects within photographic theory already do something to 
this effect. In Ariella Aïsha Azoulay’s Potential History, for instance, 
there is a general proposition of photography as having been ubiqui-
tously destructive throughout its history, with this destruction justi-
fied by the assumption of “imperial rights,” including a “right to take” 
photographs and to do so in “worlds that were ‘opened up’” by “imperial 
agents.” (Azoulay, 2019: 282–283) Part of the prescriptive counter to 
this is an argument for both alternative dispersals (photography in the 
mode of “worldly sovereignty”) and actively chosen denials (a call for a 
“general photographic strike”) (Azoulay, 2019: 388, 285).
As a different example, for Kaja Silverman, the widely dispersed 
habit of framing photography as a kind of “taking” is challenged by a 
call to foster alternative language and thinking around photography 
as receiving (Silverman, 2015: 14–15, 24–26). Active and important and 
named as such in the early days of the medium, the mode of photography 
as receiving has, in the eyes of Silverman, long been spurned in favor 
of an approach to photography that seeks to command and control the 
world’s light—and the beings who dwell within that light—by extract-
ing and fixing views. At the same time, the effectively dormant vision 
of photography qua welcoming and waiting—evident in projects such 
as Abelardo Morell’s camera obscura compositions—has the poten-
tial to spread and proliferate. While photographic postures marked by 
humility, openness, and what Silverman calls “the miracle of analogy” 
might not, as it were, outcompete those centered in taking and extract-
ing, they might nevertheless find harbor and influence in more contexts 
than before.
My point is not that Azoulay, Silverman, or others addressing photo-
graphy in its planetary reach are somehow secretly dependent on a 
microbial analogy. Rather, in reconceiving the terms of their writing 
through the notions of dispersal and denial, and in seeing the possibili-
ty that prescriptive (and political) work is possible through such repat-
terning, I elaborate what this chapter has sought to offer by way of an 
inexact analogy: revivified visions of photographic surfeit that retain 
the best aspects of ubiquity claims—including the attention they bring 
to the reality and import of astonishingly widespread photographic 
distribution—but that also work to avoid the forms of critical and con-
ceptual harm that have so far been their silent freight.
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Notes
1. Martin Hand, for instance, says photography is 
everywhere, but it is not everywhere “in the same way” 
(Hand, 2012: 12). Ariella Aïsha Azoulay says there 
are places, like disaster zones, where “the subjects of 
disaster are sentenced to be photographed rather than 
to photograph themselves.” (Azoulay, 2015: 19)
2. See, for instance, Rob Nixon’s Slow Violence and the 
Environmentalism of the Poor (Nixon, 2011).
3. Ekman writes, “Whether in cultural theoretical or 
technical discourses, the terms of ‘ubiquity,’ ‘per-
vasiveness,’ and ‘ambience’ come silently freighted 
with a notion of totalizing universality or even certain 
ontological and metaphysical remainders (altogether 
abstract idealizations and/or excessively essential or 
substantial extensions). Both the editors and the au-
thors contributing to this special issue approach this as 
a call for ongoing deconstruction and reconstruction, 
not least in the sense that remainders and implications 
of onto-theological and sovereign ideological notions 
must be questioned reasonably so as to be put under 
critical erasure in one or more ways.” (Ekman, 2011: 7)
4. On the often-overlooked ecological functions of virus-
es, see Rachel Nuwer, “Why the World Needs Viruses 
to Function,” BBC Future, June 17, 2020, https://www.
bbc.com/future/article/20200617-what-if-all-virus-
es-disappeared.
5. The oceanographer Brian Glazer puts it this way: 
“When we find water here on Earth—whether it be 
ice-covered lakes, whether it be deep-sea hydrothermal 
vents, whether it be arid deserts—if there’s any water, 
we’ve found microbes that have found a way to make a 
living there.” (Ghose, 2015)
6. There are multiple other instances in which media and 
viruses have been linked. One example is Jean Baudril-
lard’s concern that television had become a “viral, 
endemic, chronic, alarming presence.” (Baudrillard, 
1981: 30) Another is Douglas Rushkoff’s notion of 
a “media virus” that circulates hidden agendas under 
the veneer of enrapturing content (Rushkoff, 1994). 
For further reading along these lines, see the recent 
interdisciplinary volume Endemic: Essays in Contagion 
Theory (Nixon and Servitje, 2016).
7. While Sampson engages these microbial and epi-
demiological terms, he joins Deleuze in refusing to 
frame this engagement as metaphorical or analogical 
(see footnote on Deleuze below). On the one hand, 
Sampson parallels existing discourses on contagion, as 
when he writes, “This is a world awash with hormones 
and consumer goods, making people happy or sad, 
sympathetic or apathetic, and a space in which affects 
are significantly passed on, via suggestions made by 
others, more and more through networks.” (5) On the 
other hand, in dialogue with the sociologist Gabriel 
Tarde, Sampson seeks to develop a nonrepresentation-
al approach that can “disentangle contagion theory 
from the mechanistic limitations” that he perceives in 
memetics and theories of the crowd (87). Drawing on 
concepts from Deleuze and others, Sampson argues 
that the “universality of contagion needs to be under-
stood […] as independent of unifying mechanisms and 
analyzed accordingly through the relationalities and as-
sociations established between singularities.” (89) His 
account departs from others on virality and contagion 
by emphasizing “forces of relational encounter in the 
social field.” (4)
8. For the authors of these words, Karine Nahon and Jeff 
Hemsley, “viral events” are ubiquitous, but they are also 
the “exception.” “[E]ven in their ubiquity,” they write, 
“viral events are the exception while the vast majority 
of content remains obscure. Viral content is what 
stands out as remarkable in a sea of content.” (Nahon 
and Hemsley, 2013: 2)
9. Maureen A. O’Malley provides an excellent summary 
of the history of the microbial ubiquity hypothesis in a 
2008 article (O’Malley, 2008).
10. According to the documentary Life on Us: A Microscop-
ic Safari (2014), a swab of a subject’s navel for the Belly 
Button Biodiversity project at North Carolina State 
University revealed the presence of a bacteria typically 
seen at deep ocean vents called Dermacoccus abyssi.
11. Tom Fenchel and Bland J. Finlay put it this way: 
“habitat properties alone are needed to explain the 
presence of a given microbe, and historical factors are 
irrelevant.” (Fenchel and Finlay, 2004: 777)
12. Although this is not a statement found in microbiology 
contexts, I find it a fruitful way to sum up the point 
for present purposes. I am grateful to microbiologist 
Karen Ottemann for her feedback on my outsider 
attempts at summarization.
13. Another key precedent (unrelated to and of a different 
order and kind than that of Deleuze) is found in Chris-
tina Sharpe’s 2016 book In the Wake: On Blackness 
and Being. Sharpe finds in the scientific concept of 
“residence time” the means to articulate otherwise 
elusive perspectives on historical repetition and satu-
ration. Sharpe also speaks of residence time in literal 
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(and haunting) terms when she discusses the continued 
presence in the ocean of elements (like sodium in the 
blood) from the bodies of enslaved people who were 
thrown—or who jumped—overboard during the 
Middle Passage (Sharpe, 2016: 41).
14. It is important to note that Deleuze and his frequent 
collaborator Félix Guattari do not see such a practice 
as the use of science as metaphor. Rather, for these 
two thinkers, “there are no metaphors only concepts 
and occasions of their use which can involve either the 
unexpected extension, transformation or variation of 
an existing concept or, in extreme cases, the coinage 
of new words to express novel concepts.” (Patton, 
2006: 32) According to Daniel Smith and John Protevi, 
“Deleuze and Guattari’s refusal to recognize that 
their work contains metaphors is due to their struggle 
against the ‘imperialism’ of the signifying regime, a 
major theme in both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Pla-
teaus: not every relation between different intellectual 
fields can be grasped by the most common notions of 
‘metaphor,’ reliant as they are on the notion of a trans-
fer of sense from primary to secondary signification.” 
(Smith and Protevi, 2020) For present purposes, I refer 
to my use of the Baas-Becking hypothesis as analogical.
15. One observer described this practice in microbial 
terms, referring to “the need to think through other 
fields, to reconfigure a body of discourse—or an 
antibody like Deleuze’s for that matter—by infecting 
it with viruses from other locales, because thinking 
through different disciplinary terrain produces decisive 
differences.” (Harris, 2000: 27) For an example of 
work in this vein, see Narrating the Catastrophe (Saor-
sa, 2011).
16. For a helpful account of the history and appeal of 
this gesture, see Dhvani Solani, “Why Does Basically 
Everyone Do This V-Finger Peace Thing in Photos?,” 
Vice, March 31, 2021, https://www.vice.com/en/arti-
cle/k7a4za/v-sign-fingers-peace-vagina-pose-photo.
17. According to Ryan Gallagher, technology for building 
mass dragnets has been “increasingly finding its way 
into the hands of security forces in undemocratic 
countries where dissidents are jailed, tortured, and 
in some cases executed.” A related technology called 
HawkEye serves as a “temporary surveillance scene.” 
It “scans people as they walk past the camera and com-
pares images of their faces to photographs contained in 
‘multi-million-level databases’ in real time, triggering 
an alert if a particular suspect is identified.” See Ryan 
Gallagher, “Middle East Dictators Buy Spy Tech from 
Company Linked to IBM and Google,” The Intercept, 
July 12, 2019.
18. See Vibeka Venema, “How the Selfie Stick Was Invent-
ed Twice,” BBC World Service, April 19, 2015, https://
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32336808 and United 
States patent number US4530580A, “Telescopic 
extender for supporting compact camera.”
19. See Sasha Lekach and Suzanne Ciechalski, “Don’t 
Even Think About Bringing Your Selfie Stick to These 
Tourist Destinations,” Mashable, July 29, 2017, https://
mashable.com/2017/07/29/selfie-sticks-banned-trav-
el-tourist-destinations.
20. Situated on the unceded ancestral homeland of the 
Ramaytush Ohlone peoples, visited by over a million 
people per year, as of 2020, the San Francisco Museum 
of Modern Art held over seventeen thousand photo-
graphic works from 1839 to the present. On the role of 
European-caused infection—including “gastrointesti-
nal disease, measles, influenza, syphilis, tuberculosis, 
typhus, and diphtheria”—in the devastation of Indig-
enous peoples via Mission San Francisco and other 
mission sites, see Our Better Nature: Environment and 
the Making of San Francisco (Dreyfus, 2008: 27–28).
21. As I write these words, SFMOMA is closed due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The museum is also confront-
ing demands for structural reconfiguration. On the 
movements against inequality and structural racism 
at SFMOMA, including those in support of Taylor 
Brandon, a former employee whose critical comment 
was removed from an Instagram post by the museum, 
see Hakim Bishara, “SFMOMA Accused of Censoring 
Black Voices After Removing Comment by Former 
Employee,” Hyperallergic, June 2, 2020, https://
hyperallergic.com/568331/sfmoma-george-floyd-in-
stagram-comments-disabled and Hakim Bishara, 
“SFMOMA Workers Call for Major Reform During 




22. Emily Jacir, Where We Come From, 2001–2003, 
Collection SFMOMA, Accessions Committee Fund 
purchase.
23. As of 2020, the SFMOMA web page on photography 
states: “Photography is everywhere. It is in the muse-
um, but it’s also on city walls, in magazine pages, and 
on our phones. Practiced by all—amateurs, profession-
als, and artists, no matter their geographic, social, or 
ethnic backgrounds—photography is fundamentally 
democratic.” See https://www.sfmoma.org/artists- art-
works/photography.
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12. That Liking Feeling: Mood, Emotion, 
and Social Media Photography
Michelle Henning
Flipping
It is 11:45 at night. I am moving between writing this chapter, writing 
emails, and checking Instagram. Earlier this evening, I posted a video of 
a strange Italian stage performance I saw a week ago. Checking it now, 
I see that I have two “likes,” which is nice. I see a red and black graphic 
image announcing that a musician is doing a show in New Zealand. 
I don’t know what to think about the image, but I “like” it, because I like 
her music and want to support her.
I swipe to a promoted photo of happy students at my university 
(Instagram always seems to promote my own university to me) and a 
friend’s photo of a cat. I tap to “like” the cat. My friend repeatedly posts 
pictures of the cat, so liking it is a way of saying, “I like that you are still 
doing this—keep it up.” Next is a drawn image by someone I find a bit 
odd. I don’t know him except via Instagram. I don’t tap, because I don’t 
want to encourage him.
It’s actually laborious listing each image I see, as it slows down the 
speed at which I look at them, and I have to adjust my fingers between the 
gestures needed for typing on my laptop, and those needed for swiping 
the mobile phone screen, which also starts to darken and lock if I don’t 
keep touching it.
Touch screens are part of the disappearing of the interface. They en-
courage the user to feel “at one with the machine.” (Davies, 2017: 41) 
By writing the above, I have lost this sense of oneness, and I struggle 
to describe and analyze my experience of using Instagram. Just as if I 
were trying to summarize each shot of a film while watching it, I have 
ceased to be absorbed. I have broken the flow. The app itself was perhaps 
doing a better job, however crudely, of capturing my experience in the 
flow, because it is, in part, an affect-capturing technology. As William 
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Davies explains in his work on “mood capture,” social media platforms 
are designed to register our experience without interrupting it (39). 
He says that such platforms allow emotion, not to be represented, but 
to be performed, or played out (46). Another writer, Ricky Crano, sug-
gests that, instead of focusing on what is represented, or even how users 
describe their experience, we should consider our physical engagement 
with these images, through gestures of scrolling, swiping, and tapping 
(Crano, 2018: 1134). This behavioral performance has become the basis 
of another kind of description of what I am doing, one I would perhaps 
not recognize, but which feeds back into my own interactions, changing 
the order of the images placed before me, prompting me to act in specific 
ways, promoting certain products to me.
When I say I “liked” something, I mean I tapped on a tiny heart icon 
for a host of different reasons: to be polite, to register approval, to 
support, as well as to actually express the fact that I like the image. My 
daughters would say I should do it to be polite, to not hurt someone’s 
feelings and never, never, “like” an old post, because it implies you are 
a stalker. Actually, I do it to encourage, and by not tapping, to discour-
age, a certain kind of photographic or image-posting habit. I sometimes 
tap the heart on images I don’t particularly like to support or encour-
age the person who has posted them. Then again, if I dislike a picture, 
I might not tap, because I don’t want them to think I enjoy that sort of 
thing.1 “Liking” turns out to be very complicated. But Davies’s argu-
ment would suggest that, from the point of view of mood capture, this 
does not matter: Instagram’s algorithm does not have to be able to dis-
tinguish between the different motivations I have for “liking.” Intentions, 
drives, desires are not at issue here.
In a short time, I flip through a lot of images. I am aware “flip” is 
a term that does not exactly describe my finger sliding on the screen, 
as it is a gesture related to magazines. Nevertheless, I am conscious 
of a similar feeling. Paul Frosh writes that inattention is both embod-
ied and learned—he points out that we know how to watch television 
or flip through magazines without having to think about it (Frosh, 
2012: 129–130). I move through Instagram or a magazine, puzzled at 
this, dismissive of that, making a mental note of this, smiling at that. 
I generally pick up a magazine in the waiting room of the dentist’s or 
doctor’s or at the hairdresser’s. If I am not actually bored, at least I have 
nothing pressing to do.
Instagram, like other social media, has a tendency to eat up even the 
smallest in-between times. I check it because it seems to be calling to 
me. It is needy; it wants my attention. Using techniques pioneered in the 
casino, in gambling machines, it is designed to pull me back into the flow, 
to keep me looking, tapping, swiping (Davies, 2017: 42). There is the 
attraction of liveness: something new is always appearing; these images 
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are not still. Even those that are not GIFs or videos are still animated, 
in the sense that new images are always arriving. The introduction of 
Instagram “stories” has added an extra layer of liveness, since these are 
more ephemeral, disappearing altogether rather than slipping further 
down the feed.
These images work in sequences. People create running jokes: one 
musician I know photographs hotel dressing gowns that are always 
placed by the hotel staff with one sleeve stuffed inside the lapel, like 
Napoleon. People make the most of repetition: the same view from a 
window, the same wall with light falling on it. The image is not singular 
but cumulative, ongoing. As Daniel Palmer says, “aggregations of 
images are increasingly more important than individual images.” 
(Palmer, 2013: 59)
What I have just described I would call a set of practices. Someone 
writing in a different field, perhaps in the sciences, might think of these 
as behaviors. But “behaviors” can only be described as if from the out-
side, and the term makes no assumptions about intention, control, or 
motivation. By contrast, “practices” suggests something developed over 
time, a relationship with materials and instruments that is collaborative 
and requires that we yield to one another, but allows for myself and the 
phone and its software to have tendencies, preferences, motivations, 
and agency. My description of these practices hints at something broadly 
shared: what I do, many others do, since there are certain constraints 
and possibilities built into the mobile phone and the app I am using. My 
description also hints at something more narrowly collective: informed 
by culturally specific ideas of sociable interaction, politeness, and so 
on. Finally, it suggests characteristics that are idiosyncratic and cannot 
easily be extrapolated beyond myself, my tastes, my particular anxieties 
and motivations. That is, my “thick description” of my own Instagram 
use is not a description of a typical experience. The ubiquity of social 
media photographs conceals a diversity of practices.
As the analogy with the magazine suggests, any interaction with 
photographs could be thought of in this way, as a set of practices with 
certain moods, different kinds of affective intensities, different name-
able emotions linked to them. We could write, and indeed people have 
written, thick or thin descriptions of the encounter with the magazine 
at the doctor’s waiting room or the photograph on the art gallery wall or 
the billboard in the street. However, the stakes of this kind of description 
have radically changed. For one thing, the scale has changed: mobile 
phones are now the primary objects on which we encounter images we 
call photos, and, while I will go on to critique the ways in which photo-
graphy and media theorists describe the ubiquity of digital images, it is 
nevertheless true that the numbers of images in public circulation has 
grown massively. The ways we use and exchange them have changed, 
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too. The practices I just described are also being tracked and described, 
even if only as “behaviors,” through the built-in systems of the phone’s 
hardware (the accelerometer, gyroscope, and proximity sensor) and the 
software of Instagram, which records and responds to my posts, “likes,” 
comments, swipes, and tags. How do we make sense of our everyday en-
counters with photographs in this context, and in relation to this other, 
automated analysis?
Flooding
I am walking through the city at night. I am alone. A building glows 
brilliant green above me, like an alien spacecraft. I am here, now. I stop 
walking. I take my phone out of my pocket. Students push past me in the 
dark. I hold up the phone and compose an image, so nothing except the 
building and the sky can be seen. I am reminded of another photograph 
I once took in Italy. It is raining and the phone is wet. The touch screen, 
which is a replacement, is not very responsive. I want to share what I see; 
I wanted to be with someone, perhaps. But, this way, I can control the 
interpretation: I can say it was this green, this glowing, like a spaceship, 
and you will have to take my word for it. On Instagram, I write #nofilter. 
The next day, I walk past it, and it is glowing pink. I don’t photograph it 
again, not because pink is inferior to green, but because I have no plans 
for a series.
My practice with Instagram is material and embodied, involving more 
than fingers, eyes, and brain. It takes place in a place, with a pause mid-
walk, arms held in a particular way, body blocking the passage of other 
bodies. At the same time, it communicates to an absent other or several 
absent others, either in the same moment (elsewhere) or in the future. It 
might even be part of a dialogue with a past self. I am also one of those 
Instagram users who treat it as a kind of minor art practice, involving 
ideas, compositions, visual experimentation, and a developing body of 
interconnected work.
In this chapter, I want to attend to the gestural, conversational, social 
uses of photographic images and move away from an emphasis on the 
overwhelming volume of images. As Annebella Pollen suggests, instead 
of being considered en masse, as something we are drowning in, social 
media photographs might be addressed as ways of saying “hi,” of ac-
knowledging and giving presence to others (Pollen, 2016). I propose to 
shift perspective from a putative overwhelmed “we” to the “we” who 
are engaged in phatic communication, that is, in using utterances, or in 
this case photographic images, to establish and maintain sociable con-
nections (Frosh, 2012: 133). As Nathan Jurgenson writes, photography 
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has become central to the gestures and expressions that “make up the 
substance of our lives.” (Jurgenson, 2019) Thinking about this as a prac-
tice means also considering what is happening beyond and prior to the 
making of the image—as Daniel Miller observes about photographs 
taken at a teenage party, and posted online: “Taking a photograph has 
become rather like holding a drink—a key mode by which everyone ac-
knowledges how much fun they are having.” (Miller, 2016: 87)
Numerous commentators, from academic theorists to photograph-
ers, would agree with Martin Lister when he argues that “we are drown-
ing in images.” (Lister, 2013: 11–12; Lister 2016) Though Lister cautions 
against abandoning the attention to the image itself, he does raise the 
question of how, in the face of this excess, locking down on a single 
image can be useful. This is all the more pertinent because these pro-
liferating images seem to be largely throwaway: if they are as Daniel 
Rubinstein and Katrina Sluis describe them, a kind of speech, or as 
Crano calls them, “gregarious,” they also seem to be trivial, without 
content, mere chitchat (Rubenstein and Sluis, 2013; Rubenstein, 2005; 
Crano, 2018). No wonder, then, that so many writers in photography 
theory have, over the past two decades, moved away from semiotic anal-
ysis and close reading and emphasized that new methods, new ways of 
speaking about the photographic must be developed.
However, the assumption of the overwhelming nature of the sheer 
number of images is, in my view, limiting the ways in which we under-
stand new photographic practices. In several recent writings, I have 
discussed the watery language of a “torrent,” “deluge,” “flood,” or 
“tsunami,” and this has also been addressed by writers such as Pollen, 
Rubenstein and Sluis, Joanna Zylinska, Mark Andrejevic, and Ghislain 
Thibault (Henning, 2018: 130–134; Henning, 2018: 137–139; Pollen, 2016; 
Rubenstein and Sluis, 2013; Zylinska, 2017; Andrejevic, 2013; Thibault, 
2015). Such metaphors imply that we are overwhelmed by images. 
They are so seductive that even critics of this discourse resort to them: 
Andrejevic writes of “a populace enjoined to rely on their emotions, 
their gut instinct, and their thoughtless thoughts, to anchor themselves 
in a flood of information.” (Andrejevic, 2013: 98) In other words, the-
oretical discussions of the proliferation of images are often couched in 
a terminology that suggests a broader negative view of the visual, of 
photography, and of what used to be termed mass culture. They reveal 
a suspicion or denigration of mass images, and of chat or phatic speech.
“Flood” has long been a term used to describe population, migration, 
mobs, and crowds; the hysterical crowd is also linked to notions of femi-
ninity and the female body as fluid, unbounded, and in need of constraint 
(Theweleit, 1987; Huyssen, 1986). Anxieties about the crowd permeated 
20th-century thinking about “mass culture” and especially discussions 
about the circulation of images and the rise of the information society.2 
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These anxieties reveal other fears: about the fragility of existing hier-
archies, about the threat of mass participation in culture, and about a 
potential counterinvasion of Western culture by the populations and 
cultures of colonized societies (Henning, 2018a: 146–148; Henning, 
2021: 89–91). Concerns about too many images quickly recall a sense 
of a dominant culture under siege. Moreover, if people do feel anxious 
and overwhelmed in the face of huge quantities of images and data (and 
I do not think this is the only or even the most prevalent affective re-
sponse to our rich surfeit of visual culture), this is not necessarily an 
effect of pure quantity. As Geert Lovink has suggested (drawing on Bifo 
Berardi’s work), “information overload” is not so much a symptom of 
the overabundance of information as an issue of workload in a competi-
tive capitalist society (Lovink, 2011: 30). Visual abundance is not in itself 
overwhelming; we can observe blades of grass, flowers, or stars without 
panic. It would be a different matter if we were required to count them.
To think in terms of drowning, then, is to conceive of oneself or oth-
ers as losing control, being in too deep, with far too much to do; and to 
imagine images as invading or attacking. The term “drowning” is used 
by the overworked and stressed, by professional photographers who 
find themselves struggling to gain attention for their images in the midst 
of so many others, and, it seems, by academics trained in the fine, close 
analysis of visual culture, trying to distinguish which (if any) objects 
now deserve this kind of attention. Instead, I suggest that photographs 
in social media that seem so ubiquitous need to be understood in terms 
of their singularity for individuals actively engaged in making, looking 
at, and sharing images and text on social media and in terms of their 
embeddedness in social practice.
Extracting
I open Instagram, to pass the time. I see a birthday post for a girl I know 
from drama class, “like” it because it’s a sweet post—I think she looks 
good with her current haircut. It makes me think of her birthday party I 
went to last year. Scroll down and get an advert for a new Scooby Doo 
film—it looks awful. I think it’s marketed for a much younger audience 
than the original Scooby Doo as they’ve given all the characters children’s 
voices. Scroll down. Jeremy Corbyn has posted a pic of one of his tweets 
about the gender pay gap. I “like” it to show my support. I go on the 
comments section and read the arguments between people saying the pay 
gap does / doesn’t exist. This irritates me, so I decide to stop reading them 
and look at my DMs. I go on the group chat. Zach has sent a post from 
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@depopdrama; where the buyer says they live in Wales, and the seller 
says they charge extra for postage outside the UK. I “like” the post, and 
his comment to show him that I think it’s funny.
I’m bored.
My daughter’s descriptive account of what she does with Instagram 
reveals intentions (“to pass the time,” “to show my support”), mo-
tivations (“it’s a sweet post”), memories (a birthday party), feelings 
(irritation, boredom), and decisions (to stop reading). It also suggests a 
drifting, fragmented set of thoughts and opinions, moving from hair-
cuts to film criticism, from politics to jokes. Imagine this from the per-
spective of the software gathering data and you have a series of behav-
iors: open Instagram, “like,” scroll down, and so on. In addition, the 
phone is gathering information about her location and movements.
 (Auto)ethnographic accounts reveal the diverse meanings and 
experiences of cultural practices. There are a growing number of 
anthro pological and ethnographic studies of social media use, which in-
creasingly pay attention to the visual aspects of social media inter actions 
(Miller, 2016: 45–121). However, the real significance of this event is 
arguably not in the human experience at the level of the interaction, but 
in the algorithms recording and responding to this interaction. In the 
context of the so-called “big data” markets, of what Shoshana Zuboff 
calls “surveillance capitalism” and Nick Srnicek describes as “platform 
capitalism,” it might seem that the visual characteristics of this pervasive 
visual culture are largely irrelevant, little more than a superficial means 
to attract us and keep us interacting, and that what we are doing with it 
is less significant than what it is doing with us. Theorists argue that we 
become involuntary unpaid laborers, a human resource, producing the 
raw data of our own affective experiences to be translated into behavio-
ral predictions and exchanged on what Zuboff calls “behavioral futures 
markets.” “We are the sources of surveillance capitalism’s crucial sur-
plus: the objects of a technologically advanced and increasingly inescap-
able raw-material-extraction operation.” (Zuboff, 2019)
Zuboff argues that behavioral data analytics are the technical 
realization of B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviorist vision, alchemically 
transforming data that was supposedly waste into the gold of engineered 
behaviors. Data markets thrive on certainties, offering clients (such as 
political parties or commercial entities) “guaranteed outcomes.” In con-
trast to this powerful underlying purpose, social media photographs are 
often viewed as light and insignificant (Cubitt, 2021: 25). Social media 
photographs often use standardized and repetitive formulas: the off-the-
shelf “filters” are designed to add atmosphere, for example, by mimicking 
older photographic techniques. They may be made and posted, and then 
skimmed through, thoughtlessly and quickly. But writers point to their 
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simple and trivial emotional character as a defining quality: Lister writes 
that, if digital photo-sharing is a kind of speech, it is “one composed of 
little exclamations, ‘oohs’ and ‘ahs,’ nods, chuckles, pointings in sever-
al directions, silent mutterings to the self.” (Lister, 2014: 11–12) Crano 
suggests that the social media image belongs to what Barthes called the 
studium, that realm of “unconcerned desire, various interest, [and] in-
consequential taste.” (Crano, 2018: 1128) Though Barthes’s own exam-
ple was a press photograph taken in Nicaragua in 1979, the implication 
is that deep feeling (being moved) is substituted by a less substantial 
emotional engagement.
Certainly, data markets have far-reaching political effects, and their 
products are used to engineer our experiences. But this does not mean 
that their operations merit attention to the exclusion of our own ex-
perience of interacting with social media. The assumption that our 
affective and haptic engagement is more trivial than the underlying 
hard economic reality echoes not only the flawed Marxist model of a 
cultural superstructure and economic base, but also an old model of 
a supposedly “feminine” social realm concerned with visual distractions 
and “eye candy.” As with the use of flooding metaphors, the idea that 
the image is a superficial distraction from a deeper process is limiting 
and gendered: we are left with an impression of an unbearable lightness 
and innocence of the feminized surface, and a dark and sinister world 
beneath. Social media becomes the bridge over which the little goats 
naïvely trip-trap while beneath lurks a troll. If these supposedly trivial 
interactions are the “waste” or byproduct that data markets value so 
highly, it is worth paying serious attention to our everyday affective ex-
periences of social media.
Feeling
My mood fluctuates almost imperceptibly: vague pleasure at a photo-
graph of a painted pink sky, irritation at a video ad for coconut scourers. 
What kind of profiling could have identified me as interested in house-
work? The incompetence, at least, is reassuring. I sense calm with a still 
image, agitation at video, more so with sound. No wonder I find TikTok 
a sensory onslaught. Reading a debate in the comments about whether a 
musician was “fat-shaming” another, I feel a slight anxiety, then a little 
guilt at noticing a message I have not replied to, annoyance at another ad 
(with the imperative “shop now!” beneath it), mild shame at scooting past 
another (“Don’t let them kill our precious bees”). These nuances of mood 
are subtle and transient. Sometimes, I can be moved by an image or post I 
see online, but right now there are too many switches in tone and emotion 
to feel anything much for long. I don’t feel the emotional pull of a novel 
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or a film, nothing builds to much. But this flatness is strangely calming, 
because, today, I have been feeling something bubbling in me, a kind of 
suppressed anger that I had to prevent from spilling into my work emails, 
or conversations with my family. It is a miserable, rainy February, and we 
are in the midst of a lockdown. More than 100,000 people have died of 
COVID-19 in the UK. The collective mood seems to swing between sadness, 
frustration, anger, and resignation. I can’t face the news. I am looking to 
Instagram to be distracted from myself and my own feelings by dipping 
into the lives of other people.
Social media platforms prioritize photographs and other images 
(graphics, video clips), recognizing that visual “content” drives use and 
popularity, but also on the assumption that they are an effective means 
to provoke and to circulate certain kinds of feelings.3 Increasingly, our 
behaviors and our images are taken as symptoms or expressions of 
feeling, as part of a growing attention to affect and emotion in com-
puting. The field of “affective computing,” for instance, attempts to 
build emotionality into computers, and to write algorithms that can 
discriminate between emotions. Meanwhile, sentiment analysis, mood 
capture, “emotion recognition,” and “opinion mining” use computa-
tional techniques to analyze online social exchanges (Picard, 1997; Poria 
et al., 2018; Scherer et al., 2010). As Richard Coyne argues, “the word 
‘emotion’ and emotional concepts (such as happiness, sadness, anger, 
and fear) have increasing currency in the context of ubiquitous digital 
media.” (Coyne, 2016: 29) The new interest in emotion comes from 
the re cognition that emotion drives decision-making and therefore 
behavior, as well as from the view that emotion is a key component of 
intelligence (Andrejevic, 2013: 38).
These new analytic techniques largely depend on psychological and 
biological accounts of emotion in which intentions play a minimal part, 
and in which the point of view of the feeling person is mostly irrelevant. 
Observing an organism interacting with its environment, the behavio-
rist sees only stimulus and response, bracketing off any idea of an inner 
life as irrelevant or nonexistent (Williams, 1983: 44). The behaviorist 
approach to emotions treats them as discrete and universally shared, 
and connected to biologically determined responses to stimuli. The 
attractions of this are not hard to see, because responses to stimuli can 
be detected and measured (Leys, 2010: 81, 89).4
Sentiment analysis techniques also commonly classify people using 
psychological profiling techniques that were intended for therapeutic 
purposes. As Luke Stark explains, psychometrics—the measurement 
and scoring of behaviors to produce psychological profiles—becomes a 
means to renders the human subject legible, interpretable, and malleable 
on both an individual and a collective scale (Stark, 2018: 207). Applied 
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to social media photography, these analytical techniques model what is 
happening when we take, view, respond to, and exchange photographs 
on social media platforms, without reference to our own understand-
ings of what we are doing. They rely on the behaviorist view of emotions 
as observable characteristics of “a physical organism and its circum-
stances,” treating emotions as legible and measurable, either via written 
expressions such as “I am feeling…” and taps on a happy or sad face icon, 
or indirectly, via behaviors (Charles et al., 2011: 3).
Stark challenges the popular assumption that it is the accuracy of 
profiling that is worrying—the fact that platforms could use reactions 
to gauge an individual’s mental state or their sexual preferences. What 
matters more is the “performative power” of these profiles, their ability 
not to classify but to provoke (Stark, 2018: 213). They are part of an on-
going effort to engineer behaviors in order to transform mood. Moods 
and feelings are diagnosed and produced or orchestrated via correla-
tions made across vast amounts of data. Predictive analytics (such as 
Amazon’s recommendation system) that depend on representation 
exist alongside nonrepresentational, real-time analytics in which users’ 
reactions immediately inform changes in the affective atmosphere of 
the social media “feed.” (Davies, 2013: 39) Davies discusses how the 
use of emoji-style buttons and “liking” looks like crude qualitative data 
capture (yes/no, happy/sad), but is actually more about the production 
and performance of emotion (46). The (ideally) light, flowing quality of 
interactions with social media images lends itself to time-sensitive tools 
that aim to “capture” mood with minimal intervention and to mani-
pulate mood on the fly.
This manipulation of mood is a kind of “mood work,” a term Ben 
Highmore uses to describe the production of shared affective atmo-
spheres in all sorts of contexts, including air travel and cinema (Highmore, 
2017). We are currently in the midst of widespread mood work, a con-
certed intervention in individual and collective mood, something more 
widely understood since the 2016 election in the United States, the 2016 
referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union, and the 
2018 news coverage of the activities of Cambridge Analytica (Stark, 
2018: 205–206). However, as Highmore’s examples suggest, mood work 
has long been pervasive, albeit on smaller scales or in less automated 
ways. Mood work is not necessarily always controlled or predictable, 
and our devices do not simply track our moods and then shape them, 
but inform them in uncontrolled ways: for example, the frustrations 
of a touch screen in the rain or in bright sunlight, the embarrassment 
of a phone call or alarm in a silent meeting, or the sense of boredom or 
reassurance induced by repetitive hand movements.
As I suggest above, mood is not simply an individual matter, but links 
the personal and particular with what is collective, cultural, and social 
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(Highmore, 2017).5 As mediated political events influence public mood, 
it is tempting to think of the mood work of social media in terms of mass 
manipulation, but where mood is collective, it is not necessarily a matter 
of manipulation and contagion. Coyne points out that we bring our own 
moods to media, rather than being “just passive receivers of moods that 
are foisted upon us,” and he writes that “to tune in to the mood of the 
crowd is not necessarily to acquiesce to its dictates.” (Coyne, 2016: 3, 54) 
Sara Ahmed questions the concept of affective contagion, arguing that it 
“tends to underestimate the extent to which affects are contingent”; she 
also argues that an affective atmosphere is not merely “out there,” not 
already in a crowded room when we enter it, but also the consequence 
of “the angle of our arrival.” (Ahmed, 2010: 36, 37)6 We each experience 
atmosphere differently, read it differently because of our own subjective 
moods and our own existing orientations. To understand mood, emo-
tion, and affect in relation to social media means to think in terms of 
atmospheres and to include not only the observably present but also 
“the suffusion of the ordinary with fantasy,” linking material experience 
with things that are more ephemeral, from the temperature in a room 
to hopes and fears, values and imaginings (Ahmed, 2010: 30; Berlant, 
2011: 14, 15). Against a behaviorist and instrumental approach to emo-
tions, we might address mood and emotional expression in social media 
photography as extending beyond individual images and platforms, 
rather than properties belonging to them.
Close
The photograph depicts a girl from the waist up. She holds a black cat 
in her arms and gazes down at it. The cat stares straight into the camera. 
The girl casts a faint shadow on the wall to her right; on the left, the wall 
is brighter, as if a light is aimed directly at it. The cat’s body is awkwardly 
arranged, she cradles him like a baby, but one leg sticks up and his tail 
points down at a sharp angle. The photograph appears to be a family 
snapshot, except that the photographer has engaged the eyes of the cat 
rather than the girl and has placed her against a plain green background. 
Still, the overly pink skin tone, the dull lighting, and a blown-out high-
light on the wall to the right suggest this is not a professional portrait. 
There is something sentimental about the picture, as the girl smiles fondly 
at the cat. This sentimentality seems contradicted by the cat’s gaze, which 
is ironic and challenging, as if he is aware of the indignity of his position. 
It also seems to be contradicted by the girl’s jacket, which is covered in 
metal studs.
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Writing against the view (held by some in the digital humanities) that 
only big data sets can yield reliable results, Barbara Herrnstein-Smith 
has emphasized the value of the practice of close reading, “the abili-
ty and disposition to read texts attentively, one by one,” in an era of 
corporate, computational communication, in which “texts of all kinds 
are turned to manipulative ends with digitally multiplied effectiveness.” 
(Smith, 2016: 69) Yet there is also a case to be made that, taken one by 
one, contemporary visual images are less “manipulative,” or less sophis-
ticated in their manipulations than they once were, and that contempo-
rary visual culture does not lend itself to close reading.
Take, for example, advertising imagery. As Zuboff recounts, the 
markets in behavioral data grew from attempts to secure advertising 
revenue to fund digital media after the dot-com bubble of the 1990s. 
Around 2006, Google started to use behavioral data, previously regard-
ed as useful information for improving services, as a means to match 
ads to users. This transformed not only the internet but also advertising, 
which became more heavily invested in behaviorism. Previously, the 
advertising industry had been interested in the workings of the human 
mind, understanding advertising as the “art of persuasion” and setting 
out “to stir the stream of consciousness.” (Gill, 1954: 11) Advertising 
photography used an array of techniques to appeal to conscious and 
unconscious desires, directly addressing the inner lives of individuals 
in order to encourage them to consume. This approach to advertising 
seems to have peaked in the 1990s, and it virtually disappeared around 
the time that online marketing techniques pioneered by Google took 
off (Schwartzkopf, 2009). Meanwhile, in academic contexts, studies of 
advertising are largely superseded by studies of brands and marketing 
and public relations.
In its heyday, advertising emphasized creativity as a means to attract 
buyer attention and appeal to desire—the latter often understood in 
psycho analytic terms. This provided rich pickings for the cultural theo-
rist, who could have fun bringing to light the Freudian content of elab-
orate photographic campaigns. My own early lectures used examples 
of cigarette campaigns (Benson and Hedges, Marlboro, and Silk Cut), 
showing how they channeled the physical desire for a cigarette and the 
anxiety about health into sexual desire and the desire to take risks, to live 
on the edge. While the ostensible purpose was to critique and defuse 
manipulative imagery, the irony was not lost on us: we were training 
people not just to analyze ads but to potentially produce them. Even 
so, it would hardly be surprising if photography theorists were nostal-
gic for a time when close reading of highly constructed and elaborate 
images yielded such fruits. These are rare and exotic peacocks in a public 
domain now dominated by apparently throwaway and careless amateur 
imagery and bland stock photography. In this context, the uses of images, 
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and the data they generate, seem to have become richer and more com-
plex than their symbolic content.
However, the risk is that, without close reading, a culture cannot be 
understood. Without close reading, pictures such as the one described 
above can be reduced to mere expressions of emotion. In emotional 
computing, it seems that the belief that the arts are “emotional” gives 
rise to the false assumption that images directly express the feeling of 
the person who made or displayed the image (and therefore that feelings 
might be diagnosed from images).7 Writers in the fields of emotional 
and affective computing seem to oppose emotion to reason or cogni-
tion, and they associate images with emotional “contagion,” despite 
the fact that this is a contested and specifically expressionist aesthetics. 
Twentieth-century writers on art and aesthetics challenged this theory: 
both Ernst Gombrich and Nelson Goodman pointed out that it is based 
on the notion of a natural correspondence between colors and forms 
and emotional response that disregards the role of cognition and culture. 
Gombrich drew on early cybernetic theory to describe structural differ-
ences (gamuts, modalities, and scales) in the meanings we attribute to 
affects (Gombrich, 1963: 69). Goodman suggested that “in aesthetic ex-
perience the emotions function cognitively,” that what we call “expres-
sion” is an indirect and metaphorical process, so when we say a picture 
“expresses” sadness, what we mean is not that the picture is sad, but that 
it “metaphorically exemplifies” sadness (Goodman, 1976).8 Metaphors, 
however, do not lend themselves to sentiment analysis and mood track-
ing, because they are not observable as behaviors and, because, by defi-
nition, they are indirect and not literal.9
Can a sentimental picture be simultaneously ironic? Following 
Goodman, to depict a fond girl is not necessarily to express fondness, 
nor does a picture express irony because I find it ironic, any more than 
it expresses irritation because it irritates me. Pictures are cultural arti-
facts, and even photographs require cultural knowledge (here, of genres 
of sentimental imagery, family snaps, and online cat photography) to 
under stand what work they may do in the world. As with the atmos-
phere in a room, we can read the mood of a picture differently, approach-
ing it from our own angles and subjective moods. But a close reading 
helps to reveal how the picture participates in a larger culture without 
necessarily being the result of a coherent set of intentions.
Thick
You are going to a party wearing a jacket that you have had since you were 
little. Now, it fits very tightly, but it still looks great. I want a photograph 
of you in it. You pick up the cat, who is a regular photographic accessory. 
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But it’s not such a good photograph—you are too self-conscious, and the 
lighting is bad. The cat, who always rises to the occasion, turns his yellow 
eyes toward me in a glare. I want to put it on Instagram. I ask your per-
mission. Where does this desire come from? I barely know, except I have 
a sense that if I don’t put it on Instagram, I may as well not take it. I don’t 
need connection. I need approval. Even while I don’t approve. Your skin 
is too pink, the wall is not green enough, the pose is wrong, the cat—well, 
the cat is great, but there is a lot of cat competition out there. I post it 
on Instagram, and I write underneath “That cat! That jacket!” A friend 
replies “That girl!” I had given her the cue. Did I post it to feel clever?
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz famously placed the practice of 
“thick description” at the heart of the interpretation of culture (Geertz, 
1973).10 Thick description addresses what people are up to, and even 
where it is not penned by participants, it draws on their own understand-
ing of what is happening. By contrast, “thin description” describes only 
what a person is observably doing, without reference to what they or 
their coparticipants understand themselves to be doing (the data trails 
“mined” by the phone and by Instagram might be understood as thin 
description, for this reason). The job of the ethnographer is to tease 
out “a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures,” to situate the thin 
bones of what is happening (“a woman photographs her daughter and 
a cat and posts the photograph on Instagram, checking the responses 
it receives”) within the interpretative frames and practices of the wider 
culture (Geertz, 1973: 7). The ethnographer makes skilled but “second 
and third order” interpretations (15). The subject’s intentions matter 
(they are a knowing participant in the culture), but they are insufficient. 
What makes my activity meaningful, according to Geertz, is neither 
my conscious intentions nor unconscious motives, but the fact that it 
is a material and “ideational” activity drawing on skills, gestures, ma-
terials, and habits that are “socially established” and “publicly shared.” 
(10, 11) More recent commentators, drawing on feminist materialist 
traditions, might add that what these mutually entangled technologies 
and bodies are up to is materially as well as symbolically transformative 
(Coleman, 2014).
If close reading flourishes where images are semiotically rich, “thick 
description” appears to be most effective where cultural practices are 
sufficiently “deep,” the term Geertz uses to describe the kind of play 
involved in the Balinese cockfight. Geertz points out that not all cock-
fights involve “deep play.” Rather, deep play is connected with the high 
stakes of the fight, meaning both the gambling stakes and the cultural 
significance that accompanies it—“the migration of the Balinese status 
hierarchy into the body of the cockfight.” (Geertz, 1973) If we ignore the 
data dredging it fuels, my Instagram use would seem to be low stakes and 
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shallow. It is a form of sociable play, but neither the affective engagement 
nor the symbolism run deep: though I am participating in cultural prac-
tices linked to social status (such as taking and displaying photographs 
of my children), I would be pushing it to claim (as Geertz does of the 
Balinese cockfight) that it draws on every level of my cultural experience. 
Even to narrate the event of my taking a photograph seems to overstate 
its significance. While the cockfight, according to Geertz, is a “blood 
sacrifice” in which Balinese masculinity is deeply invested, which ren-
ders intelligible and felt “their involvement with rage and the fear of 
rage,” my participation in Instagram is driven by more low-level, albeit 
persistent passions (confusion, self-doubt, a vague desire for approval).
Writing about feelings of being disconcerted or unfocused, Sianne 
Ngai asks, “isn’t this feeling of confusion about what one is feeling an 
affective state in its own right?” (Ngai, 2005: 14) My self-questioning 
in the passage above, my own uncertainty about my motivations for 
posting the image, should not be taken at face value. The fact that I do 
not know exactly what I am feeling, nor what I am expressing via the 
photograph, is also a kind of affect. Ngai links this to a sense of “loss 
of control”—I have an unsettling sense that I am being programmed 
by the camera phone or the platform. As Vilém Flusser puts it, I feel 
myself to have become a “functionary” of the photographic apparatus 
(which here includes Instagram, the camera, and photographic rituals) 
(Flusser, 2000: 24–25). At the same time, as Ngai observes, such a feeling 
also “often heralds the basic affect of ‘interest’ underwriting all acts of 
intellectual inquiry.” (Ngai, 2005: 14) At the point that I sense that I do 
not know what I am feeling, emotion and cognition intertwine; I note 
the attempt to orchestrate my mood, and I begin the questioning that 
underpins this chapter. I wonder about the diverse practices of social 
media photography, their relation to automated “data dredging” and 
“mood capture,” and my relationship with the algorithms that “feed” me 
social media images.
It is clear that I am participating in a set of cultural practices, and this 
set has its own distinct varieties of affect. The fact that my engagement is 
being provoked, prodded, and encouraged by an adaptable and respon-
sive technology suggests that we need to understand this technology and 
its infrastructures as participating in this culture, rather than just medi-
ating it. This cultural participant is in some ways remarkably able and in 
some ways remarkably poor at “reading” my moves. It recognizes and 
produces bodily practices (mediated as data) (Clough et al., 2015: 154). 
It sorts huge and “seemingly unrelated” sets of data to produce “novel 
relations.” (157) It is a powerful agent in the flow of everyday living—in-
culcating new habits and gestures, appealing to inchoate desires, mark-
ing and molding the experience of time, performing mood work almost 
continuously. It “sees” the images in play but only as triggers or stimuli. 
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It can quantify the “grip” an image has on me and give me more of that, 
yet it knows nothing of how the image matters to me, where “matters” 
refers both to signification (what the image means to me) and to affect.11
José Van Dijck describes social media algorithms as “inscriptions of 
sociality”: each algorithm is different, because “a Like is not a Retweet” 
yet they share the same “social norms and cultural logic.” (Van Dijck, 
2013: 157–158) They are ideal service economy workers, hooking socia-
bility directly to sales. They are devoted to the goals that Van Dijck 
identifies as common to most platforms: “popularity, hierarchical rank-
ing, neutrality, quick growth, large-traffic volumes and fast-turnover.” 
(158) These algorithms are facilitators, whose values I mostly choose 
to overlook or to manipulate for my own ends (for example, by trying 
to promote an event, a friend, or myself) until such moments that they, 
too, openly reveal themselves in all their crassness. Once, for example, a 
personal Apple iMessage that I wrote about David Bowie’s death turned 
his name into a hyperlink to albums for sale, as if the recipient might take 
that sad opportunity to do a spot of online shopping. One of the strange 
things about Instagram, since its takeover by Facebook, is the way it 
punctures its own illusion. Before—when the feed was in chronological 
order rather than organized according to what the algorithm calculates 
I want to see—I had a sense of flow, of being in a space and in a moment. 
Now, images are out of sequence. Old news and ads also break my sense 
of being “among friends.”
In conclusion, to understand practices of social media photography, 
it may be helpful to abandon oppositions between passive subjects and 
lively algorithms, or between feeling individuals and rational machines, 
and to question assumptions that abundance is threatening or that a 
lightness of interest is morally or politically suspect. Our engagements 
with contemporary mass photography may be fodder for markets in 
behavior predictions, but they exceed what can be captured as behav-
ior and need to be understood, as Frosh has suggested, in terms of the 
ways we live with and alongside media, and as aesthetic practices, that 
mobilize affects into emotion-as-cognition (not just “emoting” and 
“expressing”) (Frosh, 2019: 5). The sentiments and moods conjured via 
social media are the sudden gusts and passing storms that drive per-
formances of sociability.12 In turn, these performances are cultural 
practices, and culture does not merely express emotions or feelings but 
structures, translates, encodes, and transforms them.
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Notes
1. My approach may be linked to my Englishness: Daniel 
Miller writes that, for his English participants, “social 
media was always going to be as important for keeping 
people at a distance as it was for coming closer to 
them,” aiding English people in keeping relationships 
not “too hot” and not “too cold”—something he calls 
“the Goldilocks strategy.” (Miller, 2016: 99–100)
2. As well as the examples discussed by Huyssen, see, for 
example, Malraux, 1951 and the discussion of Malraux 
in Didi-Huberman, 2013.
3. Instagram in particular is associated with a certain 
kind of positive and light affect (in contrast to Twitter 
and Facebook), rooted in the notion that good feelings 
produce high returns. On how this plays out for certain 
Instagram users, see Miller, 2016: 85.
4. Leys rejects both affect theory and behaviorism in 
favor of a theory of emotion that centers around inten-
tion or volition and allows for “a degree of complexity 
and uncertainty.” (Leys, 2010: 89) For Leys’s critique 
of affect theory, see Leys, 2017.
5. Similarly, Jonathan Flatley discusses mood as “fun-
damentally historical and social,” arguing against the 
assumption (by critics of the so-called “affective turn”) 
that affect is to do with individual identity and subjec-
tive experience (Flatley, 2017: 140).
6. Sianne Ngai points to the role gender plays in ideas 
about contagious and transmittable emotions, through 
the linking of femininity with imitation (Ngai, 
2005: 149–151).
7. This simplistic assumption also seems to be shared by 
Jurgenson, who sees social photos as unproblematical-
ly expressive at the same time as he compares them to 
emojis, icons, and comics, all highly coded means of 
communication (Jurgenson, 2019).
8. To demonstrate that social photos are expressive of 
feelings, Jurgenson gives the example of a palm tree 
as something “which can convey that the weather is 
warm, or that you are on vacation, or that you are 
having a relaxing time, or whatever a palm tree conveys 
to you and the people you expect to see the image,” an 
explanation that inadvertently exemplifies the difficul-
ties in isolating the expressive content in photographs 
(Jurgenson, 2019: 18–19).
9. Correlating images to emotions except via words 
seems particularly difficult (Poria et al., 2018).
10. Geertz, who took the term “thick description” from 
Gilbert Ryle, is clear: his concept of culture is “es-
sentially a semiotic one,” since he believes “that man 
is an animal suspended in webs of significance that 
he himself has spun”—the task of studying culture is 
“an interpretative one in search of meaning.” (Geertz, 
1973: 5–6)
11. See Karen Barad on “mattering.” (Barad, 2012: 69) 
The “grip” of images on bodies is discussed in Cole-
man, 2014: 35–37.
12. Stark writes that the ideal subject of sentiment 
analysis will be “fluent in the emotional expressions, 
behaviors and gestures aligned with a platform’s mod-
els—conforming to classificatory schemes.” (Stark, 
2018: 214)
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13. “The Compass of Repair”:  
An Interview with Ariella Aïsha Azoulay
Jacob W. Lewis & Kyle Parry
Jacob W. LeWis & KyLe Parry: When we were first thinking of keynote 
speakers for our symposium at the University of Rochester, we thought 
about work that directly addressed questions of photographic ubiquity, 
and what we then knew of your work—photography as a citizenry 
beyond the limits of the nation-state—was by far the most significant 
and suggestive in this respect.1 Of course, by the time we reached out to 
you, you had dramatically shifted scales, from photography as an event 
to photography as a global imperial technology. Your premise of refusal, 
this idea that the beginnings of photography lie in 1492, struck us as 
yet another instance of a stirring and indeed demanding recasting of 
photography in your work—a forceful coordinate shift with enormous 
implications. We thought we would start with the question we posed 
back in Rochester in 2018. Are these coordinate shifts of a piece with 
each other, or are there certain respects in which the ever-expanding 
operations of the imperial shutter force us to rethink the notion of a 
citizenry of photography?
arieLLa aïsha azouLay: Thank you for your careful reading of the 
book and for inviting me to reflect on my engagement with photography 
in the last decade and a half. Did I “dramatically shift scales?” This is a 
challenging question. There is a shift in scale between The Civil Contract 
of Photography (Azoulay, 2008) and Potential History (Azoulay, 2019), 
but it happened through a consecutive series of shifts that were actually 
moments of unlearning. When I wrote The Civil Contract of Photography, 
I could not tell that it was imperialism that I was unlearning, but in 
retro spect, this is actually what I did. Civil Contract was an account 
of a process of unlearning a few imperial sovereign formations—the 
nation-state as a fait accompli (Israel), sovereign citizenship (inherent 
to the differential body politic, of which the persona of the modern 
citizen is part), and photography as a device-based technology with its 
own strata of experts (acting at the expense of other participants, who, 
though visible in the images, are often treated as if they are not party 
to the event of photography). In Civil Contract, I turned these sover-
eign formations into contingent ones, rejecting them as transcendental 
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forms of being together in an attempt to engage with political forma-
tions in which unrecognized actors (i.e., the noncitizen in politics and 
the photographed person in photography) participate. Accounting for 
such shadow formations was practicing potential history avant la lettre. 
I related to this potential history of photography and citizenship as a 
historical fiction. From this, I wrote it in situations that did or could 
take place, since I wanted this fiction of a civil contract between the 
participants in/of photography to be read by others as real and worldly. 
My assumption was simple: photography was institutionalized as a pro-
ductive practice, whose products can be appropriated by sovereign sub-
jects and institutions (state archives are emblematic) through violence. 
This violence resembles the violence used to institutionalize the body 
politic as if it consists only of sovereign citizens and not of the rest of 
the governed. Both formations are premised on the negation of the par-
ticipation of those at the expense of whom such sovereign positions are 
formed. Through the process of unlearning what was institutionalized 
in the discourse of experts, and instead interacting with those whose 
worlds and lives were rendered extractable, exploitable, and disposable 
through them, the centrality of the photograph (as private property) to 
photography seemed in correlation with and serviceable for/benefiting 
the differential political regimes that invented citizenship as an asset 
given to some and denied to others.
The fabulation of a Civil Contract was written based on several 
examples, yet it still felt somehow speculative. That is, until I 
created the two photographic archives for exhibition—Act of 
State: A Photographed History of the Occupation 1967–2007, and From 
Palestine to Israel: A Photographic Record of Destruction and State 
Formation, 1947–1950 (Azoulay, 2011).2 Through the imaginative space 
created through these archives committed to the presence of those dis-
regarded by formations of sovereignty, the active participation of the 
photographed persons no longer required any speculation. Photography 
was never actually only what photographers produce; rather, it is an 
arena wherein many participate even as these participants are exposed 
to or targeted by violence. This is, in a nutshell, the political ontology 
of photography. The latter archive (From Palestine to Israel) was com-
posed of photographs in which one could see the simultaneity of the 
destruction of Palestine and at once the establishment of the state of 
Israel. Rather than two consecutive narratives, that archive is already 
committed to a potential history of Palestine.
The ontological account of the event of photography that I offered 
in a more systematic way in the Civil Imagination: A Political Ontology 
of Photography (Azoulay, 2012) rejected the institutionalized tempo-
rality of photography that associated the photograph with what had 
happened—a temporality that was constructed by and that served 
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the formation of imperial sovereignty. The political ontology that I 
drafted went against what I learned from white male theoreticians of 
photography, many of whom inadvertently acted as spokespersons 
for im perial temporality and taught us that what was taken (in the 
photograph) was seized in it forever. The political ontology of photo-
graphy rejected the centrality of the photograph and its conflation with 
photography. Different languages reflect this conflation and lure us to 
relate to photography as a productive practice—“a photographer took 
a photograph”—in a way that identifies the photographer’s work and 
the outcome of an encounter with the photograph. This is as if the 
photographer’s work was not dependent on and made possible by 
others, whose photographs are being taken. Already in Civil Contract, 
I argued against the ubiquity of this capitalist assumption that assigns 
ownership and authorship over wealth extracted from a situation of 
encounter to those who hold the means of production or circulation. 
The aim was to undermine the norm that equated the person who 
holds or owns the means of production (the camera) with the right to 
own the photograph.
What I didn’t understand before working on Potential History is that, 
as radical as my account of photography was, as long as I continued to 
relate to photography as a sui generis practice, I was actually trapped in 
the imperial temporality of the new (a singular moment of beginning) 
that inaugurates separate histories of things that are actually entangled. 
This is a common trap in the conception of imperial technologies as 
device-based. With Potential History, the understanding that photo-
graphy should be accounted for in continuity with and in connection 
to other imperial technologies became explicit. While in Civil Contract, 
I unsettled the imperial temporality of the photograph (what already 
happened) with the temporality of the event, in Potential History, I ex-
panded this intervention by conceiving the shutter as an onto-epistemo-
logical mechanism. The shutter, I argue in this book, was not invented 
with the camera but rather with earlier imperial technologies that are 
not device-based and whose operation is ubiquitous. These imperial 
techno logies are programmed to destroy existing worlds and organize 
them anew around a set of racial capitalist principles. Photography, as I 
show in Potential History, is not about the imperial world but rather part 
of it. For that, we have to refuse to study photographs independently of 
the event of photography.
It seems to me that, throughout my work, I sought ways to question 
the common understanding of photography as a productive practice that 
produces photographs, to reject the status of this product as a private 
property, and to refuse to ignore the conditions under which photo-
graphy was made ubiquitous. Suggesting that photography is an event 
that takes place among different people, I asked what is the condition 
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under which it operates, what is taken and from whom when a photo-
graph is being taken. Furthermore, I asked what happens when a camera 
operates and there are no (accessible) photographs, especially for the 
people from or of whom they were taken, who were never meant to 
receive anything in return.
JWL & KP: Among the most bracing and thought-provoking aspects 
of your recent work is your contention that it isn’t so much something 
seemingly innocent, like the camera or the photograph that has come 
to pervade this planet, but destruction. At the same time, in your book 
and in your recent open letters, you consistently refer to pernicious con-
structions that manage to achieve widespread presence and obviousness, 
whether this is what you call the “fabricated phenomenal field” of im-
perial violence or the untroubled notion of the “Judeo-Christian” you 
address in the open letter to Sylvia Wynter (Azoulay, “Open Letter,” 
2020). How do we best think through the interrelations and intercon-
nections of pervasive imperial destruction and mass-distributed im-
perial constructions, and how does the omnipresence of photography 
figure in these operations? Does potential history seek to redistribute 
alternative constructions at a world scale, or does it refuse projects of 
ubiquity altogether?
aaa: Potential History is also a manifesto against history. The past, I 
argue in the book, is an imperial invention that provides impunity to the 
different operators of the different imperial violent technologies that 
destroy the world. Photography, like archives and museums (that I also 
study as technologies), render the past palpable, in a way that scholars 
and laypersons alike are trained to recognize “it” as if it truly exists, and 
to recognize in it the time before “we were as we are, modern.” In addi-
tion, scholars and other experts are trained to recognize each of these 
technologies as having its own history, and, thus, you can see scholars 
motivated by a revisionist impulse setting off inadvertently to write the 
history of photography in different “forgotten” or “less-central” places, 
proving that different people, whose worlds were destroyed and their 
wealth was plundered, were also modern and progressive, meaning that 
they embraced modern technologies as early as their colonizers. It’s true 
that once different places were exposed to military violence and photo-
graphy could impose itself, local people also used the technology with 
inventiveness, creativity, or playfulness, though often in substantially 
smaller proportions to the imperial enterprise of producing of them 
orientalist or stereotypical images. What is often forgotten in these nar-
ratives is that it was not the dissemination of a device, invented in 1839, 
but the intrusion of a technology that normalizes the violent outcome 
of military invasions and colonization. Anticolonial resistance had to be 
violently repressed so that military forces and operations would be able 
to “open up” places for the penetration of “modernity” (i.e., destruction) 
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and these crimes relegated to the past so that history of photography 
could be written independently of them. As part of this process, 
different kinds of experts (photographers among them) installed their 
firms (studios, in photography’s case) to extract local wealth and engage 
part of the local population in their activity. For the past to exist as a 
separate tense everywhere, and for modernity to be “its” future, and for 
the transition from the one to the other to be experienced as unavoidable 
and organic—many different temporal formations and diverse worlds in 
which they made sense had to be destroyed. The challenge of Potential 
History is how not to lose sight of this ubiquitous destruction and, at the 
same time, how to reconfigure the ontology of photography in a way that 
allows us to continue both to engage with it in order not to forget this 
mass destruction, and to transform it into the compass of repair.
JWL & KP: For the book, we approach the notion of photographic 
ubiquity not as a given but as a kind of orthodoxy from the technical 
beginnings of what you identify as device-based photography in 1839, 
through the era of Kodak to the age of the internet; that is, an idea with 
a history. This is akin to a term you deploy in your own work, omnipres-
ence, as appearing everywhere, either in actuality or virtually so. In your 
approach to photography using political ontology, where does the no-
tion of photography’s universal presence belong? Would you say that the 
camera’s ubiquity functions as a necessary condition for many of your 
interventions, or are there other ways to think through the problem of 
photography’s seeming everywhereness? As an example, in researching 
the history of the term “ubiquity,” we came across something we hadn’t 
expected: the term “ubiquity” once named a quality of the sovereign. 
On the one hand, the sovereign monarch can possess a kind of fictive 
ubiquity, as though they were “in a manner everywhere” (1708), present 
and effective in all courts of justice even when not physically present. On 
the other hand, as an 1841 Supreme Court decision puts it, the United 
States has “no particular place” but instead can be seen to possess “an 
ubiquity throughout the Union.” (“Ubiquity,” 2021) It seemed to us that 
these now historical uses of ubiquity very much speak to your notion 
of imperial rights and that they also speak to forces at odds with what 
you call “worldly sovereignty.” We found ourselves wondering what 
you might make of this notion of presence and power unbound, both in 
connection to photography and beyond. Is it possible, for instance, for 
freedom to be “in a manner everywhere”?
aaa: There is something troubling about this kind of common 
chrono logy of photography as a realm apart—as if there are given points 
on the timeline—the invention of the device, the Kodak, digital, etc.—
and scholars are expected to turn the transition between them into a 
smooth one. The organized crime of plundering the visual wealth of 
non-white and non-Christian cultures was already in motion when the 
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French announced the birth of photography in 1839. The Napoleonic 
invasion of Egypt at the turn of the 19th century, as well as the colo-
nization of Algeria in 1830, consisted of the destruction of existing 
forms of sharing the world and their forced replacement with an infra-
structure of extraction that facilitated the implementation of a regime 
of plunder that targeted natural and cultural treasures and with the 
help of battalions of French draftsmen, engineers, linguists, and other 
experts produced a visual wealth based on local resources and labor. 
Photography was praised and advocated in the French Academy of 
Science as an instrument that could improve and extend this robbery 
(Arago, in Siegel, 2017: 235; Azoulay, 2019, 2–5). What was achieved—
with much violence—through previous expeditions is that everything 
of the invaded cultures could be taken and taken in a photograph, and 
the imperial ontology of photographs indoctrinated people with the 
idea that photographs carry an innate archival value that records and 
testifies to a past; this is the demiurgic power of an imperial shutter to 
relegate the now into a past. So while it is true that from 1839 on, the 
propagation of photographic devices had increased constantly (as it is 
often reflected in this kind of timeline that consists of such different 
milestones in the development of the device and its features), we have to 
put at the center the fact that this ubiquity of the device is the outcome of 
a campaign of destruction in which racial capitalism has invested since 
its inception and of a violent proclamation that all local and previous tax-
onomies, prohibitions, and rights are obsolete. Potential History rejects 
this normative dissociation of photography from its entanglement with 
other imperial and racial capitalist technologies and its fabrication as a 
sui generis idea and practice.
JWL & KP: The imagined origins of photography in 1492 is one of the 
more provocative claims that presents a demonstration of the practice 
of unlearning imperialism. Relatedly, we’re struck by the centrality of 
the camera shutter as a tool of imperial violence that pierces space, time, 
and the body politic; it is “a synecdoche for the operation of the imperial 
enterprise altogether, on which the invention of photography, as well as 
other technological media, was modeled.” (Azoulay, 2019: 2) Your de-
mand becomes all the more apparent toward the end of the book, where 
you write “To call for reparations is to hold the shutters open.” (580) 
We’re struck by how anachronism is central to these claims, and how 
these claims might provoke the ire of conventional historians who posit 
that the world’s first cameras were introduced to the public in 1839, and 
who might counter that, for the first forty years of camera technology, 
photographers commonly operated cameras without shutters. How do 
you see anachronism figuring into the project of potentializing photo-
graphy’s history, challenging the persistence of revisionist histories that 
don’t go far enough?
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aaa: That in the first decades since their invention, cameras oper-
ated without the mechanical device of the shutter, doesn’t mean that 
cameras were not premised on the operation of what I describe in the 
book as the imperial shutter. As I have explained in my previous reply, 
Potential History is also a kind of manifesto against the discipline of his-
tory, whose raison d’être is the existence of a past of which historians 
become experts. Becoming experts of “the past” means operating in a 
different time frame than that in which those studied by the historians 
exist and act. Hence, historians can write about imperial violence with-
out being motivated by or committed to join those about whom they 
write in opposing the normalization of its consequences and in calling 
for the repair of the wounds that it creates. Potential History is invested in 
studying the roots of violence in order to join the many struggles against 
its naturalization, based on the assumption that none of these struggles 
is over. Here is an example of a deliberate “anachronistic” gesture: a re-
fusal to study photographs of the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 as if 
what I’m looking at happened in the past; a refusal to inhabit the position 
of the historian authorized to study a person who is being expelled from 
his homeland as if he is a subject of research rather than a political actor; 
a refusal to participate in relegating his struggle to the past, as if the 
declaration of the state of Israel turned this struggle against its creation 
irrelevant. (fig. 13.1) This also means that all photographs taken in the 
settler colonial state that was imposed on Palestine should be read in 
continuity with this photograph, in the span of seventy-something years 
during which he struggled not to be expelled from Palestine.
Figure 13.1
Unshowable photograph: 
a Palestinian refusing 
to be expelled. “He is 
neither a prisoner of war 
nor a refugee as he is 
depicted in the archive 
but was my companion 
in writing Potential 
History” (AAA).
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JWL & KP: You have a vivid sense of what form a general strike in photo-
graphy might take, particularly with regard to photojournalism. You 
also demonstrate certain kinds of tactics of refusal throughout Potential 
History, both in your writing and in your use of illustrations, many of 
which are drawn from photographs rather than standard re productions 
of photographs that come with image rights. Recently, you’ve written 
about Tamara Lanier’s legal challenge against the Peabody Museum, 
which holds in its possession a 170-year-old daguerreotype depicting 
Lanier’s enslaved ancestor Renty Taylor (Azoulay, “Free Renty,” 2020). 
This person was photographed against his will by J. T. Zealy and under 
the direction of Harvard professor Louis Agassiz, a scientist seeking to 
visually demonstrate his belief in white supremacy. In this sense, his-
torical photographs have a major role to play in defining and redefin-
ing reparations. How might those who study photography and related 
visual cultures contribute to a general strike and take part in establish-
ing anti-imperial conditions for photography? We’re wondering, for 
instance, whether the enactment of a strike might look very differ-
ent for scholars who use historical photographs and archives, and for 
those who write on (and might themselves work in) social media and 
internet culture, particularly in an era of widespread surveillance and 
public protest.
aaa: Every strike is somehow different, and I would especially refrain 
from reifying such differences along the lines of the differences between 
historical or current images. The question is how to depart from the 
imperial organization of knowledge that anchors our activities on the 
specificity of genres or media and rather anchor them in principles of 
overdue justice, and cultivate a commitment 
to undoing imperial and racial regimes of vio-
lence while replacing the principles on which 
different technologies operate. The example 
of Tamara Lanier’s lawsuit is extremely rele-
vant here. (fig. 13.2) Allegedly, it is about a his-
torical image taken during the time of slavery. 
As is well known and as Lanier’s lawsuit em-
phasizes explicitly, slavery’s institutions were 
never abolished. The proof is in how Harvard 
University and the Peabody Museum continue 
to hold an image that was seized from Taylor, 
and in the arguments that they provide to jus-
tify why they should continue to hold it, argu-
ments that, for many ears, sound convincing. 
This is the direct effect of the policing logic of 
tools such as “anachronism” that seek to intro-
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media specificity, or geographies, and in so doing prevent us from 
maintaining our commitment in its right place where repair, redress, 
and abolition of structures that obfuscate emerge as urgent and nec-
essary. However, what is at stake with this lawsuit, beyond the explicit 
desired outcome—restitution—could have far more substantial impli-
cations on the existing infrastructures that enabled the accumulation 
of visual wealth and its use against people from whom it was expropri-
ated. Hypothetically, if Lanier wins, it means not only the restitution of 
the object to Taylor’s descendants but also its expropriation from the 
institution in which slavery still survives, alongside the refusal of insti-
tutional authority and standing to continue to possess what they seized 
through the institutionalized violence of private property. Strike MoMA 
is one of the important movements that strikes against the entanglement 
of art institutions with military and carceral technologies, and broadly 
speaking, with the genocidal campaigns of violence in different places in 
the world. This movement holds the space for “interconnected struggles” 
to come together and to understand that, from Puerto Rico to Palestine, 
this is a shared struggle that goes through institutions that were cre-
ated to protect private property over people and to do so in the name 
of the public. I contributed two video lectures to the activity of Strike 
MoMA. The first, in collaboration with the artist AGF aka poemproducer, 
is titled “Modernity is an Imperial Crime.” (fig. 13.3) The second, with 
Jina Alhenawi, is titled “Abolish MoMA: The Case of Palestine.” It targets 
the role of art in the ethnic cleansing of Palestine. Both are available on 
the Strike MoMA website (weeks 3 and 10).3
Figure 13.3
Ariella Aïsha Azoulay, 
“Modernity is an  
Imperial Crime” (still), 
Strike MoMA, 2021, 
https://www.strikemoma.
org/week-3 
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Notes
1. Ariella Aïsha Azoulay, “Imperial Rights and the 
Origins of Photography,” keynote lecture for Ubiquity: 
Photography’s Multitudes, a two-day symposium at 
the Humanities Center, University of Rochester (April 
26, 2018).
2. See the exhibitions Act of State: 1967–2007 (Minshar 
Gallery, Tel Aviv, 2007; Internazionale, Ferrara, 2008; 
Constitution Hill, Johannesburg, 2009; Centre de la 
Photographie, Geneva, 2010; La Vareina, Barcelona, 
2010; Mediations Biennale, Poznan, 2010; Foam, 
Amsterdam, 2010) and From Palestine to Israel: 
A Photo graphic Record of Destruction and State For-
mation, 1947–1950 (The Mosaic Rooms, A.M. Qattan 
Foundation, London, 2011). The Act of State archive is 
now held in the Centre Pompidou, Paris.
3. See “Modernity is an Imperial Crime,” http://www.
strikemoma.org/week-3, and “Abolish MoMA:  
The Case of Palestine,” http://www.strikemoma.org/
week-10.
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